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
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

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BENGAL

PAST & PRESENT



JOURNAL OF THE CALCUTTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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A Century of Historic Prints.

DR. JADUNATH SARKAR'S ADDRESS AT RAJ BHAVAN EXHIBITION

"IN the last century a cynic predicted that when the English would retire from India the only memorials of their empire left behind would be heaps of empty beer bottles round their deserted military cantonments and the canals they have dug," said Dr. Jadunath Sarkar opening an Art Exhibition of Historic Prints at the Raj Bhavan on Monday, the 29th March, 1954. Dr. Sarkar continued: This epigram was meant to point the contrast between the poor artistic results of British rule in India and the splendid buildings, aqueducts and viaducts built by the Romans in their provinces, and the unforgettable palaces, tombs and mosques erected by the Muslim rulers of India. But in one respect at least this modern critic has missed the truth. British rule in India did inspire pictorial art of a very high order, and the first full century of their domination, from 1757 to 1857 has preserved on canvas and paper many scenes and landscapes of India which have now mostly vanished and whose very existence would have remained unknown to the moderns but for these British artists. Who can visit Dacca today and imagine what the architectural glories of that provincial capital of Mughal days were, unless he looks at Sir Charles D'Oyly's *Antiquities of Dacca*? So, too, many a charming scene of Upper India and Rajputana, as they once were, can be visualised only through the pictures of Daniell and Grindlay. Today their beauty has been totally blacked out by neglect, earthquakes, dusty railways, smoking factories and the reckless cutting down of trees. Let us be thankful to the early British artists who preserved their beauty in its virgin purity. In another way J. Fraser's *Views of the Himalaya Mountains* (20 fine coloured plates, 1829) takes us back to a lost world.

British artists found a new source of inspiration in the achievements by which British paramountcy and British peace were established all over the Indian continent. It has been well said by one historian that Warren Hastings by his deep policy and Wellesley by his masterly combination of war and diplomacy created a new empire in the east to replace the older British empire in the West which was lost in the War of American Independence.

If the subject was attractive, the reward was even more so. Many of these British artists were lured to India by the patronage of high British officials and rich native princes like the Nawabs of Oudh. Thomas Daniell's earnings in ten years in India made him independent for the rest of his life after his return home (born 1749, in India 1784-94, d. 1840). Zoffany (1733-1810) was starving in London when he decided to migrate to India. The rich patronage of the Court of Lucknow enabled him to live in comfort in Calcutta till his death. William Hodges (1741-1797) is profuse in his gratitude to Warren Hastings who brought him out to India and supported him for six years, and thus

"made him." Robert Home accompanied Lord Cornwallis in the war with Tipu, and drew his *Select Views of Mysore*, besides portraits of celebrities in Calcutta at a later period. James Wales (1747-1795) worked in great poverty in old Bombay and died there.

In addition to the professional artists, many British military officers and civil servants like Charles D'Oyly (1781-1845) were painters of no mean ability and they drew and painted wherever they served. The long series of wars in the 19th century,—Mysore, Marathas, Bharatpur, Sikhs, the Mutiny, and Afghanistan,—all afforded a varied series of subjects to the artist's pencil. Their value to the historian of our civilisation and manners is incalculable. D'Oyly on transfer from Calcutta to Patna as Opium Agent, drew scenes of Bihar planter life, with pig-sticking, tiger-hunting etc. His *European in India* (20 coloured plates, 1813), *Bihar Amateur Lithographic Scrap Book* (2 Vols. 1828-29, 28 & 12 litho plates), and *Views of Calcutta and Its Environs* (25 litho plates 1848) are extremely rare. His *Tom Raw the Griffin* (with coloured plates) ran into three editions and was the rage of book collectors in the late 19th century, but is now dead as a dormouse in the art world.

Most of the drawings done in India were reproduced in England as prints because there was a large and enlightened demand for them by men who could pay well. It was the fashion to decorate the houses of our British rulers and merchant-princes and of the Indian nobles who imbibed a new taste from them, with such prints, and it was therefore worth one's while to print them and satisfy two markets, Home and Indian.

But Daniell's elephant folio size plates (144 in number) were very costly, and so, for poorer art lovers a small size edition in mezzotint was issued, three parts bound in one volume. Similarly, *Grindlay's Scenery Etc. on the Western Side of India* (1826) contained 36 fine steel engravings in one volume at a reasonable price.

These old prints required for hanging them a setting which is now no more to be found. Take a Scene on the Ganges by Daniell, with its flight of steps leading down to the water and the temples on the ghat, or an *Ancient Banyan Tree* dwarfing the greenery in the background. The ideal place for hanging it is the hall of the old type of mansions which once adorned Russell Street and Theatre Road, but have now all disappeared. There is a lofty bungalow with deep cool verandahs shaded with bamboo screens, thick brick walls, and trees all around. In the spacious hall free from glaze, the master is seated at ease. There is no sound except the monotonous creaking of the punkha or the snoring of the punkha-cooli when he follows his master's example by dozing off into an afternoon nap. Today all that background is gone. Gardens and lawns have been eaten up by fero-concrete; verandahs have been cut out as uneconomical waste of living room; and there is the maddening whizz of the electric fan overhead, while from outside come the jingle of the tram car, the hooting of motor horns, and the eloquence of the Magnolia ice-cream man trying to shout down his rival the Happy Boy vendor. Therefore, it is in the fitness of things that the modern Burra Sahib's drawing room in Calcutta is decorated with the picture of some American film-star with a liberal supply of paint and a minimum of clothing.

As one looks at one of these printed landscapes today, he cannot help sensing an atmosphere of profound peace and repose as in an old Dutch landscape by Jacok Van Ruysdael (1628-1682). Of him it has been said "His favourite subjects are simple woodland scenes. . . . It is in his rendering of lonely forest glades that we find him at his best His art is sensitive and poetic in sentiment and direct and skilful in technique. Figures are sparingly introduced into his compositions Towards the end (of his life) his favourite subjects were ruined castles on mountain crests."

Much of the above praise especially the last, is due to the steel engravings of landscapes, forts and temples in Rajputana and Gujrat, which have been so finely preserved for us in Captain R. R. Grindlay's *Scenery . . . on the Western Side of India* (1826) and Col. James Tod's *Travels in Western India* (1839).

These exhibits end about the year 1857, when the E. I. Company's rule ceased and India entered the modern age by coming under the direct administration of Parliament. That political change saw also the death agony of prints as a branch of art. In 1839 a power was born which in half a century totally banished engravings from the general art world (except as a rarity). In that year the Frenchman Daguerre patented the earliest photograph, which was named Daguerrotype after him. The process was rapidly improved till at last skill of human hand and human eye was no longer needed for taking a correct picture of a thing, or even for accurately reproducing it without having to engrave a block. The technique of photogravure has now been perfected, machine has replaced man, and chemistry has killed artistry.

Some Minor Reforms in the Judicial System of Bengal Under Lord Wellesley.

LORD WELLESLEY'S regime is not noted for any extraordinary changes in the administrative system, for he was throughout preoccupied with wars, annexations and political affairs of the period. But, there were some changes and reforms which have been overlooked by the historians, although they deserve some attention.

The most interesting item (1) which merits the attention of the students of administrative system is the preparation of a digest of Muslim law, according to the tenets of the Shiyas. This work was in the able hands of Mr. Baillie who arranged for the compilation, translation and publication thereof. The compiler also obtained annotations and interpretations from the doctrines and decisions of the opposite, or Sunni sect upon every question of importance in the Civil and Criminal law.

As authentic text of the Quran were not easily available for use of the law courts, it was also decided (2) to prepare an authentic text under proper titles, and with an index and also a select glossary as well as with a collection of the most reliable and well-known juridical traditions of Muhammad. The idea of such a text was originally mooted by Sir William Jones, and some preliminary work had already been completed by him. It may be mentioned here that he had started on the Muslim law of contract, inheritance etc. in collaboration with Muhammad Qasim. Mr. Baillie (3) was directed to translate such portions of the Fatwa Alamgiri as related to the criminal branch of the Muslim law. The ultimate object was to compile, translate and publish a Sunni code of law, upon all points connected with the practical administration of justice on the same model and principles with the Shiya code of law already undertaken.

The next change was an increase of salaries (4) of the Commissioners of the Court of Requests from 800 to 1200 Rupees per month. Their labour, zeal and exertions in the decision of the arrear of depending causes appeared to the Governor General in Council fully to entitle them to this increase.(5) The authorities also increased the salary of the clerk of the Court from 400

(1) Judicial Civil records—October 20, 1803.

(2) Report from S. T. Goad, Registrar, of October 20, 1803, No. 23 to the Government in the Judicial Department.

(3) Mr. Baillie had been an army officer originally, for he held the rank of Lieutenant. He was proficient in Arabic.

(4) Judicial Department: 15th December, 1804.

(5) Judicial Department: 1st March, 1805.

to 650 rupees per month. An additional Commissioner (6) was appointed to cope with the increased work. He too was allowed a salary of Rs. 1200 per month, which was granted to other Commissioners. These changes were justified by the fact that the receipts of the Court far exceeded the expense of the institution.

For the trial of very minor suits it was decided to appoint Maulavis and Pandits of the Zillah and City Courts to be head Commissioners. This change went materially to reduce the arrears of petty suits.(7)

To remove the inconvenience caused by the lack of buildings for law courts, steps were taken to rent or purchase a number of buildings at a number of places : (8)—

Shahabad	—Zillah court
Sylhet	— Do.
Etawah	— Do.
Calcutta	—Court
Purnea	—Collector's Cutchery
Aligarh	— Do.
Tipperah	— Do.
Calcutta and 24 Parganas	— Do.

In pursuance of the principles established for the internal government of the territories dependent on Fort William, it was decided to separate the Judicial and Revenue authorities in Cuttack. It was agreed that one Judge and Magistrate and one Collector would be sufficient in that province.(9)

Certain changes were made in the Courts of Sudder Diwani and Nizamat Adalats for the more expeditious and effectual administration of justice. It was found that the various important and laborious duties of the members of the Supreme Government made it impracticable for any member to discharge the extensive and arduous duties of Chief Judge of those courts. In consequence of this, the duties of the Sudder Diwani and Nizamat Adalats had hitherto been performed by only two members—the want of a third member in the practical discharge of the duties of the Court being liable to more than one objection. In consequence of the important nature of the duties, it was considered desirable that the causes and trials should be considered by three members. Should any difference of opinion arise when only two members attended the Decree or Sentence was to be suspended as prescribed by Regulation 2, 1801 for the voice of the third judge of the Court.(10) This, however, might cause delay and interruption, as long as a member of the Supreme Council continued to act in both capacities. Besides, it was in principle bad that a member of the executive branch of the Government should act as Chief Judge of the Adalats. In 1801 an attempt was

(6) The new Commissioner was Mr. James Brice.

(7) Judicial Department, 17th October, 1805.

(8) Civil Cons. July 18, 20th August etc. Judicial Proceedings 6th June etc.

(9) With the exceptions of certain parganas which were recently added to Midnapore.

(10) Letter to Court—Judicial Department—July 31, 1801.

made to separate the judicial power from the legislative and executive authorities of the state.

On a consideration of these circumstances, it appeared to the Governor General in Council to be essential, for the purpose of giving full effect to the provisions made by the constitution established for the internal government, and for ensuring to the people the enjoyment of the blessing of just laws duly administered, that the separation of the judicial authority from the executive authority in all their respective branches and gradations should be carried into full and complete execution both in form and practice. This decision (11) was highly significant, and it deserves full appreciation in this connection.

In accordance with the decision, the following appointments were made by the Governor General in Council :—

Mr. H. J. Colebrooke—Chief Judge of the Adalats.

Mr. J. H. Harrington—Puisne Judge.

The following salaries were fixed :—

Chief Judge	... Rs. 60,000 per annum.
Puisne Judge	... Rs. 55,000 per annum.

To ensure economy in the expenditure on Court houses and Cutcherries a plan was adopted in 1799 with a view mainly to reduce the present expenses. This plan of economy (12) led to some saving.(13) The plan involved erection or purchase of suitable buildings for about Rs. 12000 each Court House, and Rs. 8000 for each Cutcherry.(14)

Further economy was possible through the abolition of Assistant Judges at some stations.

In 1800 the office of Judge and Magistrate of 24 Parganas was abolished ; the Justices of the Peace for the town of Calcutta were henceforth to be subject to the control of the Judge of Hooghly.

In consequence of the heavy arrears of causes in the district of Burdwan, an Assistant Judge was, however, added to that station as a special case.

NANDALAL CHATTERJI.

(11) Civil Cons. July 25, 1805.

(12) Civil Cons. June 6, 1805.

(13) Rs. 28, 812.

(14) Civil Cons. 1805.

Nadir Shah's Invasion : Its Reaction in Bengal.

THE invasion and occupation of Delhi by Nadir Shah in 1739 produced a good deal of commotion and consternation in Bengal. Nadir Shah's forces did not march on territories to the east of Delhi, which was separated from the semi-independent province of Bengal, even as it then was, by many hundreds of miles. None the less, his movements and activities were being closely watched not merely by the Government of Bengal, but also by the European merchants who had, by that time, developed important commercial stakes in the province.

As early as September 1737, Thomas Braddyll, the then Chief of the English East India Company's factory at Kasimbazar, who, in course of his official duties, had to keep himself in touch with the darbar at Murshidabad, wrote to the Company's President (1) and Council in Calcutta about the local reports that Nawab Shuja-ud-din Khan, the Governor of Bengal, had been ordered to proceed directly to Delhi and to join his forces with those of the other great nobles in order to oppose the progress of Nadir Shah, who was believed to have come as far as "the borders of the Great Moguls Kingdom with a powerful army." The Kasimbazar Chief at the same time expressed doubt regarding the authenticity of such reports, since a lot of secrecy was maintained about all events disagreeable to the Nawab. But the rumour could not be dismissed as entirely baseless. Preparations on an extensive scale were, in fact, being made for the Nawab's journey, though it was given out that he was going only up to Patna. Samsam-ud-daulah, Khan Dauran, generally mentioned in the East India Company's records as Caundora, who was the patron of Nawab Shuja Khan in Delhi, was also reported to have written to the Nawab asking him to set out on the journey, lest he should fall in the disfavour of Muhammad Shah, the Mughal Emperor.(2)

The panic created by the reports of Nadir Shah's invasion was heightened by the apprehensions of an attack on Bengal by the Marathas who had advanced as far as Benares. The Deputy Nawab and other high officials at Patna were seized with fear of the city being plundered by the Marathas, and the sarafs or money changers were so much agitated that they refused to transact any business. The city of Patna was considered to be too weak to offer any effective resistance to such powerful enemies. As a precautionary measure, the Chief of the English factory at Patna,(3) sent an urgent requisition

(1) John Stackhouse, President and Governor of Fort William, 1732-1739.

(2) Bengal Public Consultations, 3 October 1737.

(3) Humffreys Cole.

tion to Fort William for the despatch of an extra force of one hundred soldiers. But as such a "large detachment" would weaken the garrison in Calcutta, the Council of Fort William at an extra-ordinary meeting authorised the Patna factory to recruit additional forces for the safety of the factory.(4)

Murshidabad, the capital of Bengal, was much alarmed at the news of the Maratha menace. Sarfaraj Khan, the son of the Nawab and the formal Diwan of the province, made arrangements for proceeding towards Patna at the head of a large army. But it was considered that he might not go up to Patna but satisfy himself merely by securing the pass in the Rajmahal hills.

Ali 'Wardi Khan, the Deputy Nawab of Bihar, made preparations to march out of Patna and repel the enemies outside the city.(5) But the activities of Ali 'Wardi and the rich Indian people of Patna created an impression in the mind of the English that they were "more intent on securing their wealth and flying with it than to repel the enemy".(6) None the less, the English at Kasimbazar made representations at the darbar for providing them facilities to despatch additional forces to Patna and requested Haji Ahmed, the most powerful of the Nawab's advisers, to use his influence so that the English party for Patna might be provided with conveyances overland to Rajmahal.(7) But reports were soon forthcoming that the Marathas were not proceeding towards Patna, and all preparations which were being made at Murshidabad to resist their advance were suspended.(8)

The weakness of Patna which was so much exposed to an attack from outside led the chiefs of the English, French and Dutch factories to attempt a united defence of their property in the city. Even after the menace of an immediate attack on Patna was over, Dupleix, the French Chief at Chandernagore, proposed that since the city might again fall a prey to an invasion at any time, it was worth while to continue "the union to act for the common benefit of the three companies", and he wrote both to the English and the Dutch for their opinion on the matter.(9) Sickterman, the Director of the Dutch factory at Hugli, also wrote to the English in Calcutta about the advisability of continuing the alliance of the three companies which was made to protect their interests against a common enemy. The most important provision of Dupleix's proposal was "that each nation shall be obliged to protect and secure with all their forces the persons and effects of the others against the violence of the Marathoes". But before giving their consent to such an undertaking the English insisted that the French and the Dutch companies must send with the English an equal number of European soldiers for the protection of Patna; and in case they were unable to send the requisite number of soldiers, they must pay to the English their proportion of

(4) Bengal Public Consultations, 13 April 1738.

(5) Bengal Public Consultations, 15 May 1738.

(6) Bengal Public Consultations, 15 May 1738.

(7) *Idem*.

(8) *Idem*.

(9) Bengal Public Consultations, 30 July 1738.

charges equal to what the English might have to incur on this account.(10) Neither the Dutch nor the French agreed to the terms proposed by the English. Both these companies were more anxious to secure their retreat from Patna in case of an attack. This, they considered, would be less expensive than sending large detachments from their garrisons at Hugli and at Chandernagore to Patna.(11)

The tension caused by the possibility of an impending attack by the Marathas soon died down, as the Marathas themselves were reported to have joined hands with the Mughal Emperor to resist the advance of Nadir Shah towards Delhi. Information reached Patna that Muhammad Shah intended to march with his forces to arrest the progress of the Persians, who had advanced as far as Multan. Muhammad Shah was further reported to have taken vigorous measures to oppose the invaders and to have ordered Saadat Khan (12) "to take all the treasurers in Patna (about 25 or 30 lakhs) and to raise 100,000 horse" with whom he was to join the Emperor and force the Persians to return. The English at Patna feared that in case of a change of government the city might be plundered and requested the Calcutta Council to send to Patna "three or four hundred effective men" to prevent "their being plundered" and to enable them to retreat, for any opposition to the victorious forces with such a handful of men as the English could command was out of the question.(13)

Rumours continued to filtrate about the progress of Nadir Shah towards India. But many of them were contradictory and merely added to the confusion. The Patna factory, because of its comparative proximity to Delhi, was relied upon by the English in Calcutta to keep them informed about the developments in Delhi and in the north-west. On 2 September 1738, the English Chief at Patna wrote to the Council in Calcutta that Muhammad Shah had decided not to "go out in person" to meet the invader and would satisfy himself with the reports he expected from the Governor of Kabul and Lahore about the progress of the Persians. Saadat Khan was reported to be on his march to Delhi. Another report said that Peshwa Baji Rao I's Vakil at Delhi was "stipulating for three million rupees" if Patna was to be spared an attack by the Marathas. Since confusing reports were coming from Delhi, the English in Patna preferred to be in readiness to retreat from the city and wanted more than three hundred armed men from Calcutta to facilitate their retreat in case of emergency. The Chiefs of the English, Dutch and French factories once again "met together and agreed to quit each factory as well as they could in case of an attack which on the motion of the Dutch was put in writing as they could not move without some such sanction".(14)

On 26 September 1738, Humffreys Cole, the Chief of the English factory at Patna wrote to the Council at Fort William enclosing some "Dilly News-

(10) Bengal Public Consultations, 31 July 1738.

(11) Bengal Public Consultations, 7 August 1738.

(12) The Governor of Oudh.

(13) Bengal Public Consultations, 23 August 1738.

(14) Bengal Public Consultations, 20 September 1738.

papers" regarding the progress of the Persians who were reported to have "surprized one of the three passes guarded by the Pathans". The report, however, lacked confirmation.(15) Another letter from Patna, written only six days later, stated that Nadir Shah had gone back to Persia but had left a number of forces behind. The motive that "induced him to make this retreat" could not be ascertained. It was also reported that, on the news of a Maratha incursion on Oudh, Saadat Khan, the Governor, had returned to his province.(16)

That confusing reports were pouring in to Patna is evident from an express letter from Patna written on 23 October 1738 in which it was stated that Nadir Shah "had got as far as Peshawar and Jalalabad" and that all had submitted to him practically without any resistance. Nizamulmulk and Khan Dauran were reported to have "gone out of Dilly to meet him but probably rather to join than oppose him". The Emperor, it was believed, had neither the heart nor the means "to prevent an entire conquest". He was staying alone at Delhi "under pretence of sickness".(17) In another letter written on 1 November 1738 the Chief of the Patna factory stated that they had information from an Englishman who had left Delhi twenty-one days earlier and had just arrived at Patna that the Persians were "within thirty days' march of that city". The Emperor had ordered Nizamulmulk and Khan Dauran to go out with their forces to oppose the Persians. But Khan Dauran pretended sickness and Nizamulmulk "absolutely refused going without him". It was clear therefore that Nadir Shah would "make an entire conquest without opposition". The Patna Council, accordingly, was obliged to detain the military until normal conditions returned. But since that was the time for giving the dadni (18) out, the Patna Council wanted directions from Calcutta whether they should defer the payment of dadni to the merchants "till affairs were settled". But the delay in making the dadni, it was pointed out, was likely to reduce the supply of both saltpetre and cloth which would "fall greatly short in in quantity".(19)

The uncertain political conditions in the country were likely to hinder the trade of the Company. The President and Council in Fort William, therefore, adopted the following resolution on 30 November 1738:—"As a revolution is daily expected in the Mogul's empire which should it happen will very probably create insurrections and troubles all over the country and may hinder the gentlemen at Patna from sending down the saltpetre in such larger quantities as usual: Agreed that we write to Humffreys Cole, Esqr., Chief and Council there, to send us down the saltpetre as they may purchase it there from time to time but not less than one thousand bags at once that our Honourable Masters may run as little risk as possible".(20)

(15) Bengal Public Consultations, 9 October 1738.

(16) *Idem*, 16 October 1738.

(17) Bengal Public Consultations, 2 November 1738.

(18) Advance payment made to the merchants for goods to be supplied later.

(19) Bengal Public Consultations, 13 November 1738.

(20) Bengal Public Consultations, 30 November 1738.

While the English in Calcutta were cautiously watching the situation, news came from Kasimbazar that the Nawab was recruiting his forces as fast as possible and that some notable personages from the Delhi Court were shortly expected in Bengal. It was stated that Nizamulmulk's son would shortly "pass through this Kingdom on his way southward" and orders were issued to pay him the greatest respect.(21) Since a state of uncertainty prevailed at Murshidabad, important members of the nobility including Haji Ahmed considered it discreet to send their families away from the city.(22)

The English in Bengal who were watching the situation closely became rather nervous regarding the security of the Mughal Empire and of their own position as traders. They were now anxious to secure some formal rights from Nadir Shah. In view of "Shah Nadar being far advanced into this empire and would in all probability soon be master thereof", the Council at Fort William resolved that they should write to the Council at Bombay for a copy of the farman granted by him to the Company's agent in Persia which on a revolution might be of service to them in Bengal.(23)

The news of battles and disturbances continued to pour in at Patna where all merchants except the English suspended business. Even the English decided to watch the situation and stop their investments and the despatch of goods to Calcutta for the time being.(24)

The Council in Fort William also considered that a change of Government at Delhi was almost imminent and advised the English Chief at Patna to be very cautious in their dealings and to cultivate good relations with Nadir Shah's men at Delhi. On 12 March 1739, the Council recorded, "By repeated advices from Dilly we have reason to believe that the fate of this empire is very near a determination". They were anxious to know from their Vakil at Delhi how the French and the Dutch were acting in this crisis. The Vakil was instructed, in case of a revolution, "to be very careful to cultivate an acquaintance and friendship with such of the great men as are in the interest and service of Nadar". The Council also requested the Vakil to be in constant communication with them regarding the progress of his negotiations at Delhi and "all other material occurrences".(25)

On 12 March 1739 Humffreys Cole, the English Chief at Patna forwarded to the Council in Calcutta the advices he had received from Delhi that it would be "proper to make applications as soon as possible to Sha Nadar", Cole asked for instructions from the Council in Calcutta regarding the procedure to be adopted in this connection. The situation at Patna had become normal, though Ali 'Wardi Khan, the Deputy Nawab of Bihar, had been "on the frontiers of the province towards Benares".(26)

(21) Bengal Public Consultations, 11 January 1739.

(22) Idem, 18 January 1739.

(23) Bengal Public Consultations, 26 February 1739.

(24) Bengal Public Consultations, 12 March 1739.

(25) Bengal Public Consultations, 12 March 1739.

(26) Bengal Public Consultations, 26 March 1739.

At Murshidabad things were changing rather quickly. On 13 March 1739, Shuja-ud-din Khan, the Governor of Bengal, died.(27) The English at Kasimbazar were informed by the Vakil of a report that the Emperor Muhammad Shah was taken prisoner by Nadir Shah and that the son of the Emperor had fled to Rajputana.(28) Another report said that Muhammad Shah went be highly necessary that our Vacqueel at Dilly should congratulate Nadar had "confined the King and his son directly". At Delhi the "Duhoy" (29) was being given in the name of Nadir Shah who solemnly entered the capital on 9 March 1739.

Having considered the various reports coming from Patna and Kasimbazar, the Council in Calcutta adopted the following resolution:—"It will be highly necessary that our Vacqueel at Dilly should congratulate Nadar Shaw on his accession to the throne and to supplicate his favour and protection but in the most general terms and with a caution not to mention anything of our grants and privileges lest it should draw an expense on our Honourable masters which we should avoid if possible and these we think the farthest steps we can take at present". The Council further decided to give proper directions to their Vakil at Delhi requesting him to send them "the most early and best intelligence of all material transactions at Dilly in this juncture" that in any way affected by the Company's affairs.

To cope with any possible emergency and trouble consequent on the prevailing unsettled political conditions, the Council in Calcutta considered it proper to have a granary of rice in the town to ensure supply of the commodity to its inhabitants who might have to suffer if the boats coming to Calcutta with rice were stopped on the way. They accordingly decided to purchase 20,000 maunds of rice to stock it during the crisis.(30) Since rice was then available at 1 md. 30 srs. for the rupee, the Council advanced Rs. 12,000 to their Zamindar to purchase the necessary quantity.(31)

The news came from Kasimbazar, on 26 March 1739, advising that orders had been received by the Nawab at Murshidabad "to proclaim Sha Nadar, to coin siccās in his name and keep the province quiet". The English at Kasimbazar were apprehensive that "disturbances in the Government" might endanger their dadni for silk piece goods. They delayed the giving out of dadni to the merchants and asked for instructions from the Council in Calcutta about the future conduct of their business.(32)

Reports of a more alarming nature came from Patna. The English factors at Patna were rather confused by the divergent and conflicting messages which were coming from different sources. On 1 April 1739, the Chief of the Patna factory wrote to the Council in Calcutta that the affairs of the country were more embroiled than ever, there having been no letter of any

(27) *Idem*, 19 March 1739.

(28) *Idem*, 26 March 1739.

(29) Invoking the authority by exclamation.

(30) Bengal Public Consultations, 26 March 1739.

(31) *Idem*, 2 April 1739.

(32) Bengal Public Consultations, 2 April 1739.

credit from Delhi for one month past and "the reports from thence, Agra and adjacent parts" were so "monstrous and contradictory" that it was "impossible to send any news worthy of credit". News had reached Patna through a private agency that Saadat Khan was dead and that 10,000 horse were coming to Lucknow to receive his treasure. But it was apprehended that they would come forward to Benares and Patna and probably to Bengal. "If this proves true", wrote the English Chief, at Patna, "there will be no safety in staying at Patna".(33)

Only four days later the English chief at Patna forwarded to the Calcutta Council a letter he had received from Delhi "advising the distraction in that city". The Vakil they had appointed to proceed to Delhi was still at Patna and "must continue there sometime for no man will venture to Dilly until things were in a better posture". The English Chief in his letter gave a detailed description of the report he had received from Delhi and of the situation that existed at Patna in the following words:—"It is very remarkable what the *cossid* (34) says that but one man pretends to have seen Nadar Sha and that he has not seated himself on the throne but that Mohomet Sha has still the name of King and that the siccās have not yet been stamped in the Persian King's name, tho' the Nabob at Patna did on advice from Dilly coin in one day's time 1,100 gold moheirs and 14,000 siccās, but then immediately put a stop coining any more in Sha Nadar's name. These rupees are now at 2 per cent discount and the gold moheirs are each four annas worse than Mahomet Sha's, all which seem to confirm the current report that the Persian King is not really in the country but that the whole is an intrigue of Nazar Mulmulicks.(35) The *cossid* fellows also say that 'Seerjung Cawn is set out with 15,000 men to seize his uncle Sciadat Cawn's (36) effects and that they left him eighteen course (37) on this side of Agra about fifteen days past'. As to the French and Dutch they are sitting quite still at Patna."(38)

The authorities at Murshidabad adopted strict measures on the transmission of news from Bengal. The English Chief at Kasimbazar wrote on 20 April 1739 that the Nawab had issued orders that "no letters shall pass Sickleguree (39) without liberty from him". The application made by the English to Haji Ahmed requesting that none of their "*cossids* might be stopped going to Patna" was refused any consideration. Richard Eyre, the Kasimbazar Chief, accordingly requested the Council in Calcutta that all their *cossids* from Calcutta to Patna should call at Murshidabad so as to obtain the necessary permission from Nawab. He further pointed out that the *cossids* deputed for the purpose should "carry English letters only for no Bengal or Persian letters will be permitted". The English at Kasimbazar were badly in need

(33) Idem, 10 April 1739.

(34) Courier or running messenger, Hobson-Jobson.

(35) Nizamulmulk.

(36) Saadat Khan's.

(37) Kros=2 miles.

(38) Bengal Public Consultations, 23 April 1739.

(39) Sakrigali.

of supply of money from Calcutta for Fatehchand (40) had refused them to lend any more unless they would take Nadir Shah's siccās which passed only as Arcot, that is to say, at a heavier discount than the Bengal siccās.(41) The Calcutta Council advised the Kasimbazar Chief to try to secure a loan elsewhere to carry on their business until the requisite quantity of bullion could be sent from Calcutta, for they did not "think it proper to take Sha Nadar's siccās at the rate Fatechand offered them, the loss being so very considerable".(42) Since a quantity of bullion had just then reached Calcutta from Madras, eight chests of bullion were immediately despatched to Kasimbazar to keep the business of the English going.(43)

All sorts of information continued to come to Patna, Humffreys Cole, the Patna Chief, had postponed submitting the application which the English proposed to address to Nadir Shah on his accession, "until some more certain advices arrive, it being universally believed at Patna that he has never assumed the title of King".(44) The English expected that the difficulty of ascertaining the development of events in the imperial capital would soon be over as they heard that the "guards which were posted in and about Dilly to prevent intelligence going from thence" were about to be removed.(45) None the less, their nervousness at the unsettled condition of affairs in India continued for sometime. When the English factors at Dacca wanted permission to make a visit to their newly appointed Deputy Nawab with the usual presents, the Calcutta Council wrote to them on 7 May 1739 advising the postponement of the visit as long as possible without endangering the Company's business as "affairs at Dilly were still fluctuating" and it was "highly probable that there might be a change of their Subah shortly, especially on a revolution, in which case our Honourable Masters might be put to a double expense".(46)

Nadir Shah left Delhi on 5 May 1739. The situation in Bengal began to look up soon afterwards. On 20 May 1739 the English Chief at Patna wrote to the Calcutta Council that the affairs there had begun to run "in their usual channel" and that if no unforeseen accident intervened, they in Patna had no further apprehensions from that quarter. The Dutch were "now encouraged to give out ready money for their petre". The English Chief also wrote that he was making a loan of Rs. 50,000 for investment among their merchants and requested a supply of bullion from Calcutta which would be of great service as "the mint was open again".(47)

News of a reassuring nature also came from Murshidabad. It was reported at Murshidabad, wrote the English Chief at Kasimbazar, on 27 May 1739, that the King of Persia had left Delhi and was gone to the Shalimar Garden from whence he would return to Persia. On receipt of this news

(40) Jagat Seth.

(41) Bengal Public Consultations, 23 April 1739.

(42) Idem, 23 April 1739.

(43) Idem, 25 April 1739.

(44) Bengal Public Consultations, 30 April 1739.

(45) Bengal Public Consultations, 7 May 1739.

(46) Idem.

(47) Bengal Public Consultations, 31 May 1739.

the Government had ordered Shah Nadir's seals to be broken and new ones to be made in the old King's name. This, the English hoped, would enable them to pass their *dastaks* (48) as usual. But they were disappointed. On an application to Haji Ahmed to secure the passage of their *dastaks*, they found that the Haji and other darbar officers expected a present of about Rs. 15,000 before the business of the English could be cleared. The English at Kasimbazar, therefore, asked for instructions from the Council in Calcutta as to what they should do under the circumstances.(49) The Council of Fort William took strong exception to the demand of Haji Ahmed which they described as "a most extravagant thing". They at the same time realized the necessity of keeping up "a good understanding with the darbar officers and more particularly with him who is in such high favour with the Nabob". They would rather "make him easy" by giving him a moderate present than risk his displeasure and thereby prejudice the Company's affairs at that juncture.(50)

By the end of July 1739 normal conditions seemed to have returned in the area between Calcutta and Patna, though the "affairs up the country" continued to be much embroiled.(51)

SUKUMAR BHATTACHARYA.

(48) Permits authorising free carriage of trade by the English.

(49) Bengal Public Consultations, 31 May 1739.

(50) Bengal Public Consultations, 31 May 1739.

(51) Idem, 30 July 1739.

Nature of the Indian Revolt of 1857-59.

THE Indian Revolt of 1857-59 was a gigantic challenge to British rule in India. No doubt the seeds of British political supremacy in India were sown on the fertile soil of Bengal when the battle of Plassey (23rd June, 1757) gave its verdict in favour of the English East India Company. Mir Qasim's opposition to it proved to be fruitless and conjunction of some favourable circumstances helped the English to overpower the three allies (Emperor Shah Alam II, Nawab-Wazir Shujauddaulah and Mir Qasim) at Buxar on the 23rd October 1764. Buxar supplemented the work of Plassey in "riveting the shackles of the Company's rule" upon Bengal and Bihar. Raja Nandkumar's earnest efforts to counteract British successes also ended in smoke.

A century after this was marked by the rapid expansion of British dominion in India and the growth of an Indo-British administrative system as a corollary to it, which inexorably subjected India to manifold processes of transition,—political, economic, social and cultural. All this generated here diverse fumes of discontent against British rule, all of which being focussed into produced the fierce flame of 1857-59. In fact, during this century when the British dominion in India was being transformed into the British Empire of India, these were anti-British outbreaks in different parts of this vast country. The insurrection of Raja Chait Singh of Banaras was one of these. Now it is well established that after the treaty of the 21st January, 1798, between John Shore, the Company's Governor-General, and Saadat Ali of Oudh, Wazir Ali who was kept at Banares as a prisoner, being discontented with his lot, organised an all-India conspiracy against the English. Wazir Ali had his confederates in the north-west, in the south, in Bengal and in Bihar, the most prominent of those in Bihar being Raja Mitrajit Singh of Tikari. In 1831-32 there was a rising of the Coles at Chotanagpur. In the city of Patna itself there was a plot in 1845-46 for revolt against the English, and Raja Kunwar Singh of Jagadishpur was suspected of complicity in it. More formidable than these was the movement led by the highly excited Santals in 1855-57 in a wide area extending from the vicinity of Burdwan to Bhagalpur. Its causes were deeply rooted in the changing conditions of that period and its suppression caused enormous strain to the English East India Company's Government.

In view of all these it would not be correct to regard the Revolt of 1857-59 as an isolated and sudden outbreak. Rather it was the culmination of accumulated discontent in various quarters due to different factors for which the new masters of the country were thought to be responsible. Opinions have long been sharply divided on the nature of this movement,—whether it was in meaning and origin, a mere military revolt or was the out-

burst of an organised conspiracy aiming at the overthrow of the British Empire. Even persons directly connected with this movement have expressed diametrically opposite views regarding it. In the opinion of Sir John Lawrence it was nothing more than a military rising of which the cartridge incident was proximate cause.(1). But Sir James Outram expressed the view that it was the result of a Muhammadan conspiracy which utilised Hindu grievances to its own advantage. The cartridge incident, according to the latter view, "precipitated the Mutiny before it had been thoroughly organised and before adequate arrangement had been made for making Mutiny a first step to popular insurrection." Taking a mean between these two views, Mr. Innes has observed that "the panic was engineered by political intriguers ; but the insurrection was not organised. None of the Native rulers had made up their minds to rise. There is every indication that the sepoys took their leap blindly in the dark, not knowing whither they were going. But there is also every indication that Nana Saheb on one side and a Mogul faction on the other had a great deal to do with working them up to take the leap, and that the Mogul faction at least had a tolerably definite idea of the use which was to be made of the leap when taken".(2) Holmes holds much the same view and writes that "before the story of the greased cartridges was circulated there was no definite plot for a general rising of the Bengal army, and it is improbable that such a plot was formed even after the first mutinies civil disturbances, except in a few isolated regions and on the part of a few embittered or fanatical groups, never amounted to rebellion. . . . These rebellions (in Jhansi and Oudh) arose in consequence of the Mutiny, and there is no evidence that any of the rebels, except the Nana, conspired before it began".(3) Sir Charles Aitchinson, who wrote a biography of Lord Lawrence in 1892, observes that Lord Lawrence's "view does not account for the phenomena the Mutiny of the army assumed in places the character of a partial rebellion of the people already made uneasy by military revolt; innovation and change." (4) Prof. P. E. Roberts contradicts this opinion by stating that "on the whole in spite of the fact that in some districts the people seem to have risen before the sepoys, Lawrence's view seems most nearly approximate to the truth. We may assume, therefore, that the rising was mainly military in origin but that it occurred at a time when, for various reasons, there was much social and political discontent, and that the mutineers were promptly joined by interested adventurers, who tried to give it a particular direction to suit their own scheme".(5)

In the days of early revolutionary nationalism in India during the present century, appeared Shri V. D. Savarkar's book on this movement which he described as the "*Indian War of Independence, 1857*".(6) Several others

(1) Sir Charles Aitchinson, *Lord Lawrence*, P. 74.

(2) Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*, P. 307.

(3) Holmes, *History of the Indian Mutiny*.

(4) Sir Charles Aitchinson, *Lord Lawrence*, Pp. 75-76.

(5) P. E. Roberts, *History of British India*, P. 361.

(6) First published in England in 1909 and immediately proscribed. First authorised and public edition published in India in 1947.

have in recent times subscribed to this view. From the little that I have been able to study so far by consulting original records, it seems that though the movement may not have been a completely national one, carefully planned and efficiently organised on an all-India basis under the inspiration of common patriotic ideals it is true that some sort of dissatisfaction with the Company's Government was present in the country in those days. Writing in the *Calcutta Review* of 1851, Sir Henry Durand, who became later on the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, gave the following warning to his countrymen: "Retribution follows misgovernment with an iron step and crushes with inevitable ruin the children and children's children of an oppressing nation. Strange as it may seem to some of our readers, this idea is present amongst the millions of India."

The first manifestation of the movement of 1857-59 was naturally in the more inflammable quarters of the Sepoy Army of the English in India. But this should not lead us to regard it as a mere military rising in origin and character. It is interesting to note that the Najeeb guards of the English at Arrah, headquarters of the Shahabad district in Bihar, welcomed the revolted Sepoys of Dinapore when the latter after marching to Arrah besieged the English garrison there. Mr. H. C. Wake, then Magistrate of Shahabad, made the following affidavit in this respect before Mr. Arthur Littledate officiating Sessions Judge of Shahabad, on the 8th January, 1858:—

"On Sunday, the 26th July, 1857, the Officer Commanding the detachments of Najeebs on duty at Arrah after we had heard of the Mutiny at Dinapore and of the approach of part of the Mutineers came to me for orders. I directed him to return to his post at the Jail and should only a small body of the insurgents attack it on the Treasury to do his best to defend them, and that in that case I would come to his assistance with the Sikhs; but in case of an attack by so large a body of the rebels that assistance would be useless. I directed them to retreat he assured me that nothing should induce him to retreat but that he would die at his post. I repeated my orders and he returned to the jail. On Sunday night he slept in the fortified Bungalow and about 9 A.M. on the following morning we saw the 3 mutineers regiments enter Government Compound in the centre of which is the Collectorate. On their approaching which I saw the Guard of Najeebs stationed at that Treasury run to meet them with every appearance of welcome. After plundering the Treasury the rebels attacked the Bungalow, and as after the first rush they availed themselves of the opposite Bungalow outhouse, and trees, and every species of cover from which to fire, it was difficult to distinguish individuals but I saw several of the Najeeb firing upon us from behind the trees, and expecting that we should be carried by storm I recorded the fact on the walls of the Bungalow. After our relief their clothes were found in the various places used by the rebels during their stay at Arrah mixed up with damaged accoutrements and plunder left by the Sepoys. After the mutiny at Jugdeespore many of their uniform caps were found in Coomar Sing's premise—during the whole of the disturbances many of the rebels fought without uniform and it was impossible to distinguish the corps

to which they belonged, but there is every reason to believe that the majority if not the whole of the Najeeps joined the rebels, and left the district with Coomar Sing on his retreat."

Referring to the movement of 1857-59 the Right Hon'ble Benjamin Disraeli, the member for Buckingham, spoke in a meeting held at Aglesbury, on the 30th September, 1857:—"One of the greatest calamities that ever befell this empire has fallen upon us. I believe it is now also the universal conviction, that the description originally given of these unfortunate and extraordinary movements in India, was not authorised by the circumstances of the case. Day by day, we have seen that which was at first characterised as a slight and accidental occurrence, is in fact one of those great events which form epochs in the history of mankind, and which can only be accounted for by considerations demanding the deepest attention from statesmen and nations. Nevertheless, if England, instead of being induced to treat these events as merely accidental, casual, and comparatively trifling, will comprehend that the issue at stake is enormous, and the peril colossal, I have not the slightest doubt that a nation so great in spirit and in resources as our own, will prove that it is equal to cope with dangers of even that magnitude. . . . I think that what has happened in India is a great Providential lesson, by which we may profit; and if we meet it like brave and inquiring men, we may assert our dominion, and establish for the future in India a government which may prove at once lasting and honourable to this country".(7)

In part two of a *Narrative*, dated December, 1857, by a contemporary British Military Officer in India, we read as follows:—"The crisis came. At first, apparently mere military mutiny, it speedily changed its character, and became a national insurrection. The Rajpoot villages in Bihar, those in the districts of Benares, Azimgarh, Gorukhpore, in the entire Doab, comprising the divisions of Allahabad, Cawnpore, Meerut and Agra, in the provinces of Rohilkhand and Oudh, shook off our rule and declared war against us".(8)

Some contemporary records of the English East India Company regarding Bihar phase of the movement refer to the active support of the common people behind it. Thus on the 18th June, 1857, Mr. W. Taylor, the Commissioner of Patna, wrote to the Lieutenant Governor: "The people of the districts to the west of Chapra are in open revolt". When some persons were being tried at Muzaffarpur in September, 1857, one of them cried out that "the supremacy of the English and the Company was at an end, that it was now Koonwar Singh's reign".(9) A similar observation was made by some others in that area during their trial in the month of December next. After the defeat of Captain Dunbar's Regiment at Arrah on the 30th July, 1857, Captain R. P. Harrison, commanding Detachment of Her Majesty's

(7) Charles Ball, *History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, Pp. 418-420.

(8) *The Mutiny of the Bengal Army*, P 53.

(9) *Letters from H. L. Dampier, Magistrate of Muzaffarpur, to R. Forbes, Commissioner under Section VII, Regulation XIV of 1857, dated 15th September, 1857.*

37th Regiment, observed in his report to the Adjutant-General, dated 31st July, 1857 :—

"The loss we inflicted on the rebels I believe to be too small on account of the darkness and the men being too exhausted to fire. The people of the country turned out against us".(10) When in the night of the 20th April, 1858, Kunwar with his followers reached Manahar in the Ghazipur district, there, as a contemporary English record notes: "he found himself amongst friends and the wants of his troops were voluntarily supplied by the villagers who, were almost universally in his favour".(11) In fact, as Mr. Robert Davies, officiating Magistrate at Azamgarh, wrote to Mr. F. B. Gubbins, Commander of the 5th Division at Banaras, on the 25th April, 1858, from his camp at Sheopur, there was enthusiasm and friendliness for Kunwar Singh among the common people in the Azamgarh district. On the 21st April Kunwar Singh had a sharp encounter with the troops under Brigadier Douglas at a place called Bansdeh on the north bank of the Ganges, equidistant from Ghazipur on the west and Chapra on the east. In spite of sustaining personal injuries he crossed the Ganges in the night of that date with a large body of sepoys. It is noted in a contemporary English record. "The villagers on the right bank assisted the rebels, many boats were raised from the places where they had been sunk. . . ."(12)

Though the Rana of Nepal became an ally of the English and his regiments co-operated with the troops of the latter in fighting against the Indian movement certain leaders of it and their followers had, there is no doubt, some sympathisers or supporters of them in the border tracts. On the 11th January, 1858, the Magistrate of Tirhut wrote to the Commissioner of Patna, that to prevent "disaffected characters from founding their way into Nepal in the garb of pilgrims" police officers should be stationed "at different places on the roads leading into the Terrai with strict orders not to allow any suspicious characters to pass." On the 27th January, 1858, the Assistant Magistrate of Tirhut was asked by Mr. A. L. Dampier, the Officiating Magistrate, to prevent such persons from going to Nepal during "the approaching Seoratri festival". On the 5th February, 1858, the Resident at Nepal informed the Joint Magistrate of Sewan, that the Nepal *darbar* had decided to keep the mountain passes closed during the ensuing Shivaratri festival, which was to commence from the 12th February. On the 22nd May, 1858, the Collector of Tirhut wrote to the Commissioner of Patna that the Lieutenant of Jaleswar Cutcherry refused to arrest ten mutineers, when asked to do so, by saying that he had "no authority to give assistance in arresting sepoys without receiving orders from the Government of the Maharajah of Nepal."

Many of the Zamindars of Bihar whose interests were bound up with those of the English Company, rendered assistance to the latter in the suppression of the movement. Asked by Mr. H. Dampier, Magistrate of Tirhut,

(10) Ball, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, P. 110.

(11) *Secret Consultations*, 28th May, 1859, No. 59.

(12) *Secret Consultations*, 28th May, 1858, No. 521.

his predecessor, Mr. Lantaur, submitted on the 18th September, 1857, the statement about the conduct of the principal Zamindars of Tirhut during the disturbances:—

(i) The zamindars of Soorsund (Baboo Raghoonandan Singh, Baboo Bishoon Perakash Narain Singh) placed at his disposal (on my application) 50 men whose services were accepted to guard the Ghauts on the Ganges.

(ii) B. Keerut Singh (on a similar application) sent 20 men who were ordered to guard Ghauts on the Gunduck.

(iii) Did receive no help from the Maharajah of Durbhungah as he was residing at Jhunjharpoor on the Bhagalpur frontier "although it would have been readily given had the Mahurajah been at Durbhungah when I made an application to him for assistance."

"His absence from Durbhungah at that critical time was very inconvenient as his amlahs and servants did not behave properly, stopping grain boats and committing little acts of petty oppression which were immediately suppressed by me."

(iv) B. Kooldeep Narain Singh of Pandaul, offered his assistance but it was declined as the Sikhs had joined the station along with the authorities from Patna.

Baboo Nurdeeputh Mutha (Mehtha) rendered the Government "valuable aid during our absence from the station and has continued to do so. I am greatly indebted to him for furnishing supplies, opening the Moodees' (Grocers') shops in the Bazar where the people of the town were panic-stricken. He by his acts and deed procured large supplies of grain from the interior of the district, in fact he did all that a loyal subject could do in supporting the Government and its authorities since the commencement of the disturbances."

On the 19th July, 1858, Mr. H. L. Dampier sent to the Commissioner of Patna (13) the following list of Zamindars who helped the English near Gandak when some of the mutineers were approaching Tirhut from that side:—

No.	Name of Mallick (Proprietor)	Name of Mauzah	Name of Paragunnah	No. of men supplied	No. of horses supplied
1	2	3	4	5	6
1.	Rai Kalika Sahai Durgah Sahai	Bukhreh	Ruttee	75	2 camels
2.	Mounth Gopess Dass ...	Jyitpoor	Besara	77	1
3.	Rai Ganesh Datta ...	Bukhra	Ruttee	10	1
4.	Mheep Narain Singh & others	Bussuntpur	Do.	52	2
5.	Kashee Pershad Sahu & others	Dokna Chukna	Besara	25	2
6.	Raj Keshwar Singh & others	Bara Dawoud	Ruttee	4	2
7.	Kashi Prasad & others ...	Laloo Chaprah	Do.	4	2
8.	Ansrai Rai & others ...	Fattahabad	Do.	4	
9.	Bhrigunath Singh & others ...	Ghornebah	Do.	3	2
10.	Goodar Singh & others ...	Roopewlee	Besara	8	2
11.	Baboo Jagarnath Singh & others ...	Dhurfaree	Ruttee	25	2
12.	Baboo Jagarnath Singh & others ...	Dhurfaree	Do.	5	2

(13) From H. L. Dampier to the Commissioner of Circuit, Patna, dated the 27th July, 1858.

No.	Name of Mallick (Proprietor)	Name of Mauzah	Name of Paragunnah	No. of men supplied	No. of horses supplied
1	2	3	4	5	6
13.	Munshee Oudh Bihar Lall ...	Paroo	Ruttee	4	2
14.	Baboo Sankar Singh & others	Madhopur	Do.	10	2
15.	Baboo Ruthpaul Singh B. Palakdhari Singh ...	Bungrah	Guddrshoin	200	2
16.	Mir Himmut Ali Moulvi Sheir Ali ...	Talloka Kharee Zakun	Do.	200	2
17.	Babu Kishundeo Narain Singh	Huleempoor	Do.	30	
18.	Isreedut ...	Talloka	Do.	25	
19.	Issurdeep Singh ...	Pursaunee	Do.	25	
20.	Baboo Sheopershun Singh ...	Hurdee	Besarah	17	
21.	Baboo Tilukdhary Sahi ...	Sanda	Do.	5	
22.	Md. Tecky Khan ...	Taluka Bund-rag	Do.	8	
23.	Mehanth Ramesar Geer ...	Buboorhun	Do.	3	
24.	Mr. H. Hudson ...	Kirwalpoorah	Factory	50	
25.	Petty zamindars in the neighbourhood of Gunduck ...			200	
				10,854	28

Several other Zamindars in north Bihar, including the Rajah of Bettiah and the Raja of Hathwa, gave considerable help to the English.

But the Company's Government were also suspicious of some prominent Zamindars of Bihar as being in some way or other, connected with the movement. Some letters (14) from the Magistrate of Tirhut to the Commissioner of Patna show that the Maharaja of Darbhanga was suspected of making preparations against the Company. The reasons for it were that he had maintained "a large number of upcountry men in his service" and a trench was being excavated round his palace buildings. It appears that the Maharajah was prevented from digging the trench.(15)

The Magistrate of Shahabad, Mr. W. C. Wake, had complaints against the Shahabad Zamindars for not rendering him the sort of assistance he expected from them. Thus he mentioned in his report to the Commissioner of Patna, dated the 14th October, 1857:—

"The Principal Zemindars in this district are the Rajah of Doomraon, Baboo Rameshwar Bux Singh, his brother, his Dewan Ramjeevun Singh and Ram Koomar Singh the dewan's nephew of Sooroojpoorah. The Baboo Koer Sing of Jugdispore. The Baboo Umur Singh his brother of Motaha. The Baboo Reetbunjan Singh his nephew of Dullipore. Dulein Achiraj Koer of Kukeela widow of Raja Puttee Singh, brother to Koer Singh. Ramgolam Singh of Nokha. Of these I have to report that the Rajah of Doomraon both before and at the time of the late disturbance played a supine and much pusillanimous part, he could not have been ignorant of the Baboo's (Kunwar Singh's) intentions, and it is said and is most probable that the Baboo sought

(14) Dated 2nd December, 1857 and 15th May, 1858.

(15) *Ibid.*

pecuniary assistance from him at any rate Koer Singh's emissaries were all over the district endeavouring to gain adherents, and whether himself personally solicited or not he must have known of such proceedings. Yet with the knowledge of what was about to occur he never gave me the slightest warning, nor until I spoke to his *mooktiars* on the subject did he offer me the slightest assistance at a time when the disturbances up country and the known disaffection of the Dinapore Regiments had put all the *budmashes* in the district on the 'quiver', and deserters and mutineers were pouring into it. After my message he sent in 100 '*bahulias*' and some few *Sowars*. But when that he did not apprehend or give information concerning a single deserter, though his estates teem with sepoys from nearly every Regiment in the Service. I sent back his men and instructed him to show his loyalty by maintaining all peace on his own land and apprehending all deserters or mutineers who resorted to them. Not one however did he send in though he made a great show of assisting me by sending me numbers of sepoys on leave furnished with certification. While the rebels were actually in arms in the district he appears to have remained neutral and fled from Doomraon until he heard of the retreat of the rebels from Arrah.

Major Eyre complained of the scanty assistance rendered by him when his force marched through Doomraon to the relief of Arrah. But it is probable that many of his elephants etc. had already been taken by the Baboos. Although he would take no active part against the British Government, he appears to have been fool enough to think that Koer Sing would be successful and was afraid to oppose him in any thing.

There is however no direct evidence to his having given him any assistance, nor as yet any of his villages having joined the rebels, and only a very few appear to have been guilty of plunder. From the date of the defeat of the rebels he has rendered me every assistance except the very important one of apprehending offenders and mutineers, but his villagers have remained quiet and abstained from the plundering that has gone on in several other parts of the district and I am inclined to believe that he really has not sufficient influence on his estate to enable him to interfere with a class which forms so large a proportion of its inhabitants. Since I have been in the district he never has rendered any material assistance to the police, and I long ago reported to Mr. Taylor that his conduct in this respect called for his interference. He should certainly be distinctly warned that the holder of so large a Zamindaree cannot be allowed to ignore his responsibilities as he has hitherto done.

The same remarks apply to Dewan Ramjeevan Singh and his nephew Ram Koomar Sing. The Conduct of Baboo Koer Sing and his brother Umur Sing need no comments in this report, as they are still in open rebellion against the British Government. Koer Sing's nephew Baboo Reetbunjan Sing saved the life of Mr. Samuells East Indian writer in the Collectorate who reported that Reetbunjun had not joined Koer Sing and in consequence of that statement immediately after the defeat of the rebels at Jugdishpore, I despatched a messenger to him with a letter calling on him, if loyal, at once to repair to our camp. My messenger was absent for some weeks and on

his return gave back to me my letter opened and stated that Reetbhunjun had joined Koer Sing, that he the messenger had previously delivered the letter to one of his servants at his residence at Dulloopore who after two hours brought it back to him open with a message said to be from Reetbunjun that he the messenger should know all about it in a week. There is however no evidence to his having joined Koer Sing and I think it unlikely that he has fled from fright.

On the rest there is nothing to report. They have rendered me no assistance, nor do they appear to have been connected in any way with the disturbance.

With the exception of Ramgolam Sing of Nokha who is said to have collected 'russad' for the 5 Irregulars I am now investigating truth of this report.

Not one Zemindar great or small in the whole of Shahabad proper rendered the slightest assistance to Government before or at the time of the disturbances and with the exception of the Rajah of Doomraon, have offered any since. Neither at any time has, a single deserter been apprehended, through their means. A few of the smaller ones have preferred the loan of their elephants to proceed up country, but all my returns calling for them on this subject have not come in."

Suspensions were entertained by the Company's officers in Bihar also of the Rani of Tikari in the Gaya district. The Commissioner of Patna was for demolishing the fort of Tikari and removing the Rani to Patna. The Lieutenant Governor did not approve of these measures but guns and ammunition found at Tikari were seized.(16)

K. K. DATTA

East India Company's 'Investment' Policy in the 18th Century.

THE East India Company's purchases in India acquired the name of Investment. This may be described as the public trade of the Company. This Investment was mainly provided by *dadni* (1) merchants. There was also a considerable amount of ready money Investment. The most important *dadni* merchants were the Seths and Basaks at Sutanati. They had preference over others in the *dadni* business because they had lived long in Calcutta and were under the protection of the English. They acted as brokers to the East India Company in their *dadni* business in the seventeenth as also in the first half of the eighteenth Century. Omichund (Amir Chand) was also a prominent *Dadni* merchant of Calcutta in the forties of the eighteenth century. In his early days he had attached himself to one of the Seths. He made his fortune under the aegis of his patron Bostom Das Seth and became his partner in *dadni* business. He set himself up as an independent *dadni* merchant and gradually succeeded in ousting many competitors from the Company's *dadni* Investment business. In 1751-52 the notable *dadni* merchants in Calcutta were Gopinath Seth, Ramkrishna Seth, Lakshmi Kanta Seth, Sobharam Basak, Omichund and the Cotmahs.

In 1748 the Calcutta Council could persuade the merchants to contract for *dadni* and ready money goods for about 30 lakhs of rupees.(2) We get full details of East India Company's Investment in 1751-52 on the eve of the abandonment of the policy of Investment through *dadni* merchants—

Dadni Contracts	1,053,756
Ready money goods	352,054
Account Saltpetre	265,670
Subordinate Factories—			
Cossimbazar	568,400
Dacca	840,390
Jugdea	252,880
Bullamgery	32,900
Total			3,366,050 (3)

Saltpetre, like piecegoods was also provided by contract and Omichund was the most important saltpetre contractor. Most of the ready money goods

(1) *dadni* means advance money. This was paid to the merchants to enable them to make advances to the Weavers.

(2) To Court 26 July, 1748.

(3) Ibid. 20 August, 1751, p. 34.

were also provided by *dadni* merchants. They had their dalals in different centres. In the subordinate factories the Senior Merchants in charge of Investment also depended on local Indian *dadni* merchants for the provision of their share of Investment.

Why was this system of Investment by contract with *dadni* merchants abandoned? The Court of Directors having no local knowledge readily confirmed this decision of their servants in India on the following grounds—the bad circumstances of the generality of the merchants, their notorious non-compliance with their contracts, their obstinacy and insolence in their treaty for the Investment of 1753.(4)

In 1751-52 when the *dadni* merchants attended the Board to begin their Investment for the current year they were asked on what terms "they would contract for the year's Investment. They replied that they could not think of entering into new contracts until the accounts were adjusted and they gave us the same answer the 1st, 15th, 18th and 22nd April and in this obstinate refusal they continued till the 27th May when with the utmost difficulty we prevailed on them to sign their accounts".(5) The *dadni* merchants refused to agree to any deduction from the contract price as "the French and the Dutch having made large contracts for them have enhanced their prices." The *dadni* contractors proposed "contracting on the same terms as last year viz. one third ready money and two thirds *dadni* to be allowed interest on the former from the 1st June and interest on the 50% *dadni* to commence from the 15th June and on the remaining 35% from the 1st October. We told them that if it should happen we could not advance them the 35% in October we should give them notes at interest for the amount there was delay in contracting for it. For raw silk the merchants were more or less the same as in the previous year for *dadni* and ready money goods. For saltpetre Omichund's offer of 5 Arcot rupees and 14 annas per factory maund had to be accepted though the Calcutta Council wanted it at the rate of Arcot 5-4 per maund. They had to yield because they were apprehensive that the French or the Dutch would purchase this petre if there was delay in contracting for it. For raw silk the merchants were reported to have demanded 'extravagant prices' for the French, Dutch and Gujratis were buying up at a very high price. It was with great difficulty that Sobharam Basak, Ramkrishna Seth, the Cotmahs and other *dadni* merchants could be persuaded to agree to have the contract of raw silk. After this when the time came for the delivery of the cotton piecegoods the merchants brought in their cloth very slow. They complained that on account of the strictness in sorting they lost on Gurrahs and soot rumals "from 20 to 25% for which they wrote to their dalals" to whom they advanced *dadni* to deduct the like amount out of the cloth and have received for answer they will not send them any more of the kind of goods on those terms".(7) They

(4) From Court Serial No. 1 1755-58, page 15, para 46.

(5) To Court 1751-52, Vol. 3, paras 46-54.

(6) Ibid, 20 August, 1751, pp. 41-43.

(7) Ibid.

added that the French and Dutch merchants being well supplied with money early in the season had raised the price of cloth at the *aurungs*. They had therefore forbidden their *gomostahs* to buy in the hope that the cloth would be cheaper. But the Calcutta Council thought this delay was intentionally made in order that they might not have sufficient time for sorting and grading. The *dadni* merchants were told that all cloth brought in after the 21st January should be cut in the *prizing*.⁽⁸⁾ It should be stated that *dadni* merchants contracted under penalties to deliver the goods at stated times and prices and were amenable to the laws of the country when they were guilty of any irregular practices.

This was the conduct of the *dadni* merchants referred to by the Court of Directors. From the internal evidence of British records it appears that the *dadni* merchants themselves were not very eager to do business for the English East India Company and considered that the provision of goods for the French and Dutch was more lucrative and more convenient. Even in 1750-51 they had obstinately refused to accept British terms. No one would claim for the *dadni* merchants that they were an extraordinarily honest set of people but they practically refused to work for the English East India Company on the Company's terms. As the French and the Dutch did not encounter any difficulty in making provision for their investment through *dadni* merchants those who did this business for the English were not perhaps entirely to blame for this 'obstinacy and insolence'. There was some difficulty in realising the balances from these merchants after the *dadni* contract system had ended. Most of them in the end gave the cloth due to them as ready money goods.⁽⁹⁾

The Court of Directors expressed their appreciation of the new Investment system which followed. *Gomostahs* or paid Indian agents of the Company made their purchases under the direct supervision of the European 'servants of the Company'. The Directors even enquired whether the Investments in the subordinate settlements particularly Cossimbazar could be made in the same manner as at Calcutta.⁽¹⁰⁾ The success of the new method of providing Investment by *gomostahs* continued to receive praise. But at the same time the Directors had their suspicions and they told the Calcutta Council that "their servants' future conduct should be well looked after and scrutiny made into their past management."⁽¹¹⁾ We would not be wrong if we say that abuse of *dustuck* increased very much under this system and Siraj-ud-daula had to take cognisance of it. From the reply of Durga Charan Mitra, a banian, to the complaint of the Prussian Company trading to the East Indies, we get some idea of the trade in *dustucks* 'to secure freedom from any Moors' duties in the passage.'⁽¹²⁾ It was not until 1758 that the Directors became aware of the fact "that the *dustucks* have been scandalously prostituted this perhaps may have been one of the fatal

(8) Ibid.

(9) To Court, 1753-54, p. 57.

(10) From Court, 11 February, 1756, pp. 61, 172 & 173.

(11) From Court, 31 January, 1755, p. 56.

(12) Calcutta Mayor's Court Records, 1758.

causes of your late calamities." (13) The Directors were not very wrong. The abuse of *dustucks* no doubt partly contributed to the growth of misunderstanding between Siraj-ud-Daula and the British and the provision of investment by *gomostahs* instead of *dadni* merchants must have very considerably increased this abuse. (13a) The East India Company's investment did not suffer. The Court of Directors did not complain in 1756 or in 1757 about quality, price and quantity and only expressed their hope that the same attention and care would be kept up "as has been hitherto shown." The private trade of the Company's servants no doubt increased as a consequence of the abandonment of the *dadni* merchant system but as yet this increase was not at the expense of the Company. The chief sufferer was the 'Moorish Government' and the rival Indian traders.

In March 1757 the Directors wrote, "great complaints have been made for some time past of the decay of trade in Bengal. You must give us your reply." In February 1758 the Calcutta Council wrote in reply that the complaint was not without foundation. They assigned the following reasons for this decline—The ruin of some of the principal marts abroad, the exactions of the late Subadars of Bengal, the high duties collected at the ports the British traded to in other parts of India, increase of the number of purchasers in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the competition of the French settled at Chandernagore and the great quantities of sugar made by the Dutch at Batavia and carried to Surat and the Gulf of Persia. (14)

This was Calcutta Council's analysis of the causes of the decline of Bengal's trade. The mention of French competition indicates that the period before Plassey was meant. Nowhere is there any reference to the decline of the Company's investment. There was only constriction of private trade of the servants of the East India Company in some directions. At the same time the increase of the number of country purchasers of Bengal goods and increased French and Dutch competition are referred to. The "obscure and unsung" British soldier of fortune engaged in the coastal trade of India was no doubt faced with a very difficult situation. The invoice value of raw silk, piecegoods and sugar imported to Surat from Bengal was ten lakhs in 1740. It dwindled to one lakh in 1750. (15) At the same time Bengal no longer imported raw cotton in such large quantities from Surat. Mirzapur now became a mart for the supply of raw cotton to Bengal from other parts of India. The British country traders after some time found a very profitable opening in the opium trade with China. But before this trade with China could develop the dwindled volume of coastal trade made them naturally very anxious and there was so much talk about the decay of trade in Bengal. But this talk of economic decline of Bengal before Plassey is a myth. The

(13) From Court, 3rd March, 1758, p. 147.

(13a) After the defeat of Siraj-ud-doula in 1756 he was made to engage that "he or his officers should on no account interfere with the *gomostas* of the English but that care should be taken that their business not be obstructed in any way."

(14) To Court 27 February, 1758, p. 25.

(15) Furber, *John Company at Work*, p. 163.

increasing prosperity of overland trade and export trade with Europe more than compensated for the decline of coastal trade in Bengal. The growing abuse of dustuck, ousting of other rivals from the inland trade of Bengal the attempt made by topmen in East India Company's service to induce Naib Nazim Muhammad Reza Khan to distribute Surat cotton among zamindars and an extraordinary 30% duty levied on cotton in the borders of Bihar—all these things after Plassey explain how British private traders attempted to dominate the economy of Bengal outside the sphere of Company's Investment. It was their trade which had declined before Plassey.

It may be argued that the East India Company also reduced their dividend from 8 to 6 p.c. about the end of 1755. But it should be pointed out that even in the year before Plassey 21 English ships arrived safe from India to England with cargoes valued in the English market at 2 millions sterling.(16) The East India Company's export trade from Bengal did not diminish in value to any extent. But their expenses in India had increased very considerably on account of their disputes with the French Company in India. They had also to maintain quite a big army in India. For all these extraordinary expenses reduction of the Company's dividend was perhaps inevitable.

But what were the consequences of Plassey on Investment policy? Though the East India Company did not ask Mir Jafar to grant any new trade privileges their servants began to exploit their privileged position and claimed exemption from duties on all articles in their private trade. The gomostahs of the servants of the Company took the fullest advantage of this privileged position. This large scale privileged invasion of inland trade of Bengal brought huge profits to the servants of the Company and other European companies in Bengal found themselves in a position to utilise this illgotten wealth for their Investment purposes. On the English East India Company's Investment policy the first noticeable change caused by the events of 1757 was that it was no longer necessary to import bullion for Investment. French rivalry in the field of Investment did not exist from 1757 to 1763 and the English Company's servants in India had no difficulty in absorbing this French Investment and increasing the quantity of the Company's Investment from thirty three to fifty three lakhs. But payments were made by Mir Jafar to the Company on a generous scale. One crore was actually paid under the treaty of June 1757, 30 lakhs were paid under the treaty of July 1763. Mir Jafar's deposition in 1760 brought to the Company the revenues of Burdwan, Midnapore and Chittagong yielding an income of 50 lakhs a year. They had also their zamindari income from the Twenty-four Parganas. Thus the East India Company's Investment no longer stood in need of the import of bullion. In the words of the Court of Directors the produce of their sales in England became the channel of their receipts in India.(17) When they got the Diwani in 1765 their surplus revenue was more than sufficient for Investment except of course in times of war.

(16) Macpherson—*Annals of Commerce*, Vol. III, p. 306.

(17) From Court—3 December, 1760.

(In 1757, 1760 and 1763 three successive revolutions in Bengal brought to big men in East India Company's service huge presents in cash and kind as also donations by private treaties. Even the juniormost writer engaged in private trade caught the contagion of get-rich-quick feeling.) It was no longer 'small private commerce to acquire moderate independency', (18) as it was in the days before Plassey. Mir Qasim wrote to Vansittart "Near four or five hundred new factories have been established in my dominions. I suffer a yearly loss of near 25 lakhs of rupees." Their banians and gomastahs compelled merchants and shopkeepers to take goods at 30, 40 or 50% above the market price. (This illgotten wealth had to be remitted home. But the East India Company would not let them remit their fortunes through their channel. Nor would their servants think it prudent to do so because that would give their masters an idea of the extent of their rapidly acquired fortune. The foreign nations—the Dutch at Chinsura, the Danes at Serampore and the French at Chandernagore after the Treaty of Paris, took advantage of this state of things. As the English Company did not open their door for remittances by their servants the Dutch and the French found it unnecessary to import bullion any more.) Verelst wrote, "The extent of the Dutch and French credit exceeds all conception and their bills are even solicited as favours I have the most certain information that their treasuries at Pondichery and Chandernagore are amply furnished with provision for both their investments and expenses for three years to come." (20) (Thus began a drain of wealth from Bengal totalling the combined Investments of the English, the Dutch and the French and the Danes as also the privileged trade of the officers of the East India Company's ships. It was very natural for Verelst to write that the decline of Bengal's economic condition "was neither sensibly felt by the Country nor perceptible to us till after the Revolution in favour of Meer Jaffier." (21) For more than two centuries the Europeans had found that the trade with Bengal whether carried on by individuals, Company or by illicit means had always been so much in favour of Bengal that the balance had to be supplied in cash. Now after Plassey supplies were at last found in Bengal 'by means independent of Commerce.' The former channels of opulence to the country began to stagnate. The trade of the country merchant was interrupted. The Armenian, Mughal, Gujrati and Bengali merchants found their free trade daily fettered and loaded. Before Plassey every year there was an increase of specie almost equal to the amount of the export trade of the country. There was no doubt a drain in the form of tribute to the Mughal Emperor and the wealth carried from Bengal by Mughal mansabdars. But Murshid Quli Khan had got rid of most of the Mughal noblemen enjoying sinecures in Bengal and the extensive banking business of the house of Jagat Seth with its branches in Patna, Delhi and other places outside Bengal had practically stopped remittance of bullion

(18) To Court, 25 September, 1768, p. 20.

(19) Vansittart—*Narrative*, Vol. II, pp. 97-102.

(20) To Court, 25 September, 1768, p. 13.

(21) To Court, 5 April, 1769.

from Bengal after 1728.(22) The surplus income of their Kuthis outside Bengal was quite sufficient for the payment of tribute to the Mughal Emperor by hundis. The custom house books at Murshidabad in Alivardi Khan's time showed an entry of 70 lakhs in raw silk "exclusive of the European Investment which was not registered in them as being either duty free or paying at Hooghly." The luxury and pomp of the Muslim princes encouraged a spirit of expense and large sums thus found their way into the hands of the artisans. Verelst who knew the condition of Bengal before Plassey very well gave the following description of the state of things in the days of Alivardi Khan—"the farmer was easy, the artisan encouraged, the merchant enriched and the prince satisfied." (23)

Import of bullion almost entirely ceased not long after the battle of Plassey and export of bullion for aiding other Presidencies and for helping China trade began almost systemically. The Directors wanted Bengal to supply 24 lakhs for China investment in 1770 and the same amount in 1771. They wrote, "no excuse can avail our respective presidencies in withholding any assistance that can possibly be derived from our acquisitions and revenues." (24) In 1759 the Directors ordered that bills of exchange beyond £20,000 in one year shall at no time be granted from Bengal. But they were at last persuaded in 1769 to open their treasury and allow their servants to draw upon them for £200,000 and beyond that sum for the whole amount of specie which they might be able to send to China. The Directors' main inducement in opening their treasury was that they would have it in their power to export to China as much as the country would bear. They hoped that the supply to China would be considerable notwithstanding the scarcity of silver in Bengal about which complaints were reaching their ears.(25) Their servants in Bengal insisted that "some other mode of supply to China may be thought of." (26) The Calcutta Council was, during these years, grappling with the problem of scarcity of silver, and they were forced to write to the Directors that a further remittance to China it was entirely out of their power to supply. The stock of silver in Bengal in 1757 was not only not replenished but much of it was drained in various ways. In their endeavour to solve this problem of scarcity of silver the Calcutta Council tried to introduce bimetallism but gold being overvalued the experiment ended in failure. All that the Directors would do to ease the situation was to permit their servants in India to "confine the drafts to some degree of proportion with Investment." They were permitted to increase remittance from Bengal by bills of exchange to the extent of 1/3 of the sum by which Investment sent to England exceeded 60 lakhs in piecegoods and rawsilk at the rate of 2s. 3d. the current rupee. It was hoped that this arrangement would compel rival European companies to import some bullion to Bengal.

(22) House of Jagat Seth—*Bengal Past and Present*, 1921.

(23) To Court—5 April, 1769, p. 6, 7.

(24) From Court—10 November, 1769.

(25) From Court, 30th June, 1769.

(26) To Court 28 March, 1768.

The bond debt of the Company in Bengal in 1769 was only £351,817. In 1773 it amounted to no less than £1,547,448. In the opinion of the Directors the advance of price paid for the Bengal Investment was the principal cause of the increase of this bond debt. (The increase of price on the manufactures of Bengal began about 1769. This was due in the opinion of the Directors to the extraordinary measure of purchasing goods at Calcutta and granting bonds payable in twelve months bearing interest at 8%.) Some extraordinary expenses between 1769-1773 necessitated this purchasing of goods on credit. This increase of price did not of course reach the silk winders and cotton weavers. The weavers at Santipur complained against gomastahs for the low price paid for the Company's Investment which was below the market price. "The yarn costs him as much as even more than he gets for the cloth." (27) The number of spinners was greatly reduced by the famine of 1770. Therefore the yarn was 25% dearer than formerly. But the value of the cloths remained the same, for although the rates were rather higher than before when the gomastahs came to appraise the cloths they threw them into the lower class. (The enhanced price was thus intercepted by the middleman, the lion's share going naturally to those who were in charge of the Company's aurungs. The famine of 1770 could not interrupt this moneymaking at the expense of the Company and the weaver. As a consequence of the famine there was some diminution of revenues.) But the Directors were justified in writing "when we consider that bills were drawn on us about this time for one million sixty three pounds sterling we cannot but be of opinion that so great an addition to our common resources must have been more than equivalent to such diminution of revenue." (28) (The Court appeared to be so ignorant of the state of things in India that they believed they would be able to improve their Investment position in India by creating a Board of Trade and by preventing their servants from trading in any of those articles which composed their Investment directly or indirectly except on account of and for the East India Company until Investment was completed.(29))

(The agency system was established in 1753.) When the Court of Directors expressed their approval in 1755 they wanted that a supervising committee should be immediately formed. (Until 1770 the aurungs were under a Committee called a Committee of the Aurungs and the President of the Committee was the Second in Council.) But the Export Ware House Keeper had practically the sole management, the Committee only signing public letters and despatches of treasure. When the Court passed an order prohibiting members of the Council from holding posts at the Presidency (a Controlling Committee of Commerce was established,) the Export Ware House Keeper still managing the Calcutta aurungs. (Very soon, however, a Controller of the Investment was appointed who took up a considerable position of supervision work. Subsequently by the Court's order of 29th March, 1774 a Board of Trade was established composed of eleven senior servants of the Company.)

(27) The account of the aumeen and one of the weavers of Santipur, 12 April, 1773.

(28) From Court—3 March, 1775, p. 21.

(29) Ibid.

Samuel Middleton was appointed. President with seven other members resident at Calcutta and four Chiefs of subordinates or Residents at aurungs. The President was given a salary of £2,000 sterling per annum and the other members £1,500 a year. They were not to get any other emolument "except such advantages as may arise from carrying on a legal trade." (30) In 1776 the Court directed that the Board shall entirely have under them the executive part of the business and only the amount of the Investment be subject to the control of the Supreme Council. The Directors expected that in this way it would be possible to obviate some of the grossest abuses. They were destined to be disillusioned.

The Directors became very much anxious to put an end to Bengal's gradual economic decline which had gone on for some years past. Even before the constitution of the Board of Trade they had given certain instructions to the Calcutta Council which they hoped would stem the rot and give a new turn. They wanted to revive the mode of providing Investment by contract with *dadni* merchants. "Make your contracts as extensive as possible"—this was their injunction. If necessary, ready money purchases were to be made to supply the deficiencies of contracts. To secure general freedom of trade it was proclaimed that no servant of any rank or station was "to enjoy the exclusive privilege of dustucks—not only dustucks but rowanahs, perwanahs, orders, letters or favours which can in any way yield an influence or superiority." (31) It was the confirmed belief of the Directors that commerce languished because of the privileges of their servants.

The Court wanted to go back to the state of things before 1753—*dadni* merchants providing their Investment and in private trade fair field and no favour. They hoped that this policy would give encouragement to the country merchants which was very much necessary. But the Court was unable to break down the entrenchments of the privileged private trade of their servants in India. The Governor in Council wrote back that this policy, if given effect to, would create a monopoly upon extravagant terms, would involve immediate loss of the balances, debasement of quality and deficiency in quantity. They therefore suspended the execution of the order. The helpless Court of Directors contented themselves with saying "Although this design has proved unsuccessful we have the satisfaction to reflect that it must ever remain as a testimony of our intentional justice and humanity." They added in despair, "almost every attempt . . . for the reforming of abuses have rather increased them and added to the miseries of the country." (32) Their next step was the creation of the Board of Trade already referred to. But that again only placed the abuses which they had wanted to remove on more stable foundations.

The amount of Investment steadily increased to about six million current rupees in 1767. It was ten millions in 1777. The price of Investment goods was fraudulently advanced by the Board of Trade during some years but

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 27.

(31) From Court, 1771 Serial no. 13A, pp. 35-42.

(32) *Ibid.* 7th April, 1773, p. 21.

with the exception of some war years the Investment figures normally averaged nine millions and even in 1793 Investment totalled Rs. 1,09,59,130. The two principal articles comprising Investment were raw silk and cotton piecegoods. In 1793 raw silk Investment was C. Rs. 25,86,847 and cotton piecegoods C. Rs. 67,68,408. Thus nine tenths of Investment consisted in piecegoods and rawsilk. During war years the sum allotted to Investment had to be reduced but subscription Investment made up for this reduction. In 1793 cotton piecegoods numbering 8,39,905 pieces were exported, in 1795 8,67,040 pieces.(33)

Investment had thus become more or less a permanent system, one of the main links in the connection between Great Britain and India—"the investing this surplus and our other funds in India in goods marketable in Europe". The Directors felt at times that they were perhaps bringing too large an amount of the revenues in goods for which no return was made. They were, however, told that mischief might arise from any considerable reduction of the sums which were annually distributed among manufacturers as the reward of their labour and ingenuity. Another line of argument was that "goods must be exported from Bengal or the revenue in Britain must greatly suffer." (34)

Another aspect of Investment policy deserves to be noticed. The Directors wrote in March 1768 that it was in the increase of raw silk that they chiefly depended for the bringing home their revenues—"the importation being a national benefit and the consumption more unlimited than that of manufactured goods." Again in March 1769 the Court of Directors wrote, "we would have you endeavour to induce the manufacturers of wrought silk to quit that branch and take to the winding of raw silk." Their directions were positive. "In the purchase of silk from the first hands we recommend you to give an increased price, if necessary, so as to take the trade out of the hands of other merchants of Cossimbazar to prevent the Sardars from winding off silk in their houses. Should this practice through inattention have been suffered to take place again it will be proper to put a stop to it which may now be more effectually done by an absolute prohibition under severe penalties by the authority of the Government." (35) In this connection we should consider the statements of Bolts that the winders of raw silk called Nagads had been treated with such injustice that instances were known of their cutting off their thumbs to prevent their being forced to wind silk.(36). It was already a well-known fact that the Directors wanted to increase their Investment of rawsilk and during the period of Clive's second Governorship in Bengal "it was a common thing for the Company's sepoys to be sent by force of arms to break open the houses of the Armenian merchants established at Sydahad (who have from time immemorial, been largely concerned in the silk trade) and forcibly take the Nagads from their work and carry them away to the

(33) Progs. Board of Trade, 7 July, 1793.

(34) From Court, 29 August, 1781.

(35) From October . . . 17 March, 1769, pp. 30-35.

(36) Bolts, pp. 194-195.

English factory." (37) Raw silk was during the years 1758-68 merely a profitable Investment item. But by 1769 the procuring of raw silk for the manufacture of Great Britain became "a great national object" in the words of the Court of Directors. To procure the greatest quantity of raw silk for the manufacture of Great Britain it was necessary to prepare it duly and properly for the British markets so that it could obtain a preference of the foreign and imported silk. The defects in Bengal wound silk—inequality and frequent breaks—were sought to be removed and attempts to be made to wound off at once from the cocoons into skeins of such quality and dimensions as would fit Bengal threads for European markets like Chinese and Italian raw silk. The East India Company's increasing Investment in raw silk opened an inlet to private trade. The pykars bought with the cash advanced for the provision of Investment large quantities of raw silk which was declared unfit for the Company's Investment and was afterwards sent to those in charge of Investment at Cossimbazar as private trade.(38)

The price of raw silk very much increased as a consequence of the famine of 1770 which swept off multitudes of those who bred silk worms. To the obstinate influence of the pykars over the Chassars (who bred silk worms) was also attributed the rise of the price of silk goods, but they acted mainly as the agents of private traders, who were mostly servants of the Company. Restriction of private trade in putney (39) which the Directors wanted was declared by their servants in Bengal as prejudicial to the revenue of the country because "the produce of raw silk is in general to a much larger amount than the Company have funds to produce allowing at the same time for supplies to the other branches of Investment and for the charges attending their Civil, Military and Marine Department".(40) The Directors however insisted that no private trader be permitted to purchase silk of any kind or quality whatever at any aurung from which the Company's Investment was supplied but that all such private trader must seek other aurungs.(41)

Another feature of Investment position in the sixties and seventies of the eighteenth century should be noticed. The Dutch and the French wanted to put an end to interminable wrangling with the British about piecegoods investment by demanding a partition of weavers. The proposal was rejected by the Calcutta Council on the following grounds—"This would be to throw off the mask and acknowledge ourselves the sovereigns of the country . . . the disproportion of hands necessary to form their investment and yours would appear so great that we could not accept the proposals without confessing all that policy requires should be concealed." (42) A proposal was later made by Chevalier of Chandernagore that the Investment of the two

(37) Ibid.

(38) From Court—23 March, 1770.

(39) Putney—the act of ordering goods from a manufacturer as opposed to filature silk.

(40) Home Public General letter to Court, 1770-71.

(41) From Court—23 March, 1770, p. 47.

(42) To Court—14 September, 1767, p. 62.

companies be provided at the Calcutta aurungs by the same merchants. As the French Company no longer existed and French trade was confined to private traders the Court commented on the absurdity of the proposal. They added "It is our desire that you take care not to violate the faith of treaties and that you live in good terms with the French so far as it may be practicable but that it is no less our wish to supplant them as far as we may safely and prudently do it in their Commerce." (43)

Before the constitution of the Board of Trade Investment was provided by the servants of the East India Company in the aurungs with the help of the gomostahs. In theory the servants of the Company did not get any commission or profit, the advantages which they derived from private trade being regarded as sufficient inducement for their exertion. As early as 1760 the Court of Directors had written "It is a well-known fact that our Chiefs at subordinates gain full twenty per cent upon the goods they provide the private traders" (44) and they added "even a writer trades for many thousands when at the same time he has often not real credit for a hundred rupees." They referred again in 1773 to the monopoly of commerce by the Chiefs and others at the subordinate agencies. (When the Board of Trade became established in 1774 it gradually became the practice to procure Investment by contract in which the "the Company from time to time acquiesced on the recommendation of their commercial servants under an idea of its being the most advantageous to the Company." (45) These contracts were made by the Board of Trade principally with their Chiefs at the Subordinates and other Europeans. Wherever Indians appeared as contractors they were either trustees for the Company's servants or made them certain payments out of the profits from contracts. Prices became extravagant and quality deteriorated.) This was particularly so in the case of raw silk. The Directors wrote in April 1786, "the Company's goods produced but 1s. 10d. per current rupee whilst private goods after deducting 15% netted upon an average 2s. 6d. per current rupee although our Investment was procured under every advantage that influence could give it and goods for Captains and officers by an unsupported individual." (46) The Directors became so exasperated that they filed suits in equity in England against some of their servants who had been contractors under the Board of Trade—Aldersey, Dacres, Chapman, Lucas. (The Board of Trade was reconstituted by Cornwallis and all their proceedings became subject to the superintendence and control of the Governor General & Council. For the Investment of 1786-87 the proposals of the 'natives' were rejected.) (47) On 22 January 1787 Lord Cornwallis wrote a minute in which he decided to reintroduce the Agency system. The Directors later expressed their approval.)

After 1757 circumstances shaped in such a way that Agency or Contract

(43) From Court—Serial no. 13, 1769-70, p. 50.

(44) From Court, 23 March, 1759, p. 102.

(45) From Court, April, 1786.

(46) Ibid.

(47) From Court, 22 December, 1786.

did not matter much so far as the Indians (natives) were concerned. Contracts with the Company did almost always fall into the hands of the Europeans or of Indians acting for Europeans. The reasons assigned by the Board of Trade are significant—"the Europeans have little communication with natives who are not in some shape servants, public or private or dependants. Social communication with them cannot exist while the use of the same common language, the advantage of ready perusal and comprehension of advertisements, which though translated are scarcely seen or known in the interior of the Country; the familiar and social intercourse with each other of the respectable part of the European community, the connections of friendship and consanguinity added to the perhaps insensible but forcible natural attachment and regard as countrymen are in a manner decisive of the exclusion of the natives. . . . the Board are sensible that though they have individually been each of them upwards of twenty years in India these causes operate upon themselves and they think it their duty to state them." (48)

The servants of the East India Company were mainly responsible for Investment either directly or indirectly as agents or as contractors. Charles Grant gives an idea of his profits as a contractor of Malda and Buddaul Investment. He wrote, "In consequence of a general resolution I was called on to contract. I then stated real original prices of which the provision made by myself formed the basis and upon these I required for every kind of risk to which a contract exposed me 10 or 12 per cent. Money was at first advanced. This was the condition of the contract, afterwards orders on the treasury payable as the state of it would admit was substituted and the realisation of these was tedious and uncertain but lastly paper only under the express regulation of a distinct period was given. Interest on private loan with the best security has risen to 12 p.c. and the discount on that paper given for the Investment has run up as high as 18 p.c. the discount on the paper that will be issued for the next Investment cannot be reckoned at less than 20 p.c. But I confess that I do not propose to provide the Company's Investment by discounting their paper. My hope is to raise the money necessary on my own credit. For this I shall have to pay the rate of interest now common 12 per cent per annum besides being obliged to transact my money affairs by agency which will require 1 p.c. more in all 13 p.c. per annum. Between this percentage and the Company's rate of interest the difference is 5%. I hope this difference may be deemed a reasonable necessary allowance on account of the far greater difference between the market and the denominated value of the Company's paper." (49)

For the Investment of 1787-88 the mode of provision was partly contract partly agency. All the silk aurungs were put under the management of agents. The important cloth Investment centres at Dacca, Luckipore, Santipore and Patna were also placed under the agency system. Only in some of the smaller Investment centres where Investment was very small and "more within the reach of the natives" Indian contractors were allowed to

(48) Progs. Board of Trade, Vol. 103, Part II, 1-29 April, 1793.

(49) Progs. Board of Trade, 23 May, 1786.

continue. In some of the larger avarungs the contract system had to be continued because some contracts were unexpired. (By August 1789 the Board of Trade was in a position to report that "the Agency system (except as to indigo for which the Company have no establishments) is now universal. The manufacturers are in general better paid, the cloths improved and the total cost including commission less than in the last period of contract. The net saving in money exchange of the discount on certificates was 12·9 per cent." (50) The Board of Trade permitted the commercial Agents to trade on their own account because they considered it "inexpedient to attempt the abolition of a privilege so long established". But the extent and conduct of the private trade of the commercial Agents were regulated on certain principles formed into regulations—

- (1) that he ensure the Company's demand for goods before he provides any for himself.
- (2) that he distinguish to the manufacturers between the Company's provision and his own.
- (3) that he shall give them the price for which he chose to deal with them without making the Company's prices a standard for his own.
- (4) that he make no use of any influence to induce the manufacturers for him in preference to other dealers.
- (5) that he be subject to the same regulations in case of disputes as other private traders.
- (6) that he state to the Board of Trade by the 15th December every year the gross amount of money invested or to be invested by him on his own account. (51)

The abolition of dalals in the provision of cloth Investment was one of the principles of the new Agency system. As a consequence the avarung establishments had to be increased. The commission on Investment for piecegoods and rawsilk in 1789 amounted to C. Rs. 3,16,289. Indian names disappear completely from the Investment list, even the small centres at Rangamati and Chittagong being placed under European Residents. By the allotment of 1790 commission on piecegoods Investment amounted to Rs. 2,68,796 and on raw silk to 1,60,778. (52) The Board of Trade remarked in October 1790, "the advantages of the present system of agency are generally admitted, the abuses of native servants in trust checked, the habits of fair dealing order and method daily gaining ground to the happiness of the country and the benefit of the Company." (53)

(The Indian middlemen disappear entirely from Investment procurement. No regret was perhaps felt for them. Most of them were either servants or dependants of members of the East India Company's service. Dalals and pykars were not very numerous in the days before Plassey. They were then registered in the Government books.) In Dacca before Plassey only 9 dalals

(50) Progs. Board of Trade, 23 May, 1786.

(51) Progs. G.-G. in Council, 30 October, 1789.

(52) Progs. Board of Trade, Vol. 84.

(53) Progs. Board of Trade, October 1790, Vol. 88.

and 11 pykars were permitted in the cloth trade. Any other person calling himself dalal or pykar was liable to be punished by Nawab's Daroga of Mulmul Khas Kuthee. They paid 3000 rupees for this privilege. In 1774 Barwell put an end to this restriction and in 1789 there were at least 100 such fellows in Dacca.(54) The state of things at Dacca before the battle of Plassey is best described in the words of Bebb who was Resident at Dacca in 1789—"the manufacturer in treating for the sale of his material and labour could say 'you do not offer me the price sufficient therefore I will not sell this assortment to you' and the purchaser was in a position to say 'you demand too much therefore I will not buy of you unless you will be more reasonable'." Bebb writes, "I find by a factory record of the year 1757 under the signature of two very respectable characters now in England W. B. Sumner and Cartier that it was meant and even specially stipulated with the dalals in consequence of the weavers' complaints that the weavers shall receive the full amount advanced by the Company." (55) After Plassey the weavers were comparatively free only in those areas where the East India Company's Investment and the private trade of the Company's servants were exposed to the full force of foreign competition—Dacca, Cossimbazar, Malda and Santi-pur. Coercion and monopoly gradually developed and led to further and further interception of the weavers' profit by middleman. Before Plassey there was no doubt some interception of the profits of the weavers. But when all is said purchases were made on the whole fairly without any other influence than superior credit. The situation gradually deteriorated. This can be proved by statistics contained in the Proceedings of the Board of Trade.(56) Goodwin at Luckipore collected these statistics in 1775—

Rates paid by the Weavers when Verelst was Chief

16 Gundas in the rupee or 5 p.c.

To the dalal	10	Gundas
For charges	1.2	
For Mohoree	1	
For Charity	1	
Cottah banian	2.2	

16 Gundas

In Rumbold's Chiefship

1 a. or 20 Gundas

Himself	5	
Cottah banian	2.2	
Dalal	10	
His Mohoree	1	
For Charity	1.2	

20

(54) Board of Trade, 6 March, 1789 from Resident at Dacca.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Progs. Board of Trade—3 October, Vol. V, p. 58.

In Wilkins' Residency

Himself	5
Cottah banian	2·2
Under banian	1
Dalal	10
His Mohoree	1
Charity	1·2

1 a. 1 Gundas

In Barton's time—

Himself	7
Cottah banian	2·2
Under banian	2
Dalal	10
His Mohoree	1
Charity	2

1 a. 5 Gundas

Suppose a piece of cloth was priced at Rs. 10/-
deductions made—Dalal & Dustory—1 a. 5.

Pycarry	1—2
Batta	15
Mathout	2

2 Rupees or 20%

The dalal and the pykar intercepted^a a considerable portion of the earnings of the weavers. The Chief or Resident had also his share. The dalal's share did not increase during the period under review but the Chief or Resident began to share in this interception of the earnings of the weavers. He was therefore no longer a check upon the dalal or pykar.

The Court of Directors was made to believe by their servants in India that there were not at that time in Bengal native merchants possessed of property adequate to such undertaking or of credit and responsibility sufficient to make it safe and prudent to trust them.⁽⁵⁷⁾ But it would have been more relevant to assert that in the existing circumstances 'natives' possessed of property were not very willing to take part in the Investment business of the East India Company. Two very substantial 'natives'—Huzuri Mal and Dayal Chand—were appointed managers of a bank brought into existence by Warren Hastings with a view to reforming currency and credit. The venture was financially successful. Its failure was due to the political rivalry between Hastings and Francis. Even in the eighteenth century 'men of substance and character' were not wanting to become security for European contractors—Baranasi Ghosh, Durpanarain Tagore, Madan Dutt, Jainarain Ghosal, Nursing Babu of Cossimbazar and others. In the case of Baranasi Ghose, who was

(57) From Court—3 March, 1775, p. 70.

security for Harris, a European Investment contractor of the Company it was admitted by Cornwallis that 'it was an act of goodwill to Mr. Harris without any adequate interest in the concern'.(58) In the smaller aurungs—Chunderconah, Chandernagore, Cuttora, Barnagore, Serampore—we find Bengali contractors in the Investment lists under the Board of Trade until the days of Cornwallis. The Seths and Basaks were conspicuous *dadni* merchants before 1753. They were not prominent under the Board of Trade though a Seth or a Basak appears now and then in the list of persons submitting proposals for contracts for smaller aurungs. But the list of Bengali merchants making contract offers does not indicate that they were very substantial men. Respectable Indian contractors had almost disappeared from business and the very small number of those who were there were squeezed out in the days of Cornwallis. The case of Akrur Dutt fully illustrates how this was brought about. He was the Company's sloop contractor carrying packages sent to Europe and imported from Europe between Calcutta and Diamond Creek.(59) He was 'a creditable native an owner of sloops with whose conduct the Board had much reason to be satisfied'. Yet in 1791 the Board rejected his proposal but Eckroyd whose offer they accepted was found unequal to the task. Eckroyd wanted to be relieved from his engagement and the Board had again to make the best bargain it could with Akrur Dutt. The Board's minute makes interesting reading. They observed, 'the present affords another instance to the many upon the Company's records of the ill effects of inviting proposals of contract in a society which like that of the Europeans in Bengal, contains a number of adventurers possessing little or no capital, eager for employment at any rate, hazarding as it were in a lottery in which they may, under fortunate circumstances draw a prize and in which they risk comparatively nothing, having little or no property to lose and no credit to maintain. This is without remedy for so soon as an European acquires so much property as he may deem sufficient, to satisfy his desires, he removes himself to Britain and contributes to induce others endued with the spirit of adventure or hopes of subsistence to resort hither.'" (60)

The 'native' merchants received no support unless circumstances left no other alternative to the administrators of the East India Company's affairs in India. Monied men in Bengal did not come forward for the commercial business of the Company because the servants of the Company did not want them as competitors. In these circumstances the work of Cornwallis consisted largely in checking the abuses for which the Company's own men and their 'native' agents and servants were almost entirely responsible. Cornwallis did not very much exaggerate when he wrote to Dundas in 1787, "I have every reason to believe that at present all the Collectors are under the name

(58) Progs., 14 July, 1788.

(59) Progs., 14 July, 1788—medium of packages sent to Europe for 3 years.

bales	boxes	chests	pipes	bags
8798½	2004	299	18½	35685
	.			casks
Imported 572½	35	1802	217½	100

(60) Progs. Board of Trade, Vol. 93, 15 July, 1791.

of some relation or friend deeply engaged in Commerce and by their influence as Collectors and Judges of Adwalut they became the most dangerous enemies to the Company's interest and the greatest oppressor of the manufacturers." (61) So he made provision for liberal allowances to be paid to Collectors and then issued revenue regulations and orders against their engaging in trade.

The impact of the Industrial Revolution in England upon the Investment policy of the East India Company is very well illustrated in the letters from the Court of Directors. In 1782 the Calico printers put pressure upon the Directors to prohibit the importation of printed goods from Bengal. The Directors readily agreed to prohibit for four years in the first instance. In 1783 they sent muslins manufactured in Manchester to India with a view to giving their servants an idea of the altered state of things. They wrote that the prices of these muslins were already 'twenty per cent under our own.' (62) (In 1788 they wrote that they apprehended that the export of ordinary and middling assortments of piecegoods was already doomed.) The Board of Trade under instructions from the Court of Directors wrote to the Residents at different avarungs that they wanted to improve the quality of the muslins in other words to improve the hands of the weavers employed upon the coarser fabrics. They therefore directed that the weavers should be furnished with new and finer reels, "which being an article of no great expense though essential to improvement we are willing to be at the expense of it in the Company's account." (63) John Bebb from Dacca naturally enquired "whether the thread in England was spun by the new spinning wheel or by other machines, particularly by the ingenious machine invented by Mr. Arkright, if by that machine wherein consists the excellence of it and whether you imagine such machine could be introduced and worked successfully in this country." (64) (The Directors could only think of introducing new and fine reels because they were cheap enough but they could not possibly be permitted to introduce Arkright's Spinning Jenny or any other new machinery into India.) The proportion of coarse to finer assortments can be illustrated by reference to Dacca Investment of 1789. Of the 30,504 pieces provided for Company's Investment at Dacca in 1789 the different qualities were thus composed—A, 3,669 ; B, 8,504 ; C, 13,355 ; D, 3,784 ; E, 1,172 ; F, 20. (65) It was not possible with only new and finer reels to improve the quality to such an extent that all 30,504 pieces would become A and B varieties. The Court of Directors knew that they must yield to British manufacturers. They could improve the manufacture of raw silk in 1769 because that suited British economic interest. They now thought that the best method of subserving British economic interest would be to import raw cotton in the place of cotton fabrics. They decided to import 500,000 lbs. of weight of Broach or Surat cotton or cotton of the produce of Bengal of a similar quality. The manu-

(61) Ross—Vol. I, August 14, 1787.

(62) From Court, 1 March, 1783.

(63) Progs. Board of Trade., 18 September, 1787.

(64) Ibid., 5 October, 1787.

(65) Ibid., 7 July, 1789.

facturers also suggested some substitute remittance in lieu of proposed reduction in piecegoods. The Court of Directors thought of raw cotton, raw silk, sugar, indigo, hemp and flax, even jute and tobacco as substitutes for piecegoods. In 1786 cotton yarn disappeared from Investment. The Directors were inclined to think that Indigo might become "One of the best means of remittance to this country and one of the least prejudicial exports from Bengal." (66). In 1788 they wrote again, that "Indigo by creating from the soil and labour of the natives an export commerce capable of being carried to a very large extent as well as ultimately to benefit this country in supplying an article so necessary to its manufactures and for which large sums are annually paid to foreigners." The Investment of Indigo was provided by remittance contract system.

Unfortunately for the Directors' new Investment policy they learnt from their servants in India that Bengal did not produce cotton equal to their demand for its consumption and that Bengal imported a large quantity of imported cotton amounting to 2,89,336 factory maunds. The Board of Trade reported that Bengal's needs ought to be supplied previous to compliance with requisition for exportation. "It would be an act of extreme hardship not to say injustice and cruelty to this country to throw its poor manufacturers out of employ by depriving them of the material on which their labour and subsistent depend." (67) The Poard, however, envisaged the possibility of their being able to cultivate sufficient quantity of sugar for internal consumption as also for export to other parts of India, to Persia and to Arabia. They planned to have an additional culture of 1,015 square miles of good arable land in sugar for exportation and this would also enable them to make sugar a staple article of export to Great Britain. Other European traders and Americans were exporting all that could be exported. But even in 1795 they were conscious that sugar as an article of export was not yielding direct advantages in the way of profit.(68) "Their essay in the article of sugar" did not at this stage appear to be promising. At the same time silk trade had begun to decline in England on account of the rapid progress made by the cotton manufacturers and the price of silk was so reduced that it fell from 21s. 8d. to 16s. 4d. per lb. The Court of Directors thought that 'hemp and flax were capable of being worked up into a variety of manufactures at present supplied from Russia' but they soon found that these articles would not serve for cordage or tent cloth but only for cart ropes and line for scales. The opinion about Jute which they got from linen factories was that the whole of it would not bleach and therefore it was useless to them.(69) But even in July 1796 the Directors were flattering themselves that their "sales particularly of piecegoods has experienced less depression than could be well expected. We deem this to be in a great measure owing to the quality of the various assortments."

(66) From Court, 12 April, 1786.

(67) Progs. Board of Trade, 1st August, 1788.

(68) From Court, 20 February, 1795, p. 16.

(69) From Court, 27 July, 1796, pp. 30, 31, 32.

The Directors were deluding themselves and colonial economy was already taking shape, its characteristic features developing in the early years of the nineteenth century. Charles Taylor, one of the delegates from the English Calico and Muslin manufacturers who had attended the Lords of the Privy Council made the remark that the Directors and British manufacturers "regarded each other with a jealousy which was prejudicial to the welfare of both countries and entirely destructive to the real interest of both parties." He wanted to render the connection between India and Great Britain mutually and truly serviceable and pleaded that "some political attention would be necessary in India." (70)

Thus we come to the threshold of the nineteenth century in which Bengal's economy lost its independence and became fully subservient to that of England. The process began in 1782. We admit the inevitability of the outcome. But the impression left on Indian mind by the events of these years can be best expressed in those historic words--'woe to the vanquished'. It was not, however, a scornful throwing down of the sword that it might be outweighed by gold. It developed into an arrangement in which the aristocracy, 'Moneyocracy' and 'Millocracy' of England had each its part to play.

N. K. SINHA

Matters Criminal.

(FROM ORISSA RECORDS)

WE often get interesting bits of information from Judicial letters. Here are a few of them.

The Register (Registrar) of Nizamat Adalat sends the following letter (dated Allypore, 31st January, 1807) to Robert Ker, Magistrate of the Zila of Cuttack :

"I am directed by the Court of Circuit for the division of Calcutta to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter from the Secretary to Government in the Judicial Department to the Register of Nizamat Adawlut under date the 22nd inst. and to desire that you will send to the Magistrate of the 24 Perganas with as little delay as possible all the convicts in your jail under sentence of Transportation.

2nd. You will inform the convicts that they are at Liberty to carry each one wife with them and their children if of inconsiderable number, but you will at the same time be particularly careful to explain to the women that it is entirely optional with them to accompany their Husbands or not."

Convicts were at the time transported to Fort Marlborough and Prince of Wales Island.

In 1844 the Magistrate of Balasore receives a Descriptive Roll of five Arab Convicts, transported from Bombay to the Prince of Wales Island, who effected escape from the island on 15th July, 1843, with instructions to apprehend them. Similarly in 1846 he receives a letter dated 20th August from the Under Secretary to the Government of Bengal enjoining him to take necessary measures for causing the apprehension of a Portuguese convict named James Marline who was transported for life to the Prince of Wales Island under sentence of the Supreme Court passed on 21st January, 1830 and who effected escape on 26th June last.

It was usual to forward a warrant containing the sentence passed by the Court of Nizamat Adawlut together with extract of proceedings of that Court and a copy of the Futwa of their Law Officers on the said trial.

To show how murder cases were dealt with I am giving a sample :

Extract from the proceedings of the Nizamat Adawlut on the 24th January, 1807—

The Court having duly considered the Proceedings held on the Trial of Khossallee Samul charged with murder and the Futwah of their Law Officers on the said Trial, pass the following sentence—

The Prisoner Khossallee Samul having been convicted of the murder charged against him, and having been declared by the Futwah of the Law Officers of this Court, liable to suffer death by Kissas on the legal demand

of the heirs of the slain, and there appearing to the Court no circumstances in his favour to render him a proper object of mercy, the Court sentence the said Prisoner Khossallee Samul to suffer death by being hanged by the neck until he is dead at the usual place of execution for Zillah Cuttack, and order that his body be afterwards exposed upon a Gibbet as near to the spot where the murder was committed as circumstances may admit.

A true extract
Signed and sealed by order of the Nizamut Adawlut.
Sd./ S. T. GOOD,
Register.
A true copy
H. RAMUS, S. Judge.

C.S.

Exd.

Sd. I. WILLIAMS.

Here a word of explanation is necessary. The prisoner was "to suffer death by *Kissas* on the legal demand of the heirs of the slain." *Kissas* is properly *qasās*, the Mahommedan law of retaliation or vengeance, returning like for like (*jaḥm k̄a jaḥm se*) in contradistinction to *Deyut*, i.e. 'taking back an offered thing', or a money compensation (blood-price) answering to Anglo-Saxon *wer-gild*. The prisoner was hanged "at the usual place of execution, and his body exposed upon a gibbet near to the spot where the murder was committed." Dr. Francis Buchanan in his *Bhagalpur Journal* writes in his diary of 11th November, 1810: "Near Dumaria a Hindu Dhanuk had been gibbeted for the murder of a child", and in that of 12th November when he came to the boundary of Kharakpur another murderer had been gibbeted, a Moslem who killed a man, of whom he was jealous." Mr. C. E. A. W. Oldham, the Editor, observes in the Introduction (p. xx): "It appears that murderers were at that period gibbeted in public near the scenes of their crime." (*JBORS*, Vol. XV, Pts. III & IV, Intro. pp. xx, 321, 323). Monckton Jones says (*Warren Hastings in Bengal, 1772-74*) that Warren Hastings used to hang the dacoits in their own villages by way of example. The barbarous mode of exposing the dead bodies of the hanged or executed on gibbets seems to have been a prevailing practice. The vestige of the places of execution still lingers in abandoned places and such names as ফাঁসিতলা বা ফাঁসিতলার মাঠ in many villages.

In 1831 the Magistrate of Balasore receives from the Commissioner a copy of warrant containing the sentence passed by the Nizamut Adawlut upon Musst. Kishoree, wife of Hurram Das, charged with wilful murder of Rooknee. "In case of pregnancy return the warrant with a report of the circumstances as directed in the Circular Order of the Nizamut Adawlut dated the 14th January, 1825, to be executed 40 days after delivery. The Futwah of the Law Officers—she is to suffer death by *Kissas* for the crime."

There is a reference to the Circular Order in the records, e.g., T. Pakenham, Commissioner, sends on 12th February, 1825 to C. R. Cart-Wright, Magistrate, Balasore, copy of a letter addressed to the several Courts of Circuit by orders of the Nizamat Adawlut dated 14th January, 1825 on the subject of measures to be adopted in suspending the execution of capital sentences on the plea of pregnancy.

The Magistrate of Balasore receives on 1st November, 1833 a Circular Order from the Nizamat Adawlut instructing the Magistrate "to cause all the gibbets, whereon the bodies of executed criminals may now be exposed, to be removed and the latter are to be either burned or buried."

In a letter dated 19th March, 1827 T. Pakenham sends to J. H. Patton, Joint Magistrate of Balasore, a warrant containing sentence passed by the Court of Nizamat Adawlut upon prisoner Musst. Toolsee for exposing her new born illegitimate infant with intent to destroy it, and an extract of the Proceedings and a copy of the Futwah of the Law Officers of that Court enjoining him to call the prisoner before him and make her acquainted with the sentence passed upon her—viz. 7 years' imprisonment with labour.

The crime of causing abortion was not infrequent. From an extract of the Proceedings of the Presidency Court of the Nizamat Adawlut under date the 2nd July, 1847, we find that the sentence of 10 years' R.I. was passed on a woman for causing abortion and death of another woman.

In a letter dated the 21st March, 1828 H. Ricketts, Collector of Balasore, writes to the Commissioner that the prevalence of robberies attended with violence in Bhadrak is due to the existence of Purjas—a class of slaves by birth and bought and sold by their masters who cannot provide for them. He suggests means for their repression. They gain their livelihood some as hired labourers, but in greater part by theft and plunder.

In 1833 and the two years preceding robberies were heavier than usual owing to the terrible distress caused by the storms of 31st October, 1831 and of 7th October, 1832, and the drought of 1833. Ricketts writes to the Commissioner on 29th July, 1833:

"The people appear to be poverty-stricken beyond redemption", on September 17, 1833 he writes: "Para 11. I have succeeded in preserving order through two years of continued difficulties and whatever extent the distress may reach I feel the utmost confidence that nothing in the shape of disaffection will show itself. Plunder will be committed when opportunity offers by the distressed of the lowest classes, but provided I am allowed the means of checking rapine all the other classes will look to me for protection and order in their difficulties with undiminished reliance. Throughout the two passed years the aggregate charge of extra police trying as the times have been is but 1700 rupees; not a man has been employed whose services could be dispensed with or retained in employment a day longer than was necessary and the same line of conduct shall be observed should the discretionary authority now required be granted."

In 1840 Commissioner Mills recorded his observations on the state of crime in the district forming the division of Cuttack for the year 1839:

"I ascribe the general prevalence of ordinary crimes (for crimes of heinous nature except in seasons of calamity are admitted to be rare) to the following causes, the first and chief reason is the extreme poverty of the lower orders, secondly the inefficiency of the village Police, and thirdly the operation of Reg. 2 of 1832. The far greater proportion of crimes in the Cuttack Province is of the most petty kind, being committed under impulse of hunger, and generally confined to the carrying away of some trifling article from a hut or a house without violence. . . . The Chowkidars are the principal thieves, none but the Pans and Kundras will accept this degrading office, and these are not only the poorest, but the thieving classes in almost every case that occurs. . . . I have not the least hope that any considerable diminution in the number of Burglaries and thefts will ever be effected till the village police is put on a better footing, the manners of the people ameliorated, and employment and livelihood found for the poorer classes by means of a moderate and equal assessment of the land revenue. It cannot be doubted that Reg. 2 of 1832 has been attended with bad effect ; a modification of the law is necessary. . . . The country was desolated with a famine in 1837. I find 520 cases of stealing grain from the field and fruit from trees reported in that year. In the first six months of 1838, 159 cases of grain stealing and 35 of stealing fruit are recorded, the returns for the last six months of 1838 do not give these particulars."

During the last six months of 1840 the people were subjected to indescribable misery owing to premature cessation of periodical rains followed by a high inundation in August. "The staple crop of the district suffered from both calamities, and this disaster, following so closely that of last year, has consequently aggravated the then prevailing distress and kept crime against property above the ordinary level."

From a letter dated 1st June, 1820 from A. Stirling to William Wilkinson, Joint Magistrate of Khoorda, we learn of occasional depredations of Khunds and Pans on the Banpore frontier.

Robberies were from time to time committed by some criminal tribes, e.g., we find from a letter dated 19th August 1840 a reference to the Sabakhees—dacoits who resided in the districts of Balasore and Mohurbhunge ; the Collector is asked to submit a report on their habits, manners, language etc. 'Sabakhees' may mean 'omnivorous', i.e., who had no scruples about eating, or 'who ate carcases'. In a letter dated 9th April, 1842 the Assistant of the Thuggee Department requests the Magistrate of Balasore to give him information regarding a class of men called Geedharmars (Jackal-eaters) on the bank of the Soobanrecka. They appear to be variously named as Seegalmars, or Seealkhors, or Keechak Dacoits. In a letter dated 24th March, 1847 the Superintendent of Tributary Mahals asks the Magistrate of Balasore to apprehend in concert with Major W. Reddell, Asst. General Superintendent, Keechak Dacoits or Geedarmars residing at Balasore, and Mohanpore, 4 cos E. of Danton under police surveillance.

There is also a reference to the Thugs. A circular dated 7th September, 1838 directs that depositions and confessions of Thugs should be taken down in the language best understood by them.

In the Settlement Report of Cuttack for the year 1847 we get the following in para 66 under Police :

"Heinous crimes against property are not numerous. Dacoities are of rare occurrence, and affrays are, almost unknown. Petty burglaries are common, but as crime is not systematically concealed as in Bengal, the worst, I believe, is known."

There were certain other crimes committed occasionally. M. Reid, Register, Nizamat Adawlut, informs R. Hunter, Commissioner, in 1834 that Booya Jugbundoo Dos Mohapater and Chuckerdhur Dos—Nos. 42 and 43 of statement No. 1—have been convicted of torturing the prosecutors by dipping their hands into boiling ghee. Sentence—No. 42 to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 and on failure of payment imprisonment for 3 years in irons, and No. 43 to pay a fine of Rs. 200 and on failure imprisonment for 2 years with labour and iron fetters. We have also extracts from the Proceedings of the Nizamat Adalat on the trial of prisoners charged with drug poisoning ; the drug usually administered was *dhatūra* (stramonium) as we find from a report dated 14th March, 1839 submitted by W. S. Dickens, Assistant Surgeon, Balasore. A man was imprisoned for embezzlement for 2 years without irons and without hard labour (22 May, 1820). We come across a curious crime—that of extracting silver from the rupee by drilling and thus debasing the coin as it appears from a letter dated 5th April, 1821 from H. Shakespeare, Actg. Superintendent of Police in the Lower Province, to the Magistrate of Balasore, describing the process.

Certificates had to be obtained from the Assistant Surgeon whether prisoners sentenced to hard labour were fit to bear it, as we find from the letter dated 7th June, 1836 from T. C. Scott, Magistrate, Balasore, to W. S. Dickens who on 9th June certifies that "he examined the prisoners and found them all in good health and fit for hard labour."

All convicts under sentence of imprisonment for a longer period than 7 years were forwarded to the custody of the Magistrate of Cuttack.

Commissioner A. J. Mills writes on 7th December, 1839, to the Magistrate of Balasore :

"Para 3.—The Contractor must agree to supply one seer of rice, 1½ seer of wood, and 1 Kucha Tobacco (or an equivalent number of Cheroots) per diem to each prisoner ; the prisoners must be formed into messes, and allowed to take, in lieu of the aggregate quantity of rice, wood and tobacco, such quantity of condiments as they may see fit." They were also supplied each with two blankets. From a letter dated 7th January, 1842 we learn that the Contractor agrees to supply prisoners with rice, viz. 41 seers per rupee, seer being 80 sicca weight.

In the Military Lines a sort of a Court Martial used to be held by way of trial. In a letter dated 11th December, 1807 Robert Ker, Magistrate, writes to George Dowdeswell, Secretary to Government in the Judicial Department, as follows :

"The case is : Noorun (Musulmani wife of a syce) complained that she had an altercation with Peerun, the Mehtarni of Bibi Laudig (Satarah Khanum, alias Bibi Laudig, a native woman living with Lt. Laudig, Battalion of the

17th Regiment, Native Infantry). The Mehtarni said to the Bibi that Noorun had accused her of carnal connection with Lt. Hales, whereupon on the complaint of Lt. Laudig a sort of Court Martial was held on Noorun. The latter says : 'Toofane, a barber came to the Guard and having dragged me forth bound my hands. Toofanee then placing his knee upon my neck with a pair of scissors cut off the hair of my head. Thus disgraced and handcuffed I was drummed through the Sepohee lines, and banished across the *atharah nullah*'."

In a letter dated 11th November, 1804 Robert Ker, Judge and Magistrate, was informed by the Board that in his capacity as Magistrate he was to conform to Regulation IV of 1804 entitled a Regulation for the Administration of Justice in Criminal Cases in the Zilah of Cuttack.

The Regulations of the Mogulbundy did not apply to the Garhjat States : e.g. at Dhenkanal Gurbee Shah was poisoned to death by his wife "where according to rules contained in the 13th Sect. Reg. 13 of 1805 the Regulations are not in force." (April, 1812).

In a letter dated 24th September, 1818 the Register, Nizamat Adawlut, Fort William, writes to the Commissioner, Cuttack, regarding the appointment of a Law Officer for the Court of Commissioner and stating that the Court have selected for the office Maulavi Mahomed Sajid on a salary of Rs. 150 per month.

Rewards were offered for apprehending heinous offenders or for information regarding their haunts (Khoorda, letter dated 20th September, 1819).

KALIPADA MITRA

New Light on the History of the Hillmen and Santhals of Jharkhand¹ (Jungleterry) in the early days of the Company's rule

WHILE exploring records in connexion with the Sannyasi inroads, in the Record Office at Behrampur and the Writers' Buildings, Calcutta. I happened to come across certain documents on the unknown episode of an upheaval in the region comprised at present in the Mungir Bhagalpur and Santhal pargana districts.

In the early days of the Company's rule, the name of Jungleterry (Jangal terai) was applied to the political division stretching from the Rajmahal hills in the east to beyond the river Barakar as far as Ramgarh in the west and from Colgong in the north to the frontier of Pachet in the south. This rolling country with a hilly backbone covering the approaches to Bengal from the west formed a sort of buffer between the Bengal monarchy and the kingdoms springing up in the Gangetic Valley ; but strangely enough, no account of this land or of its interesting people has come down to us, excepting the few lines in the *Sirat-i-Firuz Shahi*, translated by me in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1942 nor was any systematic attempt made at the conquest and pacification of the land, until the advent of the Company's rule.

This country is inhabited at the present time by the Santhals. The assumption has been made, on the authority of their late legends, that they immigrated here from Singhbhum and Chotanagpur only at the close of the 18th Century, but the account of the Muslim invasion into this land in the 14th Century, incorporated in the chronicle, *Sirat-i-Firuz Shahi*, discountenances such a hypothesis. "All the people of this country," says the Chronicle, "are as black as crows and their dwellings are always located in orchards where they live like crows in their rookeries. All the people of this country are warriors and independent but affable and silly." (2)

Capt. Robert Brooke, who carried out operations in this land between 1772-74, refers to have encountered the Manjhis of Manihari, Barkop and

(1) That a large portion of the Jungleterry tract was comprised in Jharkhand hardly admits of doubt. The great statistician and minister, Abul Fazl writes in *Akbarnama* III, text, 579,611 that Raja Mansingh starting from Bhagalpur in 1590 A.D. reached Jahana-bad (Arambagh) across Jharkand. Two years later the Raja accomplished another march across this region.

(2) *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1942, p. 62. Sultan Firuz bin Rajab starting from Bihar marched to Sikhar bhumi, (modern Pachet). He then encountered strange aboriginals in a land of scenic beauty (For the description, Read op. cit. pp. 62-65) for which the conclusion is inescapable that the Sultan passed through that portion of Jharkhand which was inhabited by the Santhals.

Patsunda, now in Godda Subdivision of the Santhal Parganas. The hypothesis of the Santhali immigration into this land during late 18th Century, propagated among others by Buchanan Hamilton and Risley would not therefore carry much weight.

The Santhal inhabitants of this land form at the present time, a very benumbed and servile population, without a spark of courage or independence ; but when under the Muslim rule they led a sheltered existence, cut off from the civilizing currents, they were characterised by a ruggedness and spirit of independence. Eking out a precarious existence on the herb, roots and the flesh of animals, they had a profound disdain for the arts of settled life. Hunting was their favourite occupation and amusement and robbery their honourable calling. Hence their forays into the plain all along the border of the hills from Colgong to Pakur, and only constant watch from the chain of military outposts kept them in check. Cattle-lifting robbery or any kind of assault on the part of the hillmen was met with stern reprisal which served to inflame rather than mollify the latter's resentment and kept the whole frontier in a perpetual tension and animation.(3) Hence the relation between them was marked by a rancour and antagonism deeper than that between the Highlanders and the Lowlanders. This state of affairs was brought to a close by a mixture of force and craft on the part of three Anglo-Indian administrators, Captain Robert Brooke, Capt. Browne, Cleveland which it is my object to unfold.

In the early unsettled times of the Company's rule, (1757-72) misgovernment and repeated failure of crop, in 1769 and 1770 reduced many parts of Bengal to desolation and the system of defences maintained along the border of the Rajmahal hill both for the protection of the inhabitants and the regular running of posts between Patna and Murshidabad had broken down. Many Ghatwals (Keepers of the hill passes) had either died or abandoned their posts and the task of properly manning the outposts had been neglected by the landlords who were equally affected by the large-scale depopulation.

This was the period which synchronised with an upheaval in the Santhal country and the adjoining territory. After the defeat and captivity of the Kharagpur Raja at the hands of Nawab Mir Qasim, his vacant seat was usurped by his vassal Jagannath Deo. He had farmed out lands on military tenure and raised a levy of hillmen with whose aid he carved out an independent principality. He strengthened the defenses of Tiur hill (Trikut Parvat), 10 miles east of Baidyanath-Deoghar by means of fortification and turned it into a Citadel. He became united with the Santhal chiefs of Barkop, Patsunda and Manihari now in the Godda Subdivision in an alliance and issued across the passes to attack the mart of Colgong, which his confederates made similar sallies, advancing to the outskirts of Rajmahal, then a flourish

(3) James Stuart, Judge, Benares Division wrote in 1808, "At an early period of British administration the tract of country lying between Birbhum and Bhagalpur was in a state of extreme disorder. The inhabitants were in open arms against government and its other subjects. A perpetual savage warfare was maintained by them against the inhabitants of the plains and they were proscribed and hunted down like wild beasts" (Fifth Report from the Select Committee on the Affairs of the E. I. Co., 1883, Pp. 767).

ing centre of trade. Detachments were sent against Jagannath Deo but they proved ineffective and the Collector of Mungir had to fall back once, on being fired upon—a fact which indirectly shows that Jagannath Deo's men had adopted muskets as an instrument of fighting. By the year 1772, the hillmen's power had risen to such proportions that the great highway across the passes of Teliagarhi and Sikriagali had become unsafe for traffic and the running of the mails. Jagannath Deo, by his able leadership and fighting quality appears to have become such a formidable menace to the security of the Company's territory, as was Mahāratha Chero to Sher Khan's in Bihar. The matter forcing itself upon the notice of Warren Hastings who had assumed the direction of the Company's affairs in 1772, a special corps of Light Infantry was raised to deal with this foe and Captain Robert Brooke was entrusted with the command. Taking the field only six weeks after the corps were raised (mid April, 1773), he began operations on that side from which attacks had been frequent. But before he could achieve any success, he had to march across the Ganges to Purnea to meet an attack of the Sannyasis on that town. Whether these mendicant soldiers made a diversionary attack to relieve the pressure on the hillmen or wanted to profit from the spoils of the city, *then as large as half of London* (4) in 1807 cannot be definitely stated. Brooke by his presence scared away the Sannyasis and again returned to the previous scene of battle across the Ganges. It was an arduous operation lasting more than a year in an almost unexplored country against innumerable odds, so forcibly brought out in the brilliant report.

“Water and provisions were extremely difficult to be got, particularly water, for even that laid up in the village, could not be drunk by the Sepoys as the hill people are of no cast(e).”

At length by steady and methodical advance he reached Jagannath's headquarters, Tiur and engaged the defenders of the fort in a contest. It was a singular fight. Here were ancient bow and arrow tested against matchlock and 'gun'; a disciplined force trained to obey the command of one common superior was pitted against the levies of wild Santals and other hillmen, accustomed to look up their 'Manjhi' for direction and guidance. It was an unequal match, yet the courage and determination of Jagannath Deo's ranks told upon the Company's troops who were forced to fall back and remain drawn up in an open field for four days, in expectation of the aid of heavy artillery from Patna. After its arrival the scale was turned irretrievably against Jagannath Deo who fled to the hills. The fort of Tiur was stormed and razed to the earth.

The Captain then turned his arms against the *Manjhis* of Barkop and Patsunda and by either actual resort to hostilities or demonstration of force reduced these Santal headmen and many others to submission. By accomplishing the reduction of these people, the Captain secured the highway from Bengal to Bihar and an area of land covering more than 500 sq. miles from the spoliation of a barbarous people.

(4) “The town occupies a space equal to more than a half of London,” . . . is one of the best country towns in Bengal. M. Martin—*Eastern India*, III, P. 51.

A more solid and beneficent task was the conversion of large masses of these people from savagery to the peaceful pursuits of life. It was achieved by tact and humanity. In the course of his campaign Brooke had defeated and taken captive many hill men and women. He treated these women folk with particular deference, engaging women-attendants and got released those who showed inclination to submit. Such lenity and consideration in the place of wholesale massacre and other cruel forms of punishment then in vogue produced an alteration in the temper of the Santhals towards the new conquerors. In response to the Captain's invitation, at first a knot of these people descended down the hills and built up their hut in the clearing made out of the jungle. When they were peacefully settled and treated by Brooke with great indulgence, others found it a folly to remain obstinate in opposition and grasped the hand of conciliation. It is in this way that the country from Udhanala to Barkop and beyond—"an extent of 920 coss" was covered with a network of 283 Santhali hamlets.

Such was the meritorious work accomplished by Robert Brooke, and Warren Hastings wrote to the Court of Directors "By the battalion employed in the Jungleterry, a tract of country which was considered as inaccessible and unknown, and only served as a receptacle for robbers, has been reduced to government, the inhabitants civilized and not only the reduction of the revenues which was occasioned by their ravages prevented, but some revenue yielded from this country itself which a prosecution of the same measures will improve". Captain Brooke is therefore justly entitled to rank as the pioneer of civilization in the land of the Santhals.

The following is the full text of Captain Brooke's report laid by the President before the Board of Revenue.

(*Vide*, Revenue Board of the Whole Council, Original Consultation,
6th Sept., No. 32)

An account of the expedition against the rebellious zemindars of the Jungleterry and against the robbers residing in the mountains of Mudwan, Barkope and Pertsundar, by Robert Brooke, Captain commanding the corps of Light Infantry.

To illustrate the account of the expedition some little information against whom it took place, may be necessary, as also the nature and situation of the country.

The Head Zemindar of the Jungleterry was called Jaggernaut Deo. In the time of Cossim Ally Cawn, he was under the Raja of Currickpore (Kharagpur in Mungir dit.) but upon the Rajah being taken prisoner for his crimes and carried to Patna, he became in a manner independent and the country being full of thick woods and difficult passes and little revenue having been ever got from it, it was hardly thought of by government, till Jaggernaut Deo taking advantages of this, entered into compact with the hill robbers of T (F)

atteria (5) and granted out his lands to those who would take them on military tenure, by which means he got a number of armed men together and began to plunder the countries of Mungher, Colgong and Bogglepore. On this small detachments were sent against him at different times but always meeting with great loss and never remaining long enough to do anything but overrun the country which did little mischief to the people who could so easily conceal themselves and their effects in the woods, Jaggernaut Deo was encouraged to proceed in his robbery and rebellion. However to render himself as secure as possible, he rented (?) the little district of Tiur in the Jungleterry of Beerbhoom and erected a fort there unknown by government to which place he carried the plunder he took from the open country of Mongher etc. until he had a convenient opportunity of disposing of it in Beerbhoom. In the same manner he plundered again in the Beerbhoom side and carried it to the district of Mongher. At last the Collector of Mongher went with a detachment into his country and after much negotiation prevailed on him to agree to pay a revenue of about Rs. 7000/- yearly, but not having guarantee, hostages or any other security, the Collector was sooner returned to Mongher than he renewed his robberies and carried his depredations to the very skirts of Colgong, so that the whole country near the Jungleterry was depopulated and the Collector again taking the field with a small detachment in hopes of awing him to obedience was obliged to return, after having been fired upon. In the same manner the Hill Manghis of Mudwan, Maniari and Barkop acquiring strength and by slow degrees drew away the gutwars from the passes leading from the mountains to the low country and laid it waste even to Rajmahal, rendering the great road from Bengal to Bihar almost impassable to travellers by their murders and robberies and they had at last the impudence to come down and shoot their arrows at the guards of the battalion, stationed at Nagisenbagh (Nageswarbagh). In this situation were affairs in this part of the country when the Hon'ble Governor in Council ordered Capt. Brooke with the force of Light Infantry to march and subdue them, directing him when he had struck terror by his attacks to use every conciliatory method in his power to bring the wild inhabitants of the country to relish a regular mode of life and make their thoughts turn from war to cultivation.

Captain Brooke's force having formed upon a plan approved of by General Barker, 1st of March, 1773 took the field from Patna, six weeks from the time the sepoys began to be enlisted and immediately attacked those hill people who had been most troublesome to the low country. At first Captain Brooke made two attacks with about 60 picked men to inspire the rest of the battalion with emulation and confidence and successfully answered that end. He was interrupted in his operations and obliged to cross the Ganges to prevent Purnia from being plundered by the Sennasies which he executed by taking post with his small party beyond the city until the arrival of the corps by forced marches. When he pursued the enemy and was near cutting off their retreat, (but) by an unforeseen accident they escaped with the

(5) There is a place named Patharda, 8 miles west of Madhupur Railway Station, but I hesitate to identify it with the place above.

loss of a few of their stragglers whom he took prisoners. The Light Infantry, without halting retired to their station again immediately marched against the hill robbers, attacked them with success and from thence by strategem, got through the passes into Jaggernaut Deo's country without loss and marched through the woods driving the enemy from every place with little trouble till they had arrived at Tiur (6) in and about which the enemy had principally collected their force and that of the hill-robbers, their allies. On viewing this place it was found that it could not be taken without artillery excepting by risking the loss of a number of men. The fort was situated in a small plain surrounded by thick woods and the Light Infantry had flanking parties out. The enemy having lined the woods, one of their parties all at once attacked the place without orders. Captain Brooke was astonished, he sent a party up to bring them away. The party instead of doing so joined the rest and he was obliged to go up himself and bring them off with the killed and wounded he could find. The enemy immediately got spirit upon this and growing bolder than usual were drawn into an ambuscade when they suffered considerably and the corps encamped upon the plain for four days to show the enemy. It was not the parties being repulsed that made them march away which they were obliged to do to open a communication with Patna and Mongher. They effected this by securing the pass of Charky (?) and at least after great hardships sustained, surrounded by woods full of the enemy, the artillery arrived safe and the fort was taken next day and razed to the ground. After this the country soon submitted and Jaggernaut Deo was obliged to abandon it entirely. From this business the Light Infantry proceeded once more to scour the hills and after many successful expeditions through them reduced them to the necessity of offering to submit to the directions of the Govt. The whole of this service was completed in a little more than a year after the raising of the Light Infantry Corps, but not without great fatigue to officers and men.

Imagine Europeans particularly in this climate, not being able to carry house, tents or bedding in the hills and obliged to be going perpetually backwards and forwards to seize the opportunity for surprising the mountaineers who could not be brought under subjection but by strategem and to put any strategem into execution required the utmost expeditious and fatiguing marches when water and provisions were extremely difficult to be got, particularly water, for even that laid up in the village could not be drunk by the Sepoys, as the hill people are of no cast(e).

It now became Captain Brooke's duty to carry into execution the second part of the instructions he had received from govt. For this purpose he had all along treated the prisoners with the most particular care ; he even hired women to attend the women and children who were confined, letting no man have access to them belonging to the camp. Through the means of this people pleased with a treatment so different from that which they must have expected from the former custom of govt., when those who were taken were impaled alive or put upon work as slaves for life, we now began to treat with the mountaineers with success and to get their families released, and

(6) Identified by me with Tiur also known as Trikut parvat, near Deoghar.

some few agreed to come down; erect habitations below and cultivate the waste lands. To them Captain Brooke was particularly attentive. So they found their advantage in the change of residence, while those who continued obstinate found themselves exposed to repeated attacks and therefore lived in perpetual dread of losing everything that could be dear to them. At last by degrees he got the whole of the hill-people to come down from Oduwanalla (7) along the chain of mountains to beyond Barkop, an extent of 120 coss ; the number of villages erected below in 12 months amounted to 283 and for a long time past, not a single inhabitant or passenger has been robbed.

The Government step by step directing Capt. Brooke, he was enabled to abolish the military tenures in the Jungleterry of Jaggernaut Deo disarm the men who used to their depredation to near Colgong and Mongher, and to secure the frontier upon the old establishment. Besides the revenue was increased to Rs. 3000/- this year and as this was done in time of confusion and trouble it may be expected it will soon rise to a very considerable amount.

It is worthy of remark that although the incursion of the hill-people, has been from time immemorial dreadful to the low country, I have always obliged govt. for the protection of its inhabitants to be at great and particular expense in keeping up large bodies of troops for this end. Yet that no attempt made until the present govt. to bring the mountaineers under subjection, and in the maps of Bengal, the interior parts of the Rajmahal chain are termed unknown. It does not appear to have entered the thoughts of any during the Mughal govt. to attempt even an entrance into the country. The reason for this is obvious. Their military enterprises are always conducted with great parade and executed by the cavalry and though many instances occur in the history of Hindustan in which ambition has fixed the mind of most men to daring undertakings in the open fields ; yet their disposition never led any of them to wish for the conduct of an expedition where activity and discipline must supply the place of number and where the chief must sustain the fatigues of long marches on foot participate in all the distress and set an example of labour and patience to all the followers.

Since the establishment of British power in the provinces, frequent expeditions have been set on foot against the mountaineers of these parts, but these have only been temporary, designed for surprise or to intimidate in instances of great and notorious provocation, and they have ever proved successful, when skilfully conducted ; that is to say, either the rebellious chiefs have fallen into the hands of the conqueror or their forces have been defeated and put to flight and the country ravaged. But though these successes have impressed the terror of the English power, yet it has never produced any other advantage. On the contrary, every example of rigour has served to animate the hatred of these people against our govt. The fugitive chiefs have recovered their strength, the instant our forces have abandoned their country or others have succeeded them with the same hostile principles. Those among their chiefs who, from whatever motives have afforded their assistance to our troops, have fallen an immediate sacrifice to their ill judged attachment and the same

(7) Six miles south of Rajmahal.

scenes of rebellion, invasion and devastation have been renewed. The different issue of the late undertaking may be obviously accounted for, by an application to the different principles on which it was formed and conducted—not by a precipitate, desultory and destructive war but by the steady prosecution of a concerted plan of conquest, by treating the prisoners taken of the enemy with kindness and inviting them to share in the blessings of peace and civilization when conquered. The continued adherence to such maxims must infallibly secure the advantage we have acquired ; the fidelity of the common people will be ensured by their interests and the presence of a military force will awe their chiefs into submission who alone could have an inducement in their ambition to dissociate them from us. Nothing seems wanting to perfect the system of govt. thus far so happily introduced into these savage and wild regions but to fix the boundary of Jungleterry district, by including in it such parts as from their natural state are incapable of civil controul and effecting a junction of it with the commands of Capt. Camac and Capt. Crawford.

N. B. RAY

Madrasiana.

I.

THE Andhra State having come into existence, one is inclined to consider some of the facets of peninsular history during the three hundred and fourteen years that have elapsed since 1639, the date of the founding of Madras, the oldest of India's modern cities.

Albion's direct connection with the Indian sub-continent dates from the spacious time of Shakespeare and Queen Elizabeth I, as Thomas Stevens (1549-1619) who is said to be the first Englishman to visit India arrived in Goa in 1579. Stevens was not a trader but a Jesuit priest. He studied the Konkani language, a dialect of Marathi, and also wrote poems in Marathi, being probably the first European to do so.

II.

It was Dutch rivalry in trade that made Francis Day and his men seek the lease of some strip of land on the Coromandel Coast and the fort they erected bears the name of St. George who has been honoured as the patron-saint of England since the thirteenth century.

George was a soldier from Cappadocia in Asia Minor. He was a preacher and suffered death, later, being canonised by the Christian Church. It may not be known to many that this Saint has been honoured as the patron-saint of the old Genoese Republic and of Portugal too.

The Portuguese traders came east even before the Dutch. The Portuguese people are traditionally descended from a legendary hero Lusus by name and so the poem which describes in stately verse the achievements of the Portuguese under Vasco da Gama is known as *The Lusiades* (1572) and it is the national epic of Portugal. Luis De Camoens (1524-1580) who wrote the work is a notable figure in Portuguese drama. He came east to fight the Moors and lost one of his eyes in the Wars. He was also for sometime a prisoner in Goa.

Besides the Portuguese, Dutch and British traders the European merchants in the east have included the nationals of France and Denmark too. And Lord Bryce's book, *The Holy Roman Empire* speaks of a further trading society having been started at Altona near Hamburg in Germany to seek profit in the east.

Old Roman coins found in the Madurai country bespeak of the ancient trade in articles of luxury imports of which impoverished Rome, and many things Indian, such as apes, ivory ("elephant tooth") and pea-cocks figure much in Hebrew sacred lore, while numerous pilgrims from China have come to the countries of the Indian Ocean in quest of Buddhist religious

texts. Our contacts with the outside world have been, therefore, indubitably far-flung and intimate from olden times. The Britisher was a late comer.

III.

The factors of the British East India Company were men of all sorts. Though the concern began its existence in 1600, not until 1773 did the Parliament in Westminster enact the Regulating Act to regulate its affairs. Private trading continued to be permitted till about 1800 and it was only after a further period of over fifty years that the British Crown assumed the sovereignty of the regions that its trading subjects had acquired. Till that consummation came to pass, even the humblest in the service of the Company could indulge in the pastime of "shaking the Pagoda Tree", to use a memorable phrase and India passed through many humiliations. And of travails and tribulations the Briton too had his share, having come so far to India for the sake of that "vile yellow coin" as the poet, Leyden lamented—

"For thee, for thee, Vile Yellow slave
I left a heart that loved me true ;
I crossed the tedious ocean-wave,
To roam in climes unkind and new."

It is, however, doubtful whether there are many homesteads in the British Isles that had not profited in the past from the immense opportunity for gainful employment that was available in the sub-continent during the period of British rule and it is quite on the cards that several families still continue to be connected with India and the Dominion of Pakistan.

Unsettled conditions prevailed in the days of the Company and the times were riddled with plenty of marchings and machinations. Notwithstanding sordidness of matters like the incarceration of two Governors in Madras (George Foxcroft the first Governor in 1665 and another George—Lord Pigot—in 1776 during his second term), or the mixed dubious reputation of a man like Brigadier James G. S. Neill who was a hero in the eye of his compatriots but denounced as a scourge by Indians, the Britisher has had generally, a prosperous time in the peninsula and was happier than the indigenous people he lorded over. He found in the Nilgiris, Ooty the queen of hill-stations, Waltair near Visakhapatnam became his Brighton and despite the high mortality and sickness that we read of as having prevailed among the Fort St. George community, Madras itself became the "Mont-pellier of the East and famous was its promenade, the Marina. From Madras went forth the troops required in distant Hongkong to fight the China War and old memories are now revived as troopers of Free India's Custodian Force have embarked from this same old Madras Port in 1953 for Korea on quite a different mission under United Nations auspices and have been "chopped in" by helicopters in the "Indian village" near Pan Mun Jon. Who knows India now, who only India knows?

The kaleidoscope revealing so many patterns of change and counter-change is most interesting indeed, and, taking a long range view of the

centripetal processes of history the present writer is tempted to stress the cultural links of Madras and Britain. And these merit a recital.

All may be acquainted with Mylapore's tradition of Tiruvalluvar and the local tradition of the martyrdom of Thomas one of the Apostles of Jesus Christ, which links South India with the Nazarene's own life-time. Not, however, so generally known is the entry for 883 A.D. in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* of King Alfred's day, recording the despatch of a mission to the Indian shrines of Saints Thomas and Bartholomew to render thanks for the divine deliverance of London from the harrassing attacks of the Danes and the party of almoners would appear to have included Alfred's worthy biographer and friend, Asser. As Monk Bernard ten years after the event has testified to the cordial relations that subsisted between Pagans and Christians in the East it is not improbable that the Alfredian mission came to India about eleven centuries ago, whatever might have been the actual locale of the martyrdom of St. Thomas.

IV.

Many are the observant visitors from abroad who have interpreted the civilisation of the peninsula to the outside world and instructive is the volume, *Foreign Notices of South India* in the Madras University's Historical Series as it gives several names from Fahien to Mayeng. In the middle of the fourteenth century occurred the notable peregrination of the African Ibn Batuta, Tughlak's envoy-designate to the Chinese Court, who was ship-wrecked off Kozhikode whence he safely made for Fez in North Africa. In the following century, a Russian merchant, Athanasius Nikitin by name, spent many years in the Bahmani Kingdom of the Dekhan and thereafter we have had in Madras, the Venetian Nicalao Manucci (1686). The Italian lawyer, Dr. Gemelli-Careri sojourned in the valley of the Krishna river and the Emperor Aurangzebe then engaged in the Golkonda siege is known to have granted an interview to the traveller and enquired about the Turkish conflict then raging in Hungary. A notable visitor we have had in our own time is Herman Keyserling and his "*Travel Diary of A Philosopher*" exhibits a considerate understanding of the art and civilisation of South India in many respects in refreshing contrast to the crass observations of most cold-weather tourists.*

Similarly many Britishers like Dr. Annie Besant have made South India their home and written about our hoary civilisation and even now we have in our midst the venerable Dr. J. Cousins and Mrs. Cousins besides the Rev. H. A. Popley and Rev. Keithan and other noble souls. Our statuary monuments of old-time notables include several Britons and many Indian

* I am referring to Keyserling's observations about Hindu art alone having succeeded in manifesting invisible things in the visible world, about the concept of maternity as vivified in numerous superstructures of milk-laden breasts and about portrayal of omnipotence embodied in thousands of organs and so on and how the animal instincts of life are finely sanctified in the Hindu view of life as the expression of God-like pouring of life thus sublimating the act of procreation.

themes have also inspired the votaries of the British Muse. And not a few are the Dravidian words that have gone into the loom of the English language.

V.

In *Hobson-Jobson* (1886) the well known thesaurus of colloquial oriental words we find it stated that the expression *Madras* in the sense of Madras handkerchiefs has stayed amongst French litterateurs like Honore de Balzac even after it had become obsolete in the English language. The large handkerchiefs of silk warp and cotton wool used as head covering in many foreign countries have been long known as Madras handkerchiefs in the West and are mentioned in many English works.

The word *Calico* means a fine piece of cotton cloth and is associated with Calicut (Kozhikode), the port through which many articles went out from the peninsula from the time of the first Portuguese impact. (It has gone into the English language through the French *Calicot* "which though retaining the *t* to the eye does not do so to the ear"!) The West Coast is, however, more famous for spices as *Hobson-Jobson* underlines on the authority of old Fryer and it is surmised that "the Calico" rather went from this side of the ghats probably from the Madurai region, than from the West Coast itself as "the cotton of Malabar ripening during the rains was really not usable". The name "Calico cloth" does not therefore necessarily mean that Calicut produced the stuff since most of the things which went through that port were named after it. And one even learns from *Hobson-Jobson* that Turkey is called *Calecutische Hahn* in German though it went no more from Calicut than it did from Turkey!

There are, however, other words which do not present any such conundrum. And *anicut*, *atoll*, *bandicoot*, *bandy*, *catamaran*, *cheeroot*, *coir*, *copra*, *corundum*, *curry*, *madapalam*, *mango*, *mulligatawny*, *pariah*, *teak* and *ycerum* are all words which the Tamil, the Malayali and the Telugu would recognise as forming part of the foreign debt of English language. Many hundreds of other words from oriental languages are found listed with their sources in Dr. Mary S. Serjeantson's interesting *History of Foreign Words in English* (1935).

VI.

Some of the famous gems that the world knows about are from our peninsula. The Orloff Diamond is said to have been pirated by a French guard from the eye of an idol in Srirangam and sold in London whence it eventually went to Russia. Another gem known as the Pitt Diamond bears the name of Sir Thomas Pitt Governor of Madras during 1698-1709 who acquired it from a merchant and it was destined to play a notable part in the days of the French Revolution; it is said that this gem was first picked up from the bed of the river Krishna. And the Godavari is the traditional home of the Kohinoor itself which is identified by some with the Syamantakamani of Bhagwan Sri Krishna. These associations are notable indeed but in this atomic age of ours the world knows South India for its ilmenite and

yellow monazite, the sand minerals of the Southern Coasts (these are said to have better thorium content than Brazilian monazite).

VII.

Recalling other Madrasi links with the English speaking world, we meet with a Maecenas of learning in Elihu Yale Governor of Madras during 1687-1692 who while in retirement, helped a struggling institution of Connecticut (U.S.A.) which consequently developed into the famous Yale University. Madras's Roll of Honour also includes Dr. Andrew Bell (1753-1832) whose benefactions were instrumental in starting the first Professorships of Education in Great Britain. While he was the Superintendent of an Orphan Asylum in Madras started in 1789, Bell overcame the dearth of teachers by asking senior students to teach the younger pupils and he had also found that the traditional pial schools used sand in instruction and also dispensed with such equipment. The adoption of the austere system of instruction by his countrymen was ardently advocated by Bell on his return to England where the system came to be known as the *Madras System of Instruction*. The speedy execution of educational programmes in the British Isles was inspired by the methods advocated by Dr. Bell and Wordsworth's poem *The Excursion* was also influenced by his views. Bell's memoir was written by Robert Southey the Poet Laureate of the time.

Yet another eminent 'Madrasi' was Lord Hobart, the Governor during 1794-1798, and Hobart Town the Capital of Tasmania is named after him an obvious link with his Whitehall days as Colonial Secretary.

Hobert Southey's poem *The Curse of Kehama* (1810) is of interest as the Seven Pagodas of Mahabalipuram are known to the West through it.

Southey was not the only author whom we should remember. Known to Samuel Johnson and his satellite James Boswell, Robert Orme, "the British Thucydides", was Accountant-General in Madras and he wrote poems and planned an atlas. Orme became more famous as the East India Company's historiographer and readers of Thackeray's *The New Comes* may recall Colonel Newcome's acquaintance with Orme's *History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Hindustan* and of the exploits of Robert Clive and Stringer Lawrence.

Orme was an admirer of Shivaji Bhonsle and he has recorded the paramount place of the weaver in the Indian economy.

The birth-place of Orme was Anjengo and it was also the place of "ELIZA" (Mrs. Daniel Draper) for whom the novelist Lawrence Sterne maintained his *Bramine Journal* and addressed the *Yericke to Eliza* letters. L' Abbe Raynal's famous apostrophe: "Anjengo! thou art nothing but thou hast given birth to Eliza" has immortalised this fishing village.

Oliver Goldsmith was about to come to Madras as an apothecary and methinks some descendants of Sir Walter Scott and Charles Dickens as well as an ancestor of the novelist Thackeray (who it may be incidentally mentioned, was born in Calcutta) have lived or sojourned in South India.

VIII.

The British artists who achieved fame in South India included Thomas Banks for whose work Sir Joshua Reynolds had great praise and who did a famous group of Shakespeare monuments in Stratford-on-Avon, John Flaxman a friend of Banks and Romney, who was admired by German and Italian compeers and who made the Oxford monument of "Asiatic" Jones and Sir Francis Chantrey a friend of Scott and Turner, who was famous for his delineations of children in Lichfield.

The Cornwallis statue now placed in the Archaeological Department's Museum in Fort St. George was the work of Banks and he also made the statue of Sir Eyre Coote in the Westminster Abbey and the bust of Warren Hastings in the National Portrait Gallery, London. Flaxman made the statues of Raja Sarfoji, of the missionary Christian Frederick Schwartz and of Gericke of S.P.C.K. fame, and to Chantrey's glory stands the fine equestrian bronze of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro in the Island Ground.

Henry Weekes, an assistant of Chantrey's was the maker of a fine statue of Daniel Corrie the first Bishop of Madras and of the Auckland monument in Calcutta.

Our own achievements in art and architecture have been made known to the world by James Fergusson (1808-1886) in his monumental history of Indian and Eastern Architecture and associated with him was James Burgess (1832-1916) who was in charge of the archaeological department in Madras. Captain C. R. Day's notable works on Carnatic Music and South India's musical instruments and the more famous work of C. S. Fox Strangways on the *Music of Hindustan* (1914) was widely known, as also the works of Robert Sewell, B. L. Rice, and Col. H. D. Love in the field of South Indian historiography.

IX.

Madras organised early an efficient Medical Service and Dr. Anderson was its first chief (1781) and Madras's telephone system is older than London's. Trigonometrical survey in India originated from Madras and the many Madras engineers whose names we have reason to cherish include Colonel Colin Mackenzie (d. 1821) the first Surveyor General of India who has covered himself with glory as an extremely zealous collector of historical manuscripts and his interests extended to the Far East and Java as well. A biography of this assiduous collector, with Col. Phillimore's Foreword has appeared recently and it is enriched by Hickey's striking portrait of the Colonel as frontispiece.

Madras City's Eye Infirmary, its museums and observatories are wellknown and it has been South India's good fortune that many keen and enthusiastic naturalists had made valuable studies in her plant and bird life, in her fishes and her snakelore. The Dutch van Rhee on the Malabar Coast, the Danish Missionaries in the Tranquebar Mission and a host of Britons in the Madras Medical Service have enriched scientific knowledge and the eminent

Charles Darwin had a collaborator in Sir Walter Eliot and Neil Arnott in Robert Wight.

Conspicuous too have been the labours of several scholars in yet another field namely the appraisal of India's languages and literatures and the work of Danish missions and Jesuits in the field of Dravidian linguistics during the past 3 centuries is beyond praise. We recall the memorable names of Constantius Beschi, of G. U. Pope (1820-1908) the grammarian and lexicographer who wrote on the poets of the Tamil lands, of William Chambers of an earlier day an original member of the Asiatic Society of Bengal who knew many Dravidian languages, and of the Civilian F. W. Ellis (d. 1819) who was Collector of Madras and an authority on *mirasi* rights and who knew Tamil, Malayalam and Telugu and translated the sacred *Kural* of Tiruvalluvar and exposed some forgery of a Sanskrit MS. And honoured too are the names of Bishop Caldwell (1814-91) famed historian of Tirunelveli who wrote a comparative grammar of the Dravidian or South Indian languages and C. P. Brown (1798-1884) who is remembered for his work in connection with a Telegu dictionary. A. M. A. C. Galletti-di-Cadilhac of the Indian Civil Service recently retired, who edited the Dutch Records and wrote the *Oxford Telugu Dictionary* also comes to our mind. Western contributions to South Indian studies have been notable indeed and above all one cannot omit to mention in a survey of this kind the great name of Sir Arthur Grierson, O.M. (1851-1941) as nothing so great as the linguistic Survey of India associated with his name has been achieved anywhere in the world. One is also reminded of the sterling worth of the publications of United Kingdom's learned bodies interested in eastern archaeology and it has happened that the first article in English on Avvai the Sappho of Tamil literature, that the present writer read was one that appeared some years ago in the Bulletin of the London University's School of Oriental and African Studies started about 1916 when the world war I was on.

X.

I have referred to many worthies but poignant interest ever attaches to two young scholars who were martyrs to Indology and so merit our homage. One of them was a medical man and poet and the other, a man of law.

The medical man whom we should consider as a 2nd Sir William Jones was John Leyden (1775-1811) whose poems as Vellore, the Battle of Assaye and Sultan Tippoo of Mysore generally find a place in most anthologies of Indian historical verse, alongside Sir Henry Newbolt's poems on such themes, Leyden who had a fondness for "Sweet Malabar" and was delighted with Coorg and its people who reminded him of his nation Scotland, and Cauvery's "holy stream" had made a name in Scottish balladry even before he came to India in 1803. He was an esteemed associate of Sir Walter Scott and a friend of writers like Brougham, Sydney Smith and Jeffrey. He had collaborated with Mon Lewis in *Tales of Wonder* and edited the *Scots Magazine*. What was remarkable about Leyden's youth was his passion for knowledge despite his crippling poverty and many stories are told of his strenuous

efforts in self-education and he learnt many European and Oriental languages before he was 20. His literary achievements are remarkable for a brief career of 36 years. Britain's Parnassus has him as a representative of Madras even as it has Rudyard Kipling for Lahore and Eric Linklater for Bombay.

Leyden was a licensed medico and the Rt. Hon'ble Dundas secured him an appointment as a surgeon in the Madras Service in which as we have it on the authority of Leyden himself his professional reputation was as high as his literary repute. Becoming acquainted with Earl Minto the Governor General (1807-1813) he accompanied the latter to Malaya, having held the posts of a judge in the Twenty-four Parganas and Assay Master in the Calcutta Mint. Leyden has a place in the Mysore history as well since he was on the Survey Party and he has been included in the Who is Who section of the *Mysore Gazetteer*. As Lord Cockburn observed there was really no walk in life depending on ability where Leyden could not have shone. And wrote he to Ballantyne, "I certainly shall never repent of having come to India. It has awakened energies in me that I scarcely imagined I possessed".

Leyden was passionately fond of Oriental literature. Early in life he had written a Historical and Philosophical sketch of the discoveries of Europeans of Northern and Western Africa at the close of the Eighteenth Century. Within two years of his arrival in Madras in 1803 he became proficient in Hebrew, Arabic, Persian, Hindusthani, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu, Kanarese, Malay, Sanskrit and Armenian and he was himself conscious that "no person, whatever, has outstripped me in the acquisition of country languages whether sick or well." He wrote a history of Persian poetry and translated from the Turki the stimulating memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Baber which has been acclaimed as the world's first political autobiography, and when Leyden was able to decipher some anxiously written tablets in a West Coast Jewish Synagogue, the Travancore Dewan of the time exclaimed that he needed only to pass through the sacred cow to be adopted as a Brahmin.

"In 8 years he did almost as much for Asia as the combined scholarship of centuries had done for Europe", observed an admirer of Leyden. When visiting Port Cornelis he entered a long-disused chamber for examining some manuscript and he got ill because of the foul air and succumbed. Hardly 36 years old at the time of his death, the martyr was indeed "the lamp early quenched" as Scott lamented and the world lost "*an Universal Scholar*" as the Governor-General described him once in a letter to Lady Minto.

Arthur Coke Burnell (1840-1882) another martyr in the cause of oriental scholarship was employed as a Judge in many districts, most part of his service however being in Tanjore. He was an eminent Sanskritist and had to retire from service at an early age on account of ill-health and the Madras Government recorded their regret for being prematurely deprived of the service of so distinguished a scholar. Early in his life, Burnell had been influenced by George Borrow and he had read under Goldstücker and Fausboll before arriving in India in 1860. Burnell knew Arabic, Tibetan, Javanese Coptic and Kawi besides several Indian languages. He edited some specimens of South Indian dialects, translated a portion of *Parasasmrithi* and *Sama Veda Brahmanas*, and wrote many papers on law based on the *Vyavahara Nirnaya*

of Varadaraja and Professor Max Müller of Oxford had high praise for a treatise he wrote on the *Aindra School* of Sanskrit Grammarians. Above all he was a great palaeographer and did for South India what James Prinsep did for North India. Burnell also collaborated with Col. Henry Yule on *Hobson-Jobson* (1886) and Burnell's descriptive catalogue of the Sanskrit works in the Tanjore Palace Library is beyond praise. His death at the early age of 41 was indeed an irreparable loss to palaeography.

The lives of Leyden and Burnell are sources of immense inspiration to youngmen and the names of such men will be cherished for more than the men of arms who swarm the pages of history. The present writer has felt inspired when contemplating on these two personages as each in a way represents a type of men indefatigably labouring from time to time but like Pope's Man of Ross.—

“No monument, inscription, stone,
His race, his form, his name almost weakens him.”

V. SRINIVASAN

Calcutta Historical Society

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING.

The Annual General Meeting of the Calcutta Historical Society was held at 11, Park Mansions, Park Street, Calcutta, on Wednesday, the 7th April 1954 at 5-30 P.M.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar, M.A., C.I.E., M.R.A.S. (London), D.Litt., Chairman of the Executive Committee and one of the Vice-presidents of the Society, took the chair.

The Annual Report for the year 1953 was read by the Jt. Honorary Secretary Mr. Narendranath Ganguly ; and the Honorary Treasurer Khan Bahadur G. A. Dosani read the audited Financial Statement of the Society for the year ending 31st December 1953, and laid on the table the Balance Sheet drawn up by Messrs. Lovelock & Lewes, the Honorary Auditors.

ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1953.

IN placing the Annual Report for the year ending 31st December 1953 it is pleasing to record that the Calcutta Historical Society has now entered upon the 48th year of its existence. The Editorial Committee was able to publish two volumes in the year under review instead of one. This would not have been possible without the Grant-in-aid of Rs. 500/- given by the Government of West Bengal.

In the year under review it is our unpleasant duty to record the death of one of our valued Life members and Vice-presidents Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi.

During the year under review the total number of members of the Society was 70 of whom 46 were Ordinary members, 10 Life members and 14 Honorary members.

Financial Position:—From the Abstract Statement of Account of the General and Index Funds of the Society submitted by Messrs. Lovelock & Lewes, the honorary Auditors of the Society, it will be seen that the Credit Balance of the General and Index funds of the Society on the 31st December 1953 with the Mercantile Bank of India Ltd., Calcutta, is Rs. 1,947-2-6, of which the sum of Rs. 890-10-11 is in the General Fund, Rs. 56-7-7 in the Index Fund Current Account, and Rs. 1,000/- is in the Fixed Deposit, which has been renewed for a further period of one year.

The Committee are indebted to Messrs. Lovelock & Lewes for their kindness in auditing the Society's Accounts free of charge year after year.

It may be mentioned here that the subscriptions of fifteen Ordinary members amounting to Rs. 620/- were in arrears at the end of the year 1953, that a portion thereof, viz., Rs. 115/- has since been realised ; and it is hoped that the major portion of the remaining amount is recoverable.

We are greatly indebted to the whole-hearted and warm support and unceasing help and advice which the Committee always gets from Sir Jadunath Sarkar, since he became the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Society after the retirement of Sir Evan Cotton from India in the year 1926. He is the main stay of the Society and its journal "Bengal: Past and Present" almost every issue of which contains at least one most valued article from his vastly learned pen.

Accommodation for the records, books, etc. of the Society:—

The want of permanent accommodation for properly storing the books, journals, etc. belonging to the Society is being keenly felt. The Committee has not as yet been able to solve the problem which arose with the removal of the Imperial Record Department to New Delhi in 1936. The activities of the Society are being greatly hampered by reason of the absence of a permanent meeting place for the members.

An application was submitted to the Ministry of Education, Government of India, New Delhi, on the 3rd February 1953, requesting them to kindly provide the Society with a room in Belvedere, where its books, etc. had been lying. In reply to our letter the Government of India said: "Government of India after careful consideration much regret that they are unable to accede to your request as there is no spare accommodation available in Belvedere and its out-houses". And in a subsequent letter the Ministry said—"The Library requires additional space very urgently. It is therefore, very necessary that the records of the Calcutta Historical Society now kept in the Library may be taken away by the Society immediately."

Thus, finding no other alternative, the Jt. Hony. Secretary (Mr. N. Ganguly) approached Major Harry Hobbs, M.B.E., V.D., one of the oldest members and a Vice-president of the Society, who has always been extremely kind to it. He most gladly permitted the Society to store its records, books, etc. in a portion of one of the spacious rooms under his occupation at No. 12/B, Marquis Street, Calcutta. For this generosity the books could be promptly removed there in the first week of June 1953, and saved from destruction. The Committee, therefore, expresses its indebtedness to Major Hobbs who has never failed to extend his whole-hearted and unceasing support to the Society whenever it is needed.

I am sorry to state here for your information that the Government of West Bengal have further reduced our grant from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 300/-. The original grant of Rs. 1,000/- was reduced to Rs. 500/- last year; and another cut in the grant is more regrettable. The Society must now try to find room to store its books, blocks, records. Accommodation cannot be secured for rent less than Rs. 50/- per month.

The Society expects to publish from now two issues of its journal "Bengal: Past and Present" every year. This most important activity of the Society must be continued. Valued contributors do not feel inclined to send their articles for publication in a journal which appears only once a year. The increased publication requires more funds than what the Society

can afford to spend. We, however, hope that the Government of West Bengal will kindly come to our rescue and restore to us their Annual Grant of Rs. 1,000/-. We draw the attention of the Government of West Bengal to the fact that Sir Jadunath Sarkar guides the activities of this Society, and that is the best guarantee which the Society can give of the value of its performance.

NARENDRANATH GANGULY,
Jt. Honorary Secretary.

Dr. N. K. Sinha proposed the adoption of the Annual Report and Prof. Tarit Kumar Mukherjee seconded the motion which was carried unanimously.

Major Harry Hobbs proposed the adoption of the audited account and seconded by Mr. A. A. Czill-al-Wahed the motion was carried.

The following remunerations and monthly allowance—as had already been arranged by the honorary Secretaries were confirmed :

- (i) Remuneration of Rs. 60/- to be paid to two clerks engaged for sorting, arranging, etc. all the back numbers of B. P. & P., Index volumes, etc. lately removed from Belvedere (National Library premises) to No. 12/B, Marquis Street, Calcutta, after the completion of their work ;
- (ii) Payment of monthly allowance of Rs. 10/- instead of Rs. 5/ to Bhagabati (Darwan) for his regularly dusting and cleaning the books, etc. stored at No. 12/B, Marquis Street, Calcutta.
- (iii) Annual allowance of Rs. 60/- to Sri Kanailal Bagh, and Rs. 10/- to Lallan Singh (the clerk and peon of Jt. Hon. Secretary Mr. B. N. Bose's office) for their attending to the work of the Society.

On the proposal of Mr. N. Ganguly and seconded by Khan Bahadur G. A. Dossani the following Joint Editors were re-elected :

- | | |
|---|---------------------------|
| Dr. Narendra Krishna Sinha | } of Calcutta University. |
| Dr. Debendra Nath Banerjee | |
| Dr. Nandalal Chatterjee, M.A., Ph.D., D.Litt.—Lucknow University. | |
| Dr. Kali Kinkar Datta, M.A., Ph.D., P.R.S.—Patna University. | |

Mr. Narendranath Ganguly, the Jt. Honorary Secretary of the Society expressed his inability to do practically all the work of the Society, which he has all along been doing since the year 1924, and he, therefore, wished to be relieved of them, as in this connection he had to go, almost every day, to many places, which now tells on his health.

Major H. Hobbs paid high compliments to Mr. Ganguly for serving the Society and its journal with his untiring energy and devotion.

Sir Jadhunath Sarkar said that Mr. Ganguly should be relieved of the work of keeping the accounts, cashing Cheques, etc. and we agreed to transfer this portion of his work to the other Jt. Secretary (Mr. B. N. Bose).

Thus it was resolved from the chair that Mr. B. N. Bose would in future keep the accounts and relieve Mr. Ganguly of his work in this respect.

With a vote of thanks to the chair the meeting terminated.

CALCUTTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

GENERAL FUND.

Statement of Receipts and Payments for the year ended 31st December, 1953.

RECEIPTS		PAYMENTS	
RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.
To Balance as at 1st January, 1953 :			
With The Mercantile Bank of India Ltd.			
On Current Account ...	1,204 10 11	By Printing Charges including Reprints & Sales Taxes ...	1,648 0 0
On Fixed Deposit ...	1,000 0 0	Postages & Petties ...	138 10 0
		Allowance to Durwan ...	35 0 0
Subscriptions for 1952 ...	580 0 0	Bank Charges ...	3 6 0
Do. Arrears realised ...	20 0 0	Cheque returned ...	60 0 0
Do. Grant of West Bengal Government ...	470 0 0	Removal of Books and Records ...	60 0 0
Interest on Fixed Deposit ...	500 0 0		
Sale of Society's Journal ...	20 0 0	Balance as at 31st December, 1953 :	1,945 0 0
	41 0 0	With The Mercantile Bank of India Ltd.	
		On Current Account ...	890 10 11
		On Fixed Deposit ...	1,000 0 0
			1,890 10 11
			<u>Rs. 3,835 10 11</u>


INDEX FUND.

Statement of Receipts and Payments for the year ended 31st December, 1953.



RECEIPTS		PAYMENTS	
RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.	RS. A. P.
To Balance as at 1st January, 1953 :			
With The Mercantile Bank of India Ltd.			
On Current Account	By Bank Charges
	56 8 7	Balance as at 31st December, 1953 :	0 1 0
		With The Mercantile Bank of India Ltd.	
		On Current Account ...	56 7 7
			<u>Rs. 56 8 7</u>

We report that we have examined the above Statements of Receipts and Payments of the Calcutta Historical Society for the year ended 31st December, 1953, with the books and vouchers of the Society and have found them to be in accordance therewith.

Calcutta, 12th March, 1954. }
 LOVELOCK & LEWIS,
 Chartered Accountants,
 Honorary Auditors.



BENGAL PAST & PRESENT



JOURNAL OF THE CALCUTTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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Jungle Mohals Under Lord Wellesley.

THE forest regions in the districts of Midnapore, Birbhum, Bankura and Burdwan were the so-called jungle mohals in Bengal, which were always a lawless and troublesome area in the days of the East India Company. Its primitive population and powerful local zamindars were the two constant sources of trouble for the local authorities. Law and order was difficult to maintain, and disturbances were frequent because of the inaccessible nature of the country and lack of adequate communications. It is interesting to note that in Lord Wellesley's time some attention was paid to these jungle mohals, and an attempt was made to reorganise the administration of the area. But, as Lord Wellesley was preoccupied with wars and annexations for most part of his regime, the jungle mohals remained an unsolved problem for the Bengal government.

It was proposed (1) in the time of Lord Wellesley that the jungle mohals should be formed into a new district, separated from Midnapore, Birbhum and Burdwan, and including the principal part of Bishnupur. The step (2) would have been right and proper for the better government of the area, but it was ultimately disapproved on the ground of expense it would have involved. An alternative and more economical arrangement was finally decided upon. A special officer was stationed in these mohals with the powers only of Magistrate, and an additional assistant judge was also posted for this area. The police of the jungle mohals was put on a readjusted basis accordingly. The Judge and Magistrate of Birbhum was to remove (3) his court to the most convenient situation within the limits of Pachete, (4) for at least four months in the year, in the same manner in which the Judge and Magistrate of Ramghur was to hold his court at Sherghat.

This arrangement was immediately of benefit to the jungle mohals. The essential advantages of a new district particularly with respect to the maintenance of law and order were obtained cheaply. The Judge and Magistrate of Burdwan was afforded the necessary relief. The appointment of an official to act as Magistrate of the jungle mohals was not attended with a greater expense than what would have been incurred by the appointment of an assistant Judge at Burdwan. On the whole, the administration of law and justice was put on a better footing than was the case before.

In the time of Lord Wellesley some of the zamindars and their henchmen created serious disturbances in the jungle mohals. The peace of Burbhum

(1) Letter from H. Colebrooke, 23rd July, 1805. (Judicial-Criminal No. 16, 25th July, 1805).

(2) Letter from the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, 23rd July, 1805.

(3) Letter from the Secretary to Government, 25th July, 1805.

(4) Judicial-Criminal No. 17, 25th July, 1805.

was disturbed by the local Raja's brother, Madhab Singh.(5) He was supported by the local Chooars who carried depredations all round. The local sepoy proved powerless against the combined might of Madhab Singh and his Chooar followers. Madhab Singh was asked to surrender and give security for his good behaviour, but he was not inclined to do so. All the Darogahs and the Chiefs of the chooars were called upon to seize the person of Madhab Singh, but even this too proved to be of no effect.

With a view to conciliating Madhab Singh, it was decided to fix (6) a maintenance allowance for him from his brother's zamindary. In fact, he was entitled under a decree passed by the Sudder Dewani Adawlut respecting the Burbhum Pergunna to a maintenance. The Governor-General in Council passed the necessary orders for the adjustment of the dues of Madhab Singh. This step finally induced Madhab Singh to settle down peacefully.

Raja Mohan Singh, zamindar of Juriah, was another person whose conduct was extremely reprehensible.(7) It was suspected that he was fomenting trouble in his area. In consequence, his Police powers were suspended, and the local Police Thana was strengthened. It may be noted that the Juriah zamindary was situated ten coss from Puttergutta, the nearest Police Thana which had a guard of one Havildar and twelve sepoy.

The Chooars of Burbhum,(8) however, were the greatest trouble makers of the jungle mohals. From the account given by the local Magistrate, it appears that Raghunath Narain, late zamindar of Burbhum, had a brother named Lachman Singh. The latter made himself independent and took possession of Punj Sirdaree, a division of the country so called from its being subject to five Chiefs. Lachman Singh resided at Bandee, a village near a high hill called Dulma. This hill was a place of great strength, and was very steep. It was accessible only by a narrow path through a thick jungle. It was a secure retreat for the Chooars when pressed. These Chooars numbered about 1000 or 1200, but they had adherents in distant places also, and a large force could be collected by them, if necessary.

When Lachman Singh died, he was succeeded by his son, Ganga Narain Singh. But the Chooars did not like him, and they rose in favour of Madhab Singh (9) and dispossessed Ganga Narain. So, the latter attached himself to the zamindar of Burbhum and secured some assistance from Patcoom. Then, he attacked the Punj Sirdaree. There was a regular battle, and many died on both sides. Almost all the leading men on both sides in these disturbances were robbers or murderers or outlaws who had plundered the country and fought against the Company's sepoy.(10)

(5) Letter from E. Strachey, Magistrate, Midnapore, June 20, 1805.

(6) Letter from Secretary to Government, June 27, 1805. (Judicial Criminal—No. 5 of 27th June, 1805).

(7) Letter from C. R. Blunt, Magistrate, Birbhum, March 3, 1805. (Fort William the 14th March, 1805).

(8) Letter from E. Strachey, Magistrate, Midnapore, July 3, 1805.

(9) Letter from Secretary to Government, June 27, 1805 to the Magistrate, Midnapore.

(10) Fort William, July 11, 1805. (Judicial Criminal No. 2, 1805).

The Chooars were, in short, so unruly that the local Magistrate thought force would be of no use. The country was wild and one could not get intelligence of the state of affairs in that part of the district. Little information was received from the Police Darogah who was stationed there.(11) So, it was decided not to apprehend and bring to trial persons concerned in the disturbances. On the contrary, conciliation was decided upon by the local Magistrate as the best means of establishing peace in the country. Military means would be of no use in an unhealthy country. The Magistrate thought that if troops were sent to Burbhum, they would die in a short time. "I should not think", he wrote, "of applying for Sepoys to be sent over there during the rains. . . ."

The Governor-General in Council decided (12) that if Madhab Singh continued to be dissatisfied with the allowance granted to him in conformity to the decree of the Sudder Dewany Adawlut, every effort was to be made for the apprehension of his person. This was to be made in conjunction with the local zamindar and other Hill Chiefs of the area. The latter were to be afforded every help in the maintenance of peace. The Darogah of Burbhum and other Darogahs in the neighbourhood were also to afford assistance in the apprehension of law-breakers. The Government did not think it would be advisable to despatch sepoy into the jungles particularly in the rainy season, but they ordered that parties of sepoy should be stationed in the vicinity of Burbhum at those places at which they might most likely be able to apprehend the persons guilty of disturbances. Two or three companies of sepoy were accordingly posted near Manbhum and Amyenaghur. The climate of these places was not so destructive as that of Burbhum, but it was still very bad, as the Magistrate reported to the authorities at Calcutta.

The Police arrangements in the jungle mohals were of a peculiar character ; this may be noted in this connection. There were Police Thanas at convenient centres, but they were too few for the whole area. The establishment of guard was also not adequate in these Thanas. Lately, some of the Thanas were closed down in the interest of economy.(13) So, it was decided that the zamindars of the area should be called upon to perform the functions of police officers.(14) The zamindars were to maintain law and order with the help of their own "paiks". This special arrangement was peculiar to the jungle mohals. It was, however, open to a zamindar to refuse to accept charge of the Police of his estate.(15) But, as a rule, the zamindars generally accepted the responsibility of policing their country. In return, they were allowed a token allowance per mensem for these duties. For example, the Magistrate of Birbhum reported (16) that a local chief was to accept charge of Police on reaching majority of age, and he was to be granted an allowance

(11) Letter from the Magistrate, Midnapore, July 3, 1805.

(12) Judicial Criminal No. 1 of July 11, 1805.

(13) Judicial Criminal—No. 1 of 21st February, 1805.

(14) Letter from C. R. Blunt, Magistrate, Birbhum, 12th February, 1805.

(15) Letter from C. R. Blunt, Magistrate, Birbhum, 3rd March, 1805.

(16) Letter from E. Strachey, Magistrate, Midnapore, 26th October, 1805.

of Rs. 10 per mensem.(17) This would enable the Government to close down the present Thana establishment which cost Rs. 195-8 per month. The Police Burkendauzes, it may be added, received a salary of Rs. 4 per month. The zamindars had to pay for the services of these men. Cases are known where some zamindars refused to bear the expense and offered to dispense with the services of their "paiks" than pay for them. These rules of Police for the jungle mohals were framed in the year 1800 as an experiment in the first instance.(18) These rules were permanently enacted later in the time of Sir George Barlow.(19)

The management of the Police in the jungle mohals under order of Government of the 31st of July, 1800,(20) was far from perfect. While the Government shirked its responsibility in the interest of economy, the zamindars rarely performed their duties honestly and efficiently. Most of them were reluctant to bear the expenditure on paiks, and kept no guards in many of the villages of their estates. What was worse is that many of the zamindars afforded shelter to the most notorious outlaws. The situation was so bad that gang robberies, plunder and every species of crime were practised in the jungle mohals without even the shelter of night being deemed necessary to escape the rod of justice.(21)

A circumstance appeared in evidence before the court of Birbhum which it is known was not confined to the pergunna of Pachete alone.(22). It appeared that on a complaint of robbery being preferred to the Police officers, and the property being forthcoming, it was restored to the complainant on his paying a sum equal to the one third of its computed value. Thus, the zamindar, if not the instigator of theft or robbery, derived profit from the commission of the crime, and the poor sufferer, taught to regard the zamindar with awe, submitted to the extortion, and would not seek redress in the court owing to fear and the evident inconvenience of quitting his home and family.

The zamindars (23) were so negligent that the monthly reports, they were by the rules adopted for their guidance required to furnish, consisted invariably of so many blank sheets. To the Parwanahs issued by the court the zamindars of the jungle mohals seldom returned any answer. Cases were not infrequent where the peon of the court deputed to serve it was never more heard of.

NANDALAL CHATTERJI.

(17) Judicial Criminal—No. 1 of 21st February, 1805.

(18) Judicial Criminal No. 1 of 1st November, 1805.

(19) Judicial Criminal, No. 15 of 13th December, 1805.

(20) Vide Regulations of July, 31 of 1800.

(21) Fort William 18th April, 1805, Judicial Criminal, No. 6.

(22) Letter from C. R. Blunt, Magistrate, Birbhum, 1st March, 1805.

(23) Letter from E. Strachey, Magistrate, 9th April, 1800.

The Cis-Sutlej States in the Crisis of the First Anglo-Sikh War.

THE Sikh army crossed the Sutlej on the 11th of December, 1845, and the First Anglo-Sikh War commenced. Two days later the Governor-General issued a proclamation in which, among other things, it was made clear that all subjects of the British Government and those, who possessed estates on both sides of the river Sutlej, would be indemnified and secured in all their just rights and privileges, if they were to sustain loss because of their faithful adherence to the British ; and, on the other hand, all subjects of the British Government, who would continue in the service of the Lahore State and who would disobey the proclamation by not immediately returning to their allegiance, would be liable to have their property on this side of the Sutlej confiscated and themselves declared to be aliens and enemies of the British Government. At the same time, *parwanas* were issued to the Cis-Sutlej Chieftains calling upon them to attend immediately to the duties prescribed by Articles 4 and 5 of the *Itilla Nāma* or the Proclamation of Protection of 3rd May, 1809. These articles provided that should a British force, on purposes of general welfare, be required to march through the country of the said Chiefs it was necessary and incumbent that every Chief should furnish supplies of grain and other necessities as might be demanded. And in case of war, the Chieftains were bound to assist the British to the best of their ability, by furnishing supplies and joining their contingents to the British force. Though not specifically mentioned in the Proclamation of Protection, it was also claimed that another obligation was to furnish information. This was clearly implied for it would be a strange fidelity indeed, that refused to give warning of coming danger. The manner in which and the extent to which the Cis-Sutlej chieftains responded to these obligations is the subject-matter of this article.

The geographical position of the Cis-Sutlej States, situated as they were, between the borders of British territory and the scene of action, was one of vital importance and their assistance and co-operation were urgently needed for providing supplies and for keeping the roads open. The coming storm had been anticipated sometime back and British officers had been busy feeling the pulse of the Cis-Sutlej Chieftains and impressing on them that their true interest lay in an unswerving allegiance to the British. In this connection we would refer to a very interesting letter which was addressed by Major Broadfoot, on 24th November, 1845 to the Ahluwalia Chief and delivered to his confidential agent Lal Bustiram, a highly respectable old man for transmission to his master. Bustiram despatched the letter by his own nephew Purubdial, who was instructed to explain to the Sardar the real intentions of Major

Broadfoot. The letter was in the following terms : "It is great wisdom to know how to increase friendship, and its fruits are always good. In any Government or country at such times as the bazaar of foolishness is warm and the eye of reflection is not fixed on the probable result, it behoves the wise and the far-seeing, who are real friends, to take counsel from futurity. This is forethought. I have explained the meaning of this letter through your confidential Agent, Bustiram, to the messenger who carried it." This is a sample of the way in which confidential communications were made by the Agencies. The letter itself contained only a few cryptic hints and the explanation was left to oral communication by the messenger. What Major Broadfoot wanted was that the Sardar was to dissociate himself from the Lahore Darbar in case affairs should come to a crisis. Such letters were evidently sent to other Chiefs as well and, as we have said, *parwanas* with specific directions were also sent to them. An abstract of these orders on the basis of the records of the office of the Governor-General's Agent, North-Western Frontier, is available and it shows that the earliest of these *parwanas* was issued on the 3rd of December, 1845, 8 days before the outbreak and the latest on the 8th of March, 1846, about a month after the battle of Sobraon was fought and won. They thus cover a little more than the entire period of the war and, as we shall see, reveal an interesting story.

The British officials are practically unanimous that the response to these demands was highly unsatisfactory. The reports of many of these officials are available and on an analysis of these H. M. Lawrence, Agent of the Governor-General, North-Western Frontier, gives it as his definite opinion that "all the Protected States have, more or less, failed in fulfilling their obligations to our Government, and that we have little reason to be satisfied even with the best disposed". Elaborating his point Lawrence further says that with regard to supplies, with very few exceptions, very little was sent in till the contest had virtually been decided by the victories of Aliwal and Sobraon. "Then, where before had been indifference if not open hostility, all was zeal and devotion ; and an examination of dates will show that the Sikh Chieftains were obedient only when they considered us in a position to enforce obedience. In some cases by reason of the contemptuous indifference with which our demands were treated our own ameens were sent to collect supplies but found that zamindars and agents had been ordered to withhold them. But that the Protected Chiefs wanted only the will to furnish supplies can at once be seen by comparing the amounts furnished by them with those obtained from our own districts. Of the contingents, which the Protected States were bound to furnish it will be sufficient to remark that some fought against us and many never appeared at all. Even those that did join our army were little to be depended upon, and such was their want of discipline and of equipment that had they been faithful they would still have been useless. The least that we had a right to expect from the Protected Chieftains was that they should protect the roads in our rear, and restrain their subjects from robbery and pillage. But in most cases the Chiefs seemed on the outbreak of hostilities to have suspended all civil control in their own states except where it could be employed with effect to keep back the supplies required

by our army. It must be borne in mind that these acts of the Chieftains were in the face of continued orders sent from the various Officers of the Agency, who spared no pains to impress on the minds of all the necessity of obedience, and the consequences of neglect."

Lawrence's castigation of the Cis-Sutlej Chieftains is thus sweeping and, more or less, unqualified, though, no doubt, he makes a very few exceptions. In fact, with regard to the discharge of their obligations in relation to the First Anglo-Sikh War, the reports of the British officers divide, in a way, the Chieftains into three different categories: those who tried to discharge their obligations to the best of their ability, those who openly went over to the other side, and those who sat on the fence and watched developments.

Of the first the most important was the Maharaja of Patiala, about whose good disposition there could be no doubt. Both Mr. Cust and Major Mills, two of the Agency Officers, speak favourably of his exertions from the very beginning. But even in this case the British officers were not quite satisfied. The contingent of this state did not always follow the fidelity of their Chief and even in the question of supplies, a *parwana*, dated 17th January, draws pointed attention to the fact that only one-fourth of the stipulated amount had been sent in. Moreover, a very serious charge was made against one of the Chiefs of Bhadour, who was under the protection of Patiala but in spite of these minor lapses, for which perhaps the Maharaja could not be held directly responsible, his conduct was regarded as thoroughly loyal and he was, as we shall see, amply rewarded for his fidelity. With Patiala may be mentioned the Chieftain of Faridkot, who was also very staunchly loyal throughout and, as a reward for his services, was invested with the title of Raja. The position of this Chief was extremely difficult as his possessions lay near the Sutlej and opposite to Ferozepur, and were, till the victory of Ferozeshahr, in the power and partly in the possession of the Lahore army. In his case vacillation might, therefore, have been pardonable but all agree that this Chieftain was faithful from the first and exerted himself strenuously throughout the war. Similar was the attitude of the aged lady, who owned the petty state of Rai Ke Kote.

In spite of lapses three other states are said to have acted loyally on the whole and these were Jhind, Mullode and Maler Kotla. The Raja of Jhind was charged with some lukewarmness at the earliest stage, previous to the crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikh Army. For this the Agent fined him to the extent of 10,000 rupees but all spoke highly of his later exertions and the conduct and condition of his contingent. The general opinion about him was that he was one of the best disposed of the Sikh Chiefs and that he was a man of high character. But still he was made to pay the fine before he was allowed to attend the Governor-General's Darbar at Ludhiana. The Chief of Mumdot was a relation of the Maharaja of Patiala but does not seem to have possessed the unswerving fidelity of the head of the family. Both Mr. Cust and Major Mills accused him of having intrigued with Lahore. The Agent considered him guilty of this offence and summoned him to his presence, when he was admonished and warned. His after conduct, how-

ever, was considered as highly satisfactory. and it is important to note that it was not necessary to issue any further orders to him, as is clearly proved by the abstract of *parwanas*, already referred to. The third state, viz., Maler Kotla, was a Pathan state which owed its survival to the protection of the British Government and had always been considered faithful in its allegiance. During the period of the War the Rais was ill but his subordinate Chiefs exerted themselves fully to gain the approbation of the officers of the Agency. Lawrence, however, says: "When, however, I passed the town on my way to join the army four days after the enemy had crossed the river under Sardar Runjoor Singh at Ludhiana, I was permitted to leave the place at midnight with a single horseman, although the Sikh garrison of Gungrana had, for some days before, been plundering the road I had to pass. This neglect cannot be imputed to ignorance, for I was twelve hours at Mullair Rasita, and was waited on by a Vukeel, but not by a Chief, although one, if not two, were present." Lawrence does not impute any treachery in the matter but "offer this as a specimen of the assistance that may be expected from the best disposed in the hour of need."

Coming next to the States, dependent on the Agency at Ambala, we come across a still more unsatisfactory position. Of the 41 States of this group the majority were petty and insignificant but still daily orders were issued to each and some of the Chieftains were summoned and personally warned. The response, however, was indifferent. Most of the Chiefs refused all supplies and evinced total indifference to the demands of the British. From the tabular report of Mr. Vansittart, one of the Agency officers, it appears that of the supplies forwarded from Ambala 93% were obtained with carriage from the British districts of Ambala, Dehra Dun and Shaharanpur and even where, in the tabular report, a fair amount is inserted opposite to any Chief, a note is added to the effect that it was collected by the *ameens* of the Government. The only States that are favourably mentioned are Shahabad, Dialghur, and Kulsea. The last gave supplies immediately they were demanded and sent its contingent at an early period, and all this, notwithstanding a close and long continued connection with the Lahore Darbar.

Apart from this almost universal neglect in sending supplies, the States attached to Ambala were charged with a more serious offence. This was the state of crime within the bounds of their dominions. These States were beyond the jurisdiction of the Police Court of Ambala and as they had practically no Criminal Courts of their own, all the bad characters of the neighbourhood were to be found in these partially independent States, whence they issued now and then to plunder in the surrounding districts. Some of these States, particularly Singpuriah, Sham Singhian and Birwaleeah, were regarded as the utopia of thieves and the Chiefs of those States were strongly suspected of levying blackmail and affording protection to thieves in return for a percentage on their spoils. As might be expected, during the war these irregularities reached a great height and the roads about Ambala, especially the grand road to Kumaul, was rendered highly dangerous to unescorted travellers.

It is thus clear that the assistance in contingents and supplies that the British Government received from the Cis-Sutlej Chieftains fell considerably short of what it might reasonably expect under the terms of the Declaration of Protection but this is not the whole story. There was one Chief who openly went over to the other side and there were several others who were clearly inclined that way and helped the invading Sikh Army whenever they conveniently could. The Raja of Ladwa was mixed up in the intrigues of the Lahore Darbar, where he often played a prominent part. His hostility to the British, was, more or less, known and consequently his open disaffection, flight and opposition in the field did not create much surprise. Among the others may be specifically mentioned the Sardar of Rupar and the Chief of Mumdote. Lawrence says that there was definite evidence in the records of his office that the Sardar of Rupar was engaged in intrigues with the Lahore Darbar. He withdrew his *Vakcels* from Lahore only when Major Broadfoot threatened to confiscate his estate. The contingent of this Sardar never appeared and no supplies whatever were received from him. The Chief of Mumdote belonged to a Pathan family, who formerly ruled Kussoor and to which it still asserted a claim. Up to the 13th of December, 1845 Mumdote was dependent on Lahore. Before the outbreak of hostilities Major Broadfoot had assured the Khan that if he gave fair assistance he would be confirmed in his possessions independent of Lahore. Many promises had been made by the Khan but in spite of these not only was all assistance withheld but the Mumdote contingent under the Khan's own brother fought against the British in the battle of Ferozeshahr. Lawrence says: "Even after my own arrival on the frontier, little was done by the Mumdote Agents, and nothing until after repeated remonstrance and even threats. This is the more remarkable in that for many years the family have expressed deep anxiety to be taken under British protection, and when I held charge of Ferozepur, the Khan, himself, often begged of me advice and countenance, and told me of his desire to be included within the British pale." To this group should also be added States like Seealwa and Khurur, which, from first to last, withheld all assistance, and though *ameens* of the British Government were placed in their estates, no supplies could be had from them.

We now come to the third group of States, which made a show of giving assistance and awaited developments. Some of the States, particularly the majority of the Ambala group, were indifferent to British demands all throughout; excepting these and the States already discussed, the rest belonged, more or less, to this third category. Besides the adoption of a policy of expediency and consequent lukewarmness on the part of these States, they have been charged with a more serious offence. The Agent to the Governor-General, North-Western Frontier, and most of the Agency Officers are, more or less, decidedly of opinion that, before the outbreak of hostilities, several of these States were in treasonable communication with the war-party at Lahore and that a widespread conspiracy had been set on foot. It is admitted, of course, that judicial proof of a treasonable correspondence with the enemy was not extant. This is attributed to the untimely death of Major Broadfoot, the late Agent to the Governor-General, and the facts that Major

Broadfoot had no confidant and that a portion of his papers was lost. F. Mackeson, the Commissioner and Superintendent also says that the records of his office at Simla afford no information on the subject but he adds: "But as it is one that refers more particularly to Lahore, documents adverting to it will probably be found in the office of the Agent, Governor-General. The Lahore Government had always its emissaries and reporters of news in the Protected States, and at the native courts in India, and if they were more active immediately previous to the invasion of our territory by the Lahore Troops than they had formerly been, some traces of their intrigues may have transpired." No such evidence was forthcoming but still it has been said that there were strong grounds for suspicion. Lawrence writes: "I have no doubt in my own mind from all I have heard, and even more from what has been kept back from me by those who must be acquainted with facts, that there was an understanding between the Lahore War Party and some of the protected Chiefs; and that the Nabha Raja was mainly implicated. I heard reports of these things even in Nepal, and the British news-writer at Lahore several times warned Major Broadfoot that such was the case; and especially advised him of General Ram Singh having been sent over to Nabha." The case of the Raja of Nabha is thus a crucial one and we would forthwith proceed to analyse it in some detail.

It appears that on the 5th of December, 1845, a *parwana* was issued to the Vakeel of Nabha, intimating that the camp of the Governor-General would be at Khunna on the 10th and requiring supplies for his Excellency's camp for four days. He was also ordered to mark out a road, as was the practice in the Protected States whenever troops were about to move. These orders appear to have been repeated on the 8th and the 10th and it was made clear that in case of non-compliance dire consequences would result. As still there was no response and the orders were entirely neglected, the Agent confiscated a portion of the Nabha territory on the 13th and a *parwana* was issued to the Nabha Vakeel "informing him of Dehwaroo and Maloh having been sequestered in consequence of neglect to furnishing supplies and that Shamut Khan Risaldar has been furnished with an order to realise 10 Rupees daily as a Dustuck from that Ilaqa and to collect supplies from it as from a Khas Ilaqa, that he must act in obedience to him and give supplies as soon as possible, or stringent measures will be taken." At the same time, orders were issued to the zamindars of Dehwaroo and Maloh to obey Shamut Khan Risaldar and carry out his direction. And on the 15th the confidential agents of the Raja of Nabha were addressed by Major Broadfoot, the Agent, in severe terms, reproaching their master with not only failing in his duty but with holding communication with the enemy. The Agent added: "I therefore repeat what in the morning I said by word of mouth, that unless the Raja of Nabha comes to me this or tomorrow evening, he will be considered an enemy of the British Government." Several of the Nabha agents were, at the same time, placed under restraint; and the village of Latalla, which had that day failed to furnish supplies and whose Thanadar had absconded on being called to account, was confiscated.

It will thus be seen that from the very outset stringent steps were adopted

against the Raja of Nabha. The extraordinary situation created by the War, no doubt, demanded extraordinary measures but the point to notice is that for similar delinquencies such extreme steps were not taken against many of the Protected States. The reason appears to be that a strong suspicion had been created in the mind of Major Broadfoot about the fidelity of the Raja of Nabha. The situation was a critical one and the Agency officers are, more or less, agreed that the feeling of the great mass of the Cis-Sutlej population was decidedly hostile to the British Government. "A large proportion of that population is of the Jat caste which has ever been a fertile source of soldiers and votaries of the Sikh cause. The majority of the remainder are Dogars, Ranghur and Gujars, all predatory tribes delighting in rapine and accustomed in all ages to plunder both friends and enemies, both rulers and invaders." It has been estimated that from 10,000 to 15,000 of the inhabitants of the Cis-Sutlej States, chiefly of Jat extraction, were serving in the Lahore ranks at the commencement of the war. It was then but natural that the zamindars of every village should hope success to the cause, on which depended the fortunes of their friends and relatives. "There are few Jat villages south of the Sutlej in which there were not residing before hostilities commenced, four or five or more soldiers and officers belonging to the Lahore regular or irregular army, between whom and the army a constant communication was kept up. The intended movement of that army guided by its Panches, or rather its intention to cross the Sutlej and invade the territory under our protection, must therefore have been known to the population and to the chiefs on this side the river some days before it was executed, and their concealment of this intention from us plainly indicates their disaffection." Thus writes Mackeson, who also says that he had no doubt in his own mind that the Sikh population, on this side the river, throughout the Protected States, was strongly against the British and definitely in favour of the Khalsa and that in passing through Patiala on his way from Sirsa to Amballa, a day before the action at Ferozepur and a few days after it, he observed indications of this feeling which could not be mistaken. Mr. Cust, the Asst. Agent to the Governor-General, N.W.F., alleges somewhat more definite grounds for suspicion. He says that during the summer Mohan Singh Mulwar had been sent to seduce the Cis-Sutlej Protected Chiefs and that the Vakeel of Sodhi Dewan Singh of Anandpur-Makhowal openly undertook to assist in the same work and use his influence as the spiritual adviser of the Sikhs. It will not be out of place to mention here that shortly before the outbreak of hostilities Major Broadfoot had forcibly and authoritatively interfered in the affairs of the Sodhis of Anandpur-Makhowal, who were kinsmen of the Gurus and, as such, held in high esteem by the Sikhs in general. Lawrence says: "All the Sodhis as the religious leaders of the Sikhs were probably, and not unnaturally, hostile to our Government. But the intrigues of the Sodhis of Anandpur are the most notorious. On account of their open hostility and their neglect of orders, their possessions have been confiscated and still remain so."

It is thus quite probable that the strong impression created by these circumstances influenced Major Broadfoot's mind. He felt satisfied that there

was much treachery around him and his suspicion specially of the Nabha Raja received added strength from the fact that General Ram Singh came on a visit to Nabha some time before the outbreak of hostilities. This Ram Singh was a General of Ventura's Brigade ; he was a ryot of Nabha but an old servant of the Lahore Government. He was one of those Lahore leaders who were impeccably hostile to the British Government and the British news-writer at Lahore had warned Major Broadfoot several times that General Ram Singh's visit was in connection with the intrigues that were being carried on between the Raja of Nabha and the War Party at Lahore. In his "Defence" the Raja says that this so-called emissary came only once and on his own business ; and that his simple salam was but once received in open Darbar. Lawrence, however, says : "My own opinion is that, during his visit to his family, his intercourse with the Raja was frequent and secret ; and that the latter through him made general promises to the Lahore War Party. It is at least suspicious that Ram Singh, a General in the regular troops, and commonly reported to be one of those most opposed to the British connection, should have visited Nabha, shortly before the breaking out of the War and after it was contemplated, if not determined on ; and still more so that he is simply called throughout the vindication, a document which gives all others their titles. Ram Singh ; and the prefix of General, as shewing him to have been a Lahore leader, is carefully omitted. These are points I should place little weight were not the suspicions they induce strengthened by the personal contumacy, by the mere nominal assistance he afforded in supplies, and by the entire holding aloof in the four battles of the Nabha troops." It will thus be seen that direct evidence of a conspiracy is not very strong and the Nabha case will have to be mainly judged by the personal demeanour of the Raja, and the services performed by his Agents during the war.

To come back to the story, the Raja of Nabha did neither obey the peremptory order of Major Broadfoot of the 15th December, nor did he send any communication in reply. Next we find that on the 9th of January, 1846, Major Mackeson, by order of Mr. Currie, reminded the Raja of Major Broadfoot's letter of the 15th December, and called on him now to attend and explain the cause of his delay. The Raja neither answered the letter nor attended to its summons ; and the first communication received from him was on the 14th January, though professedly written on the 29th December. In this letter, however, the Raja did not care to offer apologies for his delinquencies but its tone is that befitting an injured person ; not a word was there about obeying the summons of the Government. It also transpires that near about this time Under Secretary Edwards was approached by some Nabha agents, when he was at Patiala, and sought his advice as to what their master, who had fallen under the displeasure of Government, should do. Edwards was also assured that the Raja was perfectly ready and willing to do all that he might require. Edwards writes : "I told them in reply that the Raja had done very wrong in failing to obey the orders of Government and that I had only one piece of advice to give him and that was to proceed at once to Ferozepore. The Motamids then went away and again returned saying that the Raja was anxious to obey the orders of Government, but was very much

afraid that if he proceeded to Ferozepur he would be publicly disgraced." Thereupon Edwards took it upon himself to assure the Raja that if he at once proceeded to Ferozepore in obedience to the order of Government, he would not in any way be ignominiously treated, though of course he could not expect to be received with honour or a salute. The Motamids, however, still remained incredulous and thereupon Edwards proposed that he would take the Raja along with him. This satisfied the Motamids and it was arranged that the Raja would accompany Edwards. But as he was just leaving Patiala a message came from the Raja of Nabha to the effect that he much regretted that he could not accompany Edwards that day as the day was unlucky and that the Raja would meet him at his Fort of Dhunailah, which lay on the way. When Edwards reached Dhunailah two Motamids of Nabha waited on him and told him that the Raja was very sorry that he could not accompany him to Ferozepore but that he would follow very soon. Edwards warned the Motamids that if the Raja persisted in this course of recusancy the consequences would be serious and then went on his way.

Meanwhile, on the 18th January Mr. Currie, who was acting as Agent, had ordered a dustuck of two hundred horsemen to be placed on the Raja when he found that all other means were of no avail. But owing to the supplications of the Nabha vakeels and the intercession of Captain Mills, who, though satisfied of the misconduct of the Raja, feared that the horsemen might interfere with the supplies that he was then getting in from Nabha, the order was not carried out. Finally, the Raja joined Major Mackeson on the 13th February, three days after the battle of Sobraon, when intelligence must have reached him that the Sikhs were utterly routed, and that of the invading army not a man remained in arms south of the river.

The Agency Officers are practically unanimous that the Raja of Nabha was a traitor at heart and that his conduct becomes intelligible only on that supposition. But the Raja submitted a vindication and before we come to a final judgment it is necessary to consider it for what it is worth. The first point that the "Defence" seeks to make is that the Raja of Nabha enjoyed a special privilege—that he was not obliged to visit any British Governor or Agent outside his own territory. It is admitted that at the request of Mr. Clerk the Raja had paid a visit to Lord Ellenborough for "this once" and that in like manner Major Broadfoot had once persuaded him to wait on the Lieutenant-Governor outside his boundary. Lawrence admits that on both the occasions the Raja gave much trouble, though, in his view, he exaggerates the concessions and persuasion of the Agents. The "Defence" seems to urge that in neglecting Major Broadfoot's call, the Raja only evaded an unlawful order. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that though the Raja gives a long list of the services rendered by his father to the British Government and claims that his family had always been loyal, he forgets to mention that his father personally attended Metcalfe, both on the Sutlej, and afterwards at Delhi, previous to the second siege of Bharatpur, evidently because this upsets the plea set forth above. Lawrence remarks: "But supposing that what is said is true in the fullest sense regarding visits of ceremony in time of peace, it can in no way apply to requisitions during war and to personal service,

which was more especially due when the Cis-Sutlej States themselves were invaded."

The next plea that the "Defence" puts forward is the Raja's indispensable visits to Patiala, which prevented him from joining the British camp. This point has been closely analysed by Lawrence and he writes: "Major Broadfoot's order for the Raja's attendance was given on the 15th December, and might have been obeyed at furthest within 48 hours. The Maharaja of Patiala died on the 23rd December, and to strictly fulfill the customary obligation, it was only necessary for his kinsmen to attend on any day within seventeen days after his death; and then only for condoling with the family of the deceased which, considering that the distance between Nabha and Patiala is not above 18 miles, might on such occasion have been done in a day, as doubtless would have been the extent of his visit, had he been anxious to obey the orders of Major Broadfoot. He went three times to Patiala and was absent on these visits seventeen days: 1st, from 24th to 28th December when the ceremonies of incremation were performed; 2nd, from 4th to 7th January to offer condolence to the heir; and, thirdly, from the 10th January, at the installation of the present Maharaja, on which last occasion Raja Deo Indra Sing arrived two days before the day appointed (18th) and unnecessarily remained eight days, proving, in my opinion, that he was simply seeking for an excuse for his absence from the British camp."

The Raja also states: "When Major Broadfoot sent for me express, I set out on the morning of the 17th and went as far as Opoke, where I learnt that Major Broadfoot had left Bussean, and gone on to join the army. This news greatly perplexed me, for it was impossible that I could proceed alone." Lawrence says: "The fact, however, is that he made some semblance of preparation to obey, but did not stir a step, and was most probably deterred by the false rumours of the results of the battle of Mudki." Secondly, the Raja's remissness in sending replies and the fact that the first communication from him was received as late as the 14th January are explained by Kanh Chand, the Raja's Dewan and the writer of the "Defence" as having been due to the fact that there was no Agent and that Mr. Currie was very busy. Lawrence says: "This reply is too absurd to need remark; but I may observe that not only was Mr. Currie then officiating as Agent, but Major Mackeson, who had a few days previously been at Ferozepore, was there in the neighbourhood and in charge of the Cis-Sutlej States, and Mr. Cust, the personal assistant of Major Broadfoot, as well as Major Mills, who was in daily communication with the Chiefs, was in camp." In fact, it is admitted in the "Defence" itself that on Major Broadfoot's death "a roobukaree was issued from Mr. Secretary Currie's office, intimating that until a successor to Major Broadfoot should be appointed, Mr. Currie would carry on the duties of the Agency". It is thus clear that there was no substance in the contention put forward by the Dewan.

Another point that was urged on behalf of the Raja was that when on the *arzee* of the Dewan and other *vaakeels* and the intercession of Captain Mills the execution of Mr. Currie's order of 18th January, placing a dustuck of 200 horsemen on the Raja, was delayed for 8 or 10 days, the Raja did set out for

the British camp. But, as Lawrence says: "Although these orders were issued on the 9th and 18th January it was on his own showing a full month before the Raja reached Ludhiana, being one day after the British troops had actually crossed the Sutlej." So far as the order to join the British camp is concerned, the "Defence" thus appears to be, more or less, unconvincing, and there can be little doubt that the Raja sought to evade the order, under one pretext or another, as long as he could, and he joined Major Mackeson at Ludhiana when the Sikhs had not only been beaten at Allwal but also driven across the Sutlej at Sobraon. As Lawrence says: "Self-interest then induced the step that neither fear nor fidelity could, at an earlier period, effect."

Coming next to the services rendered by the Raja of Nabha the first item in the "Defence" is that of "constant intelligence procured at great expense". Lawrence summarily rejects this claim and says: "I neither received a scrap from any Nabha Agent, nor ever heard that they had furnished the smallest portion to any of the British Officers." The "Defence" evidently bases its contention on the services rendered by Sardar Gainsa Singh and his son Lal Singh. Major Broadfoot came to learn that Sardar Gainsa Singh, from connections he had there, was well acquainted with the affairs at Lahore and wanted to utilise him for his own purposes. The son Lal Singh was received with favour by the Agent and sent to Lahore. He continued to furnish intelligence as to the state of affairs there and for the sake of secrecy his letters were sent through the British news-writer's establishment. This, it is said, was not to the liking of the Nabha Raja, who had hesitated, in the first instance, to allow Gainsa Singh and his son to join the Agent and when Lal Singh was received with favour by Major Broadfoot, he threw Gainsa Singh to prison. The contention seems to be that even if Lal Singh had furnished intelligence to Major Broadfoot, the Raja could claim no credit for it. But Lawrence goes further and says: "The Raja's defence lays much stress on the services of Gainsa Singh and his son, Lal Singh; and refers to the great expense incurred in procuring and transmitting intelligence to the late Agent, but I neither found any evidence of such information having been given to my predecessor when I arrived on the 19th January at Ferozepur; nor did Lal Singh or his father ever give me a single item of intelligence that was worth a straw; even though the latter passed through the enemy's camp at Sobraon to me a week before the battle." But this cannot be allowed to pass without comment. As we have seen, Lawrence attributes the want of sufficient judicial proof about the treasonable correspondence between the Nabha Raja and the Lahore War Party mainly to the sudden death of Major Broadfoot and the loss of a substantial portion of his papers. In his "Defence" the Raja challenges the inspection of the Lahore offices for treasonable papers but Lawrence's view is that it is extremely unlikely that any questionable communications were made in writing, and even if they had been, and the British Government should condescend to ask the question, the point of honour would prevent their surrender. The point to notice is that the position of Lal Singh and his furnishing of information to Major Broadfoot was not much dissimilar and the fact that Lawrence, on his arrival at Ferozepur on the 19th January, found no evidence that any information had been

supplied by Lal Singh to his predecessor, may also be due to the loss of Major Broadfoot's papers.

Be that as it may, we have now to take up the question of the conduct of the Nabha troops and the services that they rendered. The "Defence" lays great stress on the zeal and bravery of the Nabha contingent and goes on to state: "In excess of the contingent of 400 horses and as many foot, with two guns and 25 Zumbooruks, furnished to the Army, seven or eight hundred men were entertained and employed at great expense by the Raja, who increased, for the occasion, the pay of all his troops." There is some evidence that additional men were employed over and above the 400 horsemen of the regular contingent. Lieutenant Lake states that 500 or 600 Nabha *sowars* escorted him with a convoy of provisions to Ferozeshahr on the 22nd December, though he adds: "I have no doubt that the Nabha *sowars* would have all run away had we been attacked; I merely mention this to show that they were present." This is a statement on which it is not possible for us to pronounce any judgment and we would leave it as it is. It has also been claimed on behalf of the Raja of Nabha that his troops occupied several forts and it is on record that Captain Mills sent a letter to Noor Khan Bukshi of the Nabha troops expressing satisfaction at his services at Choor Chuk and other places. Lawrence, however, does not seem to attach any importance to these services. He says: "The forts, which they are stated to have reduced, were not defended, and I am not sure that they were occupied. Bukshee Noor Khan is, I believe, a well disposed man, and his good intentions were recognised in a letter by Captain Mills, but I never heard of any definite service that he performed." But it is to be noted that the "definite service" is mentioned in the very letter to which he alludes. Lawrence lays particular stress on the fact that the Nabha contingent was present at Ferozepur and also at Mudki, where it was paraded by Captain Abbott, but not a man joined in the action at that place or in any of the subsequent actions. He goes on to say: "I have repeatedly challenged Dewan Kanh Chund, the writer of the vindication, and now in attendance on me, to show that they ever drew a sabre, or fired a shot in our favour; and I had personal proof of their uselessness in keeping up the communications in the rear of Ferozepore, by my failing to get a single horseman to accompany me through their territory on the 19th of January in my ride between Wudnee and Ferozepur." It appears to us, however, that Lawrence has not been scrupulously fair to the Raja regarding the services rendered by his contingent.

Lastly, we come to the very important question of supplies. We have already seen that very stringent measures were adopted by Major Broadfoot against the Raja of Nabha on his alleged failure to comply with the demands for supplies made on him and that he had been peremptorily ordered to join the Agent's camp. The "Defence" urges that there were supplies at Latalla and Bussean, but that Major Broadfoot would not look at them. Afterwards he sent Lieutenant Lake, who, "after seeing them was tolerably well satisfied" and "offered the Dewan to remain at the godown, and distribute the supplies to troops". On being referred to, Lieutenant Lake said that he did see some grain at Latalla but not sufficient for the troops; he thought, however,

that there had not been time to collect all that was required. Major Broadfoot's displeasure was the more excited at the deficiency at Latalla because "he suspected that the Nabha Raja was disaffected and hostile to our cause. . . . The Nabha Sardars were certainly very dilatory in collecting stores at Kunnake serai, a place selected by Major Broadfoot as a kind of central depot. This remissness, of which Major Broadfoot was aware, made him doubly angry at Latalla". Lawrence's view of this statement is that it endeavours to exculpate the Raja and imputes the want of energy displayed in collecting the supplies to natural indolence and indifference rather than any criminal hostility. Though on being questioned by Lawrence Lake said: "I cannot say that, previous to the battle of Ferozeshahr, I saw any symptoms of exertion on the part of the Nabha Agents", still his statement raises a very important point. It is, more or less, clear that Major Broadfoot's attitude to the Raja of Nabha was mainly determined by his conviction that the Raja was a traitor and was in league with the War Party at Lahore. It is quite probable that this conviction filtered down to his assistants and also to his successor and coloured their appreciation of the services rendered by the Raja and his Agents. This seems to be true at least in the case of Mackeson, who held quite different views, and changed them only when he was apprised of the "whole story" by Lawrence. So far as the question of supplies was concerned most of the Cis-Sutlej States sailed, more or less, on the same boat and some of the Chieftains were even worse offenders than the Raja of Nabha. It is significant that much harsher measures were adopted in his case than in those of others. There is little doubt that an all round prejudice was working against him and the main reason for his evading the orders to join the British camp may very well be that he apprehended the loss of personal freedom. In coming to a judgment on the matter of supplies provided by the Raja of Nabha these considerations should be kept in view, as also the fact that all had to work in a situation in which the people, on the whole, were, more or less, hostile. Even the much lauded Maharaja of Patiala and his Agents could not always escape the charge of negligence. This is apparent from a *parwana* issued, on the 17th January, to Sarfaraz Ali, Vakeel of Patiala, by Captain Mills. It says: "From the 30th December 2,000 maunds of atta was ordered to be furnished daily from the Patiala Ilqa and that at that rate 36,000 maunds should have arrived by this time, but that not a fourth of this quantity has reached; that it is therefore evident there has been great carelessness on the part of the officers entrusted with this duty—that the most important of all things just now is the collection of supplies, as the issue of all operations depends on them and that he is at a loss to account for the neglect apparent in this matter, and directs that he would avoid any further carelessness." Needless to say that, in a similar situation, the Raja of Nabha could not have escaped with such a mild admonition.

On the materials available it is not possible to come to any conclusion on this question of supplies with a minute exactness. The "Defence", no doubt, claims that "the Raja and all his Ministers were occupied from the 15th December, 1845, till the end of March, 1846, solely in providing supplies for the British Army, to the entire neglect of all other business" but the

British officials concerned view the matter in an altogether different light. Lawrence complains that in the enumeration of services some of the items are twice mentioned under different heads. Of the cattle and hackeries, noted in the Defence as having been supplied, the dates, on which they were furnished, are seldom supplied, though on them depends the whole question of voluntary or unavoidable assistance. The supplies stated to have been furnished are so confusedly arranged, in which large quantities, allowed to have been unweighed and not taken, are counted as supplied, that it is not easy to ascertain what quantity is purported to have been actually furnished. After a long discussion with Dewan Kanh Chund, who met him with all his receipts, and a study of the Report submitted by Major Mackeson, Lawrence writes: "From the receipts that I have examined, I have been able to shew that only sixty-four camels, out of 896, and no carts were provided before February. Of the 460 carts, mentioned by Major Mackeson, 400 must be those said to have been employed in bringing the supplies furnished. At utmost then 687 maunds of grain and thirty camels were supplied in December, or before the battles of Moodke and Pherozshahr; while 21,807 maunds, 864 camels and sixty carts were furnished after those actions. I may add that, in my opinion, the resources of the Nabha territory are such as to have enabled the Raja to have supplied all that he gave up to the end of March, early in January, and at least half the amount before the two battles. In short I cannot describe the conduct of the Nabha authorities regarding supplies better than in Major Mills' words to me this very day: 'They gave nothing until after the battle of Pheroshahar, and then exerted themselves as much as the Agents of any Chief.'" But, as we have seen above, it is not wholly true that nothing was given before the two battles and that is not easy to determine whether this earlier neglect arose out of a deliberate design, or out of circumstances over which the Raja had no control.

A plea that he was of an unbalanced mind also seems to have been set up for the Raja but in Lawrence's view "intense pride and ill-regulated passions led him the opposite way to reason; but, in the common acceptance of the term, his mind is as sound as that of any Chief in the protected territory." He goes on to add that the Raja of Nabha has allowed himself to be talked into the belief by flatterers that he is a sort of successor of Kunwar Nau Nihal Singh, and that what an untimely death prevented that Prince from accomplishing has been reserved for him. A firm belief in the traitorous intentions of the Raja is again at work here and we need not pursue the matter further.

(To be continued)

I. BANERJI.

The Koh-i-noor.

FROM THE "MOTTEE MUNDEER" TO THE BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

I

[This article on the mystic, magical, marvellous and matchless "Mountain of Light" The Koh-i-noor—the best known Gem that world has ever seen,—is based on the original records of the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am greatly indebted to the late Sir William Foster, and also to Mr. S. C. Sutton the Librarian, India Office Library, and Mr. J. R. Lloyd, Superintendent of Records Commonwealth Relations Office, London, for their kindly supplying me with the copies of almost all the documents which I required for compiling this paper on the Koh-i-noor.

In the first portion of this article I have reproduced in extenso the traditional and historical accounts relative to that peerless Diamond, which had been obtained, with great difficulty, just after the annexation of the Punjab by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, Agent of the Lieutenant Governor, North Western Provinces, and submitted to the Government of India with his letter dated Delhie Agency, the 7th January 1850.]

Extracts from the Consultations of the Government of India, Foreign
Department, dated 14th June 1850.

Nos. 72—75.

From Sir Theophilus Metcalfe Bart,
Agent, Lieut. Governor N. W. Provinces, Delhie.

To Sir Henry Ethol, K.C.B., (Sic)
Secretary to the Government of India
with the Governor General,
Head Quarters

Dated Delhie 7th January 1850.

Sir,

In obedience to the instructions conveyed in your Despatch No. 2599 under date the 13th December last, I have the honor to submit for the information of the Most Noble the Governor General the following account relative to the Koh-i-noor ; and though I cannot but regret that it is so very meagre and imperfect, I can yet assure you that no pains have been spared to obtain more satisfactory and authentic particulars.

2. I have divided the account into two heads—Traditionary and Historical.

First—according to the tradition of the oldest Jewellers in the city of Delhie, as handed down from family to family :

This Diamond was extracted from the mine Koh-i-noor four days journey from Muchlee bunder (Masulipatam) to the North West, on the banks of the Godaveri during the life time of Krishna, who is supposed to have lived 5,000 years since it was found by a Zumeendar, and became the property of Raja Kuns (Kansa). Its weight being 319 Ruthees or 1 Ounce and 8 Penny-weights. Subsequently it fell into the hands of Bur

The Sumbut is calculated from his reign. Bikramaject [Beer Bikramajeet] of the Panwas [Panwar] tribe, Rajah of Oojeur (Oojayani) in the Malwa Territory, who became Master of the whole of Hindoostan. Then the Mahomedans invaded Hindoostan and conquered Oojeur (Oojayani) this Jewel fell into the hands of the Emperors of the Ghorie dynasty, and from them successively of the Toghlug, the Syud, and the Tod'i [Lodi] dynasties, and eventually descended to the family of Timoor and remained in their possession until the reign of Mahammad Shah, who wore it in his Turban. On Nadir Shah's visit to Delhie the Emperor and he exchanged Turbans, (1) and thus it became the property of the latter, while others again affirm that Mahammad Shah gave the Diamond to effect his restoration to Power as Emperor of Hindostan. On the murder of Nadir Shah by his own tribe Ahmed Shah Drroranee [Dooranee] became possessed of the Kingdom of Khoorusan [Khorassan] and of the Koh-i-noor and at his death it descended successively to his son Tundoo [Timoor] Shah, Zaman Shah, Shah Shoojaool-Moolk and from the latter was forcibly taken by Ranjit Singh.

The second account—extracted from the "Uhber-Nameh" [Akbar-Namah] or History of the reign of the Great Uhber [Akbar the Great] is as follows :

That when Hoomayoon Badshah arrived at Agra this Diamond on being cut was found to weigh 8 micshals or 1 ounce $7\frac{1}{4}$ Penny weights that the Jewellers at that period valued it at half of the amount of the sum, daily

(1) When Nadir Shah came to take possession of Delhi, Mahammad Shah gave up every valuable thing in his treasury, except this jewel, which he kept concealed in his turban. A woman in the harem betrayed this fact to Nadir, who strongly bent upon having it, planned a grand festival in which both the conqueror and the conquered were to meet and swear friendship. Nadir Shah proposed to exchange of turbans and thus managed to get the Gem.

On the murder of Nadir Shah at Fatehabad in Kho:assan in 1747 the Diamond passed with the great Peacock Throne to Ali Shah, his nephew. On the deposition of Ali Shah the Diamond passed on to Shah Rukh Mirza, a grand-son of Nadir Shah, who at Meshad (Persia) was prisoner by Agha Mohammad and in vain brutally tortured to surrender him the Diamond.

According to another version in 1751 Shah Rukh, a successor of Nadir Shah, bestowed it on Ahmed Shah Abdali as a reward for his services. On Ahmed Shah's death it passed on to his son Tymoor Shah and from Tymoor it was inherited by his son Zaman Shah. Zaman Shah was deposed and blinded by his brother Shah Mohammad, but he managed to retain the Diamond in his custody, until finally it came into the possession of Shah Shuja. According to Elphinstone it had been found concealed in a wall of the cell which Zaman Shah had occupied during his imprisonment.

expended in the whole land, and it is said that it was first in the Jewel Office of the Ghoreyu family, who had received it from the descendents of the Rajah Bur Bikramaject(2) [Beer Bikramajeet] of Gwulior [Gwalior]. Hoomaydon [Hoomayoon] presented it to his father Babur [Babar] Shah—Babur [Babor] Shah to please him accepted the gift but afterwards returned it to him. It is also stated in the "Uhber Nameh" [Akpar Namah] that when Hoomayoon Badshah was seriously ill his father Babur [Babar] Shah consulted some Physicians regarding his cure, Mun Abool Bukkir a learned man, represented that he had ascertained from former Sages that when the Physicians despaired of the recovery of any patient the most valuable thing in the possession of the invalid should be given in charity and a blessing solicited from the Almighty. The Emperor Babur [Babar] observed that in the opinion of Hoomayoon he himself was the most precious and that he would consummate [consecrate] himself. The Standers by however intimated that by God's mercy the Prince would recover and that the meaning of the Sages was that the most valuable article of property should be offered up and consequently that the Emperor Babur [Babar] Shah should offer the Diamond which had been taken in the wars with Sooltan Ibroheem [Ibraheem]. Babur [Babar] Shah replied that no treasure on Earth could be put in comparison with his beloved Son, and that he would offer himself as a sacrifice to obtain his recovery Hoomayoon recovered and the Jewel remained with the descendents of Timoor until the reign of Mahammed Shah.

Delhie Agency
The 7th Jany. 1850

I have etc. etc.
(Signed) T. METCALFE
Agent Lieutt. Governor
North Western Provinces

Further particulars relative to this mystic and magical diamond Koh-i-noor, and how it was passed by Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, into the hands of Maharajah Ranjeet Singh; what is its value according to the principal jewellers of Umritsar, Waffa Begum, and her husband Shah Shooja—its original weight and value according to Tavernier the French explorer, and also how to ascertain the value of Diamonds from medium to greater weights, will be found from the copies of letters of Major Macgregor C.B., and Captain Campbell the Deputy Commissioners of Lahore and Loodhina respectively, which were forwarded by P. M. Melvill Esquire, Secretary to the Board of Administration to Sir H. M. Elliot, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government of

(2) Babar in his autobiography says:—After the first battle of Paniput in 1526 it was presented to Humayoon by one of the Hindu allys of the vanquished Ibrahim Lodi who fell heroically. Babar also says that this Diamond is the same which was acquired by Sultan Allauddin Khilji from the Hindu Rajas of Malwa in 1304.

India, with the Governor-General, with his letter dated Lahore 3rd May 1850. The letters are textually reproduced below :—

From Major Macgregor, C.B.,
Deputy Commissioner,
Lahore.

To P. Melvill Esquire,
Secretary to the Board of Administration
for the affairs of the Punjab.

Lahore, April 20th 1850.

Sir,

With reference to your letter No. 1448 dated the 21st December last, I have the honour to submit for the information of the Board of Administration, the following particulars regarding the Koh-i-noor diamond, since it passed from the possession of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolh (Moolk) the Ex. King of Cabool, into the hands of Maharaja Ranjeet Sing.

An interval of nearly 37 years has elapsed since the Shah surrendered this Diamond to the Maharaja, and there are but few persons now alive who attended His Highness on that occasion, one of whom however, I have succeeded in discovering now at Lahore, viz. Bhai Mahoo Singh, who was then only ten years of age, but he says that he retains a distinct recollection of what took place and he is a person much respected by the Native Community of Lahore and I think his Statement may in every respect be fully relied upon.

He relates that the Shah was then residing in a House in the City, belonging to Sirdar Sewall Singh Lulu (Lala) situated near Lahore Gate.—Wafa Begum the Shah's favourite wife, and other Members of his family were located in the "Moobarak Havalee" near Delhi Gate.—Guards were stationed round Shah's residence, and he was not allowed to communicate with the members of his family.

Bhai Goormook Singh, and Sirdar Hookum Singh Attaree Wallah, had been frequently sent by the Maharaja to the exiled Prince to demand the Koh-i-noor diamond from him, and it was only after the Shah had become fully sensible to the determination of Ranjeet Sing to resort to measures of the utmost severity to extort the envied Jewel from him that the Shah yielded compliance to the demand and agreed to give it up to the Maharaja if he would wait upon him in person to receive it.

This Ranjeet Sing readily consented to do and early in the month of June 1813 (3) about noon, he left his Palace in the Citadel and proceeded to the Shah's residence, taking with him Sirdar Hookum Singh Attaree Wallah, Jemadar Koshal Singh, Bhaee Goormookh Sing, Fuqueer Azcuzooden, Bhaee Maboo Singh and two hundred followers.

The exiled Prince received the Maharaja in an apartment in the Upper Story of the house, and both being seated, a short interval elapsed when the Shah took the diamond from underneath the Cushon on which he was seated and delivered it to the Maharaja who attentively examined it made no remark, gave it in charge to Sirdar Hookum Singh Attaree Wallah and forthwith retired.

The guards were immediately withdrawn from the Shah's residence and he was allowed to communicate freely with his family.

The Maharaja held a grand Durbar on his return to the Palace, and the Koh-i-Noor diamond was exhibited to the Chiefs and people assembled there, and repeated congratulations were offered His Highness on the attainment of this Valuable Jewel. The diamond was then made over to the charge of Mir [Mirr] Wustee Ram Ranjit Singh's Treasurer, who had been in the Service of the Maharaja's father and Grand-father, and in whom Ranjit Singh reposed the greatest confidence.

About two days afterwards the Maharaja having fully satisfied himself that the Diamond which he had obtained from the Shah was the genuine Koh-i-noor* sent him a lack and twenty five thousand Rupees. as a donation and Dewan Mokham (Chand) was desired by the Maharaja to have this money conveyed to him.

*Koh-i-noor signifies in English "The Mountain of Light". A name given to it by Nadir Shah King of Persia it is stated, but on what authority I cannot trace. (4)

The Maharaja then went to Umritser, and Raja Tej Sing, who accompanied him in that occasion, has obligingly furnished me with the following particulars—

Ranjit Sing had no sooner arrived at Umritser than he sent for the principal Jewellers of the City to ascertain from them opinion of the value of the Koh-i-noor which having carefully examined they replied that the value of a Diamond of such great size and beauty was far beyond all computation. The Maharaja desired them to set the Diamond in a handsome and suitable manner, and this work was executed in His Highness' presence, for he would not allow them to take the precious Jewel out of his sight.

The setting being completed Ranjeet Sing fixed the Koh-i-noor in the front of his Turban, mounted his Elephant and accompanied by Sirdars and attendants paraded several times up and down the principal Streets of the City, in order that his subjects might see the Koh-i-noor in his possession.

(4) It is presumed that Nadir Shah had been so amazingly charmed with the ever radiating lustre of this peerless Diamond of worldly fame that he could not find any other appropriate words in his Persian language to properly express the beauty and brilliancy of the Diamond than the Persian words "KOH-I-NUR" to name it.

The derivation of which is :

In Persian—KOH	means Mountain
KOH-I	„ Of Mountain
NUR	„ Light

Thus the Diamond named "KOH-I-NUR" means "The Mountain of Light".

He returned to his Palace in the Bhungeean Fort, situated in the City of Umritsar, and having partaken freely of his favourite potent beverage (5) as he was wont to do on occasions of great rejoicing and feeling that his senses were fast yielding to its intoxicating effects he evinced considerable anxiety for the safety of the Koh-i-noor, for on a former occasion, when he had been indulging freely in like manner a valuable jewel had been stolen from him.

He sent for Tej Sing and fastening the diamond round his waist desired him to repair with it at once to the Fort Govendghur and deliver it to Misr Wristie [Waslee] Ram, the Maharaja's Treasurer. Tej Sing was quickly mounted on Runjeet Sing's own Elephant, and attended by guards of Infantry and Cavalry, started on this important mission and soon returned with the Misr's receipt for the Diamond, seeing which the Maharaja felt easy in his mind, and renewed the potation which he had been somewhat suddenly interrupted.

The Koh-i-noor was framed and worn by Runjeet Singh as an Armlet on the Deess Mala [Deepmala] the Dusserah, and other great festivals and it was always exhibited to visitors of distinction, especially to British Officers who visited his Court. Runjeet Sing took the Koh-i-noor with him whenever he travelled, to Multan, Peshwar and other places.

Fuqueer Noor-oo-deen told me the other day when I was talking to him about the Koh-i-noor, that a few months after the Maharaja had obtained possession of it, he sent for him, and said that with all his endeavours he had failed to ascertain its value and desired him to go to the Wafa Begum, and to ascertain the value of it from her if possible. The Begum's reply was rather an amusing one, as she said that if a strong man were to throw four stones one on each of the Cardinal points, North, South, East and West, and a fifth stone vertically, and if the interspace were to be filled with Gold and precious Stones, they would not equal in value to Koh-i-noor.

Shah Shooja, her Husband, when asked the same question, is said to have replied—"Good luck" for he who possessed it, has obtained it by overpowering his enemies.

When Ranjeet Singh was dying and had lost all power of speech Kour Khurak Sing, his son, Dhian Sing, Prime Minister, Khosal Sing, Chief Officer

(5) This wine (beverage) according to Sir Lepel Griffin, "was a fierce compound distilled from corn-brandy, mixed with the juice of meat, opium, musk and various herbs. Of this the Maharaja drank large quantities in the evening and night". But Capt. W. G. Osborne who saw the wine of the Maharaja at his Court of Lahore in the year 1838 describes it thus:—"His wine is extracted from raisins with a quantity of pearls ground to powder and mixed with it for no other reason than to add to the expense of it. It is made for himself alone, and though he sometimes gives a few bottles to some of his favourite Chiefs, it is very difficult to be procured, even at the enormous price of one gold mohur for a small bottle. It is as strong as *aqua fortis*." Osborne further says that "during the Maharaja's drinking bouts the only food allowed are fat quails stuffed with all sorts of spices and the only thing to allay the thirst consequent upon eating such heating food is this 'abominable liquid fire'".

in the Army, Bhaie Govind Ram, and Maksoo deen, Chief Pundet, had assembled around the Cot on which he was lying Govind Rum [Govind Ram] addressing him said "Maharaj [Great King] you have often expressed to us your instruction [intention] to send the Koh-i-noor to the temple of Juggurnath, as an offering to Krishna (the God) is it your wish that it should thus be disposed of"? Upon which the Maharaja it is said inclined his head and made a sign by which he indicated his approval, and accordingly the assembled Chiefs sent for Misr Baylee Ram, who had succeeded to the charge of the Treasury and also of the Koh-i-noor and desired him to produce the Diamind at once, for the purpose of its being sent to Juggurnath the Misr hesitated and replied, that it was not in his power to do so, for it being the property of the State, Koar Noo Nihal Sing the Grandson of Ranjeet Sing then at Peshwar would hold him responsible for its safety. The Chiefs remonstrated but in vain, for the Misr was firm. Ranjeet Sing shortly died and thus the Jewel was preserved to the State.

Rumuh [Khurruck] Sing sometimes wore it during his short reign, Sher Sing being fond of display frequently did so.

Shortly after Sher Sing was murdered poor Misr Baylee Ram shared the same fate as his Master, and Rane Chundha's [Jinda] intrigues having seated his son the youthful Dhuleep on the throne of Runjeet Singh and raised herself to power, he [she] appointed his [her] paramour Tal [Lal] Singh to the charge of Tosha Khara [Toshakhana] which contained the Koh-i-noor and other state jewels, and when Tal (Lal) Singh had been deposed and ordered out of the Punjab, the Durbar immediately placed a Guard over Tosha Kharah [Toshakhana] and appointed Misr Meg Raj to the charge of it, which office he holds at present.

After the annexation of the Punjab the British Civil Authorities at Lahore took possession of the Koh-i-noor and of several of the most valuable of the State jewels, and deposited them in the Motie Mundur [Motee Munder] Treasury, where with the exception of the Koh-i-noor they remain at present.

ORIGINAL WEIGHT AND VALUE OF KOH-I-NOOR BY TAVERNIER—

Tavernier states that the Koh-i-noor weighs 319 Rates and a half which makes 279 and 9/16ths of our Carats, when it was rough it weighed 907 Rates which makes 793 Carates ; it lost therefore 628 Carats in cutting. The sketch of it in Tavernier's work is very correct one. The Koh-i-noor Diamond is stated to be worth 380,000 guinies though there is a small flaw near the bottom of it. Tavernier who fully examined the Koh-i-noor valued the Carat at 150 French lires.

Misr Baylee Ram weighed the Koh-i-noor by order of Ranjeet Sing, and it weighed 39 Mashas which makes 312 rates. Most probably it was then unset, which would account for the difference of rates between the weights given by Tavernier and Misr Baylee Ram.

A carat is $3\frac{1}{6}$ Grains i.e. the Diamond Carat of state $\frac{1}{8}$ less than 2 grains or $1\frac{7}{8}$ Troy.

HOW TO FIND THE VALUE OF DIAMONDS—

For valuation of Diamonds Mr. Jefferies lays down the following rules the first supposes the value of a rough Diamond to be settled at 2£ per Carat at a medium, then find the value of Diamonds of greater weights, multiply the square of their weight by 2, and the product is the value required. Therefore to find the value of a rough Diamond of 2 Carats, $2 \times 2 = 4$ the square of weight multiplied by 2 gives 8£ the value of a rough Diamond of 2 Carats.

For finding the value of manufactured Diamonds he supposed half the weight to be lost in manufacturing them and therefore to find the value we must multiply the square of double their weight by 2, which will give the true value in pounds.* Thus to find the value of a wrought Diamond weighing 2 Carats, we first find the square of double the weight, Viz. $4 \times 4 = 16$ then $16 \times 2 = 32$, so that the true value of wrought diamond of 2 Carats is 32£. On these principles Mr. Jafferries has constructed tables of Diamonds from 1 to 100 Carats.

*According to this rule the Koh-i-noor is worth £6,22,728.

The following particulars relative to some of the largest Diamonds in the world may not perhaps at this time prove un-acceptable to the Board, although they are not immediately connected with the subject of this report :

The largest Diamond ever known in the world is one belonging to the King of Portugal, and was found in Brazil. It is still uncut, and was of a larger size originally, but a piece was broken out of it by an ignorant Countryman, who chanced to find this great gem, and tried its hardness by the stroke of a large hammer upon Anvil. This prodigious Diamond weighs 1,680 Carats and though uncut, Mr. Rome [Ronie] de L'Isle says that it is valued at 224 millions Sterling, which gives the estimation of 7936 or about 80£ Sterling for each Carat, Viz. for the multipliance of the square of its whole weight.

The famous Diamond in the Sceptre of the King of Russia weighs 779 Carats and its worth is at least 4,854,728 pounds Sterling, although it costs only 135,414 guineas. This Diamond was originally one of the eyes of a Malabrian idol named Scheringham, and a French grenadier who had deserted from Indian Service contrived to become one of the priests of that idol and by that means to steal it, after passing through the several hands, the late Prince Arloff purchased it at Amsterdam in 1766 for his Sovereign the Emperor of Russia.

In Phillips Faits it is mentioned that another Diamond belonging to the Royal family of Portugal weighs 215 Carats is extremely fine and is worth at least 369,000 guineas.

The Pitts diamond weighs 18672 Carats and is worth 208,333 guineas, although it did not cost above half that sum.

The Austrian Diamond weighs $139\frac{1}{2}$ Carats and was bought in a Common stall, as a piece of rock crystal,

I beg in conclusion to express my regret at the delay which has taken place in my submitting this report to the Board, but strange to say, I have found it very difficult, even at Lahore to obtain authentic information regarding the history of the Koh-i-noor Diamond and the multiplicity of my duties as a District Officer left me little leisure for making such searches.

Lahore
April 20, 1850.

I have etc. etc.
Signed/ G. N. MACGREGOR
Deputy Commissioner.

(True Copy)
Signed P. MELVILL,
Secretary to the Board of Administration.

From Captain Campbell,
Dy. Commissioner.

To The Secretary to the Board of Administration
for the Affairs of the Punjab.

Sir,

In reply to your letter No. 1449 of 21st December, on the subject of the Koh-i-noor, I have the honour to subjoin such information as I have been able to obtain.

It does not clearly appear, from whom the Delhie Emperors got the Koh-i-noor, but its history, from time to time that it passed out to their hands, is accoding to the Shahzudah as follows :

Mahammed Shah, Emperor of Delhie used to wear it in his Turban, Nadir Shah insisted on giving a mark of his affection by changing Turbans with the Emperor, and with the Turban changed the Koh-i-noor. After the death of Nadir, his son Shah-Rook Shah presented it as a Nuzzar to Ahmed Shah Dooranee. From Ahmed Shah it descended to his son Timoor Shah and from the latter to Shah Zeman.

When Shah Zeman was worsted by Mahmood Shah, he took refuge in a place called Fort Ashae. The owner of Ashae made him a prisoner, but he had (hid) the Koh-i-noor with 12 other diamonds in a hole in the wall, subsequently on Shah Shoojah's coming into power Shah Seman (Zeman) (now blinded) pointed out the jewels. Shah Shoojah took possession and blew Ashae away from a Gun. On Shah Shoojah being compelled to fly by the Baraksgees he was made prisoner in Cashnere and his family took refuge in Lahore, with the Koh-i-noor. Ranjeet Singh begged of Shah Shoojah's wife Wafa Begum to give up the Koh-i-noor. Wafa Begum said that Ranjeet must come himself, and when he came abused him well and holding a hammer in her hand declared, that if he attempted to take it by force she would break it on the spot, but added, that it was entrusted to her by Shah Shoojah, and if he liberated the Shah, the latter might give it if he chose. Ranjeet Sing sent Dinram (Dewan) Mokum' Chund, who conquered Cashmere and brought away Shah Shoojah.

Ranjeet Sing asked Shah Shoojah to name the price of the Koh-i-noor. Shah Shoojah replied that its price was the sword (shoed) and gave it up.

Loodeanah
Office of Dy. Commr.
Camp 7th February 1850.

I have etc. etc.

Sd./ G. CAMPBELL,
Deputy Commissioner.
7 Feb. 1850.

(True Copy)
Signed P. MELVILL,
Secretary to the Board.

II

After the decisive battle of Sobraon in February 1846, in which the British troops were victorious, when Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, came to Lahore, a large Darbar was held there to receive His Excellency ; when after the usual civilities passed, and *khilluts* were presented the Governor-General desired to see the Koh-i-noor, it was brought forward and inspected by him, and he then passed the Diamond round other Europeans.

Colonel Balcarres Ramsay thus describes the incident :—

"I arrived at the camp at Lahore, just as the Governor-General was going out his *cortege* to meet the young Maharajah and receive his submission. There was a grand *darbar* afterwards, and when the Koh-i-noor was handed round for our inspection, Mr. Edwards, the Under Secretary to Government in the Foreign Department, was put in charge of it. He was evidently extremely nervous, and carried it round himself from one staff officer to another. Just as he placed it in my hands, Sir Henry Hardinge sent for him ; I naturally passed it on to the next officer, but when Edwards hurried back and demanded the precious jewel, I never shall forget the agony depicted on his face, as he rushed down the ranks of staff officers, frantically demanding it!" (6)

Sir Henry then, with a pleasant smile, fastened it (the Koh-i-noor) himself on the right arm of the little King, and patted him on the back in a kindly manner.(7)

PRINCE DULEEP SINGH AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

From the conclusion of the Treaty of Bhyrowal on the 16th of December, 1846, the whole history of the British administration of the Punjab becomes full of vivid life. The charge of the person of the minor Maharajah Duleep Singh continued with his mother, the Ranee Jinda, for a time notwithstanding

(6) *Life of Lord Lawrence*, Vol. I, p. 191. *Sir John Login & Duleep Singh*, pp. 108-9.

(7) *Maharajah Duleep Singh and the Government*, p. 71, and *Life of Sir Herbert Edwards*, Vol. I, p. 44.

the Treaty ; but she was removed and placed in restraint at Sheikhoopoor on the 19th August 1847 by the British Resident Colonel Henry Lawrence, who considered her unfriendly to the British power and influence, and desired to prevent the Maharajah from imbibing the same prejudice.

Extracts of the proclamation in which as to the guardianship on the banishment of the Maharanee Jinda, it was announced to the people of the Punjab, Maharajah's subjects, are given below :—

“A general proclamation for the information of the Chiefs of the Lahore Durbar, the priests, elders, and people of the countries belonging to the Maharajah Duleep Singh.

“Lahore, August 20, 1847. The Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, taking into consideration the friendly relations subsisting between the Lahore and British Governments and the tender age of Maharajah Duleep Singh, feels the interest of a father in the education and guardianship of the young Prince.

“With this end in view, it appeared to the Governor-General to have become absolutely necessary to separate the Maharajah from the Maharanee, his mother ; an opinion in which the Durbar perfectly coincided. Accordingly, on the 19th day of August 1847, Her Highness left the palace of Lahore and was taken to Sheikhoopoor.” (8)

Thus the British Government became the guardian of the young Prince during his minority. We need not go into any further detail of the above proclamation giving reasons for the step taken against the Maharanee Jinda, as it is not the subject matter of our paper.

Now in 1849—(within only two years) “*The Second Treaty of Lahore—TERMS GRANTED* and accepted at Lahore on the 29th of March 1849, and ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General on the 5th April 1849”—put an end to the protectorate established by the Treaty of Bhyrowal and the new Treaty contained no clauses relating to the guardianship of the minor Prince, but on the other hand, it contained an engagement to pay the minor Prince a pension according to the *fourth term of the treaty*, and according to the *third* “the gem called the Koh-i-noor shall be surrendered by the Maharajah of Lahore to the Queen of England.” (9)

Lord Dalhousie in paras. 139-141 of his Secret Despatch No. 20 of the 7th April 1849 to the Court of Directors submits his policy regarding his confiscation

— (8) *Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-9*, page 53. *Maharajah Duleep Singh and the Government*, pp. 100-01.

(9) The third and fourth terms of the Second Treaty of Lahore, 29th March 1849:—

III—The gem called the Koh-i-Noor, which was taken from Shah-Shooja-Moolk by Maharajah Ranjeet Singh, shall be surrendered by the Maharajah of Lahore to the Queen of England.

IV—His Highness Duleep Singh shall receive from the Honorable East India Company for the support of himself, his relatives and the servants of the State, a pension of not less than four and not exceeding five, lakhs of Company's rupees per annum.

of the property of the State of Lahore, and the surrender of the Koh-i-noor by the Maharaja of Lahore to the Queen of England writes :

139. "The liquidation of the accumulated debt due to this Government by the State of Lahore, and for the expenses of the war I have confiscated the property of the State to the use of the Hon'ble. East India Company.

140. From this confiscation however, I have excluded the Koh-i-noor which in token of submission has been surrendered by the Maharaja of Lahore to the Queen of England.

141. If the policy which has now been declared shall be confirmed, I am confident you will sanction my having thus set apart the Koh-i-noor as a historical memorial of conquest and that the Honble. Court of Directors will cordially approve the act which has placed the Gem of the Mogul in the Crown of Britain."

"I sincerely lament," writes again Lord Dalhousie to the Secret Committee, "the necessity by which we are compelled to depose from his throne a successor of Maharajah Ranjeet Singh ; but when I am firmly convinced that the safety of our State requires us to enforce subjection of the Sikh nation, I cannot abandon that necessary measure, merely because the effectual subjection of the nation involves in itself the deposition of their prince. I cannot permit myself to be turned aside from fulfilling the duty which I owe to the security and prosperity of millions of British subjects by a feeling of misplaced and mistimed compassion for the fate of a child." (10)

Court of Directors fully approving the policy of confiscation of the property of the State of Lahore and the surrender of the "Koh-i-noor by the Maharajah of Lahore to the Queen of England writes :

9. It is stipulated in the "Terms granted to the Maharaja Duleep Sing" that all the property of the State, of whatever description, and wheresoever found, shall be confiscated to the East India Company, in part payment of the debt due by the State of Lahore to the British Government, and of the expenses of the War ; and that "the gem called the Koh-i-noor, which was taken from Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk by Maharaja Runjeet Sing shall be surrendered by the Maharaja of Lahore to the Queen of England".

10. "The destination indicated for the celebrated Gem is, without doubt, the most appropriate ; and we direct that, every possible precaution being taken for its safety, you transmit it to us at the earliest opportunity, in order that it may be delivered to Her Majesty in the manner which shall be considered the most suitable." (11)

(10) *Papers relating to the Punjab, 1847-1849*, page 663. *Maharajah Duleep Singh and the Government*, p. 46.

(11) *Pol. Despatch from Court*, No. 24, dated 1st August 1849, paras. 9 and 10.

Immediately after the annexation of the Punjab to the British possession of India Lord Dalhousie had written to Henry Lawrence to make every deposition for the safe custody of the State Jewels of Lahore, which were about to fall into the lap of the English. In a letter dated April 27th, 1849 on the subject of Maharanee Jinda, "who had just escaped from our hands" His Excellency remarks—"this incident three months ago would have been inconvenient, now it does not so much signify, at the same time is discreditable, and I have been annoyed by the occurrence. *As guardians seem so little to be trusted*, I hope you have taken proper precaution in providing full security for the Jewels and Crown property at Lahore, whose removal would be a more serious affair than that of the Maharanee."

Doctor (afterwards Sir John) Login was forthwith appointed, on a salary of Rs. 1,200/- per month, as Superintendent to take charge of Maharajah Duleep Singh's person and establishment, and also of the Toshakhana or Treasury with the State jewels and Crown property at Lahore together with the matchless Koh-i-noor.

(To be continued)

NARENDRANATH GANGULY.

French Commerce in Bengal.

1757-1793.

COLBERT was responsible for the decision to establish French trading posts on the mainland of India. In the pursuit of this policy Chandernagore was founded in 1688. There were also two subordinate French trade establishments at Balasore and Cossimbazar. In the beginning of the eighteenth century French trade in Bengal was not in a flourishing condition. In 1722, however, they succeeded in securing a Mughal *parwana* which placed them on the same footing with the Dutch. The *parwana* runs thus—

“M. D’Arden Court, Director of the Company has come to re-establish this Commerce. As the Dutch obtained from the Emperor Farrukh Siyar a farman reducing the duty to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent M. D’Arden Court has sent his Vakil to us praying that he may be granted a *parwana* in which the duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent would be reduced to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the same footing as the Dutch. For this he promises to pay 40,000 Rupees to the Emperor and Rs. 10,000 to the Nawab of Bengal. Having received the said Rs. 10,000 we have given him the present *parwana*. Let none demand more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent duty, nor stop their boats and merchandise.”(1) The conditions under which the English traded were no doubt more favourable. They paid a fixed sum as duty.

With Dupleix’s appointment as Governor of Chandernagore in 1732 French trade in Bengal got a new impetus. The British Council in Calcutta wrote to the Court of Directors on 16 January 1733 that the French were sending that year five ships directly for Europe.(2) In the list of goods put up for sale at Port L’Orient in France we find calico stuff 387,820 pieces, 71 handkerchiefs of Cossimbazar for samples and 39 painted handkerchiefs of Cossimbazar also for sample.(3) The steady increase of East India commerce at Port L’Orient created such a favourable situation that the course of exchange between France and other states of Europe which had been to the disadvantage of France until 1725 was very much in favour of France in the thirties, forties and fifties of the eighteenth century.(4) Dupleix is also reported to have achieved phenomenal success in developing commercial possibilities of Bengal through private initiative in inter-Indies trade. He was a pioneer among Frenchmen in his exploitation of Bengal’s trade with Mocha,

(1) Letters et Conventions, Ed. Martineau, p. 19.

(2) History of Bengal II, p. 429.

(3) Macpherson—*Annals of Commerce*. Vol. III, p. 204.

(4) Ibid, pp. 305 and 306.

Manila, Achin, Pegu, Canton and Persia.(5) Chandernagore which had not a single ship in 1732 possessed fifteen or twenty vessels in daily use by the Company's employees when he left in 1742. Till 1753 the French Company's 'Investment' was provided in most places by the same *dadni* merchants who provided the 'Investment' of the English East India Company.(6) But the French like the Dutch gave more favourable terms and had thus less difficulty in procuring their 'Investment'. The great increase of French private trade can also be explained in this way.

In 1756 war broke out between France and England. It naturally led to the complete suspension of the trade of the French East India Company and of the French private traders in Bengal. On the return of peace in 1763 French trade in Bengal was slow to revive. Immediately after the conclusion of treaty in 1763 the Court of Directors wrote that from the information they could collect with respect to the French East India Company it appeared to them in a very low and languishing condition. They hoped that the French Company would be dissolved and that possibly some few ships would go to different parts of India "on condition of paying His Most Christian Majesty an indulgence." (7) But it was not until 1769 that the King's Council of State in France passed the decree suspending the exclusive privilege of the French East India Company declaring that French subjects might freely trade to the different ports of India. The French East India Company was to grant passports gratis to those who would fit out ships for India. But all the goods produced from the trade to India shall be brought to the port of L'Orient and "white cotton cloths, muslins, handkerchiefs and dimities shall be continued to be marked with and stamped with the tickets and leads of the Company". (8) Thus during the period from 1764 to 1769 both the French East India Company and French private traders traded in Bengal. But after this decree was given effect to only French private traders continued to operate in Bengal until 1778 when war again broke out between the French and the English.

The French private traders were in a very advantageous position during the period between 1764 and 1778. They traded on the capital of the servants of the English East India Company who wanted to remit their fortunes to England and keep their remittance concealed from their masters. There was no parliamentary provision at this stage against such transactions and the French private traders did brisk business in French bills of exchange. The Court of Directors in England naturally complained in 1772, "We cannot but enquire how the French without money or influence fill their ships with the prime and valuable manufactories of Bengal and from whom they draw such large and to us ruinous resources." (9)

(5) Virginia Thompson—*Dupleix and his letters*, page 91 quotes from *Memoire*, p. 13.

(6) *Progs-Board of Trade*, Vol. 61, p. 331.

(7) Letter from Court—9 March, 1763, p. 53.

(8) *Fort William—India House Correspondence*, Vol. V, pp. 247-253.

(9) Letter from Court, 1772-73, Serial No. 16, p. 22.

After the American War of Independence when peace treaties were concluded in 1783 the Board of Trade in Bengal feared rivalry and competition on the re-establishment of French and Dutch trade in Bengal. Therefore they asked for full information but in some cases as in Dacca they failed to collect information that could be regarded as adequate though every one in Bengal knew that the French had done brisk business in Dacca before the outbreak of the war. Still this account of French trade in Bengal during the years 1764-1778 is perhaps the best available from British records. (10)—

Bauleah—The French East India Company never possessed any regular factory. But about 1775 they rented a small house where they provided a quantity of country wound silk under the inspection and management of a *gomosta*.

Radanagore—A French gentleman used to reside in the neighbourhood on the part of the French Company to provide an investment of raw silk and cotton piecegoods but chiefly cotton piecegoods of the finest assortments manufactured in that part of the country.

Sonamookhy—Before 1768 the French made their investment through *Gomastas*. But in that year Monsr. Le Seigneur came into Beerbhoom and obtained a few bighas of land from a Gossain. He built a house, termed it a factory, hoisted a French flag, established guards and made advances through *dalals* to the amount of 1,25,000 rupees annually. He exercised an authority equal to that of the agents of the English East India Company and placed *Mohussils* on the weavers if they defaulted. About 1774 he left and no other Frenchman came in his place. From that time no advances were made under the sanction of the French name.

Rangpur—M. Chevalier was deputed in 1754 or 1755 from Chandernagore to carry on trade with Assam for the French East India Company. He settled at Goalpara and did good business. On the capture of Chandernagore this trade on the part of the French Company was discontinued but M. Chevalier remained at Goalpara in the employment of some English gentlemen as their agent for the salt trade with Assam. From the time of M. Chevalier's departure no Frenchman resided there until 1767 when M. Laval was appointed. He was the agent of the English private traders in partnership with M. Chevalier. The concern did not succeed and was closed. After that occasionally a few Frenchmen resided at Goalpara and traded on their private account till 1778.

Midnapore—According to the evidence of the records of the factory the French did no trade there but they had a factory at Balasore and their trade was limited to that place.

Cossimbazar—The French kept a large factory with some grounds. They had their own brokers to whom they made advances and these people were responsible to them and should any manufacturer be indebted to

(10) Progs. of the Board of Trade, Vol. 43, 6 April, 1784 also Vol. 44, 25 June, 1784.

them beyond their factory they were obliged to apply by their Vakils to the established country courts of justice. They were no more than any other merchants of the country excepting within the limits of their factory where they exercised every authority.

Pattahaut—In this aurung French business was very brisk. They had a factory and a Narsing of Sonargaon was their head dalal of aurungs and a dependent of his own acted as a dalal both to the French and English factory. The dalal purchased with ready money or made advances as he thought proper. But the dalal later quarrelled both with the French and the English. For sometime after this the French transacted their business at Jugdea by making advances themselves to the pykars until a French agent engaged one Sovaram of Aminabad as his dalal. So much reliance was placed in him that for five or six years no French agent was there and then a French agent Monsr. Broclay came up and brought one Sobharam Mullick as his banian. He was succeeded by a Monsr. De Grange who was in charge of the factory when the American War of Independence began. Those families that had any connection with French agents at Jugdea suffered very considerably in their private fortunes. The extensive connections which they had established at Jugdea were at an end and they had in 1784 to begin anew.

Keerpoy—The French had a factory where their Resident lived and provided goods annually from 1766 to 1774 when he left the factory. After that date French business was in the hands of gomostas and other agents. They had also a *Cooty* at Conicolly and everywhere advanced either openly or secretly to the weavers.

Hurriaul—The French East India Company's connections here could not be traced in records before 1766. In 1766 and 1767 purchases were made by gomastas of dadni merchants, employed by the French upon the footing of private traders to the extent of thirty to forty thousand rupees each year. In 1768, 1769 and 1770 purchases were made by gomastas immediately nominated by M. Chevalier, then Governor of Chandernagore. In 1768 M. Chevalier's gomastas imported in cash and merchandise to the amount of a lakh of rupees with which they carried on their business till the end of 1770. In 1773 they left the aurung. Since then the French had no connection with the aurung.

Santipore—During the years 1775, 1776 and 1777 M. Bedam, a French gentleman hired a small bungalow in Santipore, purchased some cloths in his own account. No other European except the Company's agent appeared in Santipore after 1763.

Malda—From 1763 to 1765 no business was carried on here in the name of the French. A resident of a village in the Malda zamindari entered into a contract with M. Chevalier and purchased goods for him. In 1767 a man named Kanai Sarkar came to Malda to purchase cloths and trade in other articles on the part of M. Chevalier as a contractor receiving commission. He hoisted a French flag over his house just as the

gomastas of Englishmen did. He provided goods by contract with the merchants and dealers of Malda and also set up factories in the mofussil, one at Kaliganj and another at Mahanandpore. In both these places he engaged some looms. In 1770 Bathoe who was Resident for the English East India Company made Kanai Sarkar take down the flag telling him that he might carry on business but should not hoist a flag. He also induced the English gomastas to take down their flags. In 1774 Kanai Sarkar was recalled and after that the French did not send any gomasta or agent until the outbreak of war in 1778.

Patna—French trade in Bihar consisted of two articles—saltpetre and coarse calico cloths. The stipulated annual quota of saltpetre allowed to the French by the English was 18,000 Mds. of 76 Sicca weight. But the French agents did not always apply for so much. In 1777 and 1778 they received each year only half that quantity. The price fixed for this was Ely Rs. 206/- per Md. The French *dadni* coarse calico business was largely confined to Shahbad where six thousand pieces of gurrah cloth were made for them in a year. According to the English Company's Resident linen trade in Bihar was appropriated by custom in many districts the British claiming two thirds of the weavers and the Dutch one-third. Shahbad's linen business was, however, exclusively French. The British did not interfere. In other Bihar districts the French perhaps made some ready money purchases.

Dacca—The information supplied by Juggernaut Ghose who was Dewan of the French East India Company to Law, British Resident at Dacca, was disappointing. The French were reported to have traded chiefly in coarse goods provided through the means of dalals. There was no mention of any particular aurungs.

After the conclusion of peace in 1783 Frenchmen who had as individuals taken part in trading ventures in the East between 1769 and 1778 now formed a new French East India Company. They wanted to enter into an agreement with the Court of Directors in England for three years "for the provision each year of goods worth forty lakhs of rupees including 30,000 pounds of Bengal silk and 400 tons of saltpetre." This attempt to form an 'international cartel' was, however, foiled and this new French East India Company was left to make its own headway in Bengal and Madras. This new French Company was prepared to import silver into Bengal. It did not depend as the old French East India Company and the French private traders had done on the remittance made by Englishmen in Bengal through the French. The French East India Company's agents in India naturally wanted an authoritative interpretation of the peace treaty so far as it concerned its trade. A provisional convention was entered into between Viscount de Souillac, the French Governor-General at Mauritius, and Lt. Colonel Cathcart on the part of the Governor-General in Council at Calcutta.⁽¹²⁾ The French were to receive annually 18,000 Mds. of saltpetre and two hundred chests of opium

(12) Progs.—Board of Trade, 25 July, 1786, p. 529.

at the price fixed before the last war. Six articles related to the protection which could be given by the French flag, the extent of French jurisdiction, the right of receiving debts and balances due by the weavers and dalals. The customs relating to civil or criminal matters as they were practised before the last war were to continue. In the written discussions no mention was made of a partition of weavers. Lt. Colonel Cathcart wrote, "I judged that this partition could not be the subject of a general regulation, that the proportion must be less subject to vary and that it may be settled of itself according to our mutual wants provided that no vexatious or improper means be employed on either side." (13) This provisional convention did not, however, become operative and a very limited convention was concluded. French purchase of saltpetre and opium was ensured and the goods of the French East India Company were exempted from every duty but that of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

This state of things naturally led to disputes in Bengal. The French Company's agents were no longer as dependent as they had been before on the capital of the servants of the English Company. They had silver of sufficient quantity to sustain their credit with the dalals and pykars. The agents of the French Company in Bengal met with opposition from the very beginning from the servants of the English Company because it was their private trade which was affected by the competition of the new French Company. The Proceedings of the Board of Trade indicate that the tocsin was sounded in every aurung that the re-establishment of the French and Dutch companies would lead to a strong competition in the purchase of cloths at all the aurungs. The French took some time to extend their activities and by 1787 the Board of Trade was receiving reports of uncommon competition from the French who were offering extravagant prices and raising the prices of goods even of inferior assortments. (14) "This tended to lessen all the restraints laid on the weavers and to encourage them by the most powerful incentive that of enormous present gain to carry on a clandestine traffic with the clothes." The Governor-General in Council admitted the extent of this evil of extravagant price offered by the French agents for cloths and wanted to know what regulations could check this great inconvenience to the Company's Investment." (15)

The French Governor at Chandernagore wrote to the Governor-General in Council that "all the different cavilings that your officers have used towards our gomastas appear to multiply to a degree which makes us apprehend an inability to prepare the cargoes which the Company require." The French Governor added, "what degree of comparative rivalry can there exist between our commerce and yours? When the demands of your Company are once accomplished ought we still to have to struggle against individuals who under its name endeavour to counteract our operations above all things prevent your officers from abusing the authority which you

(13) Ibid, p. 532.

(14) Ibid, p. 532.

(15) Progs. Sec. and Foreign, 11 May, 1787.

confide in them and taking advantage of the distance which they are from you to disturb our commerce and to expose our funds to risk under the dangerous and false pretext of an indiscreet and abusive zeal." (16) Thus the French categorically asserted that the officers of the English Company were thwarting them not in the interest of the Company's investment but for their own private trade. It is relevant in this connection to mention that when negotiations for a treaty were going on between the new French East India Company and the Court of Directors, Vergennes, the French Minister, is reported to have remarked that the treaty was "a consequence of the system which the English Company had adopted for disturbing the private trade of their servants." (17) Of course nothing ultimately came out of it and the private trade of the servants of the English Company remained too strongly entrenched for the trade of the new French Company to become its successful rival.

The French private traders and the Dutch Company's men did not enter into competition with the English Company's servants in their private trade even during the period 1769-1778. The reason was that the French private traders and the Dutch East India Company depended very much on the supply of mercantile capital by the servants of the English Company. They could not afford to displease the English Company's servants. The British Free Merchants were, however, exposed to the full competition of these European rivals. There were some aurungs in Bengal where the Company's servants were also exposed to the competition of the French and the Dutch because those who brought French and Dutch bills of exchange were not perhaps trading there. When the American War of Independence broke out even this limited competition disappeared. During the period from 1778 to 1784 the servants of the English East India Company who had a close understanding with the English Free Merchants had practically a monopoly of control over raw silk and cotton piecegoods because they were also contractors for the English Company's Investment.

The sudden reappearance of the French and the Dutch—the French sufficiently supplied with bullion—caused a flutter. It was evident that the Court of Directors favoured the idea of the French Company bringing some silver into Bengal which Bengal badly needed. The Directors were inclined to encourage the plan of the French working within certain agreed limits as rivals to their servants whose private trade was encroaching even upon the Company's Investment. But French opposition to this scheme on political grounds brought about the failure of this plan.

The French began from the bottom. Their friction with British Residents who were contractors began at once in several of the cloth aurungs in Dacca, Malda, Khirpai, Santipore and Patna. At the very beginning there was a flag controversy. Dispute on this question came to a head in Malda. There was a rumour in Calcutta in 1786 that the French were about to send flags wherever they had stationed agents. Udny at Malda intimated to the

(16) Progs. Board of Trade, 15 June, 1787.

(17) Furber—*John Company at work*, p. 36.

French gomasta that if he had any design of hoisting the flag he would do well to wait until instructions were received from Calcutta. He wrote, "a flag imposes upon the natives and may convey the idea of some privilege, authority or respect. Used by the French where they were not allowed before it might naturally be used as a concession of greater influence and be capable of misapplication." (18) A French flag was actually hoisted on the site of the old French factory a plot of ground 30 cubits long and 240 cubits broad. At Santipore a man came from Chandernagore to hoist a French flag on the ground of the compound of the house where the French dalal Chuckoo Khan resided. This controversy about the use of flag merely irritated nerves on both sides. The French themselves did not insist upon hoisting flags in the houses of their gomastas. This could not be a matter of public right. This was the prelude to an almost interminable wrangle. The regulations of 22 April 1782 incorporated with the regulations framed in 1786 definitely forbade clandestine purchase of cloths from the Company's weavers. It was now alleged that the French gomastas carried on trade of this kind. That their agents went into remote villages of the Company's weavers where there was a public market and purchased from them for ready money clothes woven with the advances made to them from the Company's factory. (19) The weavers became averse to work for the Company. "They are fruitful in their devices to elude the factory servants placed over them"—so wrote the Resident at Malda. This state of things was not peculiar to Malda—higher prices offered by the French tempting weavers to break their engagements. But the remedy was also there. The Resident contractors could prosecute in the adauluts all those who failed in the due performance of their agreements. The country courts were subservient enough. But Uday and other Resident contractors did not apparently consider that this was enough. In May 1787 Uday seized twenty pieces of cloth which the peons of the French gomasta were carrying to the French gomasta at Malda. At Chandercona, Haripal, Cannicola, Shantipore and adjacent places, Wall who was the British Chief, was reported to have made a proclamation by sound of a drum to all weavers prohibiting them from working for any person except for the contractors of the English Company. He opposed the stay of the French gomastas in this area. He placed peons at the door of every weaver to prohibit their having communication with the people. The French complained that he was "exercising this new tyranny with indecent stubbornness." (20) At Patna M. Pannon the French agent, complained that impediments were never made in writing but verbally because that was convenient. The French asserted that Rumbold at Patna had given them permission to make cloths at places where the English gomastas did not make any advances. The French could not foresee what was now the case. So they remained content with the verbal assurance and had not put the agreement to writing. The French further argued that before the outbreak of the war M. Carvalho, French Chief at Patna, had succeeded in training the weavers at Ancona-Navada, Barnavada,

(18) Progs. Board of Trade, 22 Aug., 1786.

(19) Ibid, 17 October, 1786.

(20) Ibid, 15 June, 1787.

and the Sarkar of Shahbad how to make gurrahs of good size. Before his coming there weavers had made only narrow cloths. To avoid disputes the English had also agreed that 435 weavers should be attached to the service of the French in Bihar besides those they employed at Fulbari.

During the period from 1778 to 1783 the weavers naturally worked for whoever paid them. After the peace the French Chief wanted to have cloths made in all those places where the weavers had previously worked for them. But the French complained that they experienced a total opposition not by written but by verbal orders which the gomastas executed with the greatest vigour. As a remedy for these troubles the French wanted that the affairs in Bihar should be either put on the old footing or a certain number of weavers should be fixed for French service—435 in Bihar, Ancona-Navada and the sarkar of Shahbad should remain to the French, 450 weavers should be fixed at Fulwari and as for the sarkar of Hajipur and Tirhut they might be permitted to extend the number to one thousand without any prejudice to the interests of the English Company. E. E. Pote, British Resident at Patna, complained on the other hand that M. Pannon gave no check to his gomasta Udaynarain. Four of the English Company's weavers were secreted in the factory and M. Pannon refused to deliver them up.(21) Udney at Malda took a very alarmist view of what he described as an invasion of the Company's rights by the French. He regarded himself as the general of the Company in that sector of the Investment front. He opposed this French invasion. As it was very difficult to know what dalals were employed by the French he restricted their movements as much as he could. He said that they would otherwise sap the foundations of the Company's trade. He reported that there was an illicit correspondence between some Armenians working for the French and the gomastas of the Company's factory at Juggernatpore. He commenced an action against them in the country courts. He added that the French were willing to pay very high price and the "whole country was agog to supply them on these terms and cloths poured in from all quarters." The French, according to Udney, did not take *rowanahs* for all their goods though that would exempt them from a part of other duties. They paid even the duties claimed by the zamindars. This was done by them in order to hide their transactions.(22)

The French argued that the cloths seized by Udney were "fabricated and contracted for clandestinely no doubt but not fraudulently." (23) The very favourable terms offered by the French induced the weavers to give them the surplus of their labour. They either denied themselves some hours of rest or procured others to do their domestic duties. This was, according to the French, the innocent means adopted by them for the procurement of goods for their Investment. The French claimed that the first establishment of trade in white cloths in Malda was due to them. Since 1778 the servants of the English Company enjoyed the labour of all the workmen in the district. It was clear

(21) Progs. Board of Trade, 10 July, 1787.

(22) Progs. Board of Trade, July 24, 1787.

(23) Ibid, September 22, 1787.

that they had profited more than the English Company itself. Now that the French wanted to regain their ancient footing the servants of the English Company tried in every way to obstruct them. Udney proposed that the Frenchmen should take uninitiated weavers, in other words the weaver's children, who were employed by the fathers in weaving coarse cloths. M. Dangereaux asked, "Is he to be permitted to abuse for his personal and private interest the pretended right of enjoying all the workmen of Malda in order to exercise there a species of indecent monopoly." The French claimed that either a number of good weavers should be reassigned them in Malda or every Company should be left at liberty to contract with any weavers they chose without distinction obliging them to fulfil their engagements according to order of the dates of their contracts. The French Agent-General added that they had twelve hundred weavers in Malda before the war. He concluded his letter to the Governor-General with the remark "a Frenchman may be as reasonable as an Englishman." (24)

In his reply to the French arguments the British Resident at Malda reported that the number of the Company's looms in Malda was 4533 and not 7400 as the French enumerated. The looms were called *Cautbundy* which means of long standing receiving money from the Company. It was not always that a piece of contracted cloth was received for every loom per month and of the finer assortments a very inferior proportion of the Company's orders were received. To obtain this deficiency advances were made to those weavers who having large families could produce more pieces than they had engaged for. Thus a large sum of money was laid out and there was a great risk of balances.

Udney admitted that his own private trade and the Company's Investment were inextricably blended. After the Company's orders were attended to, he purchased such cloths as were considered to be below Company's standard and which it did not suit them to take. He argued that in this way more weavers were employed, the Company had the greater choice and the inferior pieces being taken off his hands the weaver could get money to begin anew. This was precisely the argument of the French that in the interest of their private trade more weavers were employed than the Company's Investment required. In this situation Udney too had no difficulty in proving that the French were competitors with the Company. But the French argument that French competition was really with the English private traders was very true. The French pleaded independence of the country government and wanted that their servants and dependents should be exempted from the jurisdiction of the Company Courts.(26) No doubt English authority creating country courts was derived from grants subsequent to the treaty of 1763. But there was nothing in the farmans and sanads granted to the French to warrant this assumption of independence and the position was untenable. They could not claim enfranchisement of their servants from every species of country

(24) Progs. Board of Trade, 22 September, 1787.

(25) Ibid, 19 October, 1787.

(26) Ibid, 22 September, 1787.

jurisdiction on the basis of their farmans and sanads. But the subservience of the country courts made them assert this untenable claim. The Board of Trade might argue that in the country courts there was but one Judge, an Englishman of high rank in the Company's service, who was interdicted from trade and who was sworn, but this argument could not carry conviction and the country courts were not unnaturally regarded with suspicion as guardians of British interests. Unless this suspicion could be eradicated the sense of grievance could not be removed.

From an analysis of French claims two demands really emerged—a limitation of British private trade and a participation of workmen. The French said, "In all these matters your Company is a mere cypher. Your Residents only use its name to impose upon you." (27) The obstruction of which the French complained was very real. The Board of Trade did not deny this and assigned the following reasons for this obstruction—

(1) The productive ability of the same manufacturers cannot be increased by being hired for different employers. If he is capable of producing only one piece of cloth in six weeks the competition of two or three persons for this labour cannot increase that produce.

(2) The permanent number of manufacturers in a country cannot exceed the demand for their labour for if they cannot get work they will turn their hands to husbandry or some other means of subsistence.

(3) At the return of the French to Bengal all the manufacturers must have been employed either for the English Company, Danes, Portuguese or individuals European and native.

(4) They must either take inexperienced manufacturers or by higher prices turn the labour of the other manufacturers out of former channels into their own.

The idea of any general and permanent system of guiding the weavers to extraordinary labour was dismissed as incongruous. It was argued that they had come in for a share of the ordinary produce which would have otherwise gone into former channels. The commerce of the country was not properly extended. They contended for the labour of the same men. The Board wrote, "There is a competition about time and about quantity. One will not wait till another is secured. Hence each makes what trade he can. The French agents do so, the English agents must do the same."

The Board of Trade could not altogether deny that the French competition with the private trade of the Company's servants was the hinge of the whole controversy. On this point the Board's opinion is thus recorded, "the Company have at all times conceded to her commercial servants the privilege of *fair trade*. This was the original and has continued the just inducement to enter into their commercial employ and so far the servants have made a proper use of it. The treaty of peace stipulates that all the subjects of France shall have that privilege of free trade and here is a serious proposal from the French agents that the first class of British subjects in this country,

the Company's servants, shall scrupulously be excluded from it. Nothing is offered or can be offered which shall put the servants of the French Company or French subjects upon a like footing. Trade is the only pursuit in which the French representatives here of all descriptions can employ themselves. So it is with respect to other European nations. The field would be enlarged for them all and Chandernagore, Chinsura and Serampore instead of Calcutta might then become the marts of Bengal commodities to which even the officers of English ships might be obliged to have recourse to for their home investments and the hopeful plan now adopted of absorbing in the surplus tonnage of the Company and drawing to their trade of this country, would not only be defeated but the profits of that trade here and in Europe go into foreign channels the extended knowledge, connection and influence which this scheme would give foreigners in the country with other effects that might be produced need not be insisted on." (28)

In this chain of arguments we notice certain very weak links. The private trade of the servants of the English East India Company was not certainly fair trade nor was proper use made of it. The private trade of the French was not here rivalling the private trade of the Company's servants until the French National Assembly opened the trade in 1790. The French East India Company of Calonne did not leave an opening to the French private traders in India. The political argument that the European rivals must not get extended knowledge and influence carried great weight. The outbreak of the French Revolution and the subsequent hostilities between France and England put an end to all French activity in India. But for five years this new French East India Company had kept up its credit, shipped a large amount of silver to India and introduced an element of real competition in the external trade of Bengal. This was a mere interlude but this interlude proves the truth of the assertion that the British traders could make no headway unless there was political power to uphold them against their rivals. The British must remain overwhelming masters.

N. K. SINHA

Shahabad In 1801.

WHILE working on the records of the Patna Commissioner's Office I discovered a record which describes the economic condition of the district of Shahabad in the year 1801. This record contains the reply from the Collector of Shahabad, Mr. J. Deane, to Lord Wellesley's queries of the 21st October, 1801, under various items. It contains interesting information on several aspects, as I have noted below.

CULTIVATION AND CROPS.

Since the first year of the decennial settlement the cultivation in the district had been very considerably improved and extended. In that year also *i.e.*, 1801, the prospect of crops was very favourable. The proportion which the uncultivated land bore to the cultivated one was one to four, inclusive of the hills which formed the southern boundary of the district. In general the lands which paid revenue to Government were in the better state of cultivation than the rent-free lands. The most valuable articles of produce were Opium, Tobacco, Cotton, Sugar, Indigo and Hemp. Their cultivation (excepting sugarcane) had greatly increased owing chiefly to "increased population, a long peace, and the more generous employment of large capitals in trade which were formerly vested in landed securities."

LAND SETTLEMENT AND REVENUE COLLECTION.

Zemindars held lands direct from the Government. There were also persons holding lands in farm immediately of the Government. But the vast majority of the farmers held their farms from the Zemindars. Permanent Settlement had been concluded with the Zemindars and other proprietors of land, and various regulations had been passed to secure the Punctual Collection of the Public Revenue, without at the same time affecting the security or value of landed property. These regulations worked rather smoothly. But the regulations intended for realising rents from the under-farmers, without at the same time, affording to the proprietors and farmers of lands the means of oppressing them, *i.e.* under-farmers and raiyats, did not operate satisfactorily. They conducted themselves from necessity with more moderation but not with greater attention to the principles of good faith in their transactions with their reyuts (raiylats). The proprietors of estates in general derived a profit [left to them on the conclusion of the Decennial Settlement] of at least 40 per cent. on the Jumma. And they were not likely to purchase of govern-

ment the permanent remission of the fixed Jumma assessed on their lands. Regarding the expediency of such a measure the Collector wrote, "the result of such a measure would be detrimental, as may be inferred from the present Lakheraj. The natural indolence of the people seems to require some powerful incitement to exertion independent of pecuniary advantage."

The descriptions of the rent-free lands were those specified in the regulations of government. What proportion their produce bore to the Jumma of the lands which paid revenue to government had not been ascertained till the year 1801. Separate quinquennial registers—one for the lands which paid revenue to the government and the other which were exempt from payment—were being prepared. The former had been completed, but little progress had been made in the preparation of the latter.

In case of failure to pay the rent by due dates the defaulter's estate was advertised, by the Collector of the district, for sale by public auction. Zemindars residing in the district were principally the purchasers of such lands. But the system of management of the new purchasers did not vary from that of the former proprietors, so far as the permanent improvement of the estate was concerned. The amount of the Jumma of the land which had been sold for the balances of the year 1801 was Sicca Rupees 13657, and that of the land expected to be sold on the same account was Rs. 32,800. The land disposed of had sold at a favourable price.

DUTIES AND COLLECTIONS.

The stamp duties were becoming a more paying source of income. In the year 1801 the amount to be realised on that account was estimated at Sicca Rupees 12,000. The Abkarry Collections were also increasing, but the exact amount of the receipt is not recorded in this letter. On the question whether a productive tax might be levied without oppression to the people, the Collector gave the following reply:—"The most productive tax which appears to me free from the objection of oppressing the people, is a tax on horned cattle at the rate of two annas per head, per annum, to be collected by the Collector for a commission of five per cent."

CURRENCY.

The old rupees generally current throughout this district was the Benares 17 Sun Sicca Rupees. The reason for its continued circulation was that the superior intrinsic value of the 19 Sun Sicca, struck in the Province, afforded a considerable profit in recoinng it into the 17 Sun Sicca struck at Benares. From the Benares mint they were replaced.

For the purpose of introducing the 19 Sun Sicca rupees into general circulation, and of rendering it advantageous to all persons to reject any other description of rupees, the Collector recommended that the Benares mint be put a stop to or the intrinsic value of the 19 Sun Sicca be reduced.

Gold mohurs were also in circulation. The Public Revenue was payable in gold. But they did not pass at par when tendered for the purchase of goods. The Collector recorded his opinion that the introduction of gold mohurs in the interior of the country had been highly beneficial (probably to the Government).

POPULATION.

No accurate data were available. Yet the Collector estimated it at "two millions at least". The proportion of the Mahomedan population to the Hindoos was one-twentieth.

RESERVOIRS.

The reservoirs of the district were in a state of extreme decay. Francis Buchanan, who made a survey of this district only a decade after, also corroborates this fact. Generally speaking the proprietors of land did not attend to the permanent improvement of their estates by making embankments, digging canals, or such other works as were calculated to increase the produce of their lands.

ROADS.

The state of the roads in this district was very good. The Collector had further recommended that "roads leading to the several ghats on the banks of the Ganges would be highly beneficial for the country—the expence of which may be estimated at 1,000 rupees per mile."

J. S. JHA.

The Agency Houses in Bengal.

(I)

THE object of this article is to draw the attention of the economic historians to the crucial role of the British agency houses in the Indian economy of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. As the representatives of the British merchants they fought and won the battle for free trade, as the representatives of the British manufacturers they opened up the India and the China markets and as the representatives of the British capitalists they obtained a stranglehold on the finances of the company's Indian governments and introduced the capitalist system in Indian agriculture and industry. In all three capacities, which were complementary in character, they came into close contact with the government as well as the masses—deeply affecting the policies of the former and the lives of the latter.

Their beginnings go back to the heyday of the Nabobs. Their original capital had come, first or second hand, from the pagoda tree. They were mostly run by the ex-servants of John company, who had made their piles in usurious loans to the native princes or in private trade. The Carnatic had furnished ample opportunities for the former, Bengal for the latter. The making and unmaking of kings proved no less profitable in 1760's and, when the Company stood forth as the Diwan in Bengal, lucrative silk, opium and salt contracts added to the illicit profits of revenue-farming. A salt contractor like Vansittart or Barwell, an opium contractor like William Young, a revenue officer like Sumner or Graham did not like to put all his eggs in the same basket. Far less did he like to let the Company know the amount of his gains or the manner in which he got them. He preferred to send his fortunes in diamonds—Warren Hastings sent a lot of balsams—trusted "the Dutch, the Dane and the Devil", before he trusted the Company's Europe bills and deposited the rest with the agency houses to be invested in country trade or indigo or usurious loans to the government.

By the end of the War of American Independence the agency houses had made country trade their special preserve—a monopoly within the Company's bigger monopoly—having ousted all other European rivals from the field. By 1790 they got rid of their straggling private competitors. Before Cornwallis came not a few of the Company's servants ventured in country trade, often in their own ships, undertook government contracts or speculated in foreign bills and respondentia. But the fear of Pitt's Act, the decline of ill-gotten gains, consequent of Cornwallis's reforms, and the growing insecurity of investing in the foreign companies forced them to quit business gradually. The introduction of the agency system in 1787 put an end to the era of fraudulent contracts, abuses in the Salt Department were partially checked by sale by public auction and opium, still procured on contract, no longer produced a

choice spirit like William Young under Cornwallis's vigilant eye. When, in 1788, thirteen hundred Company servants in Bengal ceased their private trading following the regulation prohibiting private trade to all but the servants under the Board of Trade, the only competitors of the agency houses were laid low. Henceforth they dominated the scene, though still working on capital derived from the Company's servants or sometimes borrowed from the indigenous bankers. The only consolation of the public servants in Bengal was an easy 8 to 12% from the Company's securities and the prospect of a still higher profit from the country trade. For the remittance of the former and the conduct of the latter they were dependent on the agency houses.

In 1790 there were fifteen agency houses in Calcutta, mostly British,(1) the most prominent among them being Messrs. Fergusson, Fairlie and Company, Paxton, Cockerell and Delisle, Lambert and Ross, Colvins and Bazett, Perrean and Palling and Joseph Barretto. They controlled the country trade in the East, financed to indigo and sugar manufacturers, cornered the government contracts, ran the three banks (2) and the four insurance companies (3) at Calcutta and speculated in public securities. They also dealt in the home-ward trade of the commanders and officers of the Company's ships and negotiated bills and respondentia on the foreign companies. They had corresponding houses in London who collected these bills. Agency was their least important business.

The governments in India came into contact with these agency houses wherever they turned—be it a contact for opium or salt, or rice or military stores, remittance of funds to Canton or to the sister Presidencies, issue of treasury orders or bonds for investment or war. The Fairlies supplied rice to Madras,(4) dollars to Canton,(5) draft animals and their provisions to the army (6) and indigo to the Board of Trade.(7) Colvins and Bazett built army barracks.(8) Roebuck and Abbott got contracts for coast salt (9) and Gilchrist and Charters for silk.(10) The founder of the house of Paxtons gained his fortunes in opium deals.(11) On one head, namely the China trade, the Company found itself more and more dependent on them. From 1781 opium was not only a source of revenue but a medium of remittance to Canton, first on public account and, then, from 1786, on private account.(12) The agency houses

(1) The Bengal Calendar and Register, 1790, pp. 113-38. There were twelve Portuguese, six Greek and fifteen Armenian individual merchants.

(2) The Bank of Hindusthan (1770). The Bengal Bank (1784) and the General Bank of India (1786).

(3) The Old Calcutta Insurance Company, Calcutta Insurance Company, Bengal Insurance Company and Asiatic Equitable Insurance Company.

(4) G.-G. in C. to Court (Public) 3 Sept. 1792, 4 Dec., 1792, 8 March, 1793.

(5) Same to same (Public) 12 August, 1793.

(6) Same to same (Military) 3 September, 1792.

(7) Same to same (Comml.) 14 December, 1792, 18 May, 1793.

(8) Same to same (Military) 29 January, 1793.

(9) Same to same (Comml.) 18 May, 1793.

(10) Same to same (Comml.) 29 January, 1793. .

(11) Holden Furber John Company at Work, p. 91.

(12) Home Misc. 795, pp. 63 et seq.

had even extended their hold on the Indian finances. Though Warren Hastings ascribed to the natives an insignificant share of the securities, (13) Cornwallis's minute on the Court's letter of 31 July, 1787 still put them as the largest holders. The policy of debt-transfer (to be detailed below), however, made the securities more valuable to the Europeans as a means of remittance and when the exchange rate was raised to 1s. 11d. and later more, their demand grew. Such securities ultimately came to be deposited with the agency houses who could and did indulge in stock-jobbing with the rise and fall in their value.(14) The Company could not draw upon the fortunes of its own servants unless with their co-operation, could not send funds to Madras, Bombay or Canton unless they speculated in opium or salt and always felt their hands in its throat in any financial or political crisis.

They had two main grievances against the Company in the eighties and nineties of the 18th century. First, the Company did not give them facilities for remittance of the profits they earned for themselves as well as for their clients. Since the Company would not allow them to trade directly with London, they had been proposing for a long time to put their profits in the Company's hands for bills at a fair rate of exchange. The Company was to buy with such funds a larger investment of Indian goods and out of the sale-proceeds repay them in London. When the Company ignored the proposal they were forced to send remittances through foreign channels. This clandestine trade affected the Company's home-sale. The evil increased with the increase of the India debt, consequent of Hastings's Mysore and Maratha Wars. The government borrowed at a high rate of interest, the income was sent through the French, the Dutch and the Danes.

The Board of Control, at the inspiration of the agency houses, hit upon a plan of debt transfer in 1785. Besides reducing debt, this would provide the creditors of the Company (the agency houses or their clients *viz.* the servants of the Company) with a channel of remittance through the Company's trade and thus scotch the clandestine commerce so rampant in Bengal and Madras. But the rate of exchange on bills granted to the subscribers to this plan was inadvertently fixed at 1s. 8d. which was far below the market rate and offered little inducement to the creditors. (15) It touched only the fringe of the problem by providing for "about one-tenth of the remittance which was required by the British subjects".(16) Though the plan was modified in 1787 so as to give the discretion to fix the rate of exchange to the Governor-General-in-Council, Cornwallis had to admit of its failure to attract the surplus wealth of the private British capitalists in Bengal who went on as before investing in illicit trade.(17) Lack of funds forced him in 1788 and 1789 to accept private goods for shipment on the Company's vessels which facili-

(13) Warren Hastings Memoirs, p. 18.

(14) George Smith to Dundas, 10 January, 1790 and 18 November, 1790. Home Misc. 434, p. 361 and pp. 495-96.

(15) James Sibbald to Dundas, 25 April, 1787, 18 May, 1787. Home Misc. 370, p. 433.

(16) David Scott's Memorandum to Court, 3 April, 1787, Home Misc. 404, p. 63.

(17) Home Misc. 370, p. 685.

tated private remittance to a certain extent. But this so-called 'privilege trade', acclaimed by the agency houses, was never given the ghost of a chance. The Court of Directors, ruled by the shipping interest, imposed a freight of £31 16s. per ton and killed it.

Their other grievance was concerned with the scarcity of silver in India, caused by the continuous drain of specie from Bengal since 1757 and the mistaken policy of overvaluing gold in a bimetallic currency. The agency houses, we must always remember, had little liquid capital of their own. They had to compete with the government for loans in a narrow money-market. The acute shortage of silver, felt in the 1790's, meant a rapid rise of interest rate in Calcutta and the consequent reduction of their margin of profit. The situation grew worse with the Third Mysore War which drained away the little silver that was left in Bengal. The agency houses were forced to sell their stock of public securities to avoid high interest and in that process caused their fall in value. Discount on old certificates— $2\frac{3}{4}$ to 6% on the eve of war—rose to 12% within two months of its start. Discount on new certificates rose from 6% to 17%. (18) Unable to cope with such a crisis the agency houses asked for a loan and a moratorium on all payments, abolition of import duties on silver and encouragement of Bengal sugar, rum and cotton which would invite capital from England. Revenue was affected when lack of capital hindered high bidding on opium. Cornwallis refused the loan but at his order virtual free trade was established between the Presidencies. When the discount on government paper rose to 30% he remitted duties on French silver and when a run began on the Bank of Hindustan and the Bengal Bank he had to come out with pecuniary assistance. Revenue and credit of the Company had been inextricably intertwined with the private merchants' need for circulating capital and for remittance of its fruits. Free movement of capital between England and India through the medium of trade could alone solve the twin problems of cheap capital and profitable remittance.

The Company's monopoly stood in the way of both and the inadequacy of the measures of Cornwallis led to a spirited attempt of the agency house interest, led by David Scott, to force the Company to allow a definite tonnage for import and export of goods on private account. It was joined by the manufacturing interest which wanted to explore (the time to exploit was not yet) the Indian market. It was dependent on the agency houses for sale of British manufacture in India and import of Indian raw materials and the commission which the latter earned was an important source of capital. This fact of mutual dependence should not be lost sight of.

David Scott had a house at Bombay—Scott, Tate and Adamson and after his retirement, he founded David Scott & Co. in London. It had affiliations with Messrs. Fairlie, Fergusson & Co. of Calcutta. Scott had the ears of Dundas and he poured into them all the troubles of William Fairlie (and other merchants like him) with regard to piecegoods and indigo which the latter wanted to export to England but could not due to the restrictions of the

(18) George Smith to Dundas, 13 April, 1790. Home Misc. 434, p. 405,

Company and the high tariff charged at the port of London.(19) Scott's masterly report on clandestine trade of the British merchants (he knew the things from inside) and the Foreign Office Reports of American trade with India convinced Dundas of the private merchants' need for remittance through the Company, *i.e.* for a definite tonnage on the Company's ships. He adopted in the Charter of 1793 the idea of a regulated monopoly whereby the Company was bound to offer 3000 tons of shipping to private traders to and from London. The agency houses had won the first round in the struggle for free trade.

Even before the Charter Act was passed the Calcutta agency houses had begun to speculate in ship-building on a large scale under the impression that free trade would be established. They were disappointed with the outcome and began to press that their ships should be hired by the Company and re-let to them for accommodating on their own terms the tonnage granted to the private traders under the Act. They were naturally eager to get a profitable freight for their ships which, when paid in London, formed a medium of remittance too. Other merchants anxious to take advantage of a rising demand for Indian goods in the European markets, caused by the expectation of the Revolutionary War, joined the prayers of the ship-owners in order to avoid the exorbitant freight charged by the Company. They pestered Sir John Shore with memorials.(20) They offered 30,000 tons of shipping at £12 per ton in peace and £16 per ton in war. Sir John refused to take their ships on their terms which resulted in a wholesale consignment to Copenhagen.(21)

Shore came down, however, in 1796, as the Company needed Indian tonnage to replace its regular ships taken over by the British Government and England, faced with acute scarcity, needed grains. But the trouble was not over. Hit by an indigo-crisis, caused by over-speculation and over-production of the post-Charter years, the agency houses wanted this privilege to be put on a regular basis.

The Company had been responsible for the encouragement of indigo in the early stages. It used to buy all indigo from one Mr. Prinsep between 1779 and 1784. Though the circle of contractors expanded later to include all important agency houses, Messrs. Udney, Fergusson, Barretto and Scott came to monopolise the business. The pecuniary assistance which the Company rendered through seasonable advances and the reduction of charges on imports and the great demand for the article in the European markets after the loss of San Domingo, on the outbreak of the French Revolution, caused a speculation in indigo which was further enhanced by a conditional lease allowed to the European Planters in 1789-90. In 1795 out of a total import in England of 4,368,027 lbs. Bengal alone supplied 2,955,862 lbs.—much above the average demand and four-fifths in very low quality, being the

(19) William Fairlie to David Scott, 2 June, 1792, I. O. Charters, Vol. 10.

(20) Eur. Mss. D 281, p. 35.

(21) Lambert & Ross to Prinsep, 4 February, 1794, Home Misc. 405, p. 387. Prinsep's Speech at the Court of Proprietors, 3 July, 1799, *ibid.* p. 84.

produce of Oudh and Agra. Prices toppled down in the glutted London market. On the top of that the government began to make advances in depreciated paper and in 1794-95 stopped advances altogether. First Calcutta houses like the Fairlies and the Barretts suffered a great setback. This all the more increased their urge for sending India-built ships which would cheaply convey their private trade, automatically remit their income on freight and prove on sale a source of repayment of loans contracted in England.

Shore, however, refused to continue his concessions in 1797 as a result of which the private traders entered wholesale into clandestine trade under the Danish or the American flag. The Americans easily took advantage of the loop-holes of the Jay Treaty and soon monopolised the trade to Hamburg. The Anglo-Danes plied a rich trade between Serampore, Batavia and Copenhagen. The case of the Danish ship *Helsingoer* in which David Scott and Company and their Bengal correspondents, Fairlie, Fergusson and Company, were implicated, brought out in full the wide ramifications of the activities of the Calcutta agency houses. The Government had to re-impose duties on goods entering Serampore from the Company's territories.

The exigencies of the Revolutionary War forced the Bengal Government to increase the rate of interest on public loans to 12% to the great joy of the agency houses. But still they had no means to convey home the fruits of this windfall. The shipping interest was disturbed by the cheapness of the India-built ships, sent by Shore in 1796, which challenged the very basis of their monopoly. To protect it the shipping interest forbade the Indian governments to send any India-built ship by the despatch of 25 May 1798.

To this explosive situation came Richard Wellesley, then Lord Mornington. During his apprenticeship at the Board of Control (1795-97) he came into close contact with David Scott and Henry Dundas and before he left for India, he had imbibed the former's liberal views on trade and latter's forward policy which appeared to him complementary. The ideal of an inter-dependent empire was inimical to the concept of rigid monopoly while free trade could best exploit the industrial potentialities of Britain through expansion of the empire. To Wellesley the mercantile interests of the Company appeared trivial and tiresome while its sovereign character loomed large as the grand arbiter of India's destiny, thrown up on the vortex of history, to submerge in one fell sweep the greatness and the menace of the French empire.

Scott had recommended to him the name of William Fairlie for information and advice on all commercial matters.(22) He had also begged him to grant facilities which would enable the private traders to take off the surplus produce of India. The urgency of sharing the export trade of India with them increased with the deterioration of the Company's finances, caused by the Revolutionary War. The Fourth Mysore War added to the burdens of Bengal, the resources of which, limited by Permanent Settlement, were unequal to the rapidly mounting military charges. Wellesley expected the Court to send bullion. His policy of forming subsidiary alliance with the native States, absorption of Tanjore and Carnatic and coercive measures

(22) Scott to Wellesley, 2 January, 1798. Add. Mss. 37, 262, f. 9.

to force Oudh to cede rich territories can be explained in this context. But these subterfuges did not improve the financial position very much and he was forced to cut down the Bengal investment.

To facilitate import of capital in form of British goods, to scotch clandestine trade which had been notoriously rampant of late due to the restrictive policy of the Company and to prevent decline of Indian manufacture, bound to follow from the decline of the Company's investment, Wellesley allowed the private traders to send India-built shipping in 1798, 1800, 1801 and 1802. This policy was adopted for political and imperial objectives but was of great help to the agency houses like Fairlie, Gilmore & Co. (who owned 6 ships), Lambert & Ross (who owned 5 ships) etc. who had speculated in ship-building and who played a part behind the scenes.⁽²³⁾ Dundas and Scott supported Wellesley's liberal trade policy ⁽²⁴⁾ but the shipping interest was furious, specially when Wellesley advocated introduction of private British capital into India for encouragement of the production of Indian raw materials. A bitter battle now raged between the monopolists and the free traders over Wellesley's policy. Thomas Henchman, John Cochrane, Alderman Lushington, Sir George Dallas and Peter Moore, all connected with agency houses, fought for Wellesley and, after Scott's resignation from the Court (a triumph of the shipping interest), inspired Dartmouth to continue his stubborn opposition to the Court's move to censure Wellesley's action. They managed to bring pressure on the Addington Ministry through Parliament but the latter forced a compromise which, inspite of some concessions to the private traders, accepted the Court's stand against India-built ships. The monopolists had secured the second round of the struggle.

The India-built ship was merely a symbol: the real issue behind it was the imperative necessity felt by the British merchants and the Agency houses for free movement of British capital to and from India. Unable to compete with the government for funds they wanted to obtain an independent and cheap source of supply. Increasing country trade also demanded larger capital. And if they were eager to get funds at low interest for employment in ships or foreign trade, indigo or sugar, they were more eager to lend to the government when such speculations failed or were hindered by the Company's policy or by war.

They had been trying to solve the problem by larger imports of British manufacture. Between 1796-97 and 1798-99 they imported S.R. 37,51,054 worth of merchandise from London. In the next three years they imported about S.R. 1,09,32,610. Their import of specie from other parts of the world had about trebled. Use of India-built shipping could help it further by

(23) William Fairlie to W. Lennox, 16 November, 1799. Home Misc. 405, pp. 537-38. Same to same, 7 December, 1799, *ibid*, p. 635, Colvins & Bazett to Law, Bruce & Co., 19 November and 20 December, 1799, *ibid*, p. 683.

(24) Dundas to Wellesley, 21 March, 1799. Add. Mss. 37, 274, f. 142. Same to same, 14 June, 1799, *ibid*, f. 224, Scott to Wellesley, 19 April, 1799. Add. Mss. 37, 282, f. 85. Same to same, 5 March, 1800. Philips, *The Correspondence of David Scott*, Vol. 11, P. 236

decreasing costs. The other problem—remittance of fortunes to London—was more difficult, now that indigo suffered from continual crisis. Silk, sugar and cotton gave good remittance only if borne in cheap India-built vessels.

Import of capital was also welcomed by the government. This would replenish the scanty resources of the Indian capital market, bring down the prohibitive rate of interest and thus help it not only to establish its credit but its ability to draw cheaply in future emergencies attendant on a forward policy in India and a seemingly endless war in Europe. Wellesley's government understood the link between private trade and public finance. So long as private individuals were unable to secure money for speculations in raw materials or to carry the same at low freight, so long as salt and opium remained a close monopoly and silk all but the same, they would want to invest their fortunes in public loans and to sell out their holdings during financial crises. The stranglehold of the European capitalists on the public finance was complete by the end of the 18th century. H. St. George Tucker, the financial adviser of Wellesley, computed that the debt held by the natives in Bengal on 31 January 1801 amounted to S.R. 1,89,45,000 while that held by the Europeans was S.R. 6,69,20,000. Wellesley found it difficult not to oblige his creditors. He sought remedy in greater import of capital from England, preferably by the Company, but if that was accompanied by stringent conditions which shackled his freedom of action, by the individuals.

The agency houses were beaten in 1802 mainly because their free-trade policy aroused the hostility of two principal interests—the shipping interest, and the West Indies Planter interest. The manufacturing interest, their ally in 1793, was indifferent and on the whole apprehensive of the results of that policy. Free movement of capital was anathema to monopoly and the agitation for reduction of tariffs (vigorously pursued by the agency houses under David Scott) was viewed with distrust by the sugar cane planters (and distillers and refiners) and textile manufacturers. In 1802 plain white Indian calicoes paid a duty of 6s. 8d. per piece plus £27 1s. 1d. of ad valorem, Indian muslins—6s. 8d. per piece plus £30 15s. 9d. % ad valorem and Indian sugar—£5 % ad valorem on warehousing and £37 16s. 3d. % plus 3s. 2d. per cwt. on home consumption. The manufacturing interest, though rapidly catching up with the Indian cotton manufacture in the cost of production, was still loath to part with its best defence. Nothing short of the abolition of monopoly could now serve the interests of the agency houses in Bengal and for victory they needed the support of the manufacturing interest.

(To be continued)

AMALES TRIPATHI

Matters Criminal.

(FROM BEHAR RECORDS)

WE find from Behar Records of the latter part of the 18th century that the Sarcars of Tirhoot and Purnea were infested with robbers. They were suspected to be patronised and sheltered by big zamindars, hence they could carry on their nefarious trade without let or hindrance.

In a letter dated 27th July, 1771 the Superintendent of Sarcar Tirhoot writes thus to the Chief and Council at Patna :

"There are itinerant robbers who frequent this Sarcar, and these along with the thieves who are residents of this Sarcar have grown too formidable and they are supported by Rajah Pertab Singh. As it was not possible for the sepoys to arrest them openly, they were sent in disguise. They put in their clothes and ammunition in grain bags and they themselves were made to look like bullock-drivers. In this way three of the thieves were caught. I have made the darogha acquainted with my having seized these men and have written to Raja Shitab Roy (1) on the subject requesting him to direct his darogha to punish them as he may judge proper for the good of the country and an example to their brotherhood."

In this letter the Superintendent also seeks permission to order the confinement of the Rajah. In reply the Chief entirely approves of his endeavour to clear Tirhoot of the gangs of thieves and robbers and directs him to make full enquiry if the charges against the Rajah are well-founded, and in case it should appear that the Rajah really encourages them and they are his men, then it would be more advantageous to the country that he should be kept at Patna than allowed to reside at Darbhanga.

The Committee of Revenue issued a circular letter on July 22, 1782 fixing the total expense for the Faujdary Magistracy at 9055 sicca rupees per mensem, and sent an advertisement in English, Persian and Bengali for publication proclaiming that all zamindars, chowdhuries, talookdars and other proprietors of land take effectual care that no robberies, burglaries or murders be committed within their districts, if any robbery be committed, the zamindar to whose district the robbers appertain or where robbery is committed, shall be made to refund the amount. If any zamindar shall either

(1) Administration of criminal justice remained vested in the Naib Nazim. Shitab Roy was the Naib Nazim of Behar, and after him his son Raja Kalyan Singh. In a letter dated 27th September, 1772 Governor Warren Hastings sent copies of Bengal Regulations and directed Kalyan Singh to act as the Naib Nazim and Roy Royan of Behar and that sentences of capital offences were to be carried into effect by the authority of the Naib Nazim.

commit or connive at any murder, robbery or other breach of the peace, and it be proved against him, he shall be punished with death."

Regulations were formed (12th August, 1783) adopting more stringent measures, e.g.,

(a) "... the Committee Chiefs and Collectors be authorised on information given, or on well-grounded and general suspicions to cause such zamindars to be apprehended, and on their apprehension to publish advertisements requiring all persons who have been robbed within their respective zamindaries to come and give evidence thereof and in case evidence should be produced the zamindars should be forthwith delivered over to the Fauzdari Courts to take their trial. But in case no witness should appear against them they should be released either with or without security as circumstances may direct."

(b) Members of the family of guilty zamindars not to succeed to their property without express permission of the Board.

(c) Employment of force against contumacious or armed zamindars; leader or instigator of sedition to be apprehended and brought to public justice.

The Board thought that the farmer of Purnea should be made answerable for a robbery committed at Jagannathpore (Nov. 25, 1784). A circular letter was issued to the Collectors of Purnea, Dinagepur, Murshidabad etc. directing them to ask the zamindars in the vicinity of Jagannathpore (in Purnea) to pay the several proportions of the penalty on them to make good the loss for the robbery committed on the factory at Jagannathpore as inflicted by the late Naib Nazim according to the investigation in the Fougedary Adawlut of that Division (To S. G. Heatly, letter dated 28th Dec., 1787).

Bands of robbers known as Fakeers made frequent depredations in the northern districts of Behar and Bengal, during the last two decades of the 18th century. They were under different leaders. Two of them, Mudginoo Shaw and Moosa Shaw, became a terror to the Company's territories, and the Collectors of Govindgunge, Rungpore, Dinagepur and Purnea (Richard Goodlad, Day Hart Macdowal, George Hatch, and Suetorius Grant Heatly respectively) had to be constantly on the alert, and to employ military force to disperse them whenever they came in considerable number, say 200 and upwards. Hatch writes on 20th October, 1788 that he captured 21 Fakeers, 17 of whom he delivered to the Fouzdary Court to take their trial.⁽²⁾ In a letter dated 30th September, 1788 he writes to John Fendall, Acting Magistrate (and Collector), Moorshidabad: "I am of opinion that the penalty held out by the 69th Article of the Revenue Regulations may be introduced into your perwannah (to the zamindars) with effect. For I much fear that these marauders meet with an asylum from the zamindars, otherwise it would be difficult to account for the frequency and regularity of the incursions."

(2) In a letter dated 18th January, 1788 the Governor-General in Council expressed disapprobation of instructions he had given for executing upon a summary examination every tenth man taken in arms and desired that the Detachment officer should deliver over all prisoners taken that they might be tried before the Fouzdary Court, "as prisoners can suffer the punishment of death upon due conviction only after a regular trial."

The Senassees (Sannyasis) also committed outrages. From 1782 onwards we find that the Chief of Purnea had to send military force to check them (e.g. under Captain Williams). E. Lambert, Officer Commanding at Taugepore, sent on 10th October, 1789, to Heatly, Magistrate of Purnea, troops to check dacoits. The Zamindary of Soujapore in the district of Purnea was a haunt of notorious dacoits, some of whom were captured by Hatch in pergunnah Saalbarry. Hatch writes to Heatly on 27th June, 1789: "I have further to observe that at the close of the examinations, and upon my issuing orders for their commitment they exclaimed that their case was peculiarly hard since that the profession of dacoiting was universally practised throughout the pergunnah of Soojapore."

In the archives of the Collector of Purnea are to be found several letters relating to the activities of Fakeers, e.g.

(a) Translate of a Hindoo letter written by Pan Roy Doobey to the Tera Cordeh Zamindar dated the 27th Bhado 1197 Mulky (A.D. 1789-90):—

"The Subah of Morung has sent on the frontier 80 sepoys who are encamped to the westward of Mouza Sunry and Bupati in Tera Cordeh. Moosa Saw has been stationed with some troops at Mouza Cordeh in Morung and he has attached the paddy harvests of the Muglana country and it is thought will soon have it cut down. By information of people from Morung it appears that the Subah has received orders to send troops at the Frontier and that he is inclined to raise a quarrel. The ryots are in great terror. I have therefore written to you that if early measures are not taken to prevent it the Morung sepoys will possess themselves of the crop."

(b) Thomas Hawkins, Commanding at Taugepore, writes to Heatly on 5th July, 1793, that he despatched an officer and 59 men in pursuit of Loohan Ali Shaw, a leader of Fakeers.

(c) Collector of Purnea to William Cowper, President and Members of the Board of Revenue under date 28th July, 1794:

"In consequence of a Darkhast presented to me yesterday by Gholam Ghosa, the farmer of Nautpore, a pergunnah bordering on the Morung Frontier, stating that Khurram Shaw with a party of Fakeers had attacked and plundered two villages dependent thereon and killed one man and severely wounded 3 others, I have made an application to Captain John Witherston (Commanding at Taugepore) requesting that he would station a guard for the present at the Farmer's Kutchery which can be recalled as soon as the Fakeers withdraw from the pergunnah. In the course of last six months Khurram Shaw and his followers have made 3 several attacks and without success." He wrote to Witherston: "If some speedy stop is not put to the incursions of these daring marauders, the depopulation of the pergunnah in the Northern Frontier will be the consequence."

(d) Collector of Purnea to N. B. Edmonstone, Persian Translator, Fort William, under date 12th December, 1794:

"I have for these last 10 days past been wearied out with accounts from the Surberacar of Surjapore and the farmers of the Northern pergunnahs of the incursions of three separate parties of the Fakeers who have killed 6 men

and plundered to the amount of near 2000 rupees so that I expect the ensuing kist to be at least that sum in balance not so much from the ryots having been plundered as from the circumstances of constant incursions in their pergunnahs ; it is not to be supposed they will remain to have their properties exposed to the merciless ravages of a set of freebooters who commit their depredation with impunity and who are protected and encouraged by so high a power as the Rajah of Morung and from the inattention shown to the frequent representations of our Government I should suppose likewise the Rajah of Nepaul. The boundaries shall no longer be a plea for encouraging the Fakeers, but this in my opinion is a most daring and impudent pretext. I really cannot express to the Governor-General in terms at all adequate to convey the smallest idea of the Insolence I suffered from the Vakeel of the Rajah of Morung and upon my expostulation he absolutely attempted to bully and frighten me into settling the boundaries and said till that was finally adjusted he was instructed to use such language. Had he been the representative of a Zamindar I would have instantly fined or imprisoned him for contempt. I cannot refrain in this place from observing that notwithstanding the Raja of Nepaul's fair assurances and promises to the Governor-General, yet who may be said to be an eye-witness to the depredations of the Fakeers—I am sorry to say that I have not yet been able to discern any abatement or change in their plundering system that has taken place since in consequence of the Rajah's determination of dealing with them in the effectual manner he proposes as expressed in his letter to the Hon'ble Governor-General to which I allude. Herdooar Sing, the new appointed Soubah, is still at Nepaul, Khurram Shah the Chief of one (band?) of the banditti has been released as the Rajah of Nepaul writes to me he is forbidden by his faith from punishing or in any way annoying a Fakeer,(3) and I now hear that he is at his favourite encampment at Mutteanee, a village belonging to the Morung on the Tirhoot Boundary threatening to pay Rajah Madho Singh a visit unless he pays a sum of money."

This is confirmed by a letter dated 9th January, 1795 from J. Neave, Magistrate, to G. Arbuthnot, Collector of Tirhoot, informing him that Khurram Shah Fakeer has gathered on the borders of Tirhoot a large body of armed men with hostile intention.(4)

(c) An extract from Collector's letter dated 9th January, 1795—"The Fakeers had very near got hold of me. The village at which the Mahant put up was attacked by 250 or 300 of these gentry. The hubbub the Ryots made frightened the elephant and the noise she made frightened the Fakeers who

(3) This profession may be feigned or sincere, cf. the connivance of the chiefs of Bundelkhand, Malwa, and Rajputana which "enabled the officers of the governments and many of their subordinate jagirdars to shelter the Thugs from whom they receive a portion of the fruits of their crimes"; also letter of F. C. Smith, Agent to Governor General of the Saugor and Nerbuda country, dated 6th December, 1833: "Hinduism would appear to favour these confederacies and the Saugor family are said by the Pundits never to have thriven since they abolished human 'sacrifice'"—Vide IHRC (1939), pp. 110-111.

(4) Records of the Collector of Muzaffarpore.

thinking she belonged to a party of sepoys took to their heels till they got to the Morung 3 cos from the place."

These are references to dacoities and robberies in the records of the Collector of Muzaffarpore, some of which are given below :

(a) On 10th June, 1789 the Collector of Tirhoot writes to Col. White, Commanding at Dinapore, requesting him to despatch a company of sepoys in order to oppose 3 to 4 hundred dacoits who had assembled within a cos of his place, and stating that he was without any means of opposing them, having 10 sepoys in all at his house.

(b) In a letter dated 28th April, 1794 G. Arbuthnot writes to William Cowper about the total plunder of revenue from Darbhanga on its way to Muzaffarpore on the night of the 25th inst. at Scribdy Gunge $3\frac{1}{2}$ cos from Muzaffarpore. On 5th August, 1794 he applied for additional number of sepoys (viz. 1 Naik, and 12 sepoys) to be stationed at Darbhanga. In a letter dated 3rd May, 1796 the Secretary, Board of Revenue, writes to C. Sweedland, authorising him to write off, to the account of profit and loss, the amount of Sa. Rs. 9771 plundered by the dacoits.

(c) Letter dated 24th March, 1797—gives an account of attack on the 21st night by 100 men on the treasury of Darbhanga containing Rs. 15,000 under charge of 6 sepoys who beat off the thieves.

The dacoits were very daring. In the Shahabad records we find the following letter written on May, 1782 by W. A. Brooke, the Revenue Chief of Behar, to Sir John Cummings encamped near Chausa: "I have been favoured with your letter of the 16th and am sorry to hear of the robberies committed in your encampment. I have sent orders to Raja Bikramajeet and Baboo Bhup Narain Singh, Aumils of Shahabad, and you may depend on their taking every measure in their power to prevent the like inconvenience in future. Thomas Law, being Judge of the Dewani and Phoujdarry Courts, you will of course send such offenders as may be apprehended to that gentleman."

In another letter dated June 26, 1782 Brooke writes to Thomas Law, "Superintendent of the Fougedarry at Patna" that he has received orders from the Hon'ble Governor-General and Council to deliver Rajah Narrain Singh over to the Fougedarry Court for trial both on account of his alleged rebellion and for murder, of which latter crime he stands accused at the charge of Byroo Singh."

Thomas Law, Magistrate and Collector of Rohtas district, in a letter to the Revenue Chief, Patna, dated 3rd January, 1785 informs him of his having apprehended some thieves, and wishes that "the Zamindar may be examined and punished who willingly protects these nightly plunderers, and by not arresting them connives at least at their atrocities."

In a letter dated 29th January, 1788 the Collector of Purnea writes to John Shore that he delivered one Ghunny, the Head of the Ryots who made complaints and obtained remission, to the Fouzdary Court to be tried as a disturber of the public peace for instigating the ryots to rebellion.

From the foregoing account two points stand out clearly :

(1) That the Rajas and big Zamindars were generally suspected of giving encouragement to dacoits and of having been somehow connected with robberies. (5) This suspicion ere long gained the form of conviction, supplying the *raison d'être* for holding the zamindars responsible for keeping the peace in their jurisdiction.

(2) That rebels, robbers, murderers, disturbers of the public peace, etc., were arrested by European Collectors acting as magistrates who made them over to the Foujdary Courts to take their trial.

Some Collectors would indeed like to hang persons (including dacoits) who committed murder for the sake of example, but they were generally restrained.

Criminal justice was within the sphere of the Naib Nazim. Mahommedan criminal law was in general force, and administered by the Mahommedan Law Officers (the district Qazi, Mufti, and two Maulvis). The European officers superintended the proceedings. At the Presidency was established a separate department under the control of the Governor-General to receive monthly reports of proceedings and lists of prisoners apprehended and convicted. A special officer with the title of the Remembrancer of Criminal Courts was appointed to arrange records and exercise supervision.

In a letter dated 30th May, 1782 G. F. Grand, Collector of Tirhoot, is informed that "the pay of all the native officers of the Fauzdari Department will be defrayed by the Naib Nazim himself and no further disbursements on this account are to appear in your monthly accounts. These orders are not meant to extend to the receipts of the Judges of the Dewanny Adawlut on account of their Foujdari charges, which is to be defrayed by you as usual." In a letter dated the 10th June, 1782 he is informed that "the said regulation is to take effect from the 1st of Baisakh 1189 Fasli and the vouchers under the signature of the Naib Nazim for the pay of the officers of the Foujdary Adawlut to the end of Chait 1188 are to be discharged as usual by you."

In 1785 (letter dated 15th April) "for the more speedy and effectual administration of criminal justice" the Magistrates were invested with powers to hear and determine without any reference to the foujdary Courts all prosecutions of petty offences such as abusive language or calumny, inconsiderable assaults or affrays, pilferings and the like ; but that in all cases affecting either the life and limb of the party accused or subjugating him or her to imprisonment for any term the space of 4 days or to corporal punishment

(5) The President's Rule under Article 356 of the Constitution of India was established in the state of PEPSU for 6 months on March 4, 1953. On 14th September, 1953 Dr. K. N. Katju, the States Minister, pleaded for continuance of the Rule for another 6 months to complete the measures already taken to restore law and order in "that trigger happy land" (i.e. PEPSU, as Dr. Katju chose to dub it) saying that "dacoity had come down from 46 to 6, robbery from 174 to 73". On this a newspaper commented that dacoity in the State was the outcome of direct or indirect encouragement on the part of the mediaeval type of feudal oligarchy still lingering there. The President's Rule was ended on 8th March, 1954 as a result of the elections when Col. Raghubir Singh (of the Congress), Chief Minister, took charge of the State.

exceeding 15 rattans the magistrates do proceed according to the existing regulations to remit the cause to the hearing and determination of the established Criminal Court."

Extracts from the proceedings of the Hon'ble Board of Revenue dated 30th March, 1786: "We agree to the application of the Collector of Tirhoot to be invested with the Foujdari jurisdiction in pergunnahs Kusmar and Toorkey on condition that no additional expense be incurred on that account and the Governor-General will acquaint the Naib Nazim accordingly."

In a letter dated 10th January, 1791 J. Fombelle (Nizamat Adawlut) sends to G. F. Grand, Magistrate of the City of Patna, a copy of the Regulations passed by the Governor-General in Council on 3rd December, 1790 for the administration of justice in the Foujdary or Criminal Courts in Bengal, Behar and Orissa.

On 22nd August, 1792 S. Davies, Assistant Magistrate, Bhagalpore, writes to John Fombelle, Registrar to the Nizamat Adawlut, enclosing the report on the Zillah Cauzys of the Bhagalpore and Rajmehal districts required by the Court, having advised them at the same time of abolition of that office by Government. An account of the Cauzys stationed in the district of Bhagalpore was sent by him to the Registrar on 1st November, 1792.

Punishments awarded according to the principle of Mahommedan Criminal Law were of oriental fashion—rather ferocious, involving mutilation etc. The sense of offence against the State had not developed. Murder could be compounded for by money fine; (6) privilege was granted to the son or nearest relation to pardon the murderer or to take vengeance by execution of the sentence passed on him. Capital sentences had to be referred to the Nizamat Court. The crudeness of the Futwahs of the law officers will be manifest from the samples given below:

From records of the Collector of Saran—Criminal Court decisions pronounced by Qazies and Muftis translated by judges:

(a) Extracts of a Futwah passed by Qazi Mahomed Ally and Mufti Shualul Huq of the Court of Circuit for the division of Patna on the trial of Soodoo Roy, Surda Roy, Sury Raut and Mansa Raut for an assault and battery dated Chupra the 13th April, 1791—This is the explanation of "Hukumut Adool". Assert that a wounded man is a slave. A conscientious man well informed of the price of slaves shall fix a price on him as well as on a sound person. Certainly there will be a difference in the price of the two, more or less. Whatever may be the excess of the sound man's value over the unsound one so much shall the inflicter of the wound pay to the wounded person. The *Deyut* for one Hand is half of that for a man complete, viz. 500 golden Dinars or 5000 Dinars or fifty camels or one hundred oxen or one thousand goats or one hundred clothes each competent for two *Jamas*.

(6) It was called *deyut*, blood-money or blood-price, fine or mulef of retaliation for murder (*Khan ke 'iwaz ke rupaiah*); in contradistinction to it there was *qasās*, the law of retaliation or returning like for like, e.g., killing the murderer (*qātil ko qatl kar*), or wounding the inflicter of wound.

(b) To Charles Boddam, Esq., Magistrate of Sarcar Saran, from Henry Ramus, Second Judge, Patna, dated 4th November, 1794: "Dyall, charged with perjury, having been tried and convicted of perjury in a cause of murder and sentenced to be mounted on an ass and carried through the town of Chupra and at 3 of the most public places his crime proclaimed and to receive at each 13 Tazeannahs, to be confined for the space of 5 years from the date hereof subject to hard labour and then to be released in conformity to the Futwa of the Qazi Mahomed Ali and of the Mufti it is hereby ordered that the execution of the said sentence be made and done upon the said Dyall without delay as commanded by the regulations passed by the Governor-General in Council on the 1st day of May, 1793.(7)

(c) To C. Boddam, Esq., Magistrate, Sarcar Saran, from Henry Ramus, Second Judge, Patna, dated December 26, 1794: "The trial of Deby Dutt being considered by the Nizamat Court incomplete I am directed to desire you will enquire whether there are any other heirs of the deceased besides his widow and child, and if there should be you will with the least possible delay cause their attendance and in presence of the prisoner make the reference to them prescribed by the Musalman Law—that is, whether they require retaliation for the murder, *Deyut* or the price of Blood, of if they pardon the offender, and that you will immediately report the same to me that I may state the result to the Nizamat Court."

How superstitious people took the law in their own hands, tried and put to death persons for witchcraft becomes revealed in the following letter from the Governor-General in Council to John Lumsden, Esq., Magistrate, Sarcar Saran, dated the 15th February, 1793:

"The Governor-General in Council understanding from a reference that has been made to him by the Court of Nizamat Adawlut that it has been the immemorial custom with the people of the Sutar caste to try persons for witchcraft and to put them to death when supposed to have been guilty of the charge without any reference to the Courts of Justice His Lordship in Council with a view to put an effectual end to such a shocking and inhuman custom in future direct you to issue a proclamation in the native language throughout your jurisdiction giving notice that if any person or persons of the Sutar caste or any other caste within the Company's provinces shall hereafter put any person to death on the ground of his or her sorcery, that such person or persons on being convicted of the crime will be held guilty of murder and be invariably punished accordingly."

Superstition dies hard; the offence mentioned above was not confined to Sutar (carpenter?) caste or Chapra, but continued for more than a century in other parts of Behar also, especially Chotanagpur, as sporadic cases reported occasionally in the newspaper of the time show.

Numerous small zamindars of Sarcar Saran presented a petition dated 13th December, 1794 in which they made some objections when asked to sign the printed Cabooleats, one of which is quoted below:

(7) Vide my article entitled "Punishment and Disgrace in Folklore—Riding the Ass" in JBORS, Vol. XX, p. 80ff.

(1) In the printed Cabooleats it is specified that the zamindars and farmers be careful that no property is stolen within the limits of their respective Estates, and in the event of any robbery being committed that they restore the property stolen to the owner and deliver up the thief to the Magistrate of the district. On 7th December, 1792 we received the Police Regulations in the first section of which it is enacted that in future the police of the country shall be lodged solely in hands of the officers of Government and that the zamindars and farmers discharge all people whom they may entertain to guard and protect their respective districts and that in future they do not keep up any establishments for that purpose.

"In the 2nd section—In future the zamindars and farmers will not be held responsible in cases of murder and robbery, but in the event of its being proved that they aided, assisted, or received stolen goods or concealed the theft, or be accessory to or assist him in his escape or refuse to lend assistance to the officers of Government towards his apprehension ; in these instances they will be made answerable for the property stolen.

"Agreeably to the orders of Government, the expense of the Tanna Establishment is defrayed by the shop-keepers and traders living on our respective estates and management of the Police attached to the Tannas. We therefore hope that what relates to the Police in the Cabooleat may be rescinded."

J. Fombelle, Magistrate, Bhagalpore, in a letter dated 31st July, 1799, addressed to the Committee for investigation into the Police throughout the Company's Government, while reporting "the present state of Police within his jurisdiction" diagnoses the following causes as contributing to the increase of gang robberies :

(1) Abolition of Sayer—Previous to its abolition, Police rested with the zamindars and landholders. When Police Establishment was instituted by Government many thousand men were deprived of employment. They preyed upon the community. The new Police established were too weak and at too great a distance of each other to be an effectual check on them.

(2) Inadequacy of the present Police Establishment to protect extensive tracts committed to their superintendence, the jurisdiction of a Police thanah being ten square cos and 10 to 20 barkandazes under a darogha and a jamadar to watch.

(3) Relieving zamindars and landholders from all responsibility in cases of robbery.

(4) Vagrants wandering about the country.

(5) Bands of armed men parading the country in parties of from 5 to 20 upwards.

(6) Insecure state of rivers that run through Company's territories, and want of proper regulations for ferries.

(7) Release of prisoners since 1791, confined by the late Naib Nazim.

(8) Inadequacy of punishment for gang robberies. Severest punishments under Naib Nazim checked dacoity. The refined principles of European criminal justice are not deterrent.

(9 Want of sufficient authority vested in magistrates. The prisoner is tried before the Court of Circuit ; six months or so elapsed before his trial ; when it does come prosecution witnesses may be dead, or are not to be found. His remaining in jail for so long a period exercises destructive influence on him.

In a letter dated 11th January, 1799 the Magistrate of Bhagalpore while reporting the state of prisoners says that the jails were composed of mud with chuppers—473 ft. by 405 ft. ; smaller ones being 225 ft. by 100 ft. prisoners number nearly 600 ; wife and children of prisoners (were allowed to be) their constant companion in confinement.

In a letter dated 12th April, 1800 he says that at every other station, except Bhagalpore diet to the prisoners did not exceed $\frac{3}{4}$ of an anna, "but at this station the daily allowance is one anna."

K. P. MITRA.

The French Settlement of Mahe—From 1765 to 1779.

I. CONDITION IN 1765.

THE settlement of Mahe dates back to 1721 when the French occupied the territory from the ruler of Kadattanad, one of the numerous petty states then dotting the Malabar coast. The origin of this settlement has been traced in details by Martineau in his *Les Origines de Mahe du Malabar*. It is out of place here to sketch the history of Mahe during the troublesome days of Dupleix and Lally. Suffice it to know that it capitulated to the English on the 8th February 1761 and was not restored to the French till the 20th October 1765. In violation of the terms of capitulation the English had destroyed not only the forts but also most of the houses of the settlement, including those of private persons, and the act of pillage and destruction was completed by the ruler of Kadattanad, to whom the English had handed over the settlement. In 1765 Law de Lauriston, Governor of the French Settlements in India, sent Captain Plusquellec to take possession of Mahe from the agents of the English Company at Tellicherry, but although Plusquellec arrived in March various difficulties were raised and negotiations dragged on for nearly eight months before the place was restored to the French. (1) Plusquellec protested to the Tellicherry Council against the destruction of private property in violation of the terms of capitulation and demanded three lakhs of rupees as indemnity. Needless to say that it was rejected by the English. Plusquellec further demanded that the English should notify the ruler of Kadattanad, to whom they had handed over the settlement, about the restitution and should procure a formal declaration from him recognising the rights of the French over the territories restored. While agreeing to the first proposal, the English rejected the second. Another point of difficulty was the demarcation of boundaries. Finally, after much wranglings, on the 20th October 1765 Plusquellec received possession "of the settlement of Mahe and its dependencies, with the places where stood the fortifications, the *Fort Mahé*, the *Fort St. George*, the *Fort Dauphin*, the *Fort Condé* and the *Grand Calaye* with their dependencies as we possessed them at the beginning of the year 1749".(2)

The settlement of Mahe was situated on a river sufficiently deep for navigation by medium-sized vessels, but the sand-bar at the mouth rendered entry difficult. The principal article of commerce was pepper which grew in abundance all along the coast. The other important articles were cardamom

(1) The documents relating to the restitution of Mahe and the negotiations preceding it are preserved in the Pondicherry Archives, mss. 4444-4452.

(2) Pond. Arch. ms. 4451.

and sandalwood, but the total value of the French trade was quite modest, not exceeding eight to nine hundred thousand livres a year in normal and peaceful times (roughly $2\frac{1}{2}$ livres—Re. 1/-). There was indeed scope for greater trade, but lack of funds constituted a serious difficulty. Law in his *mémoire* of 1767 considered the maintenance of the settlement at Mahe to be uneconomical, since in exchange for the small amount of commerce carried on there the French had to incur a heavy expenditure on the maintenance of a large garrison, rendered necessary by the uncertainties of the political situation in the neighbouring areas requiring constant vigil and military preparedness.(3) In order to understand this observation of Law it is necessary to look at the political condition of the Malabar coast at the time.

About the middle of the 18th century the Malabar region was parcelled out into a number of small principalities ruled by Nayars, a class of feudal aristocracy. In the immediate neighbourhood of the French settlement was the principality of Kadattanad, stretching from the river Mahe in the north to the Kotta in the south. To the north of the river Mahe lay the two principalities of Kottayam and Kurangod, and further north lay the principality of Kolattanad or Chirakkal under the rule of the Kolattiri family who had originally held sway over the entire region. To the south of Kadattanad were the principalities of Calicut and Cochin, equally feeble powers and weakened by many years of internecine strife, which in fact had given the European nations, the Portuguese, the Dutch, the English and the French their first foot-hold on the Malabar coast. In the extreme south of the peninsula was the kingdom of Travancore, which was rising in importance and power since the middle of the 18th century. In 1766 taking advantage of the enfeebled state of the Malabar principalities Haidar Ali led an invading army and quickly overran the whole country from Chirakkal to Calicut. But in spite of his ruthless policy Haidar Ali failed to subdue the Nayars completely. Down to 1792, when the Malabar region passed under English control, there were chronic revolts against the rule of the Mysore Nawab, followed by brutal suppressions. It was these political turmoils, Haidar's invasion, rebellions of the Nayars and their suppression, as also the internal feuds among the Malabar chiefs themselves which Law had in mind in 1767. (4) We shall notice later how the French settlement of Mahe was dragged into these conflicts by the forward policy of two successive Governors, Duprat and Repentigny.

In the midst of these political turmoils the French settlement lay in a poorly defended state. It was bordered on the south and east by a chain of hills, where the French had built three small forts, demolished by the English in 1761. To the north of Mahe, on the other side of the river, the French had built another fort on a hill overlooking the settlement. The territory belonged to the Nayar Chief of Kurangod. But this fort had also been equally destroyed, and in 1765 the settlement stood completely exposed on three sides. Law

(3) Pond. Arch. ms. 100.

(4) For a more detailed account of conditions in Malabar at this time see Madras District Gazetteers : Malabar and Anjengo Districts, vol. '1, pp. 57-75 ; also N. K. Sinha—Haidar Ali, pp. 144-163.

wrote in 1767, "We are not thinking at all of reconstructing these works on account of expense. It will soon be necessary, however, to decide either to quit Mahe or to make this expense." The principal part of the settlement was limited to a small area at the mouth of the river, surrounded by a wall with a few batteries for defence. The garrison consisted of 120 French soldiers and about 150 sepoys and topazes. There were 30 pieces of cannon. About the defensive strength of Mahe Law remarked, "I even believe that in a general way they (the citizens of Mahe) are better provided than we here (at Pondicherry) in arms and munitions of all kinds ; but that is not saying much. It does not prevent their feeling greatly troubled if a serious attack is made".(5)

Law considered that neither for trade nor for defence was Mahe worth retaining, and in his *mémoire* of 1767 he suggested two alternative places for transferring the settlement. One was Colachel in the kingdom of Travancore, close to Cape Comorin, and the other was Karwar, a little to the south of Goa, originally belonging to one of the petty Princes on the coast and annexed by Haidar Ali to his own dominions. About the first Law wrote, "Collèche, two or three leagues from Cape Comorin, in the kingdom of Travancore, would have been more suitable to our Company. It would be possible to have a trade there worth 3 million livres every year in pepper, white cloth and other articles produced on the Malabar coast. The king of Travancore had invited us and had even pressed us to establish a settlement in his territory from the time of Messieurs Dumas and Dupleix. I do not understand how this affair did not materialise. The English and the Dutch have established themselves in the kingdom of Travancore and they are doing well there".(6) About the second place, Karwar, Law stated that it offered great commercial as well as military advantages. "It is a little bay capable of accommodating 13 or 14 ships of the line and is equal to a port, since vessels are in perfect safety there in all seasons. Just near the mouth there is a little island, which every ship entering the bay must pass by. A small fort may be constructed there. There is also a fairly large river flowing into the bay, in which small vessels can enter." Law did not think it impossible to secure the place from Haidar Ali "inspite of his inveterate hatred towards all Europeans ; but for that it would be necessary to enter into an engagement with him, promising to help him on all occasions, and he is such a man that it would not be possible to elude the execution of the articles of a treaty with him". It is interesting to notice here that in 1770 Law pursued his project further and asked Picot, Governor of Mahe, to collect secretly all information about Karwar through the captain of a French ship, the *Iphigénie*, proceeding to Goa.(7) Picot did not favour the Karwar project because of its proximity to Goa and of the huge cost it would entail. On the other hand, he proposed the capture of the Maratha port of

(5) Pond. Arch. ms. 100.

(6) The king of Travancore had made the overture in 1741 in view of the threatened attack by the Dutch and their allies among the Malabar chiefs. But the victory of Colachel in August removed the danger and the plan of an alliance with the French fell through. See Panikkar—*The Dutch in Malabar*, p. 69.

(7) The instructions to the captain, his report on Karwar and Picot's letter to Law on the subject are preserved in the Pondicherry Archives, mss. 4454, 4455.

Viziadroog. The Karwar project, however, lingered in the minds of the French for some time more and we find it mentioned again in a report by Tronjoly, Commander of the French naval force in the East, to Bellecombe, Governor of Pondicherry, in 1778, (8) as also in the *mémoire* on Mahe by Martin in 1784.(9)

2. THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF DUPRAT.

Although the settlement at Mahe was not very important either from the commercial or from the military point of view the forward policy adopted by its two successive Governors, Duprat and de Repentigny, brought it into great prominence during the period under review and almost led to a war between the French and Haidar Ali. It is necessary therefore to go into some details of the history of the settlement during this period, since it took Haidar Ali a long time to forget the incidents and become reconciled to the French. After the restoration of the settlement in 1765 Picot de la Motte was appointed Governor, and he remained in charge till 1773 and again from 1775 till the capitulation of the place in March 1779. There was nothing remarkable in the first part of his administration except the transfer of the settlement, like all the other French possessions in India, to the French Government consequent on the suppression of the Company in 1770. During his absence on leave Duprat assumed charge as Governor in November 1773. The new Governor had an undue notion about the power and prestige of his nation, and on his own responsibility, and even in direct violation of the instructions from Pondicherry, he undertook the task of extending French political influence on the Malabar coast, unmindful of the resources at his command and of the difficulties to be encountered. As he expressed himself in a *mémoire*, "I have never looked at things except in a grand way. I have believed all through my life that a man can do what a man has done and many have done great things." (10) The result of this kind of ambitious idea was that within a few months of his assumption of office he dragged the French into a serious conflict with Haidar Ali, from where they could extricate themselves only by a great loss of prestige.

Duprat's ambition led him to imagine that he could turn the Zamorin of Calicut into a vassal Prince and utilise him for the extension of French political influence on the coast. It will be remembered that Haidar Ali had subjugated the territory of the Zamorin a few years back, but taking advantage of a temporary eclipse of Haidar's power the Zamorin returned and installed himself at Calicut in 1773. Haidar Ali sent a formidable force under Srinivasa Rao against the Zamorin, who in his distress sought for military assistance from the French at Mahe. Duprat, without waiting for instructions from Pondicherry and without calculating the risks involved, at once agreed to give military help to the Zamorin. At the beginning of 1774 he landed at Calicut with 100 men and three pieces of cannon, taking with him a frigate, the *Belle-Poule*, which

(8) Pond. Arch. ms. 251.

(9) Ibid., 4536.

(10) Bibliothèque Nationale, ms. Fr. N.A., 9366, p. 400.

was at Mahe at the time. The French flag was hoisted on the citadel and the palace, and on the 12th January 1774 a treaty was concluded with the Zamorin, by which the latter placed his country under the protection of the King of France and granted to the French a complete monopoly of trade and the right to build forts wherever they liked. On their side the French guaranteed to protect him against all enemies.

Duprat had embarked on a light-hearted adventure, but he had soon to give serious reflection to the consequences of his action when Srinivasa Rao, Haidar's General, arrived with a large force. It was only for the wise patience of Srinivasa Rao that a conflict was avoided between the French and their traditional ally, Haidar Ali, in which Duprat's handful of men could have offered little resistance. The Zamorin fled away from Calicut and the French also withdrew to Mahe in February 1774. The withdrawal was as humiliating as the adventure had been rash, and moreover it did not conciliate Haidar, since Duprat was more imprudent in his letters than in his actions. Before Haidar's forces had arrived Duprat had written to him that he had come to take possession of Calicut with a battleship and that he was expecting two more with 4,000 men as re-inforcement. In a proud tone he advised Haidar that his interests would be better served by an alliance with a powerful nation like the French. After the capture of Calicut by Srinivasa Rao Duprat again wrote to Haidar, telling him haughtily that he had withdrawn of his own will and not in fear of Haidar's army. He also reminded Haidar of his obligation to the French for their past help.

Duprat's action and more so his letters created in the mind of Haidar a deep suspicion and animosity against the French, whom he had all along regarded as his allies. He was in regular and friendly correspondence with Law de Lauriston, Governor of Pondicherry, and even at the time of the Calicut incident he had in his service a French corps which received regular re-inforcements from Pondicherry. Naturally, when Law made professions of friendship towards him and tried to draw him into a close alliance with France against the English, Haidar doubted his sincerity as he could not believe that Duprat could have behaved in the manner he did without definite instructions from Pondicherry. The Calicut incident alienated Haidar from the French and rendered the diplomatic efforts of Law extremely difficult. It was not till four or five years later that Haidar was reconciled to his old allies. (11)

The discomfiture at Calicut and the reprimand he received from Law did not put a stop to the imprudent conduct of Duprat, and he soon got the French entangled into another conflict with Haidar Ali. At the time of the first occupation of Mahe the French had acquired through treaties concluded with the ruler

(11) Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Fr. N.A., 9366—Duprat's letter to Law de Lauriston, dated 29th Jan. 1774, dealing with the treaty with the Zamorin of Calicut (pp. 190-191); Law's letter dated 21st Feb. 1774, severely reprimanding Duprat for the Calicut fiasco (pp. 200-203); a detailed *mémoire* of Duprat, dated 14th Feb. 1774, dealing with the negotiations with the Zamorin and reproducing all the letters exchanged between Duprat and the Zamorin, Haidar Ali, Russel who commanded the French corps under Haidar, and Srinivasa Rao (pp. 400-423). The last is also to be found in the Pondicherry Archives, ms. 4465.

of Kadattanad in 1723 and 1727 a monopoly of trade in pepper, cardamom and other spices over an area of three leagues along the coast, having the river of Mahe as the only outlet. But as the French owed money to the ruler of Kadattanad and had not sufficient funds to buy all the produce of the country, for many years they had relaxed their monopoly right and had allowed the ruler of Kadattanad to sell the surplus produce to the English of Tellicherry. In his anxiety to restore French prestige after the Calicut fiasco Duprat suddenly decided to enforce the treaty right of commercial monopoly and refused to allow any relaxation. It meant total ruin for the ruler of Kadattanad, since the French while enforcing their treaty right were not in a position to buy all the produce themselves. He protested, but only in vain, and Duprat declared that all cargoes of pepper sold in violation of the French monopoly right would be confiscated, holding out a threat that a large number of troops would shortly arrive to enforce the treaty right. In a letter to the chief of Haidar Ali's fleet, dated 12th March 1774, Duprat declared that the French had a monopoly of trade in spices in the kingdom of Kadattanad and that if Haidar Ali wanted pepper he must buy it from the French at Mahe. Haidar Ali protested both in his name and in the name of his protégé, the ruler of Kadattanad, and called upon Duprat to re-establish freedom of trade. Without replying to him direct, Duprat wrote to Srinivasa Rao on the 23rd April that the King of France was a much greater sovereign than the Nawab of Mysore and that he would under no circumstances yield to the ruler of Kadattanad. The haughty tone of the letter was deliberate and meant to cover up the humiliation of the Calicut episode, and for the second time it brought the French on the verge of an armed conflict with Haidar Ali. It was only averted by the prompt action of Law who, as soon as he came to know of Duprat's indiscretion, recalled him and sent de Repentigny from Pondicherry to replace him. De Repentigny took over charge in September, and Duprat in indignation resigned his Colonel's rank in the French army in order to take service under Nizam Ali. By an irony of fate he was arrested by Haidar's men while passing through Mysore territory, and he would have been made to pay dearly for his past imprudence but for the pressing intervention of Law which secured him his liberty.

3. REPENTIGNY AND RELATIONS WITH THE NEIGHBOURING PRINCIPALITIES.

Repentigny's first task as Governor was to remove the cause of conflict with Haidar by reversing the policy of Duprat and restoring the commercial *status quo* which existed before Duprat's time. But although Repentigny was anxious to maintain peaceful relations with his neighbours, particularly with Haidar Ali, he too soon got himself entangled into difficulties which might have produced serious consequences for the little French settlement. The young Prince of Chirakkal, heir to the throne, had been living at Tellicherry as a pensioner of the English since the conquest of the country by Haidar Ali in 1766. The example of Duprat in relation to the Zamorin of Calicut raised an ambitious hope in the mind of Bodman, the English Chief of Tellicherry,

of restoring the Prince of Chirakkal to his territory and extending English influence on the Malabar coast through him. He was encouraged in this idea by the estrangement between the French and Haidar Ali, caused by the imprudent policy of Duprat. So he stood as a mediator to establish peace between the Prince of Chirakkal and Haidar and to re-instate the Prince in a part of his old territory as a vassal of Haidar. As a price of his mediation he got from the Prince the grant of a monopoly of all pepper in his future territory, to be sold to the English at half its normal value. The English sent an agent named Rodriguez Dominguez Seringapatam in October 1774 with a lakh of rupees to win support for their scheme at the court of Haidar. The mission succeeded, and the Prince of Chirakkal himself visited Seringapatam to pay homage to his suzerain. He came back in December 1774 and installed himself at Cannanore. Being an agent of the English and a vassal of Haidar, he was naturally hostile to the French at Mahe.

Once installed at Cannanore the Prince proceeded to increase his dominion by conquering the neighbouring territories. He overran Kottayam and threatened the Nayar ruler of Kurangod, whose territory lay to the north of the Mahe river. The Nayar of Kurangod, who had no force to oppose the invasion, fled away and took refuge at Mahe. Repentigny received him honourably and took him under French protection. The Prince of Chirakkal overran the territory of Kurangod and threatened to attack Mahe with 4,000 men. Repentigny had only 300 men, including sepoys, to defend the place. But his courage did not fail him. Advancing with his handful of men he inflicted three severe defeats on the Prince of Chirakkal in February and March 1775, whereupon the latter retired to his own territory. In order, however, to avoid a future attack with larger forces Repentigny hastened to enter into negotiations with the Prince of Chirakkal. The latter agreed to recognise the Nayar of Kurangod in return for a tribute of 80,000 rupees, and since the Kurangod ruler did not have any money Repentigny advanced him the amount, which was raised by loans from private persons at Mahe. Thus peace was concluded between the Prince of Chirakkal and the French which upset the calculations of the English. (12)

4. MAHE FROM 1775 TO 1779.

Picot returned from France and resumed office as Governor in December 1775. For the next two years nothing remarkable happened, and the French were left at peace with their neighbours. There was no revival of commercial dispute with the ruler of Kadattanad ; the Prince of Chirakkal completely forgot his recent war with the French ; the Nayar of Kurangod, who had been saved by the French, paid back his debt with total indifference. Even Haidar Ali seemed to have got over the affronts he had received from Duprat, although there always remained a lingering suspicion in his mind that the conduct of

(12) Bibliothèque Nationale, Ms. Fr. N.A. 9366—letter of Repentigny to the Minister, dated 31st May 1775 (pp. 430-431). This volume and also 9215 contain the correspondence of Repentigny and Picot with the Minister in Paris giving a full account of French relations with the principalities on the Malabar coast.

Duprat showed what he could expect from the French if they ever got a secure footing in India. Anyway, at least outwardly he remained on friendly terms with the French and even agreed to the cession of a few villages on the northern side of the Mahe river. Negotiations for this purpose which had been started by Picot were concluded by Bellecombe, Governor of Pondicherry, during his visit to Mahe at the beginning of 1778. During his short stay at Mahe Bellecombe also settled the question of repayment by the Nayar of Kurangod of the money advanced to him by the French while he had been attacked by the Prince of Chirakkal,—27,000 rupees for the expenses of the war and 80,000 for paying the tribute demanded. By this settlement, concluded on the 16th April 1778, the Nayar of Kurangod recognised the annexation of a part of his territory to Mahe. (13)

With the outbreak of war between the English and the French in 1778 Mahe was again faced with a grave danger. It had neither money nor troops to organise an effective defence. After the fall of Pondicherry in October 1778, Picot wrote frantic letters to Haidar Ali, begging him to take the French settlement under his protection and to send money and troops for its defence. (14) For a time the fear of Haidar Ali deterred the English from attacking Mahe, the only surviving French settlement in India, but in March 1779 they sent a considerable force under Braithwaite and Mahe capitulated on the 19th on honourable terms. The garrison was accorded the honours of war and the English gave a solemn pledge not to destroy any public or private property, a pledge which they violated as before. Some time later when hostilities broke out between Haidar Ali and the English the former captured Mahe and laid siege to Tellicherry. But three years after his forces were driven out of Mahe and the English completed their work of destruction begun in 1779.

S. P. SEN.

(13) Pond. Arch. Ms. 4496.

(14) Ibid, 4511 (letter dated 3rd Nov. 1778) and 4516 (letter dated 21st Jan. 1779).

A Note on the Sinu-Sikh Treaty of 1842.

TO the east of Kashmir, in the Upper Indus Valley, lies a very elevated and rugged country. It is the tableland of Ladakh. It is bounded on the north by the unexplored region south of Chinese Turkistan, on the north east by the Chinese territory of Khotan and Rudak, on the south east by Chinese territory and Spiti. To its west lies Baltistan, the chief town of which is Iskardu. Leh, the capital of Ladak, stands on two ancient trade routes, one to Lhasa via Gartok, and another to Kashgar in Yarkand. The trade of Ladak was not inconsiderable, though almost the only stock in trade was shawl wool. Ladak in early 19th Century had no relation of a political nature either with China or with Lhasa.

Ladak was thus not an unprofitable country to conquer. Moreover from the Ladak side Kashmir could always be invaded and the task of invasion would become easier in the winter with the snow frozen and all the rivers and water courses passable over the ice. (1) So after Ranjit Singh had conquered Kashmir, it became necessary for him to subdue Ladak and maintain it as a buffer. It was however not before 1834, that a Sikh army invaded the weak and distant state of Ladak. In that year Zorawar Singh, Raja Gulab Singh's commander in Kishtwar, taking advantage of internal disorders succeeded in reducing it to subjection. He sided with one of the contending parties, deposed the reigning Raja and set up a rebellious minister in his stead. (2) A tribute of Rs. 30,000/- was fixed for Ladak. The dispossessed Raja complained to the Chinese authorities in Lhasa, but as the new ruler continued to pay the tribute regularly no notice was taken of the usurpation. The conquest of Ladak made the Sikh Government the immediate neighbour of the Empire of China. It opened up for Ranjit Singh new but unprofitable field for expansion. With the west and south blocked to any further extension of territory, an ambitious Sikh Government could only aggrandise itself in the bleak and rugged country from the right bank of the Indus to beyond the Himalayas and that at the cost of China and Tibet. For the next 6 years however no further effort was made by the Lahore Government in that direction.

During the years of political turmoil that followed the death of Ranjit Singh, the Lahore Government was convulsed at its centre and gradually lost all unity and cohesion. The Jammu Rajas were not slow to take advantage of the situation and to consolidate their position. Zorawar Singh their deputy in Ladak tried to extend his masters' authority over the region to the east and north of Ladak. He found the situation favourable for aggression.

(1) Hearsey's note, *Asiatic Journal*, Vol. XVIII, 1835.

(2) *History of the Sikhs*, Cunningham, P. 201,

Ahmed Shah the reigning Chief of Balti had differences with his family and he proposed to pass over his eldest son in favour of a younger one, in fixing the succession. The natural heir would seem to have endeavoured to interest the Governor of Kashmir and also Zorawar Singh the Jammu deputy in Ladak in his favour. In 1840 he fled from his father and sought refuge and assistance in Leh. (3)

The puppet king of Ladak wanted to throw off the yoke of the Jammu Brothers. He entered into a conspiracy with Ahmad Shah. A body of Iskardu troops was allowed to enter Ladak and to carry off the son of their Chief. Zorawar Singh thereupon attacked Iskardu and made himself master of Little Tibet. Emboldened by his success the Jammu Deputy resolved to compel the Chinese Governor of Yarkand to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Sikh Govt.

There was an ostensible reason behind this move. It appears that opium valued at eight lakhs of rupees had been confiscated by the Chinese authorities in Yarkand and that opium belonged to the merchants of Kishtwar, Jammu, and Kashmir. 'Raja Gulab Singh is now,' wrote Clerk to Maddock, 'intent on a new scheme of ambition he now hopes to find, in the seizure and destruction at Yarkand of opium belonging to traders and subjects of the Sikh Government, the means of inciting the Durbar to authorise his attempting the conquest of Yarkand, an enterprise which his Vizier there, Zorawar Singh, long considered to be of easy accomplishment The troops which the Raja had at his command for such service are inured to mountain warfare and to cold and capable I do not doubt of wresting from the Chinese Empire Yarkand or any tributary in that position, if the encroachment were not opposed by the independent Mahomedan states lying west of it.' (4) Nothing came out of this move of the Jammu Raja as it was discountenanced by the British Government. In the east however Zorawar Singh was more successful. Laying claims to Rudhok, Garo and the lakes of Mansarowar, he occupied those regions. The valleys of the Indus and the Sutlej to the sources of these rivers were overrun by the Sikh troops and a garrison was fixed close to the frontier of Nepal and on the opposite side of the snowy range from the British post of Almora. The district of Rudhok situated to the right bank of Indus, east of Leh, commanded the trade routes from the east. 'The immediate object of the Jammu Rajas', observed Clerk, the British Agent at The Lahore Durbar, 'in this forward march movement Eastward is to secure the Shawl wool and other valuable import trade through Ladak from that direction A more remote object is that which would suggest itself to a rising Hill power namely the maintenance of a friendly intercourse with the Nepalese'. (5)

The activities of Zorawar Singh could not but alarm the British. The latter were at that time at war with the Chinese. Any move against the Chinese possessions beyond the Indian frontier was likely to be interpreted by the Government at Peking to have been engineered by the British and they might throw additional difficulties in the way of pending or probable

(3) *Ibid.*, P. 243.

(4) Secret Consults, 25th January, 1841—No. 63. *

(5) Secret Consults, 28th September, 1841, No. 65.

negotiations. The British Government further deemed it inadvisable to allow the Lahore and Nepal dominions to march with one another behind the Himalayas. Moreover it was alleged that the troops of Zorawar Singh had entered the territory of Busahir, a state under British protection and committed acts of depredations. (6)

The Governor-General through his agent demanded the withdrawal of Zorawar Singh within the limits of Ladak. 'An excitement,' wrote Maddock to Clerk, 'has already been caused at Kathmandu which it is very desirable to check the British Government would not permit any aggressive measure which might obstruct the free transit of commerce through the Busahir state, or through any other districts entitled to British protection you will at once call for explanation avowing that your Government will not allow of a bar being placed to any trade which has been customary with its provinces permitting it also to be understood that His Lordship in Council insist on the return of the Sikh or Jammu troops within their frontier boundaries in the Ladak territory.' The Lahore Durbar in reply wrote (8) "The Chinese plundered merchants, the Khalsa subjects, inflicting on them a loss of lakhs of rupees and the Vizier did not think it amiss to punish them. He also reported that having gone to perform his ablutions in the Mansuraver lake, about 500 sowars of the Jhaba country fell upon him but that he defeated them and they fled and that while pursuing them he had captured a fort or two in that country." On the 1st of November 1841 Raja Dhian Singh sent a perwannah to Zorawar Singh to return to Ladak and to resume his usual duties there. A day, the 10th December 1841, was fixed for the surrender of Garo and Lt. Cunningham was deputed to see that the Lama's authority was fully established. (9)

But before the order could reach him, or be acted on, he was surrounded in the depth of winter and at a height of 12,000 feet or more, by a superior force from Lhasa inured to frost and snow. "My messengers heard many reports," so reported Cunningham from Shipkee, "of the approach towards the lakes of a considerable Chinese force and the Sikh showed some alarm on account of the rumours afloat A large Chinese force under Yorkong and Pishee had advanced into the Pooring Pergunna and had driven the Sikhs before them The Sikhs were suffering severely both from the weather and the scarcity of supplies—Zorawar Singh had intended to have gone to Ladak, but the altered state of affairs had obliged him to remain with his troops". (10) It appears that a desultory fight took place between the Sikh and the Chinese troops ending in favour of the Chinese who had made many prisoners. Zorawar Singh probably perished in the encounter. During the spring of 1842 the victorious Chinese advanced along the Indus, and not only recovered their province but occupied Ladak and laid siege to

(6) Secret Consults, 21st June, 1841, No. 57, Para 9.

Busahir—a Punjab Hill State with an area of 3320 sq. miles.

(7) Secret Consults, 16th August, 1841, No. 39.

(8) Secret Consults, 22nd November, 1841, No. 18.

(9) Secret Consults, 27th September, 1841, No. 97.

(10) Secret Consults, 3rd January, 1842, No. 122.

the citadel of Leh. The Kalmaks talked of another invasion of Kashmir and the Tartars of the Greater and Lesser Tibet were elated with the prospect of revenge and plunder. (11)

At first the British policy remained unchanged. "Should the war with the Chinese", wrote Mr. Clerk, "on the east be protracted it might be expedient to check them in Ladak ; otherwise I do not see that the Government of India need to concern itself about hostilities between the Chinese and the Jammu Rajas at the back of the Himalaya mountains". (12) But Chinese offensive in Ladak alarmed the British. A large body of troops would now be required for operations in Chinese Tibet while on the other hand their very presence in the Khyber region was necessary in the interests of British policy relating to Afghanistan. (13) Moreover in the event of a Sikh defeat the British Government would be faced with the problem of resisting the advance of the enemy from the east. The Governor-General out of the particular regard he entertained for his good allies the Sikhs expressed his hope that the difference between the Sikhs and the Chinese would be settled and proposed to send Lt. Cunningham to mediate between them. (14)

In the meanwhile a body of 5,000 men well equipped to endure cold marched from their Hills into Ladak under Meean Rutno. (15) He seized the Lhasa Wazir by treachery and dislodged his troops by stratagen from a position between Leh and Rudhok where they had proposed to await the return of winter. An arrangement was then come to between Lhasa and Lahore authorities which placed matters on their old footing agreeably to the desire of the English. The text of the treaty is given below—

"Translation of Treaty of Peace and Amity concluded between the Chinese and Sikhs subsequently to the death of Wazir Zorawar Singh, signed by Kaloon Zoukund on the part of the former and Rutnoo Wazir and Dewan Hurrichund on the part of the latter."

"The following chiefs having assembled in the city of Leh on the 28th Assoge 1899 Sumbut corresponding with 17th October 1842 viz. Kaloon Zoukund and Dwar Jeesy on the part of the Chinese and Shah Gholam on the part of the Ruler of Lahore and Rutnoo Wazir and Hurry Chund on the part of Rajah Golab Singh besides others of inferior note belonging to both parties—it was mutually agreed that a treaty of amity and peace should be concluded between the Chinese and the Sikhs—the conditions of which as under mentioned were recorded in writing in the presence of the Chiefs aforesaid and likewise Sibchu Tudpun Peesy, and Lamba Weezeer, both confidential advisers of the Viceroy of Lhasa.

1st. That the boundaries of Ladak and Lhasa shall be constituted as formerly, the contracting parties engaging to confine themselves within their

(11) History of the Sikhs—Cunningham, P. 244.

(12) Secret Consults, 7th February, 1842, No. 74.

(13) Secret Consults, 1st June, 1842, Nos. 25/26.

(14) Secret Consults, 22nd June, 1842, No. 26.

(15) Secret Consults, 31st January, 1842, No. 91.

respective boundaries the one to refrain from any act of aggression on the other.

2nd. That in conformity to ancient usage, tea and Pushums shawl wool shall be transmitted by the Ladak Road.

3rdly. Such persons as may in future proceed from China to Ladak or from Ladak to China nor to be obstructed on the Road.

4thly. That no renewal of the War between the Chiefs of the Rajah and of those of the Viceroy of Lhasa shall take place.

5thly. That the above mentioned conditions shall remain in force without interruption and whatever customs formerly existed, shall not be removed and continue to prevail.

6thly. It is understood that in signing the above treaty the contracting parties are bound to a true and faithful observance of all the provisions thereof by the solemn obligations attached to the Holy Place called "Gengri" to the lake of Shantalore and to the temple of Kojoorch in China." (16)

It will not be out of place to note here that after the Sikh conquest of Ladak, Zorawar Singh suggested to Ranjit Singh that 'by the luck of the Maharaja' he might conquer Little Tibet. Ranjit deprecated the idea of any further advance that would bring him into collision with the mighty colossus of Asia, China. He moderated the ambition of his overzealous deputies and Lieutenants. "After his death when Zorawar Singh took Iskardu in 1840 and Garo in 1841 Ranjit's prophecy proved true. There was a collision with the Chinese, a Sikh defeat, English interference, resulting in peace and restoration of the status quo ante bellum." (17)



T. K. MUKHERJI.

(16) Secret Consults, 24th May, 1843, Nos. 62/63.

(17) Ranjit Singh—Dr. N. K. Sinha, P. 125.



BEN PAST & PRESENT



JOURNAL OF THE CALCUTTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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Popular Discontent in Bihar on the Eve of the Movement of 1857-59.

FOR all movements or wars there must be deep-rooted causes, though the actual outbreak of each may be precipitated by certain immediate circumstances. The Indian Movement of 1857-59 was not, indeed, a sudden outburst but the product of accumulated discontent due to various factors inherent in the changing conditions of these days. Such discontent among certain sections of the people in Bihar on the eve of the outbreak of this movement was referred to by W. Taylor, then Commissioner of Patna, in the following paragraphs of his booklet, entitled '*Our Crisis*':—

"More than two years before the first appearance of an insurrectionary spirit, I had, myself publicly reported to Government, that the minds of the Behar people, and specially of the Mohammedans, were greatly disturbed in consequence of reports that had been circulated of an intention on the part of the Government to interfere with their religious observances, and social customs; I pointed out the dangerous effects of certain measures in progress, and contemplation, the misconception which had arisen from the late orders regarding the messing and drinking vessels of the prisoners, the sudden establishment of an expensive educational machinery, and other matters of the kind, of which the object was either unintellegeble or misunderstood by a people who are profoundly ignorant and profoundly sensitive, on all points connected with their faith, customs and caste.

This representation, the only notice I believe that has been given to the Government of the popular discontent, was found on enquiry to be correct, and was followed by a proclamation from the Lieut. Governor, explaining the matters which had been misunderstood, and reassuring the people on the points on which their fears had been excited."

Recently I traced (1) the letter written by W. Taylor to W. Grey, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, dated the 27th June 1855, in which the former thus reported to Government the disturbed state of feelings in Bihar at that time :—

"Owing to sundry causes which will be more fully explained below, the minds of the people in these districts are at present in a very restless and disaffected state and they have generally conceived the idea that there is an intention on the part of Government to commence and carry through a systematic interference with their religion, their caste, and their social customs.

This idea which is either an idea and belief or a conviction according to the mind of the individual who holds it—has been called into existence and

(1) In the Record Room of the Collectorate of Patna.

corroborated by sundry recent occurrences which I will briefly recite, and it is apparently the coincidence of those occurrences, or rather their immediate sequences one upon the other that have served to collect and strengthen the half formed suspicions previously floating in the minds of the masses and bringing them to head.

Some six months ago an army man's letter was written by some person in Calcutta and circulated throughout these districts addressing to all the more respectable Mohammadans and specially to all public officers of that persuasion inviting them to a discussion on religious topics and pointing out the present as a specially fitting crisis for such considerations.

This letter was received by the more intelligent and better informed individuals of the Mohammadan persuasion simply as what it was a challenge to theological controversy and was treated by them either with the silent contempt, real or feigned with which the learned Mohammadans have always regarded or affected to regard such addresses, or answered and commented upon in native prints. But the more ignorant of the Mohaminadans at once adopted the idea that the address emanated from the Government and that it was the covert forerunner of an attack upon their religion.

The fact of its being anonymous, and of its being addressed to the Government officers seems to have given some 'color' to this impression, and the belief originally conceived through ignorance was fostered and confirmed by the misrepresentations of the ill-disposed.

They argued and still argue that were the letter the production of a private individual, the man who would take the trouble to print and publish such an address would not scruple to affix his name to the letter, that missionaries never circulated anonymous address but preached unto and exhorted openly before all men.

This feeling was not confined to Mohammadans, but met *with entire sympathy from the Hindoos, and I would here by the way remark which is too frequently overlooked that in all such matters there is perfect community of feeling between these two classes specially among the lower order in this province.*(2) Indeed their respective creeds 'sit' as regards the other sect as loosely upon them that festivals, the saints and many observances are held in mutual and undistinguishable veneration.

Immediately following upon this, and while the excitement and discussions caused by the distribution of this letter were yet rife, there was announced the appointment of the new educational Inspector for the province of Bihar with the sundry arrangements connected with his office.

Slow as are the great body of the people even to understand the existence of disinterested benevolence, and utterly incapable of appreciating it, the announcement of these arrangements at this particular crisis was at once to their minds as confirmation of their fears, and so strong is their feeling that Mr. Chapman has found it impossible to secure the services of a single respectable resident in any of the districts although the salary offered is such as would in other situation attract a crowd of anxious candidates.

(2) Italics our own.

No resident of respectability dare at present take the proffered post, or have the taunt and reproaches which its acceptance would entail upon him.

Again at the very crisis of the agitation which might possibly have subsided after time and reflection, there occurred the late unfortunate affair in the jail. The rapidity with which the excitement spread in the district of Muzaffarpore serves to show how ripe the minds of the people were for the conviction under which they acted, prevalent^a was the previous feelings in which their conviction was rooted.

One and all appear to have been convinced that they had rightly judged and that the dreaded interference of which the former events were the prelude and preparation had actually commenced. ...

The removal of the Lotahs more particularly and immediately affected the Hindoos, the Mohammadans being comparatively careless in the matter, and this is the reason why the excitement both at Muzaffarpore and Arrah was far greater than at Patna.

But the belief was universal that the order was the first step in a projected attack by Government on their customs and religion. Although it was cancelled by Government, and the restoration of the Lotahs directed, this impression and belief is still strong throughout the districts, and they attribute perhaps naturally the reversal of the order to the apprehension excited by their opposition.

There is to be added to the above special circumstances the fact that reports have been of late busily circulated apparently coming from Calcutta that the rite of circumcession and sundry other rites and observances both of the Mohammadans and Hindoos are about to be abolished, laws on these subjects being about to be introduced by Prosono Coomar Tagore, that all the Government officials are to be in the first instance, subjected to a compulsory mastication of the flesh which they respectively venerate or abhor, and that the process is then to be extended to the rest of the people.

I strongly suspect that there is a purpose in the dissemination of these reports.

I now take the liberty to suggest that some steps be immediately taken to remove as far as may be, the mistaken ideas of these ignorant and misguided people.

However absurd and unfounded these beliefs may be it is neither the less firm, nor the less fraught with future mischief, and my conviction is that unless pains are taken to explain the measures and intentions of Government to conciliated the affection and encourage the loyalty of the people, our efforts to enlighten or elevate them will be idle and abortive.

Separated as we necessarily are from the millions around us by our habits and ideas we are still further and without the same necessity isolated from their hearts by the utter absence of all individual feeling or sympathy.

The great mass see or hear of functionary after functionary coming and going and holding for a time the destinies of the people in the hallow of their hands, but they seldom, perhaps never know what it is to feel that the minds of their rulers have ever been directed to understand or sympathise with the great heart that is beating around them.

The result is an utter absence of those ties between the governors and the governed, that unbought loyalty which is the strength of kings, and which with all its faults the native of India is well capable of feeling.

Future measures I reserve for future suggestions but I would earnestly recommend that with a view to pave the way towards happier and more promising state of things proclamation be issued throughout the district under my jurisdiction briefly explaining the purposes of Government and setting the people right in regard to the late occurrences which I have above described.

I feel confident that this preparatory measure will have the best possible effect, and if it be sanctioned by his Honor, I propose not only to circulate them through the usual official channels, but to make it a personal request to the influential landholders and residents to distribute them among their tenantry of all classes, accompanied with such further explanations as their good feelings may suggest.

I submit herewith a draft of the proclamation which I propose to circulate, and will merely remark that while I have briefly touched upon each separate subject of misconception, I have purposely avoided making any allusion to the existence of any evil intention towards Government attributing the misconception of the people to ignorance or the misleading of their ill wishers. I believe this to be the best policy and the best calculated conciliate even those who are conscious of disaffection."

True Copy.
Sd. Illegible.
Offg. Asstt. Commr.

I have etc.
Sd. W. Taylor.
Offg. Commr.

KALI KINKAR DATTA.

Bengal and the Hindi-Urdu Question in 1875.

THERE is a bundle of papers in the District records room at Lucknow which would indicate that shortly after the Mutiny the Hindi-Urdu question cropped up in Bengal, Bihar and the North-West Provinces of Agra and Oudh in a manner which is totally forgotten now. The controversy was confined to high officials, and it was carried on with a show of academic detachment. Plausible arguments were advanced, and each party sought to prove his contention with vigour and warmth. The arguments, however, show that the language question was viewed in the light of imperialist considerations on the whole.

The controversy is so interesting that the whole file which has not yet been utilised by any scholar deserves complete reproduction. The correspondence is printed below for the benefit of historians.*

From Arthur Howell, Esq., Officiating Secretary to the Government of India, to the Chief Commissioner of Oudh. Fort William, the 17th November 1875, No. 2/208.

From C. S. Balley,
Commissioner of Patna,
No. 182, dated 20th
May 1875.

From Government of
Bengal, No. 17, S.T.
dated 9th July 1875,
with enclosure.

Sir - I am directed to forward the accompanying papers, including a Minute by Mr. A. W. Croft, Inspector of Schools in Bengal, on the adoption of Hindi as the Court language of Behar.

2. The Government of India are not aware how far Mr. Croft's remarks are applicable to the circumstances of Oudh, but desire to express general concurrence in the view that it is an object to diminish the antagonism between Hindi and Urdu, and that it is inexpedient to foster in Government or Aided Schools under the name of Hindi an artificial, Sanskritized language, which is in most cases as far removed from the common rustic vernacular as it is from the ordinary language of the towns. The Government of India are further of opinion that the Educational Departments can give efficient help in this matter in connexion with the preparation of text books."

"From C. E. Buckland, Esq., Officiating Junior Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to the Commissioner of Patna Division, No. 17 S.T., dated Yacht "Rhotas," the 9th July 1875.

With reference to your letter No. 182J., dated 20th May last, reporting on a Nagri Pamphlet, entitled "Why should Nagri be introduced in the Courts and other Offices of Behar?" I am directed to forward for your information, a copy of a Note by Mr. A. W. Croft, Inspector of Schools, on "Hindi as the

* The Indian Historical Records Commission published my paper on this topic last year.

Court Language of Behar, ' and to state that the Lieutenant Governor concurs generally in the views therein expressed.

2. His Honour has no desire to pass any orders that may countenance the idea that Hindi and Urdu are two distinct languages ; but he recognizes the tendency of some writers of the former to reject every work which is not Sanskrit in origin, while some writers of Urdu confine themselves strictly towards of Persian origin. He would wish to encourage the growth of a full, harmonious language, uniting these two elements now separate and discordant ; and for this purpose he would require that all candidates for employment above the lowest, should be equally familiar with both the Nagri and Persian characters.

3. The Lieutenant Governor is of opinion that the order of Government, terminating with Mr. Dampier's letter No. 1210, dated 2nd April 1874, should be steadily carried out. Those orders enjoined that all processes, notifications, and proclamations should be made in Hindi ; that official records should be kept in Hindi ; that petitions should be received in either Hindi or Hindustani ; and that a knowledge of the Hindi character should be insisted on in the case of police officers and amlahs. The late Lieutenant Governor was strongly opposed to making Hindi the exclusive court language at present, and to this policy Sir Richard Temple desires to adhere. It is apparent that there is some amount of passive obstructiveness to be overcome, although progress is being made in the introduction of the reform instituted by Government. His Honour trusts to you to preserve steadily in the policy already indicated.

4. For these reasons the Lieutenant Governor is unable to accede to the request preferred by the subscribers to the pamphlet abovementioned, and I am to ask you to communicate to the petitioners this decision.

Note by A. W. Croft, Esq., Inspector of Schools, on "Hindi as the Court Language of Behar," dated the 16th June 1875.

The petition mixes up two things—the character and the language—which should be kept distinct.

To call Hindi and Urdu two languages, is to perpetuate a vicious error, originally due to the antagonism of Pundits and Maulavis. They have the same accidence and syntax, and the same stock of words for most simple objects and conceptions ; they only diverge when it is necessary to express the language of compliment, of science, or of complex ideas in general. This is not to have two languages, but to have a language capable of being enriched from two different sources ; and I conceive that it is the object of Government to destroy or to diminish this antagonism.

It can do so in two ways,—in its ordinary civil administration, and by means of its educational machinery. In the first place it can, I believe, do much more than it has yet done in discountenancing the Persian/Urdu of the public offices and courts—a language unintelligible to any native of this country who has not received a special education. I do not refer to technical terms of law or of civil business ; these are in possession ; they are as convenient as any, and they could not, in fact, be replaced by others. They are

parts of the Hindi language, just as the legal terms of French origin are parts of the English language, I refer to the jargon in which the body of court documents is couched; a language altogether Persian, except for Hindustani inflexions, and not always with that exception; a language known only to the initiated, who cling to it as the source of their livelihood. Government has repeatedly fulminated against this court language, and, I am told, much has been done towards simplifying it. But the effort requires constant vigilance; the amlahs have every interest in quietly opposing the change, and there still remain in constant use numbers of words and phrases that have not the smallest justification. This is to perpetuate the delusion of two languages; and still more, it is to give the largest section of the people a substantial grievance, by excluding them from the most lucrative forms of civil employ. So long as a document read out in court is not intelligible to any person, Hindu or Muhammadan, of fair education, much remains to be done. As it is, our middle schools are deserted, because the education they give is valueless as an avenue to the civil employment. I cannot but believe that the constant and clear expression of the will of Government, the steady discouragement by all officers of exaggeration in language and the occasional rejection of a petition on this ground, would gradually, if not speedily—in the next generation of amlahs, if not in this—produce marked results.

The Education Department can, in a different fashion give efficient help towards the same end, namely, the unification of Hindi and Urdu. The books used in the Schools of Behar ought to be books of such a style that they might be written in differently, and with equal propriety, in either character. No one will say, for example, that a sentence like "Suraj nikalta hai," is distinctively Hindi or distinctively Urdu; and it is the business of the Education Department to extend the bounds of this common language. The test of a good School-book for Behar is, that it can be printed without violence in either character. Individual authors, on the other hand (with a few noticeable exception), generally strive to intensify the difference by rejecting every work which is not either Sanskrit in origin or Persian in origin; for it is not supposed that pedantry is confined to writers of Urdu. On the contrary the pedantry that I have chiefly to complain of in my own work, is that of writer of Hindi. The Purism of men who carry their repugnance to Urdu so far as to say, not admi but manush, not sirf but kebal, not chiz but vastu, not magar but parantu, is a thing not to be tolerated in a region where some kind of compromise is necessary. In looking about for books for the Behar schools, I have had to reject numbers for this very fault; one in particular, an elementary book of Natural History, which I sorely needed, but whose pages bristled with Sanskrit expressions for the commonest conceptions, e.g. Utpatti, Bishay, Manushya, brittanta, parantu, bahuddha, nirog, karan; all occurring on a page taken at random.

This sort of pedantry reaches its culminating point in the very pamphlet sent for report; I transcribe the opening sentence:

"Siddha Sriman Maharaja Dhiraj Bharatvarshiya purvadesh adhikari yashasvi tejasvi sriyukta Laftanent gavarnar maha pratapike nikat ham sab Patna nagar ke pradhan vivasi, jamidar, ade prajayonka tan manase koti koti

dhanyabad pahunche. Ap aise buddhiman, prajopakari, desh hitakari raj niyamak kī raksha sada sarvada sarva shaktiman jagadishvar karta rahe."

This, coming in a prayer for the restoration of the language of the people, represents, I suppose, that language. It represents, I have no doubt, the language which its author would rejoice to introduce into the courts in place of Urdu. Nothing could be more intolerant or more ludicrous. It is like a man, in his zeal for pure English, rejecting the "impenetrability of matter" and substituting the "unthorough foresomeness of stuff."

It is well to recognize, in order to avoid it, the danger that lies before Government when it is asked to support Hindi against Urdu. The danger is that of committing itself to the cultivation of a language as artificial as the most Persianised Urdu, and having just as little relation to the ordinary speech of educated man, Hindus no less than Mussulmans.

I repeat my opinion that it is desirable for Government to guard most carefully against passing any orders which may countenance the idea that Hindi and Urdu are two distinct languages; and more particularly, having this object in view, to guard against encouraging eccentricities of style, whether having a Persian bias or a Sanskrit bias, such as I have described above. I regard it as well worth the attention of Government to try, by every means at its command (the educational means being out the least efficacious), to unite these two elements, now separate and discordant, into one full and harmonious language. If civil officers will repress Persian exaggerations, the Education Department can wage vigorous war against Sanskrit aggressions. The result will be a joint language, abounding in synonyms of different origin; in this respect resembling English and the wealthier group of living languages. The varieties of such a language will differ no more than the style of Rasselas differs from that of the Lord's Prayer. It is equally English, whether you speak of "an unlikely thing to happen," or "an improbable event to occur," and it is only usage that determines which is the best style.

Such a language cannot be created by an edict. But authors in Behar and in the North-Western Provinces are even now grappling with the question, and Government can, by ready encouragement of such authors, and more especially by the organization of its schools, so control the tendencies of current literature, so help to fix the standard of educated speech, as to hasten this desirable consummation. In an illiterate age and with no efforts of Government tending to promote the union it took two centuries to weld the English and the French elements of the language into the national speech of England. It should not take so long now.

Only on condition that efforts are made so to settle the language question do I see any chance of satisfactorily meeting the second difficulty, that of character. Government has already done much. All processes and notifications—all documents, in fact destined for service outside cities—are in Nagri, and all petitions may be presented in that character. If further, the order of the Magistrate were always transliterated, when required, from Urdu into Nagri, probably every need of suitors would be satisfied. But it is not the needs of suitors that have prompted the present petition. It is the needs

of that body of Hindus whose education does not fit them for the public service. And they are too numerous for their claims to be lightly set aside.

I should think it a very hazardous experiment definitely to substitute Hindi for Urdu as the language of the courts. The temporary block to public business would be a small matter compared with the political danger involved in the disaffection of a class of men, about whom the complaint already is that their means of living are too scanty. The Mahomedans in fact would be ousted from public employ. But the same principle of fairness to them suggests a course which might possibly be pursued in the interest of the large body of Hindus. Mr. Bayley says that all the Persian-writing amlahs have been required to pass an examination in Hindi; is it too much to require that Brahman and other Nagri-writing candidates for employment should pass (an examination in Urdu)? It is, no doubt, too much as matters stand; for we see that with the exception of the facile Kayasth, no Hindu will now submit to learn a foreign language, as the Urdu of the courts is. But if Government strives to identify the language of the courts with the ordinary language of educated men, to make it a language as much Hindi as Urdu, and fitly adapted to either character, the Hindu aspirant would in such case have only to learn a new character in which to write his own language—a very different and much more simple matter.

If all candidates for employment above the lowest were required to be equally familiar with two characters (and to such an end ought our school education to be directed), and if consequently, both were used indiscriminately in official writing, it might not happen that one would drive out the other. Nagri undoubtedly take more time and more room, but the same objection might be urged against English; and if for other reasons it is convenient to write it, it will be written. It might be conjectured indeed, that the forces of numbers would gradually make itself felt and that Nagri would prevail; but even if not, is there any serious objection to the use in courts of two characters side by side? They exist in fact already, for Kaithi accounts are filed with Urdu plaints, and have to be interpreted by irresponsible experts. But whatever the objection, it could not weigh against advantages on the other side; for it is evident that the friction produced by the contact of two characters would rub down the harsh points peculiar to each, whether Persian or Sanskrit. By the ordinary reaction of character upon language, the conflict of Nagri with Urdu would go far to produce the kind of compromise that we desire. A document that has to be written indiscriminately in one of two characters, will not often bear marks of special alliance with either.

"From S. C. Bayley, Esq., Commissioner of the Patna Division, to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal Judicial Department No. 1821, dated Bankipur the 20th May 1875.

In returning herewith the Nagri pamphlet received with your memorandum No. 101T, of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to submit as follows:—

2. The pamphlet purports to be a petition from some of the residents of Patna and Bhagalpur, addressed to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, showing the superiority of the Nagri character to the Persian, and the Hindi

language to the Hindustani, and praying that the order of the late Lieutenant Governor, directing the introduction of the Nagri character into the courts and Government offices in Behar, may be carried out and maintained in force.

3. The following considerations are urged in support of the above petition and prayer :

1st.—The anti-Nagri party call Hindi a rude language, having neither a literature nor grammar. This cannot be true, as Hindi is a branch of the Sanskrit, which is, according to the principal English and German scholars, such as Professor Max Muller, Haug, Goldstucker, Wilson Colebrooke, &c. the best language in the world, all the other languages, Greek, Latin, Arabic, Persian, being derived from it. How can, then such a language be unfit for the transaction of court business?

2nd.—It is objected to Nagri that it cannot be written quickly. This is merely a question of practice.

3rd.—Nagri can be mastered in three or four months while Hindustani cannot be learnt so easily. Even the best Persian scholar cannot read an official paper without one or two years practice in reading Persian manuscripts.

4th.—Nagri is better adapted for transliteration than Persian, e.g. "Revenue Board," "First Arts Course," &c.

5th.—The Persian characters can be altered with much great facility than Nagri and hence it affords greater temptation to fraudulent tampering with documents.

6th.—Nagri is used in the transaction of all kinds of business in Nepal, Nagpur, and the Commissioner's office at Almora,—a fact which proves that there is no defect in it.

7th.—True, the Nagri takes a little more space in writing than Hindustani, but this defect cannot weigh against the many considerations in favour of the use of Nagri, which is the vernacular of Behar throughout the Provinces.

4. I fully agree in the petitioners' view that Nagri can be and should be gradually introduced into the courts and offices of Behar. On this subject I submitted a report to Government in October 1873, from which it will be seen that Nagri has been pretty extensively introduced into the districts of this division, and that all process notifications, proclamations, &c., and all Police reports, diaries, and registers are written in that character. The court amlahs also were made to pass examinations in the Nagri character and language, and they are now conducting their duties with tolerable facility in it. The change, however, is steadily opposed by this class of people, who, as Kyests or Mussalmans, have almost a monopoly of the court language, and consequently of the court places.

5. This opposition is not without its effect on their superiors at the head of offices, who unconsciously imbibe their prejudices, and it requires persevering and steady pressure from above to get the reform carried out. There is to my mind no more reason for having in Behar a court language other than Hindi, than there is in Bengal for having one other than Bengali. The introduction of Bengali as the court language in Bengal was, I have been told, strongly opposed at the time. Now no one ventures to suggest that it was not an improvement.

6. The law papers of the present day, written in so-called Hindustani, differ very little from those of the time when Persian was the avowed language of the courts. Inflexions and auxiliary verbs are Hindustani, but the body of the document consists still of the largest Arabic words, that the mookhtear who compiles it can attain, and it is absolutely unintelligible to any but the specially educated classes. Hindi is the language of the people, the language in which accounts, zemindari business, private business, and, as a rule private communications by letter are conducted; and why the courts should continue to use an absolutely artificial language, which has, to counter-balance all its disadvantages, only the one advantage of being more rapidly written, and more easily miswritten and misread, I cannot understand.

“From Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, to Junior Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Oudh, dated Lucknow, the 28th March 1876, No. 3704 of 1875-76.

In reply to your endorsement No. 5500, dated Lucknow 24th November 1875, I have the honour to communicate my views on the question of the

No. 841, dated 27th January, 1876, from the Inspector, Eastern Circle.

No. 1746, dated 25th February, 1876, from the Inspector, Western Circle.

adoption of Hindi as the court language of Oudh. In connection with the same subject, I beg to enclose copies of the letter noted in the margin from the two Circle Inspectors. I regret the delay which has occurred in sending up my views on the subject, but it will be seen from the dates of the Inspectors' letter enclosed, that an earlier submission of the former was hardly possible.

2. Whatever may be the right answer to the question under discussion, it seems important not to overlook the motive which appears to have prompted the Behar and similar petitions. This motive, as Mr. Thomson has pointed out in para. 2 of his letter, has nothing to do with the convenience of suitors, the welfare of the majority, or the superior fitness of the one language over the other; but consist in the desire of Bengalis to be more extensively employed than at present in the Urdu speaking provinces of India. Something to the same effect appears to be implied in Mr. Croft's remarks at the close of the 3rd paragraph in page 3 of his memorandum. It is easy to see the connection between the contents of the petition and the motive which dictated it. The transliterated extract from the petition, with which Mr. Croft has favoured us, is a specimen of the kind of language which, under the name of Hindi, it is proposed to substitute for Urdu in the up-country courts. This is certainly what is meant by Hindi in this part of India whenever the Hindi language is spoken of in contrast with Urdu; and this too is the language of Prem Sagar, the Purans generally, Bhoj Prabandhar, and in fact of all classical Hindi books. Now the vocabulary of this language is, with very rare exceptions, nothing more than Sanskrit, so much so that one who, like myself, has made a study of Sanskrit, but not of Hindi, can read and understand any Hindi book with facility. But the vocabulary of the Bengali language is as much derived from Sanskrit as that of Hindi, and the consequence is that the acquisition of Hindi is not merely as easy, but considerably easier, to a native of Bengal than to

a native of Hindustan. It is not likely therefore, that this continually revived question of substituting Hindi for Urdu in the up-country courts, will be allowed to drop, so long as the English Schools and Colleges of Bengal continue to turn out about 2,000 men per annum, eager for employment in Government offices, but unable to find it in their own overstocked country.

3. If, however, the question is to be considered on its own merits, that is, with reference to the wants of the people of Oudh, then it is necessary to observe the distinction to which Mr. Croft draws attention between language and character. The former, it is needless to say, refers only to vocabulary, the latter only to the form of writing. The Behar petitioners wish to introduce not merely the Hindi, that is, the Sanskrit vocabulary but also the Hindi, that is, the Nagri character. This is, of course, not one, but two questions; but the Behar petitioners have preferred to treat it as one, knowing that the use of the Nagri character would be likely to bring in with it the use of Sanskrit vocabulary.

4. The first question then is, should the Hindi language be substituted for Urdu in the Government courts of Oudh? To this there can be but one answer. Barring the grammatical inflections, which are the same in Hindi as in Urdu, the Hindi language as defined above is extinct in this province. Some persons doubt whether in this highly elaborate form it was ever spoken at all by the illiterate masses. But however this may be there can be no question now that what is distinctively known as the Hindi vocabulary or language,—such, for instance, as that used in the Behar petition, is not the kind of speech used at the present day by the people of Oudh either in towns or villages. During my five years' service in Bengal, I heard so much about the claims of the neglected Hindi language, that I came into Oudh with a mind imbued with the belief that the Urdu language so widely taught in the Oudh Schools was one foreign to the masses, and especially to the village population. But since I have had time to become better acquainted with the vernacular of this province, I have found out my mistake. Take the first clause in the first sentence of our first Hindi Reader, *Pratyek balak ko uchit hai*, and repeat this aloud in any village; not a single villager would understand it. He might detect the grammatical forms of *ko* and *hai*, which are the same in Hindi as in Urdu, but the words *Pratyek balak uchit* are obsolete and unintelligible. Now take the Urdu equivalent to the above sentence, as it is given in our First Urdu Reader. *Harek larke ko chahiye* and repeat this aloud in a village; every villager would understand it at once. Illustrations might be multiplied. *Bahudha*, being derived from Sanskrit, is a highly correct Hindi term for often, and consequently it occurs very frequently in Hindi Books. No one, however, but a Pandit or a pedant has the faintest idea what *bahudha* means while the corresponding Urdu term *aksar*, which is derived from Arabic, is understood and used by every villager. In a word, substitute unthorough foresomeness of stuff, as Mr. Croft suggests, for impenetrability of matter, and we have an unexaggerated description of the absurdity of the proposal to substitute Hindi for Urdu in Government courts, that is, to substitute an obsolete vocabulary for one which every one understands and uses. When it is remembered that all the vernacular news and all the vernacular periodicals

published in Oudh are in Urdu, and none in Hindi, there cannot be much doubt as to what the vernacular of this country really is.

5. But in thus declaring that Urdu, and not Hindi is the vernacular spoken by the people of Oudh, I do not mean to say that the Kind of Urdu used at present in court documents coincides as nearly as it could and should do with the spoken vernacular, that is, with that kind of phraseology, which every man of fair education, whether Hindu or Mohammedan, can at once understand. To make this point more clear it is necessary to distinguish between the technical terms of law or civil business, and the phraseology in which the body of court documents is couched. To express technical conceptions the use of uncolloquial terms is necessary; and if the choice lies between using terms of Perso-Arabic or terms of Sanskrit origin, preference should certainly be given to the former, not merely because they answer the purpose, and are already in possession, which alone is a conclusive reason, but because they are shorter, more convenient and more easily fixed in the memory than terms derived from Sanskrit would be: (Vide remarks in para 8 of Mr. Thomson's letter). But to express ordinary facts and ideas, such as form the untechnical portion of the matter of court documents, the use of Perso-Arabic terms, which are not understood by the general public and are intelligible only to those who have received a special education, is altogether indefensible. These foreign Persian phrases are as far removed from the spoken vernacular, as the absolute Hindi vocabulary of the Behar petitioners; and as long as such language continues to be used in the body of court documents, it affords a pretext to the Nagri party to reiterate their claims for the introduction of Hindi. Some reform in this respect appears to be urgently needed on behalf of suitors and the general public. It is also needed on behalf of vernacular education, for in order to satisfy the requirements of the Oudh court vocabulary, we are forced to teach more Persian in our Primary and Middle Schools than we find convenient, and to teach it at the expense of imparting useful knowledge more efficiently than we might do. If therefore some means could be adopted for repressing the unnecessary use of Perso-Arabic or outlandish terms in the body of court documents, and for insisting on the use of Hindustani terms in general use, whenever these are sufficient to express the facts or ideas intended, a great reform would be effected, and much good would be done both in Schools and Courts. Possibly one way of repressing the use of outlandish Jargon would be to reject petitions which are not worded in the vernacular; but any reform of this kind will of course be steadily resisted by that class of professional writers, whose means of livelihood depends upon the preservation of a language which no one but themselves can understand without the help of an interpreter.

6. The second question proposed is, what kind of character should be used in the writing and printing of court documents? Before attempting to answer this question, it will be best first to enquire what are the different kinds of writing in vogue in this province. Of Persian writing therefore of course two kinds, Nastaliq and Shikasta, and the latter is the one used in the Government courts. Besides these there are three others: (1) Nagri, or the Old Sanskrit character, which the Behar petitioners wish to introduce in the place

of Shikasta ; (2) Kaithi, which is a form of writing something like Nagri, but yet so far distinct from it, that a person knowing only the one is incapable of reading the other ; (3) Mahajani, which differs from Kaithi, in that the letters are more rounded and the vowels are omitted. No further allusion will be made to Mahajani, as the omission of the vowels renders it almost unintelligible, and the only class of men by whom it is used is that of bankers.

7. Now then it is proposed, as is done in the Behar petition, to put the Persian character altogether aside, and substitute the Nagri in its place, the question arises, what class in the community or in other words what proportion of the population, would be benefited thereby ? So far as Oudh is concerned it seems to me that the answer is a very simple one. Since there is no class in the community, not even Brahmins, who transact matters of business, either public or private, in the Nagri character, it obviously follows that there is no class in the community which could receive any benefit from the change. Nagri writing is never used by the people. For business matters even Brahmins do not use it, but only for copying out Sanskrit manuscripts. Nagri writing is taught in Government schools certainly in Oudh, as elsewhere, but why it is taught I have never been able to understand, and it is well known that the boys immediately give it up as soon as they leave school. If then the choice lies between the Persian and the Nagri character, I think no one can hesitate to select the former. There seems in fact as little reason for introducing Nagri writing as for introducing Chinese. There is no Government who can write a Nagri running hand ; none of the outside public can write it, or wish to write it, very few of the outside public can read it. No native of Oudh, that I have ever heard of, desires the change. In fact, the Nagri character is one which scarcely admits of being written in a running hand, and this fact alone is a decisive proof of its unfitness for being used as the court character. In disproof of the truth of this objection, the Behar petitioners appeal to the stock instance of the facility with which Nagri penmanship is practised in the Almore Commissioner's court. But Munshi Durga Prasada, the Inspector of the Western Circle, has examined specimens of this writing on the spot, and found them so unlike what is usually known as Nagri, that he was quite unable to read them.

8. But in thus condemning altogether the proposal to substitute the Nagri for the Persian character, I still think that the use of an alternative character should be permitted and encouraged, and this not because there is any other character which is better than Persian, but because the convenience of that large section of the native community, which cannot read or write the Persian character, and does not intend to learn it, seems to me to be entitled to some consideration. This second court character should, in my opinion, be not Nagri but Kaithi. Kaithi is the character used by all or almost all Zemindars, who can write any character at all, by all tradesmen and shopkeepers of every grade and description, by Taluqdars accountants, by Patwaris, by Mahomedans as much as by Hindus. In fact there is no kind of writing which has so many followers and is used by so many different classes of the community as Kaithi. It is to the rural population what the Persian character is to the

town population, and even among the residents of towns it disputes the ground with Persian, because it is universally used by tradesmen and shopkeepers. Why Kaithi writing has up to the present time been systematically proscribed by the State, is a point which I have never been able to understand. Possibly this may have been owing to the jealousy of court mohurrirs, who were already in possession of the field and whose livelihood depended upon keeping Kaithi out of court. Possibly it may have been owing to a belief that this character was nothing more than a form of Nagri scribbling, which, under the name of Kaithi, encouraged bad spelling and bad penmanship and was therefore quite unfit to be used as a medium for transacting Government or any other important business. But the best answer to this is, that all the private business of the natives of Hindustan, which they by no means consider to be unimportant, is carried on in Kaithi, and as to bad spelling and bad penmanship, it is obvious that these are simply the consequences of its being universally neglected both in schools and offices. These would of course disappear if Kaithi were taught in Government schools, and if neatness and accuracy were insisted on. In the Kaithi character there is a couple set of consonants as in Nagri, and as complete a set of vowels also, except that in the case of the single vowels one form has to do double duty for long and short. This slight defect could easily be remedied if necessary. In any case this Kaithi character, notwithstanding its long neglect by Government, is to this day as complete an alphabet and as fit to be patronised by the State as the Bengali character was at the time when the Serampur Missionaries first took it in hand. These Missionaries finding that there was a character already in common vogue and as widely used by the different castes or classes in Bengal as the Kaithi character is in Hindustan, wisely determined upon adopting the Bengali character in preference to the Nagri as the vehicle of popular instruction. As they had the start of the Government in opening schools and publishing vernacular books, the Bengali character which they had patronized and reduced to proper form was admitted unchallenged into Government schools and finally into Government courts. Such was the fate of the Bengali character, and the consequence has been that in Bengal no collision between two rival characters, Nagri and Bengali, the one patronized by the State and the other used by the people, has appeared, such as we see now existing in Oudh and elsewhere between Nagri and Kaithi. The Kaithi character has received a very different treatment, though its claims, uses, and popularity are precisely similar. It has found no friends but only enemies, has been systematically condemned by Educational Departments, and jealously kept out of court by a class of writers whose only means of subsistence depended upon their being able to exclude it. There is not denying the fact, however, that in spite of all this official neglect or rather opposition, the Kaithi character is still the most popular mode of writing in Hindustan, and is used to this day as much as ever in the transaction of private business. The persistent determination of Government to put down Kaithi and compel the people to use Nagri, appears to me as inexplicable as would be an attempt on the part of the Prime Minister in England to force every one in that country to write in the Roman printed character and to discontinue the use of the script character. If such an attempt were made

in England, it would no doubt fail as signally as the attempts to supersede Kaithi have failed in India.

9. If, then, there is any character besides Persian which ought to be used in the writing of court documents, that character, I urge, should be Kaithi, and not Nagri ; because while the Nagri character is used by no one, the Kaithi, and not the one used by tradesmen and agriculturists, and these are not only the two largest sections of the native community, but they are the two who are brought most frequently into contact with the Government courts. And from what I can learn of the present usages of courts in Oudh, the proposed introduction of Kaithi as an optional or second character would be no great novelty. Kaithi accounts I understand are already permitted to be filed with Urdu complaints ; Patwari's annual papers are filed in Kaithi, and Extra Assistant Commissioners, I have heard, are required to be able to read Kaithi as one of their official qualifications. It would, I should think, be conferring a great boon upon the public, if orders were passed that all processes and notices should be written in Kaithi as well as in Persian, if suitors might be allowed to present petitions in either character, and if the orders of Magistrates were, when occasion required, transliterated from Persian to Kaithi. Such a change could not of course be completed at once ; but the time for its completion would not be far distant, if a rule were made and enforced that in future no clerk could be appointed to a Government office who could not write the Oudh vernacular with equal facility and correctness in both characters.

10. It remains to consider the question to which attention is directed in the Home Secretary's letter, namely, what amount of help the Educational Department can afford towards furthering the objection of diminishing the antagonism between Hindi and Urdu, and fostering and extending the common element. Respecting this subject, I shall first state what the tendency of our present school-books appears to be, and then indicate the means by which the above object can probably be best secured.

11. At present we have two sets of vernacular school-books, the one Hindi and the other Urdu. The Urdu Prose Readers were written first, and the Hindi Readers are translations from these. The language in which the Urdu Readers have been composed is the language understood and spoken by the people. They in fact represent the Hindustani language as written or printed in the Persian character. The first of these readers is called *Talim-ul-mubtadi* ; and the care with which it was prepared and the trouble which was taken to exclude every word or idiom which the commonest village would not be able to understand at once, have been described at length by Mr. Thomson in para 8 of his letter. The other Urdu books deal occasionally with subjects which do not come within the ordinary experience of villagers : hence technical terms and proper names occur here and there, which might at first sound rather strange to the villager's ear. But the phraseology used in the body of these books is almost as strictly vernacular as the language of *Talim-ul-mubtadi*, or at least it could with very little labour be made so. In our Urdu Prose Readers then we have a correct representation of the Hindustani language, which every man in Oudh understands and speaks. The Hindi books, on the other hand, are of quite different stamp. These contain not

the vernacular Hindustani, but the obsolete Sanskrit, which the Behar petitioners wish to introduce into the Government Courts and against which Mr. Croft has protested with so much ability in page 2 of his memorandum. Both of the Directors who have preceded me in Oudh have followed the example of the North Western and other Provinces in prescribing books of this stamp for the use of those students who do not wish to learn the Persian, character. I myself have followed in their wake, not daring even to hint at proposing such a startling innovation as the suppression of a series of school-books, which while professing to teach the village population how to read and write their own vernacular, do in reality teach them neither, but teach them a phraseology which no one speaks, and a character which no one write. But as we are now called upon by the Supreme Government to give up the use of books which tend to keep up "the Antagonism between Urdu and Hindi," and are forbidden "to foster in Government or Aided Schools, under the name of Hindi, and artificial Sanskritized language which is in most cases as far removed from the common rustic vernacular as it is from the ordinary language of towns," I feel no longer authorized to keep silence, but am forced to confess the truth, that the Hindi school-books used in Oudh come fully up to the description of those books which we are warned not to use. But if we are forbidden to teach a vocabulary which is not used by the people in ordinary life, we are, by the same argument, forbidden to teach them a kind of writing which is no less obsolete than the vocabulary. The consistent course then to be followed under these circumstances would be (a) to remove our elementary Hindi Prose Readers from the curriculum, reserving the study of classical Hindi literature for the higher classes only, as an optional course for the study of Urdu or Persian poetry in the same classes; (b) to have our Hindustani or Urdu Prose Readers transliterated from the Persian into the Kaithi character, so that some students may learn to read their spoken vernacular in the one character and some in the other, accordingly to their respective tastes; (c) to discontinue the teaching of Nagri writing, and to teach Kaithi writing in its place. The very sight of the Nagri character tends to perpetuate the antagonism between Urdu and Hindi, and to give an undue prominence to words of Sanskrit origin, on account of the long standing and almost resistless association existing between the Nagri character and the Sanskrit vocabulary. No such association, however, exists between Kaithi and Sanskrit. On the contrary, there is a counter association already established between the Kaithi character and the Hindustani vocabulary, and this is an additional argument for having Kaithi taught in our schools.

12. I shrink, however, from recommending the adoption of these changes, untill the Chief Commissioner shall have been pleased to make me informed of the changes, if any, which he decides on introducing as to the characters and languages to be used in Government Courts. The changes which I have ventured to propose for consideration, so far as the Courts are concerned, are the following:—

(1) To adopt some means for repressing the present practice of using outlandish or Persianized phrases and idioms in the body of court documents.

whenever Hindustani words in common use are sufficient to express the facts or ideas intended ; retaining, however, the use of Perso-Arabic words for the expression of the Technical ideas of law or civil business.

(2) To allow the use of Kaithi as a second character in the issuing of court processes and notices, in the submission of petitions to be filed in court, and in the writing out of the Magistrate's orders.

(3) To prescribe such tests of qualification for employment in Government Offices, as shall ensure that all clerks to be hereafter appointed can write with equal facility in both characters.

13. It appears to me that the above measures, or something resembling them, present the only means available for satisfying the wants and conveniences of all classes of suitors, for diminishing the antagonism between Hindi and Urdu, and for putting an end to the hitherto endless discussion as to the respective claims of the different languages and characters to be used in the Government courts. If some such measures were adopted, the popularity and general usefulness of our vernacular schools would become far greater than they are or ever can be under the existing circumstances, for it would put an end to the ceaseless and mischievous rivalry between Nagri and Kaithi, the former of which is patronized by the State, but still not used by the people, while the latter is used by the people, but still not countenanced by the State. But there are many officers in Oudh, who are far better judges than myself, as to what languages or characters should be used in the Government courts, and as soon as I have been favoured with the Chief Commissioner's orders on the subject, I shall call a Committee to consist of the most intelligent and experienced officers of the Department, who, with myself and the Inspectors, will decide what changes, if any, may be found necessary in order to bring our curriculum into full harmony with the new requirements of the Government's courts.

From A. Thomson, Esquire, Inspector of Schools, Eastern Circle, Oudh, to John C. Nesfield, Esquire, M.A. Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, dated Camp Utraula, the 27th January 1876, No. 841.

With reference to your No. 2628, dated 7th ultimo, I have the honour to offer the following remarks on the use of Hindi as the Court language of Oudh.

2. The real question involved in the Behar petition and similar documents is, as I believe, very simple. It is just this, shall greater facility be given to Bengalis for obtaining Government employment in the North Western Provinces, Oudh, and the Punjab Bengalis have better opportunities for learning English than up-countrymen have and their superior knowledge of English would enable them to obtain employment more extensively if they know the vernacular of the Upper Provinces also. This knowledge is at present by no means easy to acquire. A foreign character, the Persian, has to be learned, and then there is the ever-recurring difficulty of the Arabic technicalities. The Hindi characters and the Sanskrit technicalities are so similar to those of Bengal, that Bengalis imagine they could learn Hindi easily and so fit themselves for the vernacular, as well as the English part of the work in Government offices in the Upper Provinces. I cannot say,

however, that I see any necessity for introducing such a change on such grounds.

3. There is an ambiguity in the use of the word "language" to which I must here draw attention. We sometimes use the words "different languages" to signify forms of speech, the one of which will not be understood by those who speak the other without special and generally protracted study. It is in this sense we use the word when we say the Bengali is a different language from the Persian; but we also say e.g. that Charles Lamb's language is very different from that used by Dr. Johnson, though quite aware that any one who understands the Essays of Elia would understand Rasselas. Now Urdu and Hindi do not differ as Persian differs from Bengali. They are simply the city and rustic forms of one and the same language, the Hindustani. So far as my experience goes, the language of Patna differs very slightly from that of Delhi or Lucknow; but the language of Lucknow differs considerably from that of a village in Gonda district, only 50 miles off. Still the Lucknow Munshi and the village Zemindar have no difficulty in understanding each other.

4. Hindustani consists of two elements, the Sanskrit and the Perso-Arabic; and the question is, in what proportion should these elements be combined, or rather in what proportion do the people of Oudh combine them in ordinary conversation? I believe I have already completely answered this question. About eight years ago I began to prepare a series of Vernacular Readers, one of which was finished and published under the name of *Talim-ul-mubtadi*. My object was to prepare a book in language such as correct speakers throughout the Province use in daily conversation. From the labour I bestowed on the work, and from the ability of those who assisted me, I have little hesitation in saying that it is as good a representation of the speech of Oudh as can be made. In regard to every sentence, I might almost say every word, the question was asked again and again, is there any form of expression in more general use than the one we have adopted? Afterwards a Hindi version of *Talim-ul-mubtadi* was brought out under the name of *Shikshavali*. The translator is not an extreme Hindi purist, yet his language differs much more widely from the ordinary speech of Oudh than the language of *Talim-ul-mubtadi*, which has always been called Urdu. Take a dozen ploughmen or cartmen from any village of Oudh and read over to them the same lesson in *Talim-ul-mubtadi* and *Shikshavali*, I have no hesitation in saying the Urdu version will be decidedly better understood than the Hindi version.

5. From this it is clear that the language used by the Behar petitioners is unknown in Oudh, and in my humble opinion we may stick to the language we have, as it answers our purpose very well.

6. There are two other questions to be considered, viz. 1st, in what character should this Hindustani be written? and 2nd, taking the language of the people for ordinary purposes from what source are we to get new words and technical terms?

7. In Oudh we generally in courts always use the Persian character. There is no reason, however, why the Nagri should not be used; but I confess

I do not see what would be gained by the change. Nagri is said to be easier to read, but I suspect there is no great advantage on either side. School boys, learn to read the Persian character as readily as the Nagri. And for my own part I find the Ramayan, when printed without spaces between the words, as puzzling as the Gulistan. When the words are separated the Nagri becomes much easier. But there is no reason why words should not be printed separately in the Persian character, and indeed this has been done in several cases in the Punjab. Shikast writing is often extremely difficult to read ; but though English is the most distinct script character in the world, many English officers write a hand as bad as Shikast Persian. In such a case there is no use of complaining of the character. Such scribblers, whether English, Urdu, or Nagri should be put upon leave without pay until they learn to write whatever character they use, legibly ; and the evil would soon be remedied. On the whole, therefore I do not see that the Nagri character has any great advantage over the Persian ; but I think it is very desirable that in Public Records both should be gradually superseded by the Roman character. Were the Roman characters used, neither the Sanskrit element nor the Perso-Arabic would be at a disadvantage; and the Hindustani language would be formed, as it should be, by the survival of the fittest words.

8. Our technical terms, legal, scientific &c., are Arabic, and I think it is well they should for the most part remain so. Where simple Hindustani terms can be formed, such as those used in the books brought out in Patna under Dr. Fallon's auspices, by all means adopt them ; but if we must go to a foreign source. Arabic has advantages over either the Sanskrit used in Bengal or the Greek used in Europe. In Arabic words never can be long, while both Sanskrit and Greek words may, and sometimes are, of an inconvenient length. Again the root in Arabic is so prominent that one sees the history of the word at a glance, and thus the word is thoroughly impressed on the memory. I believe any one who has had practice in using all the three, will admit that Arabic terms are more easily kept in mind than either Sanskrit or Greek terms. I am therefore of opinion that in Upper India we should adhere to Arabic technicalities.

"From the Inspector of Schools, Western Circle, Oudh, to the Director of Public Instruction, Oudh, dated Lucknow the 25th February 1876, No. 1746.

In acknowledgement of your No. 3148, dated the 8th instant, and No. 3317, dated the 24th idem, I have the honour to inform you that I quite concur with Mr. A. W. Croft, Inspector of Schools, in thinking that the court language should be the common Hindustani Boli, free as far as possible from Arabic Persian, and Sanskrit words, and so simple as to be well adapted to be written either in Urdu or Nagri characters. Now this end cannot be attained unless the Nagri character be introduced in courts, and as it is worth while I think to encourage the introduction of that character into courts, for reasons adduced by Mr. S. C. Bayley, Commissioner of the Patna Division, steps should, I think, be taken to encourage the introduction of the Nagri character into the Oudh courts ; also by having the printed and lithographed documents, such as Summons, Dakhilas, &c., in both the Urdu and Nagri characters, and by ordering the Amlah people to try and learn how to read and write Nagri."

also. It may be possible then by and by to have the court papers written in the Urdu or the Nagri character as suggested by Mr. A. W. Croft, Inspector of Schools.

The enclosure of the docket I have alluded to is herewith returned."

NANDALAL CHATTERJI.

The Agency Houses in Bengal.

(II)

THE victory of the Shipping Interest in 1802 brought about a crisis in the mercantile and shipping world of Bengal. Between 1781 and 1800 no less than thirty-five ships had been built at Calcutta—totalling 17,020 tons. In 1801 and 1802, alone, under Wellesley's encouraging policy, another twenty-nine ships of 14,535 tons had been added. The Court's letter of 16 June, 1802, however, pricked the balloon of this speculation. Between 1803 and 1806 an average of 3774 tons were constructed per year—just sufficient for the expanding country trade and the ordinary wear and tear.⁽¹⁾ No tenders were offered in 1803 for building ships according to the stringent terms laid down by the Court.

The private traders had to look elsewhere than in direct trade with London for remittance of their fast growing income from military contracts, the opium trade and Government securities. The Fairlies had monopolised the elephant, bullock and victualling contracts of the Bengal army.⁽²⁾ They were also the agents of one Andrew Kelso who got the contract for army clothing.⁽³⁾ Fortification contracts went to Lambert and Ross.⁽⁴⁾ Others had a lesser share in this Wellesley war-boom but everyone had prospered from the high interest on war loans. The largest source of profit, however, was the country trade in opium. Exports to China leapt up from S.R. 38,64,597 in 1802-3 to S.R. 70,79,641 in 1805-6 of which S.R. 32,94,370 was in opium. Opium also formed the major item of export to Pulo Penang and the coast of Sumatra.⁽⁵⁾

When war and high freight prevented this profit from being carried to London, the private capitalists tried to send it through the foreign European and American channels. This can be statistically proved from the excess of the Portuguese, Danish and American exports over imports. In 1803-4 the American exports exceeded their average between 1795 and 1802 by as much as 70%. The Americans had been, as before, abusing their neutral position since the renewal of the Anglo-French War in 1803 and transgressing the provisions of the loosely worded Jay Treaty. The cases of the *Harmony*, the *Astrea* and the *Brigantine Hazard* bore ample evidence of the American illicit trade between Serampore, Batavia, Malay and the Continental Europe. It was through the Americans that a large share of the profits of the coastal

(1) John Phipps, *History of Ship-building in Calcutta etc.*, pp. 126-27.

(2) G.-G. in C. to Court (Military) 18 August 1794, 31 January 1795, 1 February 1796.

(3) G.-G. in C. to Court (Military) 29 August, 1799.

(4) G.-G. in C. to Court (Military) 20 March, 1795.

(5) *Bengal Commercial Reports*, 1802-3 to 1805-6.

trade was being remitted to London. Messrs. Fairlie, Gilmore & Co.'s name was again being mentioned in this connection. The Court wanted to know why they had been allowed to remove to Calcutta 440 bales of piecegoods lying in the godowns of Serampore if they did not really own them.

The Government offered the private capitalists a more lucrative field of investment than indigo and a safer medium of remittance than the neutral channels. By 1801 the greater part of the public loans, contracted since 1798 for the prosecution of war, had been transferred to the European hands. The principals of the decennial loans of 1798 and 1799 were payable in bills at 15 months date at 2s. 6d. the Sicca rupee. Though only the interest on the first 8% loans of 1799 was payable in bills, the second 8% loan of 1800 promised both interest and principal in that medium. Now that the private capitalists were seeking frantically for profitable channels of remittance, Wellesley started the Maratha War. A series of optional loans were floated at 8% the holders of which could demand bills on account of both interest and principal at any time. They could ask for no better terms. These assured them a handy and lucrative investment, marketable at a premium whenever needed in India and readily remittable to England when the medium of trade ceased to be profitable. Everybody in Calcutta was happy. The Court had forbidden such loans foreseeing troubles which could arise from large unexpected demands on the home treasury at a period when returns from trade were uncertain. It had even sent to India a plan for transfer of debt, devised by Dundas in his last year of office and modified by Castlereagh, his successor at the India Board. Wellesley, however, bent upon the total annihilation of the Marathas and nursing an implacable hatred of the Court, which had ignominiously rejected his plan of sending India-built shipping, disregarded all instructions and went on floating optional loans to finance the Maratha War. Once again imperial expansion became the most profitable field of investment and means of remittance of private capital and its fruits.

Ever since its tussle with Wellesley over the question of private trade the Court had been suspicious of his intentions and critical of his policies. It refused to believe with him that prosperity lay round the corner of the next military triumph. In deep dismay it saw the Maratha War frustrate its plan of debt-transfer, hamper its design of reviving its monopoly (by curtailing the investment) and cause the rapid rise of optional loans, which helped the private capitalists at its expense, without any immediate increase of revenue. From a business man's point of view the expansion of the empire must either justify itself in terms of larger investment and larger dividends or be given up as a ruinous luxury. His vision seemed to be empty, his dream illusory, in the context of the rise of the India debt from £11 millions to over £28 millions in 7 years. Financially and commercially his administration proved too costly for the Company to be continued. He was recalled.

Cornwallis was sent to put things right as he had once done before. But he died a few months after his arrival in India and Barlow succeeded him in October, 1805. Besides launching on a course of retrenchment, which Wellesley sneeringly attributed to a "determined spirit of penury", Barlow proposed three measures to bolster the Company's credit. These were import

of bullion from England, floating of an 8% loan and 10% treasury notes and establishment of a bank at Calcutta. All these measures, be it noted, would help the private capitalists. Apart from speculation, the exigencies of foreign trade and indigo manufacture often forced the agency houses to sell out public securities on a large scale whereby they as well as their creditors, the servants of the Company, suffered heavy losses. Import of bullion and the establishment of a bank would obviate the necessity for large scale sale of securities by increasing the quantity of money, facilitating the circulation thereof and providing for easy credit. The proposed issue of treasury notes would offer a field of investment for capital which had been accumulating due to stagnation of trade. It would also absorb the discredited treasury bills in which the agency houses had been for sometime forced to accept price of indigo or interest on public debt.

The Government was, however, compelled to take a measure, detrimental to the interests of the agency houses. The financial situation worsened in 1806 in spite of the arrival of bullion and the end of the Maratha war. 10% notes and loans alone totalled S.R. 3,45,19,000. Some sort of finding at a lower rate of interest was absolutely imperative if credit was to be stabilised and investment, which had fallen to as low a sum as 67 lakhs, was to be revived to its old level. Barlow meant to add to the resources of the agency houses. The policy of debt-funding, however, resulted in withdrawal of capital from India and depletion of their very slender resources.

The creditors were affected by this attempt of the Government to fund 10% loans at 8%. They exacted in return the option to transfer the principal to England by bills at a greatly reduced sight. Bengal got rid of her cumbrous floating debt at a stroke but only at the expense of the home treasury. Minto's regime saw the full working out of this disastrous process. Funding started a sort of chain reaction. More funding meant more bills on the Court and more bills could be paid by more returns from India i.e. larger investment. When Bengal failed to send that, the home-treasury could not stand the intolerable strain. The Company had to ask the Cabinet for financial assistance almost every year since 1806, which inevitably led to the Parliamentary investigations of 1808-12 and the ultimate abolition of its India monopoly.

The private capitalists would not have exercised their option to demand bills on account of the principal, had trade been prosperous and remittance to London, in commercial channel, free and profitable. Renewed war with France and her allies and the Company's restrictive policy made this impossible. It was the difference of the interest rates (9 to 10% in India and 5% in England) which had induced them so long to retain their principal in India and remit the interest in bills. Funding at lower rates, begun by Barlow and continued by Minto, now took away their only incentive to keep capital in India.

It was not merely stagnation of trade or the restrictive policy of the Company which stood in the way of commercial remittance. Bengal's productive powers were totally inadequate to cope with the vast sums of money annually remittable at this period on different accounts by the Governments as well as the private capitalists. Bengal had to provide for remittance of not only the

interest on public debt (6) but the private fortunes which arose from savings from salaries (7), profits from shipping, docks etc. (8), income from indigo-manufacture (9), rents of European-owned houses at Calcutta (10), and returns from the country and coastal trade. Had it not been for indigo, a large proportion of the Company's debt would have been transferred to England. But even indigo, the production of which rose sharply, could not cope with the demand for greater remittance. There was a normal rise in indigo-prices, following increased demand, which was further accentuated by the speculative dealings of the agency houses. Even persons, who did not hold any public securities, found it necessary to purchase them from the resident creditors with a view to exchange them for bills on the Court. In 1809-10 the Bengal Government drew bills on account of the principal of the India debt to the extent of £2,292,606 (11).

The only way open to the Court, if it seriously considered meeting this avalanche of bills, was to tighten its monopoly of Bengal trade. Unfortunately, all its exhortations for increase of investment in indigo, silk and cotton fell on deaf ears. These had already been gained by the private traders. John Palmer of Trail, Palmer & Co (later, from 1810—Palmer & Co.) was now the accredited spokesman of the Calcutta agency houses and in his letters, mercifully preserved in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, we get an idea of what our agency houses felt about the whole business. They favoured the purchase of indigo by the Company (which kept up the price) but not its purchase of silk and thought it (the Company) should better leave cotton speculations "to us poor Bengalese." (12) The Government confirmed their opinion that the channel of trade no longer afforded remittance to the Company and that facilities should be given them either to take country ships to London or to send goods indirectly through the Americans so that private remittance, now demanded in bills, could be diverted. In short the Court was given a lecture on the benefits of free trade and called upon to commit commercial suicide.

The Court's peremptory order in reply to send an enlarged investment or, if that was impossible, bullion, could not be carried out for four causes.

(6) Reckoned to be about £2 millions per year. G.G. in C. to Court (Fin.) 23 August, 1809.

(7) These had greatly increased with additions to the civil and military establishments.

(8) Declining since 1803 but showing a rise after 1809.

Year	Vessels built at Calcutta
1807—9	... 6,027 tons
1810—13	... 24,732 tons

Phipps, *History of Ship-Building in Calcutta* op. cit.

(9) About S.R. 76 lakhs worth of indigo was being exported annually by private merchants since 1805. Almost all Bengal districts now produced indigo under European management. See W. W. Hunter's *Bengal MS. Records* 4 vols. Dr. Buchanan Hamilton gives figures for Purnea, Patna, Gaya, Shahabad, Dinajpur and Rangpur.

(10) 20 lakhs per year, calculated on the basis of a 5 per cent house tax which yielded S.R. 1 lakh. G.G. in C. to Court (Fin.) 23 August, 1809.

(11) App. I, Second Report,

(12) John Palmer to George Millet, 14 December, 1809 *Palmer Papers*, Vol. 75, p. 50.

There was a renewal of American competition after the embargo had been lifted, there were further funding operations, the Government had to incur heavy expenses on account of Minto's expeditions to the French Islands (1810) and Java (1811) and, finally, there was a trade depression in England.

As indigo gave 2s. 6d. the sicca rupee where other bills fetched only 2s. 4d. the price of indigo shot up and American competition and low production increased it further (13). Cloth prices rose by 35% and silk, for long a rigid Government monopoly, could not be immediately extended. Bombay absorbed most of the available bullion and only about S.R. 40 lakhs could be sent in silver. Even this small exertion constricted the market and incensed the agency houses.

Next came funding, which enraged them still further. Interest on five millions at least was reduced to 6% (14). This measure resulted in another hectic transfer of the principal of India debt to England—amounting to no less than S.R. 4,79,12,755.

Expenses on expeditions to Mauritius in 1810 and Java in 1811 rose to £7 millions and drained away a large amount of the circulating capital from the market. Speculative commercial ventures to these regions accentuated the scarcity of capital and soon the rate of interest in the private market reached 12%. On top of this, incessant demands from their European constituents poured in on the agency houses. They began to sell out their stocks of securities which were consequently depressed. To preserve their value as well as to maintain the salt and opium revenues, the Government had to offer a loan of 25 lakhs to the agency houses and to allow some transfer of capital. Bullion was sent to the Court only with the proceeds of a new 6% loan but the bills on the Court once again amounted to S.R. 1,04,09,593. (15)

To make matters worse, England entered a period of trade depression. The South American boom had failed, Napoleon had ordered a more stringent application of the Continental System, and the Anglo-American War had broken out. The Courts' expectation of a larger investment could not materialise in these circumstances. The bullion sent by the Bengal Government was a veritable drop in the ocean. And the private traders were frantically praying for the end of the war and seeking for the end of the Company's monopoly which prevented the import of fresh capital from England to refill the depleted resources of the Bengal money-market.

The free-trade agitation of 1812-13 should be viewed in this context. The manufacturing interest, which had preferred to be neutral in the struggle between monopoly and free trade in 1802, was now in the throes of a slump and willingly joined hands with the free traders in their assault against the Company. Absorbed in trade with the American Continent, the northern ports had paid little attention to the widening prospects of the Oriental market. Manchester had not dared to challenge the supremacy of the Indian fabrics in their own home. Now everything was changed. The Embargo,

(13) Same to H. Trail, 3 October, 1809 *ibid*, Vol. 73, pp. 73-4.

(14) G.-G. in C. to Court (Fin.) 3 February, 1812.

(15) Same to same, 10 October, 1812.

followed by the Anglo-American War, made speculations for the American market uncertain and hazardous. Manchester rivalled the Indian cottons in fineness and outbid them in cost. No European competitor remained in India to disturb their peace and the British supremacy was wellnigh established in the Indian Ocean. The rapidly mounting coastal and country trade in and around India held out the hope that the East would redress the balance of the West and, absorbing the surplus produce of Britain, help her maintain the terrific pace of industrialization called forth by the wars and improvement of technique in the first decade of the nineteenth century.

In this adventure the Agency houses and the manufacturing interest were inevitable partners. The former required capital for trade as well as for development of Indian raw materials like indigo and cotton. The latter required an agency to capture old markets and to create new ones. A bargain was, therefore, struck in which the manufacturing interest undertook to supply the agency houses with capital in the form of finished goods and the agency houses undertook to sell them in India and abroad and to supply raw materials. The Company was their common enemy and against it both directed their heartiest broadsides in 1812-13. The Parliament was flooded with their petitions, the public with their pamphlets. Deputations were elected and committees formed to put pressure on the Cabinet ministers. They went as far as to say that . . . "the concession of a free trade to India alone and not to China, will be considered by merchants and manufacturers as a nugatory measure . . ." and in no uncertain terms threatened joint action in case the Perceval ministry's promise to open India trade was not kept.(16)

However true this general pattern may be, exceptions cut across it. The older and more substantial agency houses, like the Fairlies and the Palmers, looked askance at free trade agitation. William Fairlie gave evidence on behalf of the Company and in favour of its monopoly before the bar of the Lords.(17) John Palmer apprehended a chaotic competition in banking and indigo business once the trade was open.(18) They naturally feared a veritable deluge of fortune-hunters and a diminution of profits so long shared among the big few. Already the number of agency houses had risen from 16 in 1803 to 25 in 1812, and, of insurance companies from 6 to 11. Ship-owners like the Fairlies and the Palmers knew they would be helpless before the small and cheap ships of the British registry. A furious freight-cutting would ensue and bring country ships to ruin. But these were more or less private thoughts, secretly gnawing at the back of their minds. Scarcity of capital was the chief issue in 1812-13 and capital could only be had in the medium of manufactured goods. Herein lay the root of an uneasy but inevitable alliance between the manufacturing and commercial interests in Great Britain and the agency house interest in India. (To be continued)

AMALES TRIPATHI.

(16) Add. Mss. 38, 410ff, 81-84; f. 184.

(17) Evidence of William Fairlie, 6 April, 1813.

(18) John Palmer to George Millet, 14 December 1809 Palmer Papers op. cit., Vol. 75, p. 61.

The Koh-i-noor.

FROM THE MOTTEE MUNDEER TO THE BUCKINGHAM PALACE.

(Continued from previous issue)

II

DR. LOGIN'S DESCRIPTION OF THE FAMOUS TOSHAKHANA OF RANJEET SINGH.

IMMEDIATELY after his appointment as Superintendent of the famous Toshakhana (or Treasury) of Ranjeet Singh Dr. Login engaged himself in the removal of all the State jewels, with the help of Misr Makraj the old Treasurer of Ranjeet Singh, from the old Toshakhana to the Mottee Mundeer, and placed them there with various other valuable jewels, etc. under vigilant guards.

Misr Makraj after delivering over the Koh-i-noor to Dr. Login said—"the relief to his mind was great at being free of responsibility". He further added that "the Koh-i-noor had been the cause of so many deaths, having been fatal to so many of his own family that he never expected to be spared." (1)

Dr. Login followed the advice given to him by Misr Makraj—"when showing the jewel (Koh-i-noor) to visitors to keep it in his own hand with the ribbon cords that tied it as an armlet twisted round his fingers. It was still set, as before described, as an armlet, with a diamond on each side of the Koh-i-noor as a contrast of size." (2)

As Dr. Login walked through the famous Mottee Mundeer superintending the arrangement of the vast quantities of gold and silver, the jewels of surpassing beauty and splendour, and the Koh-i-noor far beyond what he had imagined, which exceeded all calculation and beyond his comprehension, he stood bewildered and completely wrapped up in astonishment of such charming and dazzling splendour as for the first time in his life vividly displayed to his eyes. He could not, at the same time, conceive that his Indian life could ever become so much romantic, as he had never dreamt of having to do with such strange and exceedingly rare and historic characters as now accumulated in his charge.

Dr. Login, therefore, felt very much the absence of Lady Login by his side, at such a momentous occasion, in the famous Mottee Mundeer, as he could neither show her its wonders, more specially the matchless diamond the Koh-i-noor, nor could he get her valuable suggestions and help in performing

(1) *Sir John Login and Duleep Singh*, p. 198.

(2) *Ibid*—199.

the most important duties so confidentially entrusted to him while Mrs John Lawrence, Miss Wilson, and Mrs Napier very often came to help him with their valued advice and guidance.

Many other lady visitors also came to call on Mrs Login—knowing fully well that she was in England—but the drift of their mind could easily be understood, as actually they cherished at heart the eager desire to have a moment's glance, if they luckily could, over those pretty collection of jewels in the Mottee Mundeer, and more specially over that famous diamond the Koh-i-noor.

The following extracts from some of the letters from Dr. Login to his wife will, it is hoped, throw much interesting light in the subject :

(i)

Citadel, Lahore, April 29th 1849.

"My occupation continues to multiply, I am now known as 'the Killiah-ki-Malik'—Lord or Master of Lahore Citadel." I have just been placing some surgeants of Artillery in charge of the magazine under my orders, to write out lists of all the arms of all kinds. Another set I have appointed, in the same way, in Ranjeet Singh's Camp establishment, including ever so many splendid Cashemere tents, carpets, *purdahs*, etc., while I myself take the jewel department in the Toshakhana, and overlook the whole. The extraordinary way in which jewels of the greatest value are packed away would amuse you. Yesterday, when looking over some diamond rings with the Treasurer and his men, which were all huddled together in a bag—one of them being a *very beautiful likeness of Queen Victoria*—I suggested that, until the velvet rolls I had ordered for them were ready, they should tie a label to each with a bit of thread or string to which they agreed.

To my amusement, I find that they had misunderstood me, for they strung them all on a string like so many buttons, dozen by dozen! The first ring I took out of the bag was a diamond valued at 6,000 rupees! and some of them were very valuable.

I cannot yet arrive at a valuation of the jewels (exclusive of the Koh-i-noor) but I don't think it will be far short a million! and the other valuable properties are much more.

Lord Lawrence seems to think that Lord D—— intends, after making over what may be proper for the use of the deposed King, to send the rest to England (3)

(ii)

Citadel, Lahore
May 6th and 8th, 1849.

I continue very busy paying off all the Durbar establishments, taking list of jewels and treasures collected by Ranjeet.

BĒNGAL : PAST AND PRESENT.

. Hollings and Drake turned up, just as I was engaged superintending the removal of the Koh-i-noor and State jewels from the old Toshakhana to the place in which all the other treasure is kept, in the *Motee Mundeer*, so they were fortunate in having an opportunity of seeing them, before they were shut up for a time

You will doubtless see by papers that the Ranee Jinda (Duleep's mother) has made her escape from the fort at Chunar, near Benares, where she was imprisoned (4)

(iii)

Citadel, June 10th, 1849.

Certainly Indian life is full of romance ! I never dreamt of having to do with such strange and historic characters as are now accumulated under my charge for I have all the political persons now. It is very amusing the request I get from friends and acquaintances. One asks me to get him appointed to carry the Koh-i-noor to England ; several to get them appointments in the Punjab under Lawrences ; I often wish you were here to help me with your suggestions in many things. I would like, above all things, to be able to show you the gorgeous State jewels, as I have now arranged them in the fine box I have had made and lined. You would have laughed to see how they were kept before, by the native treasurers, rolled up in bits or rags, and stowed away in such queer places." (5)

(iv)

Citadel, Lahore, July 17th, 1849.

It is very amusing the number of lady visitors I have, they all come to call on Mrs. Login, but they are all eager to see the pretty things I have to show. Mrs. John Lawrence, Miss Wilson, and Mrs. Napier came yesterday to help me with their advice and assistance, as to the arranging of the State jewels in the handsome box I have had prepared for them, and they promise to come again till all is finished.

How amused you would have been with the old things that came under my inspection. Such a queer conglomeration of odds and ends has never before been seen, I do believe ! (6)

(4) Ibid—pp. 159-61.

(5) Ibid—pp. 165-66.

(6) Ibid—p. 168.

WAY OF CONVERTING THE POSSESSION OF THE KOH-I-NOOR INTO A BLESSING INSTEAD OF A CURSE.

In October 1849 there was a report going on in England that "Queen Victoria declined to accept the Koh-i-noor as a gift under the circumstances in which it had been proposed to offer her."

Dr. Login was absolutely conscious of the fact that the policy adopted by Lord Dalhousie in converting the possession of the Koh-i-noor from the minor Prince Duleep Singh to the Queen of England was not very fair and laudable to the prestige of the British Administration of the Punjab. He, therefore, urged Henry Lawrence to propose to Lord Dalhousie that "if the Queen's subjects all over the Empire were allowed to purchase that celebrated Diamond the Koh-i-noor by raising subscription, and present the Gem to the Queen of England as a token of their love, respect and goodwill", it would be a better "*way of converting the possession of the Koh-i-noor into a blessing instead of a curse.*"

In this connection we reproduce below, in extenso, the letter from Dr. Login to his wife dated the 24th October, 1849, which will amply repay perusal—

Citadel, Oct. 24th, 1849.

"There is a report going about since last mail that, much to the honour of "our little Queen", *she has declined to accept the Koh-i-noor as a gift, under the circumstances in which it has been offered her*; indeed, I shall rejoice to hear that this is true, and I am sure that many of her subjects will with me.

I think I told you that I had urged Henry Lawrence to propose to Lord Dalhousie that the Queen's subjects all over the Empire should be allowed to embrace the opportunity of showing their love and goodwill, by offering it to her. I feel certain that it would be easy to raise a sufficient sum to purchase it, of course it would be absurd to fix a price that would be near its intrinsic value, but I think £200,000 would meet the purpose; and it would have more value in her eyes, given her in this way by her people, as a token of their respect and honour, the money to be spent for the good and benefit of her subjects here, by making the Punjab to bloom like garden. This may easily be done, by giving employment to the 100,000 men who have been cast adrift, making road, bridges, and canals, and establishing schools among them, and thus showing that we are above taking anything from them in a shabby way.

This would be one way of converting the possessing of the Koh-i-noor into a blessing instead of a curse, which the natives say it has been. But there! I've no doubt you will say that, as usual, my romance is running away with me." (7)

It was Lord Dalhousie who first contemplated the removal of the Koh-i-noor together with the vast collection of jewels from the famous Toshakhana of Maharajah Runjeet Singh (from the bosom of the Punjab) with no little anxiety, and his mind was always flowing in that direction. In one of his private letters "dated Camp 6 marches from Lahore, 15th December, 1849" Lord Dalhousie writes: "I saw it (Koh-i-noor) when at Lahore, and was in no respect disappointed. It is a superb gem." (8) He, therefore, it is presumed, with his strong propensity to make himself and his views the measure of excellence, and in the zest of his triumphant progress, "did not like at all the idea", (9) as proposed by Dr. Login. As he subsequently told Login—"that Her Majesty was most anxious to see the jewels, and that it was all stuff about Her refusal to accept them." (10)

LORD DALHOUSIE'S VISIT TO LAHORE.

Early in December 1849 Lord Dalhousie paid a visit to Lahore, and camped outside the walls on the parade-ground, where Maharajah Duleep Singh, who was then only a boy of eleven years of age, went to pay His Excellency a visit, Khilluts were exchanged; and when Lord Dalhousie afterwards paid Maharajah a return visit at his palace, he repeated a sentence taught by Dr. Login—"I am happy to meet you, my Lord." His Excellency patted him on the back. (11)

ROBBERY AND FIRE AT TOSHA KHANA.

There was rather a very strange and unexpected occurrence on the very night when Lord Dalhousie had inspected, with satisfaction, all the work of Dr. Login in the Citadel, and also witnessed how happy the young Maharajah Duleep Singh was with Dr. Login. The famous Toshakhana was attacked by robbers, and although there were sentries—both European and Indian—all around the Toshakhana the robbers had managed to decamp with "the property worth about 20,000 rupees" before Dr. Login was called, and broke open the door of the Toshakhana and got the fire out.

It may not be unwise to presume that the main target of the robbers was the matchless Koh-i-noor, and other jewels of value, but by the timely arrival of Dr. Login they were hopelessly disappointed.

This incident was nicely described by Dr. Login in one of his letters to his wife. The extracts from which are given below—

Citadel, Lahore, December 7th, 1849.

"After Lord Dalhousie had inspected all my work in the Citadel, and had witnessed how happy the young Maharajah was with me he thanked me, and shook hands with me warmly.

(8) *Private Letters of Marquess of Dalhousie*, p. 107.

(9 & 10) *Sir John Login and Duleep Singh*, p. 217.

(11) *The Maharajah Duleep Singh and the Government*, pp. 79-80.

That very night, however, as if to show me the emptiness of human praise, and perhaps to bring down any little pride I may have felt in showing all my work to the Governor-General, at midnight my Toshakhana was robbed, and property to the amount of 20,000 rupees carried off (this out of some thirteen or fourteen lakhs was not very much); but in what way was greater loss prevented? Why, by the providential circumstance of the place catching fire accidentally, by the light brought in by the thieves! Had this not occurred and caused the discovery, I should have been ruined! Immediately on the fire being discovered I was called, broke open the door and got the fire out, which had done little damage, and found that a breach had been made in the wall, by which the thieves had entered. This, with sentries all round, was rather strange. What if it should turn out that it was with their connivance, and the European sentry then on duty had a hand in it? Can any foresight provide against that?

The native sentry, it is true, is posted in the same court, but he is not exactly in the same position, and the European can easily manage to keep him at a distance, when he wishes to do so.” (12)

Lord Dalhousie remained about a fortnight there, and on the day previous to his leaving Lahore in December 1849 he went personally to the quarter of Dr. Login taking with him a small bag of velvet specially made by Lady Dalhousie to hold the diamond Koh-i-noor. On receiving the Gem from Dr. Login, and “putting it inside the bag he most secretly fastened it with the Gem round his waist under his clothes in the presence of Dr. Login, and then wrote out himself the formal receipt of the Koh-i-noor, which was counter-signed by all the Members of the Board, and after making over the receipt to Dr. Login His Excellency left for Bombay.(13)

A BOX WAS STOLEN FROM THE POSSESSION OF DR. LOGIN.

Shortly after Lord Dalhousie left Lahore in December 1849 the infant Maharajah “was desired by Dr. Login to prepare for a journey without being informed as to his destination.” (14)

Dr. Login started with the Maharajah and his party for Futtehgurh, a small village on the Ganges situated between the fort and the cantonment, which had been determined by His Excellency for the future residence of the Maharajah. Their march occupied several days, and they reached Futtehgurh in February 1850.(15)

It is worth while to state here that during their march to Futtehgurh a box was stolen from the possession of Dr. Login, which contained the Original Receipt for the Koh-i-noor granted to him by Lord Dalhousie.

It was pretty well known not only to the people of the Punjab but also to the English ladies and gentlemen—both official and non-official—that since

(12) *Sir John Login and Duleep Singh*, pp. 189-90.

(13) *Ibid*—p. 224.

(14) *The Maharajah Duleep Singh and the Government*, p. 80.

(15) *Ibid*.

the annexation of the Punjab Dr. Login was placed in absolute charge of the famous Toshakhana of Ranjeet Singh together with the matchless diamond the Koh-i-noor ; and that it was the earnest desire of every one—both European and Indian alike—to have a look, even for a moment, of that peerless Diamond the Koh-i-noor, if they could not get it. It cannot, therefore, be unwise to presume that the robber anticipating that Dr. Login had certainly been carrying that famous Gem with him, and hoping that that box might contain the Koh-i-noor he very carefully stole that box from the possession of Dr. Login, but to his great disappointment ! That robber had not the least imagination that far far better brains than his were engaged for the most secret, confidential and careful removal of the Koh-i-noor from the bosom of the famous Toshakhana of Ranjeet Singh to Bombay for its perpetual transmission to England.

DUPLICATE COPY OF THE RECEIPT FOR THE KOH I-NOOR.

When Lord Dalhousie was informed all about the occurrence of the robbery, and the loss of the Original Receipt for the Koh-i-noor, a duplicate copy of the Receipt and a certified copy of His Excellency's Memorandum dated the 31st May 1850 were sent to Dr. Login.

The Minutes, Memorandum of His Excellency together with the certified copy of the Receipt for the Koh-i-noor are reproduced in extenso—

EXTRACT INDIA POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS

Fort William, the 16th January, 1852.

(For : Dept. Nos. 110—12).

Minute by the Most Noble the Governor General of India.

29th December 1851.

On 31st May 1850, I recorded a Minute, to which was annexed a Memorandum containing a duplicate receipt for the Koh-i-noor, which Doctor Login had had in his charge, and explaining why the duplicate was supplied.

Doctor Login informed me yesterday that he had never received the duplicate receipt.

On enquiry to-day I find that from misapprehension the minute and receipt were *recorded* only and not transmitted to Doctor Login.

Send a certified copy of the Memorandum and of the duplicate receipt to Doctor Login now explaining the delay.

(Sgd.) Dalhousie
29th December 1851.

True Copy.

(Sd.) E. THOMAS.

Off. Under Secy. to the Govt. of India
With the Governor General.

Minute by the Most Noble the Governor General of India

Dated Simla 31st May 1850.

Dr. Login had the custody of the Koh-i-noor diamond at Lahore. He got a receipt for it when I took the gem. This he has
Receipt for Koh-i-noor. recently lost by robbery.

I replace it, as explained by the accompanying memorandum. I think it as well as to record this with the other papers regarding the Koh-i-noor.

Simla,
May 31, 1850.

(Sd.)/ DALHOUSIE.

True Copy.
E. C. BAYLEY,
Under Secy. to the Govt. of India
with the Govr. General.

Memorandum by the Most Noble the Governor General

Dated Simla the 31st May 1850.

Dr Login recently informed me that on his journey to Futteghur, a box was stolen from him, containing the receipt for the diamond called the Koh-i-noor which I gave to him on taking possession of the gem on December 1849.

That receipt was executed in duplicate, and one of the documents was kept by me. From that original document I now annex a copy, to replace that which Dr. Login has lost.

(Sd.)/ DALHOUSIE

Simla
31 May 1850

True Copy.
E. C. BAYLEY,
Under Secy. to the Govt. of India with the Governor General.

I have received this day from Dr. Login into my personal possession for transmission to England, the Koh-i-noor diamond, in the presence of the members of the Board of Administration and of Sir Henry Elliot, K.C.B., Secretary to the Government.

Lahore December 1850.
Sd./ H. M. Lawrence

„ C. G. Mansel
„ John Lawrence
„ H. M. Elliot

(Sd.) DALHOUSIE.

True Copy.
E. C. BAYLEY,
Under Secy. to the Govt. of India with the Govr. General.

(No. 4018 of 1851)

From The Secretary to the Government of India,
 With the Governor General.
 To Doctor J. S. Login.

For: Dept.
 Sir,

Under instructions from the Most Noble the Governor General, I have the honor to transit herewith a Certified copy of a Memo: & of the duplicate receipt given you by His Lordship for the Koh-i-noor which had been in your charge at Lahore.

2. I am desired at the same time to explain, that these documents should have been transmitted to you in May 1850, but from misapprehension of His Lordship's orders they were merely recorded in the Office.

Camp Gosaingunge
 The 31st December 1851

I have the honor to be &c.
 Sd./ H. M. ELLIOT
 Secy. to the Govt. of India
 with the Govr. Genl.

True Copy.
 Sd./ E. THOMAS
 Offg. Under Secy. to Govt. of India
 With the Governor General.

From Dr. J. S. Login
 To Sir H. M. Elliot, K.C.B.,
 Secy to the Govt. of India
 With the Governor General.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge your letter No. 4018 of the 30th ultimo, forwarding a certified copy of a Memo: and of the duplicate receipt given me by the Most Noble the Governor General, for the Koh-i-noor diamond, which had been in my charge at Lahore; and I have to request that you will oblige me by tendering my most respectful thanks to His Lordship for his considerate kindness, in favoring me with the above documents, to replace the original receipt, which was stolen from me.

Futtygurh
 The 3rd January 1852.

I have the honor to be &c.
 Sd./ J. S. LOGIN

True Copy.
 (Sd.) E. THOMAS
 Off. Under Secy. to the Govt. of India
 With the Governor General.

MEASURES ADOPTED FOR THE SAFETY OF THE KOH-I-NOOR.

Lord Dalhousie had been demi-officially intimated by the Court of Directors that one of Her Majesty's Ships of War would be placed at his disposal for the secret conveyance of the Koh-i-noor from Bombay to England. But, when on reaching Bombay on the 1st of February 1850 with the Koh-i-noor most secretly and constantly attached to his own person Lord Dalhousie found that Her Majesty's ship the *Medea* had not there, considering it prudent and absolutely necessary to provide for the safe custody of the Gem until the ship should arrive he delivered the Koh-i-noor into the joint custody of Lieut. Colonel Mackeson, and Captain Ramsay, and the Gem was at the same time most securely, secretly and confidentially packed in a small iron-box, and which was then put into a despatch-box in the presence of Sir Henry Elliot, the Secretary to the Government, and his Private Secretary Mr. F. Courtenay ; and the despatch-box was subsequently deposited, on that very day, in the Treasury of Bombay.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CAPTAIN RAMSAY.

Lord Dalhousie before he left Bombay gave full instructions to Captain James Ramsay in his letter dated the 1st February, 1850 which is reproduced in extenso—

To Captain James Ramsay,
Military Secretary to the Governor General,
etc. etc. etc.

Sir,

Having received instruction from the Hon'ble Court of Directors to transmit to England the gem called the Koh-i-noor with every possible precaution for its safety, I have brought the jewel from Lahore to Bombay in my own possession.

Entertaining full confidence in your integrity, discretion and judgment, I have resolved to entrust to you in conjunction with the Lieutt. Colonel Mackeson C.B., the duty of conveying it from hence to England, I have this day delivered it into your charge.

It has been intimated to me that H.M. Steamship *Medea* will be placed immediately under my orders. On the arrival of this ship at Bombay, you will be so good as to deliver to the officer in command the enclosed despatch which contains the instructions necessary for his guidance.

On his intimating to you that the ship is ready to proceed to England, you will convey your charge on board and will endeavour to reach your destination with as little delay as possible.

Every possible precaution must be taken by you for its safe conveyance on board the ship, and for its custody under the joint care of Lieut Colonel Mackeson and yourself during the voyage.

When you reach England you will forthwith report your arrival to the Chairman of the Hon'ble East India Company forwarding at the same time the enclosed despatches to the Chairman of the Court and to the President of the Board of Control. You will then await on board the receipt of instructions from the Hon'ble Court of Directors.

On delivering the Koh-i-noor into the hands of the person or persons appointed to receive it, you will obtain their signatures to the enclosed receipts, two of which you will transmit to the Govt. of India by the earliest opportunity.

You will be so good as to report to me your departure for England and any assurance which it may be desirable to communicate to the Government.

Bombay,
1st February 1850

I have &ca
Sd/ Dalhousie.

(True copy)

Sd/ E. C. BAYLEY

Under Secy. to the Govt. of India
With the Governor General.

SECRET VOYAGE OF THE KOH-I-NOOR.

The despatch-box thus had lain deposited in the Bomay Treasury for full two months under the charge of Mr. Goldsmid, and the sub-treasurer, but they were completely unaware of its contents.

Her Majesty's Ship of War *the Medea* reached Bombay on the 31st of March, 1850 ; and on the 6th of April she sailed for England with Lieutenant Colonel Makeson and Captain Ramsay together with their joint luggage an iron proof safe. But the Officer in Command of the ship was also kept in the dark that the famous diamond the Koh-i-noor was thus being so secretly conveyed to England without giving him the least chance for claiming the freight usually allowed for such services.

OFFICIAL INTIMATION OF THE DESPATCH OF THE KOH-I-NOOR.

The official proceedings of the despatch of the Koh-i-noor, which was so long kept strictly reserved and confidential until Her Majesty's Ship the *Medea*, after leaving the port of Bombay carrying the Koh-i-noor confidentially in her bosom, sailed far far off the Indian shore, now reported to the Hon'ble Court of Directors by the Governor-General in His Minute dated the 14th of May 1850. The full description of the precautions taken, and the "strictest secrecy" observed by "all the very few persons who were necessarily cognisant of the facts" for the safety of the Koh-i-noor in its long voyage from Bombay to England, can be best told in the words of Lord Dalhousie himself.

The extract of His Excellency's letter to the Court of Directors, although it is a long one, but, as it bristles with such interesting details of the faithful estimate of the various measures adopted by Lord Dalhousie with gleeful aptness and strict secrecy in the safest despatch of the Koh-i-noor from India, is worth giving—

Extract from letter from the Most Noble the Governor General of India, dated Foreign Department, Simla, 14th May, 1850 to the Honorable the Court of Directors of the East India Company—



No. 6

Foreign Department
Simla,
14 May 1850.

To

The Honorable the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

Honorable Sirs,

In the despatch of the 1st August last No. 24, your Honorable Court directed me to transmit the gem called the Koh-i-noor to England "every possible precaution being taken for its safety" I took immediate measures for carrying your orders into effect, and I have now the honor to report my proceedings for your information.

2. Having been compelled reluctantly by the state of my health to repair to the Sea Coast, I resolved to take charge myself of the Koh-i-noor as far as the Port of Bombay. Intimation having been made to me demi-officially that one of Her Majesty's ships of War would there be placed at my disposal for its conveyance to England, I therefore selected two Officers in whose charge it should be placed during the voyage.

3. I nominated for this duty Lieutenant Colonel Mackeson C.B. of the Honorable Company's Army, and my Military Secretary Captain Ramsay of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment of foot. In making my selection I had regard solely to the appointment of Officers possessed of those personal qualities which were essential for a charge of so much delicacy and responsibility. During the late war Lieutenant Colonel Mackeson, as my confidential Agent with the Army, had afforded me abundant proofs of his judgment and discretion, and had in every respect maintained and increased the high character he enjoyed before. Captain Ramsay is my own kinsman, holding a high office near me. I repose entire confidence in his integrity, judgment and discretion as in those of Lieutenant Colonel Mackeson, and after careful consideration I could select no two Officers better fitted than they for the charge which has been entrusted to them.

4. On the day before I left Lahore in December 1849 I received the Koh-i-noor from Dr. Login in the Citadel in the presence of the

members of the Board of Administration and of the Secretary to Government, and I conveyed it constantly attached to my own person in safety to Bombay.

5. On the 1st of February 1850 I again embarked Her Majesty's ship *Medea* which had been placed at my disposal had not reached that port, so that it became necessary to provide for the safe custody of the jewel, until the ship should arrive.

6. I delivered the Koh-i-noor on that date into the joint custody of Lieutenant Colonel Mackeson C.B. and Captain Ramsay, in the presence of Sir H. Elliot Secretary to the Government and F. Courtenay Esquire my Private Secretary. The gem with its cords was carefully packed in a small iron box, which was locked and the key of it delivered to Lieutenant Colonel Mackeson. The box was surrounded by a fastening and sealed with the Governor General's seal. The iron box thus secured was enclosed in a despatch box which was then locked and the key of it delivered to Captain Ramsay. The despatch box was likewise surrounded by a fastening and sealed with my seal.

A letter was then addressed to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay requesting him to receive the despatch box and to retain it in his custody in the Government Treasury until further orders.

7. The box was accordingly deposited in the Treasury on that day and a receipt for it was given by the Sub Treasurer—Another document signed by Colonel Mackeson and Captain Ramsay and witnessed by Sir H. Elliot and Mr. Courtenay, was also given testifying to the receipt of the Koh-i-noor from me by those Officers, and also to its deposit in the Treasury at Bombay.

8. Full instructions were given to Colonel Mackeson and Captain Ramsay for their guidance.

They were directed on the arrival of the *Medea* to deliver to the officer in Command a letter from Secy. to Government of India, requesting him to receive on board the above mentioned officers and to convey them to England whither they had been ordered to proceed by the Government of India. The Honble Court will observe that no mention whatever is made of the purpose for which they have been sent—that the officer in command of the ship has no knowledge of the conveyance of the Koh-i-noor, and no responsibility for it, so that I apprehend he can have no claim for the freight usually allowed for such services.

9. When the ship was prepared for sea, Colonel Mackeson and Captain Ramsay were instructed to deliver to the Secy. to the Govt. of Bombay a letter from the Secy. to the Govt. of India requiring him to deliver to them on their joint requisition the despatch box which was deposited in his custody on the 1st February.

They were directed to take every possible precaution for the safe conveyance of their charge on board the ship and for its custody during the voyage.

On their arrival in England they were directed forthwith to report their arrival to the Chairman of the Honorable East India Company ; to await on board the instructions of the Hon'ble Court ; and on delivering up there to obtain receipts for the same, as well for themselves as for the Government of India.

The official intimation of the despatch of the jewel from India was reserved until their departure should be reported and is now to be transmitted overland. They were further directed to report to me their departure from Bombay and any occurrence which it might be desirable to communicate.

10. Her Majesty's Ship *Medea* did not reach Bombay till the 31st of March—nearly two months after my departure.

11. On the 6th April the ship sailed for England. Colonel Mackeson and Captain Ramsay reported on that date having conveyed the Koh-i-noor safely on board ; and the Government of Bombay likewise reported having delivered to them the despatch-box which had been deposited in the Treasury there.

13. I have been thus minute in my description of the several measures that have been taken, in order to satisfy your Honorable Court that I have carefully obeyed your instructions, to take every possible precaution for the safety of the Koh-i-noor in its transmission to England. The strictest secrecy was enjoined upon all the very few persons who were necessarily cognisant of the facts.

Simla,

The 14th May, 1850.

I have the honour to be, etc.

Dalhousie.

Extract from a private letter from Lord Dalhousie on the same subject—

Muhassoo, May 16th, 1850.

The Koh-i-noor sailed from Bombay in H.M.S. *Medea* on the 6th April. I could not tell you at the time, for strict secrecy was observed, but I brought it from Lahore myself. I undertook the charge of it in a funk, and never was so happy in all my life as when I got it into the Treasury at Bombay. It was sewn and double sewn into a belt secured round my waist, one end through the belt fastened to a chain round my neck. It never left me day or night, except when I went to D. Ghazee Khan, when I left it with Capt. Ramsay (who now has joint charge of it) locked in a treasury-chest, and with strict orders that he was to sit upon the chest till I came back ! My stars ! What a relief it was to get rid of it. It was detained at Bombay for two months for want of the ship, and I hope, please God, will now arrive safe in July. You had better say nothing about it, however, in your spheres till you hear others announce it. I have reported it officially to the Court, and to her sacred Majesty by this mail." (16)

 THE KOH-I-NOOR'S ARRIVAL IN LONDON.

Her Majesty's Ship of War the *Medea* reached Spithead on the 2nd July 1850, when Lieut. Colonel Mackeson and Captain Ramsay left the ship in a small open boat with a view to greater security as well as to guard against the detention at Custom House, the Gem was taken out of the iron-safe and secured in a strong silk handkerchief and tied round the waist of Lt. Col. Mackeson, which was subsequently transferred again in the iron-safe on their reaching India House, and delivered over charge of the Koh-i-noor to the Honorable the Chairman and Deputy Chairman in the presence of J. Melvill Esqr., the Secretary to the Honorable Court of Directors on the 2nd July 1850.

The circumstances connected with their taking charge of the Koh-i-noor out of the Treasury at Bombay, and all the measures adopted by them for the safety of the Gem throughout their long voyage of full three months have clearly been described in their joint letter to the Secretary to the Honorable Court of Directors, which is reproduced below in extenso—

4 Abermarle Street,
July 3rd, 1850.

To J. Melvill Esqr.,

Secretary to the Honble Court of Directors.

Sir,

On delivering over charge of the gem called the Koh-i-noor yesterday to the Honble the Chairman and Deputy Chairman in your presence, we omitted to mention the circumstances connected with our taking it out of the Treasury at Bombay where it had lain deposited for two months before we embarked for England.

2. You are already aware that in consequence of non-arrival of the *Medea* at Bombay and of the uncertainty attending her arrival, Lord Dalhousie caused the gem to be deposited in the treasury, as being safer place than to leave it in our secret custody for an uncertain period on shore at Bombay. The manner in which the jewel was deposited was as follows:

Sir Henry Elliott, Secretary to the Govt. of India, Mr. Courtenay Private Secretary to the Govr. General, and ourselves being present, Lord Dalhousie placed the Gem in the small iron safe, and this safe was deposited in a small dispatch box. Both the boxes were locked and further secured by red tape to the fastening of which his Lordship's seals were affixed, the impressions of the seals, as observed at the time, were imperfect ones, but we were hurried for time to reach the Treasury before it closed for the day, and it was not thought necessary to renew them. The key of the inner iron safe was given to one of us (Coll. Mackeson) and the key of the outer red dispatch box to the other (Capt. Ramsay). We four then proceeded with the dispatch box to Mr. Goldsmid, the Financial Secretary who took us to the Treasury, and in the presence of all of us Mr. Muspratt the Treasurer deposited the dispatch box in a chest in the Treasury.

The dispatch box thus deposited remained under charge of Mr. Goldsmid and in the subordinate custody of the Treasurer at Bombay, without their having been made aware of its contents for two months, during which time we were awaiting the arrival of H.M.'s Steamer *Medea* from China. On the arrival of the *Medea* at Bombay we presented to Mr. Goldsmid the sealed instructions of the Most Noble the Governor General with which we had been furnished directing him to place in our charge "the dispatch box which had been deposited in the treasury." Mr. Goldsmid accompanied us to the Treasury and taking Mr. Muspratt with us we all went to the room in which the dispatch box had been deposited. Mr. Muspratt in taking out the dispatch box by the handle on its lid from the box in which it had been pressed down, was obliged to apply some force to it. With the force applied by pulling at the lid the lock gave way, and the lid was separated from the under portion of the Box to such extent as the tape secured by a seal admitted.

This accident caused some alarm to Mr. Muspratt and Mr. Goldsmid, and me, taking into consideration that the impressions of the seals were not from the first very distinct,—that they were put on as much for our satisfaction when the box passed temporarily out of our charge as with any other object; feeling moreover confident that the Governor General when he entrusted so valuable an article to our charge, invested us with full control over it, to be guided by circumstances as to the means we might take for its safe custody and disposal, determined, in fairness to all parties after what had happened, to use our discretion in satisfying ourselves of the gem being present in the small safe, and of its identity, before we sailed from India. We therefore requested Mr. Goldsmid and Mr. Muspratt to withdraw, and close the door on us, while we satisfied ourselves that the locks of the boxes had not been tampered with, and the contents not withdrawn. Having satisfied ourselves on these points, we gave to Mr. Goldsmid the receipts he required "for the dispatch box that had been deposited in the treasury" and embarked on board the *Medea*. The dispatch box being no longer trustworthy we supplied its place by a second heavy iron fireproof safe, which we purchased at Bombay. We conveyed the gem on board in the dispatch box and small iron safe, and immediately transferred both of them to the larger safe—one of us (Capt. Ramsay) retaining the key of the larger safe, the other (Coll. Mackeson) that of the smaller one. In this manner the gem was taken care of until we reached Spithead. When we left the ship, at Spithead in a small open boat there was a stiff breeze blowing, and with a view to greater security as well as to guard against scrutiny and detention at the Custom House, the Gem was secured in a strong silk handkerchief and tied round the waist of one of us (Coll. Mackeson) and was transferred again to the small iron proof safe when we reached the India House. We trust the foregoing explanation will satisfactorily account for the Gem not having been delivered over by us in the boxes secured by seals in which it had been made over to our charge, and that we may receive an assurance to this effect in time to admit of our informing the Governor General of the same when reporting our having been relieved of our charge by the mail now about to leave for India.

The dispatch box and the larger iron proof safe in which the gem was

brought from Bombay are herewith forwarded, the smaller iron safe was delivered with the gem. A Bill with voucher is submitted for the cost of the larger one which we hope will be passed.

We have the honor to be

Sir

Your obedt. Humble Servants

J. MACKESON, Bt. Lt. Coll. 14th Regt.

J. RAMSAY, Capt. 22nd Regt.

Mily. Secy. and A.D.C. to Gr. Genl.

DELIVERY OF THE KOH-I-NOOR TO QUEEN VICTORIA

The following records relating to the delivery of the gem to Queen Victoria in 1850 has been extracted from the Court Minutes of the East India Company :—

“Wednesday the 3rd July 1850.

“The Chairman and Deputy Chairman being temporarily absent at Her Majesty's Command to deliver the Koh-i-noor to the Queen, Sir Robert Campbell, Bart., the Senior Member of the Court now present, took the chair.

“Wednesday the 10th July 1850.

“The Chairman reported to the Court that last Wednesday he and the Deputy Chairman had the honor of a *private* audience with the Queen and delivered to Her Majesty with a few words of Address on behalf of the Court, the gem called the Koh-i-noor which was most graciously received.”

RE-CUTTING OF THE KOH-I-NOOR

The re-cutting of the diamond being thought necessary, Herr Voorsanger of Amsterdam was selected to do the work. The operation was conducted by steam, which was commenced on the 6th July 1851 and completed at the end of 38 days. This re-cutting of the Koh-i-noor is said to have cost 80,000 rupees and the diamond assumed the form of a nicely cut most brilliant one weighing $106\frac{1}{8}$ carats, but when it had reached Her Majesty's hand on the 3rd June 1850 its weight was 186 carats. Thus in re-cutting the diamond lost $79\frac{7}{8}$ carats ; and still it created quite a great sensation in the great exhibition held in London in 1851.

CONVERSION TO CHRISTIANITY GOES IN FAVOUR OF DULEEP SINGH'S VISITING ENGLAND

Lord Dalhousie had all along discouraged the idea of the deposed Maharajah's visiting England ; but immediately after his conversion to Christianity on the 8th of March 1853—at the age of only 14 years and 6 months—His Excellency altered his opinion as to the expediency of allowing him to go to England.



MAHARAJAH DULEEP SINGH (1851)

From the lithograph executed by R. J. Lane, Lithographer to H. M. Queen Victoria,
from the original portrait by Xavier Winterhalter.

Now in the Royal Collection at Windsor.

Photograph by the courtesy of The British Museum.
(Copyright reserved)

When the young Maharajah arrived in London for the first time he was very cordially welcomed by the Court of Directors and was brought in close contact with the Queen and Prince Albert.

Describing the reception accorded to the young Maharajah, Dr. Login writes :

"The Court of Directors were agreeably impressed with the unassuming manners and quiet dignity of the deposed young ruler of a warlike nation, and accorded him a friendly welcome. The Queen and the Prince Consort, very soon after the Maharajah's arrival, gave him a special audience, and he returned charmed with the kindness of the Queen's manners to him"

"Her Majesty orders for a full-length portrait of him to be painted by Winterhalter, and for this he gave sittings at Buckingham Palace twice a week.* This brought him much in contact with the Queen and Prince Albert ; for they were always present, and greatly amused by his naive remarks on all he saw and heard in this, to him, strange country."

"The condour and straight-forwardness of his comments seemed especially amusing to the Prince who delighted in drawing him out, and getting him to talk freely to him."(18)

But knowing full well what a high estimation and veneration the Maharajah always holds in his mind about the "Koh-i-noor" diamond they always very carefully avoided to make any mention of the diamond in his presence in any of their conversation. In this connection Sir John Login writes :

"Hitherto, since the arrival of the Maharajah in England the subject of the Koh-i-noor had not been touched on in conversation in his presence ; his Governor and Lady Login were, however, well aware of his sentiments on the matter, as, indeed, he had made no secret of them. They knew that, to him, 'Koh-i-noor' meant something beyond a mere jewel of fabulous value,—in his eyes, and in the eyes of Oriental nations it was an object of superstitious veneration, as the symbol of imperial sovereignty over Hindustan, and the countries adjacent marking its possessor as chief among the rulers of Southern Asia."(19)

STORY OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE KOH-I-NOOR BY DULEEP SINGH TO QUEEN VICTORIA IN BUCKINGHAM PALACE

The story of the formal presentation of the 'Koh-i-noor' diamond to Queen Victoria by the young deposed Maharajah Duleep Singh with his own hand at the time of his sitting for the portrait with the painter Xavier

* The portrait of Duleep Singh, of which we give an illustration on the opposite page, is little known. The original portrait by Xavier Winterhalter is in the Royal Collection at Windsor ; and the lithographic copy executed by R. J. Lane is in the British Museum.

(18) *Sir John Login and Duleep Singh*, p 336

(19) *Ibid*—pp 339-40.

Winterhalter in the Buckingham Palace as described by Sir John Login in his book "*Sir John Login and Duleep Singh*" is given below :

"Lady Login was present, by special desire, at all the sittings for the Maharajah's portrait, given by him at the Buckingham Palace. At one of these the Queen, in the course of conversation, asked her—'If Maharajah ever spoke of the 'Koh-i-noor', and, if so, did he seem to regret it? Observing at the sametime, that she had never mentioned of the jewel to him, and would feel certain delicacy about wearing it in his presence. Lady Login replied, that he had never spoken of it since he came to England, though he had often done so in India, and had been greatly interested in the description of the operation of re-cutting it. Her Majesty then said, that she hoped Lady Login would be able, before the next sitting, to ascertain what the Maharajah's feelings were on the subject, and whether he would care to see it, now that it was re-cut, adding, 'Remember to tell me all he says'."

"The task was by no means any easy one to Lady Login" writes Dr. Login "for she dreaded what the Maharajah might say, and did not wish to bring the matter formally into discussion. No good opportunity presented itself, as the days went on, until just the day before the next sitting when, as she was riding with him in Richmond Park, she managed to lead the conversation up to the subject. Then trying to put the question in a casual manner, 'Would you like to see the Koh-i-noor again?' she waited in some anxiety for his reply. 'Yes,' was his answer, 'I would give a great deal to hold it again in my own hand.' 'Why? For what reason?' 'I should like to have it in my own power myself to place it in Her hand, now I am a man. I was only a child, then, when I surrendered it to Her by the Treaty; but now I am old enough to understand.'

"The feeling of relief caused by this answer was great, and it was with a light heart she repeated it to the Queen on the following day.

"Unknown to the Maharajah, who was engaged with the painter at the further end of the room, Her Majesty at once gave orders for the Koh-i-noor to be sent from the Tower. After some interval, there was a slight bustle near the door; the arrival of the jewel and its escort was announced; and it was brought in, and presented to the Queen.

"Taking the Diamond in Her hand, Her Majesty then advanced to the dais, on which the Maharajah was posed for his portrait, and, before the astonished young man realized what was passing, he found himself once more with the Koh-i-noor in his hand, while the Queen was asking him if 'he thought it improved? and whether he would have recognised it again?' "At first sight, indeed, he would hardly have done so, the cutting and European setting had so altered its character; yet, in spite of these, it remained still the 'Mountain of Light', and it was with some emotion and eagerness that he walked to the window and minutely examined it, making remarks on its diminished size and greater brilliancy, whilst the spectators could not help watching the movements with some anxiety. It was a nervous quarter of an hour for Lady Login!"

"But, when at length he had finished his inspection, Duleep Singh walked across the room, and, with a low obeissance, presented the Koh-i-noor to his Sovereign, expressing in a few graceful words the pleasure it afforded him to have this opportunity of *himself* placing it in Her hands. Whereupon he quietly resumed his place on the dias, and the artist continued his work. . . ."(20)

HOLLOWNESS OF THE STORY UNVEILED.

Regarding the story of the formal presentation of the Koh-i-noor diamond by Duleep Singh to Queen Victoria at the Buckingham Palace, as narrated before, there are no records traceable (either in the National Archives of the Government of India or in those of the India Office). Neither do we find any reference to the subject in any of the books relating to Queen Victoria.

But a private letter written by Lord Dalhousie from the Government House (Calcutta) on the 26th of August 1854, throws much interesting light on this fabricated story about the presentation of the Koh-i-noor by Duleep Singh to the Queen. The extract given below amply repays perusal :

Government House,
August 26th, 1854.

"L——'s talk to you about the Koh-i-noor being a present from Duleep to the Queen is *arrant humbug*. He knew as well as I did that it was nothing of the sort ; and if I had been within a thousand miles of him he would not have dared to utter such a *piece of trickery*. . . ."(21)

However, accepting the truth of the story as described and also printed by Sir John Login in his book—"Sir John Login and Duleep Singh",—we must admit, that all credit and praise are due to the deposed unfortunate young Duleep Singh, as he, even at his early age of only 15 years and 10 months (22) was not unable to realise fully his actual position under the Fifth Article of the Terms Granted to him by the Second Treaty of Lahore, 29th March, 1849, and ratified by the Right Honorable the Governor General on the 5th April, 1849. The Fifth Article of the Treaty is as follows :

"V. His Highness shall be treated with respect and honour. He shall retain the title of Maharajah Duleep Singh Bahadur, and *he shall continue to receive, during his life, such portion of the above-named pension as may be allotted to himself personally, provided he shall remain obedient to the British Government ; and shall reside at such place as the Governor-General of India may select.*"

The concluding portion of the above article partakes of the nature of a penal clause in the event of disloyalty. But, after saying in the Fourth Article of this Treaty that "Maharajah *sha'l receive*" a pension of not less than four

(20) Ibid—pp. 339-43.

(21) *Private Letters of Marquess of Dalhousie*, p. 315.

(22) Duleep Sing was born on the 4th Sept., 1838.

and not exceeding five lakhs of Company's rupees per annum," (23) it sounds strange to add: "And he shall continue to receive a portion" only of the same pension. Therefore, when it is said,—"*and the Maharajah shall continue to receive,*" etc., "*provided he shall remain obedient,*" it probably means—"but the Maharajah shall *not* continue to receive *unless* he shall remain obedient." Therefore the young Maharajah acted most prudently with his presence of mind, and foresight, and at the sametime he nicely displayed his nobleness of mind and soul.

We tell in mournful words "Maharajah Runjeet Singh's famous Toshiakhana of Jewels in the Punjab is but an empty dream of the glorious past just a century ago!"

NARENDRANATH GANGULY.

(23) The Fourth Article of the Second Treaty of Lahore, 1849:—

IV—His Highness Duleep Singh shall receive from the Honorable East India Company for the support of himself, his relatives and the servants of the State, a pension of not less than four, and not exceeding five, lakhs of Company's rupees per annum.

“The Sepoy Mutiny” In Chotanagpur.

HISTORICAL INEXACTITUDES.

THE British chroniclers have given a very perverted account of what is known as “The Mutiny of 1857” in Chota Nagpur. A strenuous attempt was made to show that the Mutineers did not have any popular support and that the Mutiny could be put down very easily. A study of some of the original sources in the National Archives in New Delhi and in the Record Rooms in the District Collectorates, however, shows that this recital is absolutely unsupported, and, on the other hand, the movement was very popular, widespread and acute.

Lister in the District Gazetteer of Hazaribagh published in 1917 has quoted two paragraphs from the Settlement Report and apparently he corroborated them. The quotation is as follows:—

“The sepoy mutiny in Chota Nagpur started in and ended in Hazaribagh district. At the beginning of August 1857 the Hazaribagh detachment of the Ramgarh Battalion consisting of two companies of the 8th Regiment mutinied. News of their revolt was sent to Ranchi, and Lieutenant Graham was sent from there with a detachment of the Ramgarh Light infantry to disarm them. His detachment mutinied on the road, and joined the Hazaribagh detachment which was marching on Ranchi, at Burmu. The combined force continued to march on Ranchi, and Captain Dalton, the Commissioner, after ascertaining that the remainder of the native troops at Doranda were not loyal, withdrew with all the Europeans by the Ramgarh road to Hazaribagh and from there retired to Bagodar to await support coming along the Grand Trunk Road. As soon as a guard of Rattary’s Sikhs was put at his disposal Colonel Dalton reoccupied Hazaribagh, and from there kept under observation the movements of the mutineers. The mutinous troops had received no support in Hazaribagh, and very little in Ranchi. They stayed in Ranchi for over a month, and then moved west-ward, with the idea of joining another body of sepoys under Kunwar Singh near Rohitasgarh. Their advance was opposed at two of the ghats by loyal zamindars, but after forcing the breast-works with their cannon they marched through Chandwa and Balumath in Palamau to the town of Chatra. While they were looting there they were surprised and attacked by a much smaller mixed force consisting of 320 men, and completely defeated: their guns and all their ammunition were captured, 150 were captured, 150 were killed, and the remainder fled in the direction of Sherghati and dispersed.

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"While there was no sympathy with the mutineers in Hazaribagh the Santals not unnaturally became excited by the weakening of authority and thought the occasion opportune for squaring accounts with oppressive money-lenders and others. Several bands of Santals collected for marauding purposes and were joined by the local bad characters, and a certain amount of plundering occurred between Gola and Chas (i.e. thana Peterbar) in Kharagdiha, at Kuju on the Ramgarh road and at Jharpo near Bagodar. At Mandu they were instigated by three local landholders to commit murder as well as plunder the village. The landholders instigating the murder were subsequently caught and hanged. A small punitive expedition of Sikhs was sent to Gola, and the excitement died out immediately. The disturbances were only sporadic ; there was no organized movement among the Santals as a whole, and no special measures against them were considered necessary after the rising had subsided. Instead, it was decided shortly after the mutiny to raise a levy of Kols and Santhals for military police, and a body of 500 of the more ardent aboriginals was enlisted for this work. Similarly in the north of the district the news of the sepoy rising evoked some small uprising among the dispossessed Bhuiya *tikaitis*, who considered the opportunity suitable for recovering their lands from the purchasers then occupying them ; and they received some support from their tenantry."

Unfortunately some of the assertions are historical inexactitudes. The original sources in the shape of old English Correspondence that are available in the Record Rooms as well as in the National Archives bear out that not only the so called "Sepoy Mutiny of 1857" was a very popular move but there were earlier spontaneous moves in the different districts of Chotanagpur to throw away the foreign yoke. In this paper some of these original sources are proposed to be discussed.

BRITISH OCCUPATION OF CHOTANAGPUR.

But before the actual recital of some of the original letters disproving the assertions in the Settlement Report reiterated by Lister, it is necessary to give a very short resume of the establishment of British Authority in Chotanagpur. The Subah of Bihar along with most of the part now known as Chotanagpur passed into the hands of the East India Company with the grant of the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by Emperor Shah Alam. This gift entitled the Company to receive the tribute of Raja of Ramgarh, the land Revenue of Kharagdeeha and Kendi and the services of Kuuda. But the area was hilly and difficult of access and the degree of control was very small. It was early considered necessary that the districts should be properly reduced to subjugation. Captain Camac was entrusted near about 1769 to establish some sort of order in the "Junglebery district" by which name Hazaribagh was then known. Captain Camac was successful to a great extent and from Ramgarh he carried on operations in Palamau district near about 1772. Camac was succeeded by Chapman in 1780 who has been described as the first Civilian administrator of Chotanagpur. The "Conquered Provinces" were formed into

a British district and the district comprised roughly the present districts of Hazaribagh, Palamau, portions of Manbhum and the area all round Sherghaty now in Gaya district. To this area later was added the present district of Ranchi which was then known as the tributary Mahals of Chotanagpur. The headquarters of Chapman was held alternatively at Sherghaty (Gaya) and Chatra (Hazaribagh). Ramgarh Battalion was early stationed at Hazaribagh to help Chapman's administration.

KOL REBELLION.

The subsequent Kol rebellion in Singhbhum was followed by active operations in that great Kol area and Singhbhum was brought under subjugation by 1833. By Regulation XIII of 1833 the districts of Ranchi and the Jungle Mahals with the estates of Dhalbhum, till then included in Midnapore, were exempted from the operations of the Regulations and every branch of the administration was vested in the officer designated as the Agent to the Governor General. This Agent had his principal Assistants at what are known now as the districts of Hazaribagh, Ranchi and Singhbhum. The administrative headquarters were shifted from the alternative sites of Sherghaty and Chatra to Hazaribagh one of the chief reasons being the Ramgarh Battalion that had been stationed there from before. A set of Rules were drawn up for the administration of Criminal Justice and these Rules continued till they were superseded by the Criminal Procedure Code of 1861. But for the Civil Justice a separate set of Rules had been drawn up which continued for a very much longer time.

The movement commonly known as "the Sepoy Mutiny" in 1857, was, however, not an isolated land-mark. It was, in a way, a more pronounced conflagration spread all over the area in Chotanagpur along with Bihar but, nevertheless, prior to this movement there was a formidable Kol Rebellion in Singhbhum districts near about 1833 and a widespread Santal revolt in Hazaribagh district in 1853-55.

WHY HAZARIBAGH AND PALAMAU OVER-RUN.

To appreciate the factors behind these popular revolts against the British rule one has to look into the cause that brought the British into the different districts of Chota Nagpur. While the British or the East India Company had spread themselves to other parts of Bihar for trade purposes they had come to Chotanagpur districts because of purely administrative reasons. A Select Committee proceedings dated the 16th January, 1772 shows that Hazaribagh and Palamau were actually over-run because of the danger arising from the Marhattas. Although the Marhattas had been reduced for the time being the danger was not over. It is mentioned in the letter "without stopping the roads of the Provinces of Bahar, Bongeepoor, Ramgur, Bishanpur, Barboom, we cannot hope to defeat their attempts but whenever they make any irruption we shall have to follow them from one place to another and the country will be laid waste. Therefore it is necessary first to stop the passage of the Marhattas." Captain Camac very early saw the unpopularity of the Raja of Ramgur, the vulnerability of the territory of Ramgur and he fully utilized the

opportunity. A letter of Captain Camac to the Chief of Revenue of Patna in O.C. 3rd January, 1772 shows the working of the mind of Captain Camac. Captain Camac discussed the forces that would be helpful and mentioned "Palamou being now settled forms a perfect Province (possession) to the wealthy Parganas of Sasaram, Siris Katamba, Chauparan, Simnout and Sherghatty. . . . The present situation of affairs in the hills afford us the first opportunity of reoccupying these places and gaining the absolute subjection of them with very little trouble or expense."

SINGHBHUM.

The same mailed-fist which Captain Camac demonstrated in Hazaribagh and Palamow districts was shown by the early British rulers in Singhbhum district. The Kols in Singhbhum district rose to a man after brooking the first phase of the British rule. They found their old customs and social solidarity being tampered with. They found their Mankees and Mundas system which kept up the solidarity of the Kols both socially and politically torn to pieces. The Koli insurrection of Singhbhum was a major event. Khandu Patel of Seraikella fomented the genuine dissatisfaction and he has been mentioned in Foreign Consultation 12-3-1832 no. 87-88. From F.C. 23rd January 1832 no. 118 it appears that the Kols at Singhbhum had even spread into Sonepoor in Orissa and raised the standard of revolt there. After the Kol revolt was mercilessly put down Captain Wilkinson, Acting Political Agent, South West Frontier was specially commissioned to bring about as much peace as possible in Singhbhum area. Wilkinson's Rules were drawn up for the administration of the Kols and some of them still stand good. There is no doubt that Captain Wilkinson had a certain amount of vision in him and appreciated the difficulties and problems of the Kols to some extent. He tried to save the Kols from the clutches of the Mahajans, Banias and the adventurers from outside who were buying up their lands and putting them into perpetual indebtedness.

SANTHAL REBELLION IN HAZARIBAGH.

The Santhal Rebellion in Hazaribagh district was another spontaneous move against the ruthless tampering with their social ideas, customs and institutions. Here also the Santhals found that their best lands were being taken away by the foreigners. The Santhal Rebellion in Hazaribagh district in 1853-55 has not drawn as much attention as the Santhal Rebellion in Santhal Parganas which led to the creation of a separate district of Santhal Parganas.

The old English Correspondence preserved in the Record Room of the Deputy Commissioner of Hazaribagh throws a good deal of light on the Santhal movement of Hazaribagh district in 1855. The Assistant Principal Commissioner in 1855 thought that although there was some dissatisfaction among the Santhals, he did not anticipate any general rise. He depended on the Zamindars to keep the Santhals in check but he was wrong in his impression. From the very beginning of 1856 there was a movement among Santhals throughout the Hazaribagh district. The Deputy Magistrate at Burhee was

re-inforced by the Section of a Cavalry under Lt. Ryan and a reserve force from Kharagdiha was also sent to make an example of the rebel Santhals. But by May 1856 all the Santhal population had risen to a man and Lt. Ryan met with some reverses. The ring-leaders were, Lubia Manjhi, Bairu Manjhi and Arjun Manjhi. All the blacksmiths were put under surveillance as they were suspected of manufacturing arms. Bhairu Manjhi was arrested and the informer Tek Narain Singh was rewarded handsomely. The tempo of the British administration was such that Mr. Tweedie, Deputy Magistrate on special duty at Kharagdiha was asked to "let me know what would you require to carry out the destruction and no sources will be spared to supply you as quickly as possible."

The Santhal rising had brought a lot of suspicion on the zamindars. The Raja of Ramgarh was specially asked to send out armed men to the interior of thana Gomia as some of the hills had already been occupied by the Santhals. There were ruthless military operations to put down the Santhals and Chuhars who were often described as "the Budmashes". The 40th Regiment was sent for putting down the Santhals and the hills and jungles were ransacked to trace them. A very large number of Santhals were arrested on suspicion and were released only after being confined for a pretty long time. Many Santhals' huts were burnt to ashes to strike terror in their mind. A large number of Santhals were tried and convicted to hard labour and irons. Some of them were transported for life beyond sea with hard labour and irons.

As there was a later unrest amongst the Santhals in Bhagalpur Division every attempt was made to see that the contagion in Hazaribagh district does not spread in Bhagalpur Division. Among the men suspected for fomenting the Santhal trouble mention has been made in the old Correspondence of Raja of Serampur, the servants of the Ex-Ameer of Sciende and the Meer Saheb at Hazaribagh. Ruthlessness had gone to the extent of Mr. Tweedie, Deputy Magistrate at Burhee writing "I have arrested some Santhals who were concerned in the late illegal assembly and plunder. Although I have no evidence legal to convict still I consider it my duty as a policy of the State to put restraint on these men by confining them at Burhee until such time as it may be deemed expedient to act otherwise." Ample rewards were offered for the apprehension of the suspects and the Correspondence shows that a number of Santhal women were also imprisoned for their communication with the rebellion. This ruthlessness and the helplessness of the Santhals contributed to the suppression of the movements.

"THE SEPOY MUTINY" IN CHOTANAGPUR ; MILITARY : ZAMINDARS.

The Santhal Rebellion had just subsided when there was the bigger conflagration known as the Sepoy Mutiny. There was a superficial calm which suddenly liquidated itself and almost simultaneously the first Natiye Infantry Detachment at Dinapore, Hazaribagh, the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Segowlee and the Ramgarh Battalion at Chotanagpur mutinied. It was not

confined to just a few men in the Military. The long lists of the persons that had mutinied which are found in the old Correspondence Volumes in the office of the Commissioner of Ranchi for 1857-58 show that the infection had spread far and wide. The Mutiny was not confined to the army alone. A statement of cases tried under Act XIV of 1857 and 1858 in the Division of Chotanagpur mentions one Koreban Ally a Jamadar of the Principal Assistant in Collectorate who had been convicted to 14 years' imprisonment for "Rebellion and causing the proclamation of the Padshahee Raj on or about the 4th August, 1857." Koreban Ally not only actively joined the Mutineers but he appears to have been the link between the Mutineers section of the Army and some of the Zamindars. Thakurai Kishan Dayal Singh raised the rebellion in Palamou District and burnt some Thanas in that District. Tikayat Omraon Singh and Sheikh Bhikhari were given capital sentence and forfeited their property of every description and the execution of the sentence was carried out on the 8th January, 1858. These two persons were charged for having attempted to prevent the return of the Government officers with troops to Chotanagpur by closing the Chootoopaloo and Cheroo Ghats. From the statement of cases it appears that the sentence was passed on the 6th January and no time was lost in executing the sentence two days later. Thakoor Bishwanath Shahi, an important landlord of Lohardagga district was sentenced in April, 1858 to capital punishment and forfeiture of all his property. It is mentioned in the statement that Thakoor Bishwanath Shahi was one of the most influential zamindars in Chotanagpur and had joined the Mutineers of the Ramgarh Battalion and closed the Ghats to prevent the return of the Government officers to the district. It was further observed that "The prisoner more-over promised to give the Sepoys *Badshahee* pay. The prisoner also seized some wealthy merchants and caused them to be plundered and illtreated them with the purpose of extorting the sum of Rs. 25,000/- to enable him to fight against the Government. After the defeat of the Ramgarh Battalion at Chutra the prisoner returned to Chotanagpur and a large body of men having been collected by him several villages were plundered and the Government Thana at Barwa was burnt. The prisoner had assembled a force of 1,000 men with a view to attacking the town of Lohardagga and arrived close to the places when the Principal Assistant who was stationed with some Sowars at Lohardagga made a night march and captured the prisoner who was hanged by the orders of the Court on the 16th April last."

Pandey Ganpat Rai who was a former Diwan of the Maharaja of Chotanagpur was elected the Commander-in-chief by the Mutineers and came to Doranda. He joined Thakoor Bishwanath Shahi and also was arrested and sentenced on the 21st April, 1858 and hanged on the very same day. A large number of persons who assisted Bishwanath Shahi were also hanged or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

Bishwanath Shahi who had been hanged for rebellion had some endowments and claims in Jagarnath temple in his confiscated estate to which the priest had laid claims. Capt. Davies, Senior Assistant Commissioner, Lohardagga was asked to separate the village of Jagarnathpur from the rent-paying

portion of the confiscated estate and make it over to the priest to the service of the temple. But the Senior Assisant Commissioner was warned that the widow and the children of the late proprietors should not be allowed to reside in the old Gurh at Hatia.

MILITARY PENSIONERS.

It further appears that a large number of Military Pensioners had taken arms against the British. The Lt. Governor warned that the insurgents under the rebel Kooer Sing of Jagdishpoor included a large number of Military Pensioners of Government. It was suggested that all the Military Pensioners in Bihar should present themselves within a given period before the officer through whom their pension were given for the purpose of screening.

HEADMEN VILLAGERS.

Not only the Military Pensioners but a large number of the headmen had joined the movement. The Principal Assistant Commissioner, Manbhoom gave to the Senior Assistant Commissioner, Lohardagga a long list of the headmen who had plundered in Jaipur, Kaspal and Gola Parganah in the districts of Manbhoom and Hazaribagh. The landed proprietors, big or small, as a class, remained passive and it was only a very few of them that came to the help of the British. This "passive loyalty" and complacent attitude were very severely commented on by the Commissioner of Chotanagpur to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal. Not only the Commissioner was fully satisfied that the great landed proprietors and the Rajas of Garjat Mahals were passively loyal but he further observed that if they had actively cooperated, there would not have been further disturbances in Chotanagpur from the date of their re-occupation of the districts. He remarked that they had "secretly aided and encouraged the rebels". The rewards that had been offered for the apprehension of guilty persons did not have any effect. In the despatch it was mentioned that not a single incident of arrest was due to the help of the zamindars and it was only the Military or the Police who, without the help of the people, had captured the rebels. In the hilly tracts the Ghatwalis and the villagers had exploited the situation. It was only a fore-gone conclusion that taking advantage of the general unrest and confusion there would be some persons to take advantage and loot. As a matter of fact this passive and complacent attitude of the zamindars who had the charge of most of the Police Thanas of that part led to the British change their ideas and after peace was restored the system of the Zamindar-Police Thanas was slowly liquidated.

RUTHLESS MEASURES.

Ruthless measures were taken to suppress the movement. One of the earliest measures was the promulgation of Act XIV of 1857. The Principal Assistant of Lohardagga was appointed to be a Commissioner under section 7 of Act XIV of 1857. Circular No. 1792 dated the 15th August, 1857 clarifies

the effect of the declaration of Martial Law and of the extension of Act XIV of 1857 on the jurisdiction of the ordinary Criminal Courts of the district to which these measures were applied. It was mentioned that the declaration of Martial Law did not affect the executive functions of the Magistrate. But as regards higher Criminal Courts their functions were suspended by the declaration of Martial Law and all heinous offences were to be tried by the Commissioners appointed under Act XIV of 1857. In the Archives of the Commissioner's office at Ranchi there are long lists of Sepoys including the Hindus and Mohammadans belonging to 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10 and of the Ramgarh Light Infantry who were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and forfeiture of their property under the orders of Major G. G. Macdonnal who conducted the European General Court Martial.

A great hunt was ordered to be made for capturing all the prisoners who were taking leading part in the Province of Bengal. From time to time lists with Descriptive Roll of the prisoners with their parentage were called for from the District officials. Strict screening was ordered to be made for new recruits to Government employment. The Secretary to the Government of Bengal warned the Commissioner that the disbanded Sepoys and State Mutineers were on no account permitted to find their ways in the Government employment. In another Circular it was ordered that the grounds for awarding sentence falling short of capital punishment were to be given.

The local administrative machinery was considered to be inadequate to hunt down the rebels. Letter no. 283 from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal dated Allahabad the 13th March, 1858 mentions that Mr. J. C. Wilson was put at the head of a Commission that was created for the apprehension and punishment of Mutineers and Rebellious. It was mentioned that the primary business of the Commission was the detection, trial and punishment of the Mutineers although it was not intended that the Commission should be spending time in hunting out people who had been in rebel. These duties were still to be performed by the District Officers and it is quite clear that the Commission that was set up was an independent body for coordinating some of the work.

A careful watch was also ordered to be kept on all religious mendicants and vagrants and to retain in custody all such who would not give a satisfactory account of themselves or find a security for good conduct. It was mentioned "That these people are known to convey letters concealed about their persons or in the hollow of their Latties, the clothes and other articles of those persons to whom any suspicion attaches should be strictly watched and where any evidence of sedition is discovered the culprit should be immediately tried and dealt with law."

In Singhbhum district the Raja of Porahat was actually driven to revolt by the tactless handling of the situation by Lt. Birch. In Singhbhum as soon as the Military revolted the administrator ran away and the Raja of Seraikella was asked to look after the affairs. The Raja of Porahat whose position and status were higher than those of the Raja of Seraikella took an offence at this. But, nevertheless, while a section of the rebel Army was crossing the Raja

of Porahat put them under arrest and kept the part of money that they had looted from the Treasury. After some time when Lt. Birch was appointed to restore calm the Raja of Porahat was at once declared a rebel and a warrant of arrest was issued. Capt. Dalton who was the Commissioner of Chotanagpur strongly opposed this move and characterised it as a tactless and uncalled-for action. But somehow Dalton's subordinate Lt. Birch had his order sustained. This drove Raja Arjun Singh to go to the Commissioner and deliver to him the money of the Treasury and the Mutineers that were under his custody. The Commissioner asked him to report to the Principal Assistant of Chayebass, Lt. Birch, but the Raja made himself scarce. The Raja was later apprehended and banished to Benaras and the Porahat estate was escheated. The Porahat Raja was fully supported by the Kols who under the Mankees and Mundas once again rose against the British Rule. Ruthless operations of the Military rule broke their back-bone. The move in Singhbhum district was characterised by the abundant support from the tribals.

Commissioner Dalton, reported to the Secretary, Board of Revenue that the report about the Mutiny in Hazaribagh sent by Major Simpson, Principal Assistant had never reached him. This would show the acuteness of the revolt and that it was not a superficial defection on the part of a section of the Military only. Dalton Infantry stationed at Hazaribagh revolted on hearing of the defection of the Mutineers Regiments at Dinapore. The Military at Hazaribagh revolted on the 30th July, 1857, burnt the Bungalow of Civil Officers and plundered the Treasury. They further ransacked the Cutchery and Record Rooms and released the convicts from the Jail. At Lohardagga the Infantry and the Artillery of the Battalion mutinied on the 2nd August and the European officers both Civil and Military left the station leaving the Mutineers to do what they liked to the Civil population. The Cutchery was completely destroyed by fire and most of the English and Vernacular Records were burnt or torn, including the Settlement papers of Pargana Palamou.

In Purulia the detachment of the Ramgarh Light Infantry revolted on the 5th August, 1857 and plundered the Treasury. Here the Mutineers immediately went to join the Mutineers at Dorandah. The civil population who had very little affection for the administration burnt all the Government buildings including the Cutchery. Most of the Records including the quinquennial or decennial settlement papers were destroyed. Dalton mentioned that through the instrumentality of the Raja of Porahat Rs. 25,500/- of Singhbhum Treasury had been recovered. The memorandum showing the damages done by the Mutineers to the several Treasuries in the Chotanagpur Commissioner-ship shows that Lohardagga Treasury lost Rs. 162,296, Hazaribagh Treasury, Rs. 93,872, Manbhoom Treasury, Rs. 111,194 and Singhbhum Treasury, Rs. 37,705 in round numbers.

TEMPO OF ADMINISTRATION.

In Hazaribagh old Correspondence Volume for 1857 there is a letter with an extract from the Proceedings of the Governor General of India in Council in the Home Department, under dated the 31st July, 1857 and the first

paragraph shows the tempo of the administration. The first paragraph runs as follows :—

"The Governor General of India in Council has observed with approbation the zealous exertions of the local Civil Authorities for the apprehension and condign punishment of the Mutineers and Deserters concerned in the present revolt. It was necessary by the severe and prompt punishment of such of these criminals as found their way into the districts in our possession where the minds of the Native Troops could not but be in a very unsettled state though the men for the most part had abstained from open mutiny, to show that the just fate of the Mutineer is death, and that the British Government was powerful to inflict the penalty. It was necessary also by the offer of rewards for the apprehension of all deserters, to check the crime of desertion which was becoming rife in some of these Regiments, and to prevent the possible escape of men who, apparently mere deserters, had been concerned in such terrible atrocities that their apprehension and condign punishment was an imperative duty."

The Proceedings cover Rules that were to be followed in giving punishments to the deserters. From the facts that have been cited before it will be difficult to accept the statement in the proceedings that "The men for the most part had abstained from open Mutiny."

Among the other measures adopted to meet the situation may be mentioned a general declaration of a reward of Rs. 10/- for the re-capture of each of the prisoners who had been released by the Mutineers from the Jails in the Province of Chotanagpur. The same letter also mentions that the holder of the Jail establishment at Chayebassa was "dismissed and declared to be incapable of ever again serving the Government." Another measure was to hunt down the Santhals who had again risen in Hazaribagh district. The Commissioner wanted the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Hazaribagh to take particular steps to stop the depredations by the Santhals in the South-East portion of Hazaribagh. It was mentioned that Capt. Oakes had been sent out with the detachment of Sikhs who were still in the vicinity of Jaipur in Manbhoom district. The Principal Assistant Commissioner at Hazaribagh was ordered to proceed to Golah with 100 Sikhs to co-operate with Captain Oakes in putting down the lawless gatherings of the Santhals. An extract from the proceedings of the Presidency Court of Nizamut Adaulat under date 27th March, 1857 which was sent to Hazaribagh shows that one Lattaie Manjee was sentenced to 14 years and one Gurmu Manjee to three years imprisonment for "Illegally and riotously assembling with offensive weapons for the purpose of plunder or to commit a serious breach of the peace leading to the wilful murder of Pooran Singh Dafadar and Ramsharan Pandey, Sowar."

Regarding the course of the Sepoy Mutiny in Hazaribagh district the Principal Assistant Commissioner of Hazaribagh gave a report to the officiating Commissioner of Chotanagpur. There are other Correspondences indicating that the Santhals armed with bow and arrow used to assemble at frequent intervals and the Sikhs of Ramgarh Infantry used to be deputed to

disperse the Santhals. The Raja had reported in September 1857 about the rise of the Santhals at various places with Rupu Manjee as their leader. Two other Santhal leaders Arjun Santhal and Rambani Manjee had been apprehended and forwarded to Hazaribagh with a report on the 21st November, 1857. The battle at Chutra was a major event in the course of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 in the Hazaribagh District and this battle was won by the British only because of their superior Military force.

MASS MOVEMENTS.

From the recital of the facts gathered from the original sources in the shape of letters received at and dispatched from the zones where the so-called Sepoy Mutiny in Chota Nagpur had occurred it will not be correct to say that the Sepoy Mutiny in Chotanagpur had started in and ended in Hazaribagh district, nor would it be correct to say as mentioned in the Settlement Report and Supported by Lister in the District Gazetteer of Hazaribagh published in 1917 that the Mutineers' Troops had received no support in Hazaribagh and very little support in Ranchi. It will also be a factual in-exactitude to state that the Santhals were merely excited for looting money and were instigated by the land-holders to loot and murder. It will be difficult to support the theory that the disturbances were only sporadic and that there was no organised movement amongst the Santhal as a whole. The facts cited above will show that the so-called Sepoy Mutiny in Chotanagpur was a mass movement which had very widespread and deep support from the different sections of the civil population. The Santhals, the cultivators, the Ex-Military pensioners, the headmen and the landed-proprietors had all joined the movement that may have been started by a section of the Military. If the movement was not a popular movement declaration of ample rewards to the rebels would have had the adequate response.

It is true that the leaders of the movement in Chotanagpur had not been so publicised or might not have the stature of the leadership of Kooer Sing of Shahabad but nevertheless their contribution to the bid for freedom is very considerable. It is unfortunate that the valuable Records in the Archives of the Government had not been studied so far properly with a view to draw the correct picture of the so-called Sepoy Mutiny in Chotanagpur. The research workers will find ample materials in the Archives of the Government for constructing the story of the so-called Sepoy Mutiny in Chotanagpur.

P. C. ROY CHAUDHURY.

Maratha Revenue Administration in Orissa.

THE country called by the Marathas the Subah of Cuttack—comprised two kinds of possessions one of which was distinguished by the name of Mughulbundy, the second by that of Gurjat. The first was considered actually in the possession of the Government as a Royal dominion and land held direct from Govt. without any intermediate superior. The second was held by tributary chieftains paying a stipulated revenue to Government. They held an intermediate tenure between Government and the tenants of the soil. The Gurjat kings paid a fixed tribute to the Maratha Govt.

The boundaries of these possessions were, to the eastward, the sea, to the westward the Maratha Province of Chuttisgurrh, to the southward the Chilka lake and the Ganjam District and to the northward the District of Jallesore and Midnapore and the Province of Birbhoom.

The Marathas divided the Mughulbundi into four chaklas—(i) Cuttack (ii) Bhadrak (iii) Soro (iv) Balasore and about 150 parganas. Each Pargana was, as a rule, subdivided into one, two or three or more of the following allotments or mahals that is to say Taluk Chaudhury, Taluk Kanungo wilayat, Taluk Kanungo, Taluk Sadar Kanungo, Taluk Majkur. In some cases the word Tappeh was substituted for Taluka.

It appears therefore that the terms Chaudhury and Kanungo were used as synonymous with that of Talukdar and the same responsibility attached to both names.

Under the head of Taluka mazkuri were specified certain mauzas and other lands, the revenue of which were paid through mokuddums and sarbarakars. It was but rarely that a talukdar or a zamindar appeared under this last head.

There was an amil in charge of each chakla. He was individually responsible to the State for the revenues assessed on his division and for the general conduct and supervision of revenue, civil and criminal business. He was remunerated by the grant of land called nankar, which he held rent free and was allowed certain perquisites and deductions on account of expenses of collection.

His chief assistant was the Sadar Kanungo. The Sadar Kanungo was assisted by a Gumastha or Mofussil or Wilayat Kanungo in each Parganna.

Each Gumastha had under him one or more mohurrirs. The Gumastha's main duty was to affix their signatures and seals to bills of sale and other documents.

When Talukdars fell into arrear, they (Gomasthas) became security for the talukdars and took their estates into their own hands. The office of Sadar Kanungo was abolished about 1792 A.D. by Subadar Rama Pandit but that

of Gumastha or Wilayati Kanungo was retained until the British acquisition of the Province in 1803.

The British abolished the office of Wilayati Kanungo.

The Amils did not, as a rule, make the mokuddum responsible for collection of all lands within their own chaklas. A settlement was made yearly and the amount of it was duly reported to the Government. The Amils respected hereditary rights of the makuddums and got their nankar lands which was called their Pitrali or patrimonial property.

"By degrees the Maratha officers resigned the detailed management of revenue and left it into the hands of any person who used to pay them lump sum. Mokoddums and Amils took engagements from them. During the confusion between 1801 and British conquest of the Province in 1803 it seems most probable that the chaudhuries kanungoes and mokuddums and other persons entrusted with collections in estates held khas or who had given agreements to the Amils to pay the lumpsum due from their lands assumed the title of zamindar and claimed to hold the land itself in virtue of hereditary rights valid or invalid as the case may be to collect its rents. The zamindars of Orissa were at the time of British acquisition either principal mokuddums with a hereditary right of collection but without any right, title or interest in the land itself or Government officers chiefly choudhuries and kanungoes in charge of collection. This view is also supported by three distinct facts.

The Kanungoes under Marathas were in many cases selected from among the best of the mokuddums.

The title of kanungoe is retained to the present day by several of the zamindars of Orissa.

When the British took the province in 1803 they could not get possession of a single revenue document of any importance. They were all either made away or hidden by the Mahratta Revenue Officers or by Mukddums who appropriated them to their own use." (Toynbee)

SOURCES OF TAX UNDER THE MARATHAS.

The revenue collected by the Marathas besides what may have been derived from salt, consisted of land tax, sayer duties, tax on marriage, of various kinds of contributions, fines and forfeiture. Part of these revenues, derived from the sources above mentioned, appeared to be of a permanent nature and is said to have been levied according to established rates, from which, however, there can be no doubt that there were frequent deviations owing to the violence and improvidence of the Government and the want of any efficient control over the conduct of its officers.

The collections made under the other heads were necessarily uncertain and precarious depending on the profligate practices of the people, their violation or neglect of duties prescribed by their religion or family disputes, on the transfer of estates and on other contingencies. These duties and taxes formed almost as regular a resource of the Maratha Government as the land revenue.

The Maratha land holders could scarcely be said to have had a proprietary right in their estates. This right was indeed so far recognised by the Maratha Government that their legal course of descent was seldom altered or interrupted, but every transfer of lands was attended with difficulties and expense which were justly considered by all well regulated Government as incompatible with the rights of the property. The legal heir could not obtain the Estate of his ancestor without paying a large fine and this fine was not certain in its amount or regulated by any fixed principles but depended entirely on the circumstances of the heir or the good or ill dispositions of the officers of the Government and on their personal character. A fine of this kind was equally exacted on every transfer of property, whether it arose from the operation of the law or from the act of the land holder, it formed a part of the revenue of the Maratha Government.

The officers of the Maratha Government tried to keep the land revenue as low as possible and the Government had little or no control over the conduct of its officers. Little sagacity was required to enable the latter to discover that the less the Government received, the more would fall to their share. They had a thousand ways of extorting all that the zamindars could afford to pay by fines and forfeitures, by attaching their lands and by threatening to raise their assessments and zamindars could not fail to see that it was their interest to give way to temporary demands and exactions rather than to entail an increase on their land revenue which they might never get rid of and which they know very well would not exempt there from the arbitrary demands to which all Maratha zamindars have ever been liable.

Thus it was the interest of all parties on the spot to prevent the land revenue from being increased.(1)

As the officers were far from the seat of capital, they had more privilege to do arbitrary things.

Octroi duties were levied by the Marathas on merchandise entering towns and the proceeds were devoted to the expense of the kotwali and thana establishment.

The Marathas do not appear to have paid any attention to the Abkari revenue and spirituous liquors were during their occupation, manufactured and opium grown in and imported from the hill states and sold without any restriction whatever. Apart from these sources of revenue there were Pandhri, Sair, City customs including unit and ubari of zamindars. All those collections with the exception of city customs and ubaris were in the hands of kamavisdars of Parganas, who were at once officers of revenue, justice and police.

The village head was the important figure in the whole revenue administration under the Marathas. The village head was the agent of Govt. for apportioning and collecting the rent of his village, possessed rather *undefined* magistrerial and judicial authority. The office was held at the pleasure of Govt. It was neither hereditary nor saleable.

The cultivators held their lands on a yearly lease granted to them by the village head. There was no cultivation in perpetuity.

Division of the village into fields was recorded in the village accountant's

register. But there was no fixed assessment nor any assessment rates. The total jumma of the villages constantly fluctuated.

Annual settlements were concluded at the commencement of the agricultural year between the ryots on the one part and the village head acting as the Govt. agent on the other side.

Lands were classed as chal and Thok, chal applied to fields for which the patel or village head could conclude engagements including the settlements for any given year. The rent roll of the preceding year was usually adopted as the basis on which new engagements were drawn.

The annual demand of the Govt. on village was founded on but not regulated by, the previous year's assessment.

Every portion of the cultivated land but no other was liable to assessment.

The Govt. demand was on the village lands in general and not on the particular portion of it.

The apportionment of the assessment fell where the responsibility was mainly on the village head and village community.

There were no fixed rates to prevent the apportionment going hand in hand with changes in land.

In the whole Land Revenue system, the zamindars (or hereditary land holder) Khandytes and Mokuddums had their own roll.

II. It was the business of the zamindars (when ordered to do so) to make all his ryots bring their rents to the representative of Govt. It was the duty of the Khandyte to seize on the application of the zamindar a refractory ryot, who was in balance, and it was the duty of the Mokuddum to be present when the different ryots were paying their rents.

III. Under the Marathas the land holders or whosoever engaged for payment of revenue had never any balance of revenue over them. Under that Govt. a system of coercion was adopted in the early part of the year at the time the crops were on the ground and if the public officers at that time failed in the collection of the greatest part of the revenue of the year, they had scarcely any means afterwards of collecting the Balances and therefore the landholders were rarely deprived of the management of their estates, merely on failing to discharge their revenue.

SALT MANUFACTURE UNDER THE MARATHAS.

The manufacture of salt was a privilege of the zamindars under the Marathas.

It was a part of their means and sources of paying their revenue to the Maratha Govt.

IV. Towards the close of the rainy season, the tributaries and zamindars usually summoned from every village under their control a proportionable number of ryots who could be spared from attending on the cultivation of the lands to manufacture salt under the terms of the sale of one third of the salt that should be made being carried to their account of revenue keeping the ryots as much as possible in ignorance of the product and conciliating

the manufacturers by allowing each to have daily a small quantity of the salt made during the time they worked under the appellation of Dustoorree.

At the close of the season three or five merchants with a like number of zamindars assembled to settle and fix a price for the salt manufactured in the season, on account of the merchants and which varied according to the situation and distance of the golahs from the places of manufacture, but on average for some years prior to 1803, the price was fixed from 3 to 5 mds. for one sicca rupee. The zamindars and officers of the Maratha Govt. agreed amongst themselves for the price they should nominate as the value of the salt they appropriated to themselves and which was less in account with the ryots than that made for the merchants.

The quantity of salt the merchants took, was in general exported by sea to different places and disposed of at the company's golhas the freight of which was estimated at the rate of Rs. 12 per 100 mds. of salt.

The remaining salt made on account of the zamindars and other officers of the Maratha Govt. was kept for the consumption of the Division.

Under the Marathas in the Northern Division of the Province from the Mahanuddy to the Subarnarekha river, the manufacture had been generally a monopoly in the hands of the zamindars, but in the South of the Mahanuddy to Manick Patna, it had been conducted by the ryots, solely on their own account, on payment to the zamindar a high rent for all land adjacent to the sea, adapted for this purpose, generally Rs. 6 per bigha and furnishing him free of expense with the salt required for his household.

The price of Salt, on the average varied from 3 to 6 annas per md. varying to the season for production, demand and other circumstances, such as must always, attend an unsettled state of Govt. and the conduct of the officers deputed to collect the revenues and to govern the province.

No accurate estimate can be found of the quantity annually manufactured throughout the province, from the unwillingness of the inhabitants to give any information on that subject. It may however be computed at about 7 lakhs of md. of salt per annum out of which 3 lakhs were exported, rather smuggled, to Chattisgurh, Nayagurh, Singhoom and various parts of Maratha empire, from one to two lakhs to the *Hidgelle* district, and two lakhs remained for the consumption of the province.

During Bhawani Pandit's administration, the Maratha Govt. in order to incur the pleasure of the British made a treaty with Clive by which Bhawani Pandit would direct the zamindar to sell out their salt to the company only. Once Mr. Marriot who was appointed by the Board of trade to purchase salt complained that zamindars of Orissa were selling their new salt to other traders contrary to the treaty. Such a treaty, was apparently a check on free enterprise of salt under the Marathas. It would have bound the hands of the zamindars who were forced to sell out their salt to the company's servants without any regard to better profit. Such a treaty might have affected the economic condition of the zamindars. But the zamindars were able to smuggle the salt in large quantity every year which affected the company's interest.

Under the Marathas, we see there was no restriction on consumption of

salt, as it was under the British and salt was much cheaper inspite of smuggling than under the British who raised the price of salt four to five fold.

The Maratha Govt. also allowed a large quantity of salt free of price for the consumption of the Temple of Jagannath, which was disallowed on the British conquest.

B. PILGRIM TAX UNDER THE MARATHAS.

"The collection of the tax on behalf of the Maratha Govt. commenced at a place called Khuntaghata on the border of the Mayurbhanj territory." But this statement of Toynbee is not fully true. Indeed the pilgrim tax began at a place called Khuntaghata in Mayurbhanj territory but the money went to the treasury of Mayurbhanj kings. R. D. Banerjee says that the tribute of the Gurjat Rajas under the Marathas was much more than under the British. In order to prove his statement he says: "in 1822 the Garjat chiefs paid a fixed tribute of Rs. 1,20,411/-. This must have been much more under the Marathas as Mayurbhanj paid Rs. 6,000/- to them while it paid only Rs. 1,001/- to the British".

But it must be noted that Rani Sumitra Dei of Mayurbhanj petitioned to the British Govt. stating that she obtained nearly Rs. 10,000/- from Pilgrim tax under the Marathas. This petition was subsequently admitted by Commissioner Melville. Not only the Rajahs of Mayurbhanj but also the Rajahs of Nilgiri, obtained a portion of pilgrim tax under the Marathas.

From Khuntaghata to the Atharanala bridge Maratha Tahsildars were stationed to collect tolls from the pilgrims passing through each station. The Tahsildars issued them pass. The average annual revenue derived by the Marathas from the pilgrim tax and other fees connected with the great temple of Jaganath at Puri was near about 2 lakhs of Sicca Rupees.

HOUSE TAX :—The Marathas levied the tax professedly on only large towns. In Puri under the Marathas the number of houses were 9396. Of these 5757 were exempted from the tax, as being religious institutions and the annual revenue derived from the remainder was Rs. 10,195 sicca.

The Marathas granted a large number of sunnuds to the Brahmins granting them land to be held on rent free tenure.

THE MARATHAS AND THE RAJA OF KHURDHA.

A charge has been brought against the Marathas, by Sterling and others that they had plundered the ancient Royal House of Orissa i.e. the Raja of Khurdha, by increasing the tribute from £90,000 to £180,000 and as his revenue (public and private) was only £200,000, even the Maratha cavalry failed to make good this extortion.

It must be noted that the Rajah of Khurda was one of the most powerful chiefs. The Marathas took away four pargannas from him i.e. Serain, Chaibisa, Rahang and Lambai, but the Rajah also received a fixed tribute from the Marathas.

From the Calendar of Persian Correspondence it is known that the Raja of Khurda obtained a promise of 500 Tilangas from the chief of Ganjam and collected a large number of men intending to attack Jagannath. In view of this fact,

it is not a great surprise, that the Marathas would try to make exactions from the Raja. Several times he had tried to rebel against the Maratha rule. The nature of the zamindars during this period was revolting and refractory.

Mr. Ernst writes in 1805 that the zamindars of Balasore under the Marathas were in an imperfect state of obedience. The zamindars were not at all submissive to the Marathas as they were to the British.

Weak subadars were unable to bring these zamindars under control.

Mudhoji Hari, the Subadar of Orissa, was found incapable of punishing the zamindar of Kujang, who had seized a few Englishmen wrecked near Kujang. Mudhoji Hari was therefore dismissed and Rajaram Pandit was appointed as subadar of Orissa. He was engaged in reprimanding the refractory zamindars who sometimes used to fight with the regular army.

Sterling's view on condition of Orissa under the Marathas :—

The total revenue of Orissa under the Marathas fluctuated from 11 to 12 lakhs of rupees. "The excess of regular receipts under the head of land revenue alone may be stated from one to two lakhs per annum in favour of the British Govt. and the increase of which may be fairly ascribed to the improved and more lightened system of management pursued under the British. The memory of the 50 years of Maratha rule haunted the whole population like a night-mare long after it passed under the British rule. The result of the Maratha rule is a scene of extortion, desolation and rapine which even at this distance cannot be read without indignation and horror".

The collection of lesser amount of land revenue cannot be regarded as the sole proof of rapine and misrule, nor the sudden increase of land revenue, without taking into consideration the state of cultivation and quantity of production as a healthy sign of improved condition of the people. I have analysed the causes of such decrease of land revenue under the Marathas. Apart from this, there is ample evidence to show that the Marathas took into consideration the flood and inundation from which the province suffered frequently. For this also, the Govt. spent every year a huge sum on embankments. Thus the distance of the province from the seat of capital, the selfish interest of the officers, the refractory nature of the land holders together with the consideration of flood and drought etc. made the land revenue stand on a lower level than what it was under the Mughals or what it became under the British Govt.

"The administration of the Marathas in this as in every other parts of their foreign conquest was fatal to the welfare of the people and prosperity of the country, exhibits a picture of misrule, anarchy, rapacity and violence combined which makes one wonder how society can have kept together under so calamitous a tyranny". (Sterling's account). Mr. Hunter is also of the same opinion. By the oppression of the Maratha cavalry the peasantry used to fly away to the jungles and consequently the land remained uncultivated.

Several political factors were responsible for such condition of the country.

There was a constant change of subadars. This post was generally given to the person who could assure the highest amount of revenue. Once the subadar had assured such amount he tried his best to collect that money by

hook or by crook. Since Raghuji's reign the condition of Orissa went from bad to worse. Moreover, sometimes the subadar himself went against the Raja of Nagpur.

Sheo Bhat rebelled against the Govt. A few zamindars took his side. At last with British help the rebellion was crushed. This anarchy had encouraged the landlords to keep as much as possible for themselves and to give frequent battle to the Fouzdars. Apart from it the country was under frequent military occupation.

Maharaja Mudhoji Bhonsle sent forward 30,000 horses towards Cuttack in 1779 under his second son Chimnaji. The stationing of troops was a heavy expenditure in which the poor people of Orissa had to participate.

Apart from military occupation frequent incursions into the Midnapur territory of the company and the plunder of Balasore factory of the British increased the anarchy that prevailed. Under such maladministration, there is no surprise that the peasantry suffered.

"No trace of civil administration is available for that period and the collection of revenue in hilly frontier simply reduced itself to an annual campaign. The Maratha cavalry harried the country at stated periods each year and departed with the spoil. The village organisation formed the only sort of civil Government during the 40 years which preceded the British accession." (Hunter)

We know that during the period from 1770 to 1777 Orissa witnessed two famines.

Mudhoji Bhonsle wrote to the Governor-General about the condition of Orissa during these years. Referring to Col. Campbell's journey through Cuttack to Nagpur the Raja wrote that the passage through his country of Orissa cannot produce the least degree of anxiety. But as the country of Orissa had been laid waste these years through want of rain and other calamities the people had been reduced to great distress.

It does not seem that the Maratha Govt. took any effective measure to ameliorate the condition of the people so badly affected by the famine.

The whole revenue system was based on weak foundations, because the seat of government was far away, the subadarship was given to the highest bidder. It was weakened by the selfish motive of the Amils, the stubborn nature of the landlords. Constant military occupation did not keep any scope for civil administration. It is a fact and no conjecture that the rayot was oppressed more by the landlord who in his turn was fleeced by the Maratha officer.

USHA RAY.

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An Administrative Blueprint of 1785.

OF the many discussions, held at different administrative levels on the eve of the Permanent Settlement, the Grant-Shore and Shore-Cornwallis controversies are well known. Historical research, however, has yet to acknowledge the fact that in the decade that separated the Act of 1784 from that of 1793, many other fruitful debates had taken place in the Council and in the Board of Revenue among highly placed Government officials on the very same problems of revenue settlement and administration. Very much material concerning these still lies lost in dusty oblivion in the Proceedings of the Revenue Department of the Governor-General in Council and the Board of Revenue, and one wonders why even William Hunter, who is one person supposed to have been familiar with these archives, does not as much as honour these discussions with a mention. For to any one who has even idly rambled through these proceedings it is clear how these controversies recorded in lengthy communications and minutes, written sometimes in the impassioned style of a Mackenzie but more often in the sober tone of a Law or a Chapman, formed the very stuff out of which the vague and rather wishful Act of 1784 gathered substance enough to assume a concrete administrative shape in the Decennial Settlement and an elaborate legal shape in the Act of 1793.

One of the earliest of these debates is recorded in the Proceedings of the Revenue Department of the Governor-General in Council, dated the 10th May and the 18th May, 1785, during Macpherson's regime. The historical importance of this debate lies, first in the fact that it records some of the earliest reactions to the Act of 1784 among the Company's seniormost servants in India. Secondly, it reveals in an unmistakable fashion and in John Macpherson's own words the hesitancy and the indecision characteristic of that gentleman's short term of administration. Thirdly, it was in course of this debate that the Governor-General produced almost literally from his pocket John Shore's Memorial of 1782 which was as much a continuation of the ideas of Philip Francis as an anticipation of the Act of 1784.

PITT'S INDIA ACT OF 1784.

Pit's India Bill, made into law in 1784, brought the private interests of the East India Company directly in line with the interests of the empire. Therefore, "the Directors of the Company felt that they must put their house in order."¹ For the cracks in Warren Hastings' system had become too wide and obvious to be lightly papered over. Everywhere the old zemindary system was breaking down. Many of the ancient zemindar families were

(1) Romesh Dutt: "Economic History of British India", p. 81.

on the road to destitution, their estates having been auctioned out in whole or in part to farmers. Many others succeeded in retaining their properties only by placing themselves at the mercy of the usurers. Meanwhile, complaints of rackrenting and oppression by farmers started pouring in to the Council from the district officers, zemindars and ryots. And the only too recent disturbances of Rangpur were a sharp pointer that even the unshakable fortitude of the peasantry might be overstrained.

So far as the internal administration of the Company's territories was concerned, the Act of 1784 was an open acknowledgment that the Hastings' plan had outlived itself and that a radical change was required. But how exactly this change was going to be effected, was nowhere in this Act stated except in very vague terms, which fell short even of the provisions of Fox's abortive East India Bill. On the question of zemindaries, for instance, the Act of 1784 contents itself by merely showing an undefined bias in favour of a permanent settlement, but maintains a convenient silence about the knotty question of hereditary rights and unalterability of taxes. It was, as Mill correctly observes, even less than a palliative. The Directors, however, seem to have had little or no concern about the inadequacies of the law. They had almost a superstitious faith in Cornwallis' ability to make up for what had been left out of legislation. Meanwhile, however, between the departure of Warren Hastings and the arrival of Cornwallis, the day-to-day administration had to be carried on, the settlement for 1785-86 made and the business of collectors and investment continued by mediocrities who knew no magic.

The debate of 1785 shows how in this vacuum of twenty months that elapsed between the enactment (August 13, 1784) and its first elaborate interpretation by the Directors in their letter of the 12th April, 1786, two of the most responsible officials of the Company both drew upon the language and spirit of the Act seeking to wring out of it the promised solution of their problems; and how, since the solution was just not there, each of them argued so differently from the other that they reached almost as opposite conclusions as Francis and Hastings had done years ago.

CHARLES STUART'S PLAN².

In the preamble to his "Plan for Collecting the Revenues", dated April 1785, Charles Stuart, member of the Supreme Council, states that in drawing up the Plan, "I have attended to the spirit of the 39th Article of the late Act of Parliament in favour of the rights of Zemindars". The Plan opens with an attack on the existing system. But the criticism is limited to the principles of administration alone without even as much as raising the question of Zemindary rights and the propriety of the farming system. This was possibly because the probe into the complex problems of proprietorship had not yet begun. Bypassing these momentous issues which were to excite as

(2) Extracts quoted from Stuart's Plan are all taken out of the Proceedings of the Revenue Department, Governor-General in Council, dated the 10th May, 1785.

much controversy at a later date, the author directed his objections to the over-centralized system of revenue administration which since 1781 had reduced the Collectors to mere figure-heads by virtually entrusting the task of revenue collection to the Centre. This, said Stuart, helped nobody. The elimination of the intermediate agency of the Collectors meant no economy for the Zemindars. Forced by the distance between districts and Calcutta, they had to engage the expensive services of Vakeels who were often quite unreliable. Nor was this system of any advantage to the Government. In a statement of net receipts into the Treasury for the last twelve years from 1772-73 to 1783-84, Stuart showed that the average for the last three years fell far short of that for the years when the Collectors were in charge of collections. Thus, according to this statement the average of net receipts for the three years from 1781-82 to 1783-84 was Rs. 2,12,28,339 which was Rs. 18,23,638 less than the average for the period from 1772-73 to 1773-74³. From this he concluded that "Government benefited more by the former system of employing Collectors than they do by the present one".

REVENUE ADMINISTRATION.

The positive recommendations of the Plan begin with a new set of rules for the settlement of Company's territories. In the first place, Stuart proposed that the settlement should be made with "every Zemindar who is not totally incapable", and in case of a Zemindar being a minor or a female or otherwise considered incapable—with a near relative or an old servant of the zemindary. Significantly enough, he did not ask: "Who owns the land?" His unequivocal advocacy of a zemindary settlement and utter silence about traditional and legal rights in land may be interpreted to mean that by 1785 there were already a number of high officials in Bengal to whom the need for a zemindary settlement was beyond question. After the hopeless experience of the farming system they were convinced, empirically, of the benefit of a change-over to what seemed at that time the only other alternative. And they were eager to give it an immediate trial without considering it in the least necessary to consult the Hindu and Islamic law-books or the opinions of RoyRoyans and Canongoes. Many such uncritical protagonists of the zemindary settlement must have been trusted later on by Cornwallis to collect for him the local data on which alone depended the ultimate decision as to the

(3) In a note to his Plan, Stuart admits that "this account is not perfectly exact. . . . If, however, there is any difference in the sums . . . such difference extends to all the years here stated and will be found to make no alteration in the principle which I set out with, viz. that the net receipts into the treasury were greatly more formerly than they are at present." In fact, he found it necessary later on to correct these figures as is clear from a statement in his Minutes printed as evidence of Hasting's trial, according to which the average of the three later years would be Rs. 1,92,32,472 as against Rs. 2,12,70,739 for the two earlier years. This does not, however, change his contention which is confined also by Mill's estimate that in the year ending on 1st May, 1772, the net territorial revenues of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa amounted to £2,126,766 declining to £2,072,963 in the year ending on the same day in 1785.—Mill & Wilson: *History of British India*, Vol. IV., pp. 358-60.

desirability or otherwise of this system. No wonder, therefore, that conducted by officials biased *a priori* in favour of a settlement with zemindars, the seven years' rural investigation that preceded the Permanent Settlement produced next to nothing.

Secondly, Stuart recommended that the rate of assessment for the new Settlement should be the average of Collections for the three years from 1773-74 to 1775-76. "From the best information I have been able to obtain this was considered very equitable jumma." He was, however, ready to allow a certain amount of flexibility in the rate of assessment and added a note to say that the officers "need not be absolutely confined to the rate of assessment mentioned in the first part of the Plan." Only, the three years' average was "to be taken for the basis of all their settlements."

Thirdly, the settlement with the zemindars should be permanent. It was to remain experimental for the first year only "until we receive the orders of the Court of Directors upon the 39th Clause of the late Act of Parliament. But after that it will be proper to fix the Jumma unalterably during the lifetime of the zemindar."

Fourthly, Stuart proposed to enforce the payment of revenue in regular instalments (*kists*) on pain of public sale of a part of the defaulting zemindars' lands.

Would a Settlement, based on the above principles, mean an over-all loss in revenue to the Company? Stuart sought to disarm doubters by stating that although the proposed Jumma, amounting to Rs. 2,67,82,458 might appear less than the current Jumma of Rs. 2,75,59,000, nevertheless the net collections for the present year would by no means exceed Rs. 2,45,59,000, thus giving his recommendation a clear advantage of Rs. 22,23,458.(4)

Hardly more convincing than this wishful statistical inuddle is Stuart's prophecy of a golden age resulting from his settlement:

"At present the Zemindar collects the utmost his country can produce, and consequently rackrents his tenants. Could he be assured that Government would not raise their demands upon him, it would be his interest to encourage improvements. He would grow rich himself. The people under him would be happy....."

There, the classic illusion of the Permanent Settlement! As is well known from later history, nothing of the sort happened. The zemindar grew rich allright, but the people under him suffered a corresponding degree of pauperization. For neither Mr. Stuart's Plan nor its perfected prototype of 1793 pro-

(4) The figures quoted in this paragraph are a testimony to Stuart's excellent optimism—but nothing more than that. He calculates the proposed Jumma on the average of three years *gross* collections from 1773-74 to 1775-76 and compares it with the net collections expected in the current year. If the proposed Jumma is calculated on the average of net collections for those three years, as stated in Stuart's own account in the Minutes, it would amount to Rs. 2,31,10,495 which is Rs. 14,48,505 less than the expected net collections for the current year. If the average is calculated on the basis of Stuart's revised estimates of net collections for those three years as presented in his "Minute of Printed Evidence of Hastings' Trial" (Appendix, Art. VI., No. 157, p. 904), the deficiency increases still further.

vided any effective safeguard for the peasantry against rackrenting by zemindars.

THE SUPERINTENDENTS

The most striking reforms proposed by the Plan are those concerning the organization of revenue administration. By 1785 the Collectors stood shorn of all effective powers. The policy of revenue settlement was controlled by the Council, and its execution by the Committee of Revenue. The zemindars were encouraged to pay their revenue directly into the Khalsa at Calcutta, for the Collectors were not trusted. And not infrequently did the Committee send out specially empowered commissioners to the districts to conduct business over the heads of the Collectors. The result was that the Government's ignorance of agrarian conditions increased in direct proportion to its distrust of its local officers. And, as Ascoli puts it: "A combination of ignorance and distrust has never proved an administrative success." (5)

Stuart, like Shore, had clearly grasped the truth that the key link in the chain of the Company's administration was the Collectorship. His Plan for the restoration of zemindari was, therefore, based in its organizational aspect on a strong plea for the restoration of the Collectorships to their former importance. But not in the old way. By the former system the Collector's authority had been built up at the cost of the rights and status of the zemindar. The consequent lack of co-operation resulted in many impediments to the collection of revenues. "This was an evil productive of many inconveniences and will be rectified by the Plan which I wish to propose."

The three principal recommendations of the Plan concerning the collecting agency were: (a) appointment of European officers as Superintendents; (b) relative independence of the Superintendents in their function; (c) grant of adequate salaries for them.

The Superintendents would be required to combine collection of revenue with magisterial and judicial duties. But Stuart's emphasis was as much on an increase of their authority as on their being Europeans. The native *amils* employed for some time under Warren Hastings had proved to be a complete administrative failure. They had imported into the Company's service all the vices of corruption, graft and inefficiency characteristic of a moribund feudal bureaucracy, and unfortunately they had found nothing exemplary in the Company's service itself to learn from. But the time for turning the lights inwards had not yet come, for the powerful exposure of deficiencies in the civil service began only with the opening of Hastings' trial. So, to start with, the alien native element had to be purged, because "in times of exigency Government will be able to depend much more on every kind of execution upon European Superintendents than they possibly could do upon the Natives, who, it is not to be supposed, can be influenced by these ties which must ever bind the servants of the Company and subjects of Great Britain, to exert themselves with ardour in promoting the general welfare of the British nation." The Plan

(5) Ascoli: Early Revenue History of Bengal. p. 37.

suggested that the total number of district officers should be raised to thirty—fifteen Senior Merchants, ten Junior Merchants and five Factors—all serving as Superintendents in graded ranks.

Nowhere in his Minute, Stuart spoke openly of the evils resulting from the Council's lack of confidence in the independent exercise of authority by the Collectors. On this point, indeed, his proposed reforms fell short of the radical measures of the Cornwallis administration later on. Nevertheless, he made his inclination quite clear when he defined the relationship between the Council and the Superintendents under the proposed arrangement. Eager to relieve the Council of "all the trouble and difficulties which would necessarily arise from their entering into the detail of the business of the Superintendents"—a very mild description of what was in fact vexatious interference—Stuart recommended that the duty of maintaining a routine check over the work of the Superintendents should be delegated in monthly rotation to one of the members of the Council. He was to take his seat in the Khalsa, during his monthly term, as "Comptroller of the Collections". He "would never want for the best information with respect to the interior state of the Districts" and "it would be impossible for the Superintendents to deceive him even if they were so inclined." The independent exercise of authority by the Superintendents was emphasized further by the recommendations mentioned above, that the proposed rate of assessment would not be binding on them, but was to serve as only a "standard of expectation" and that "a latitude was given to the Superintendent to make the Jumma more or less according to local circumstances." Thus was to be restored that very important operative authority which was taken away from the district officers twelve years ago.

Finally, the question of salaries. Stuart touches upon the very heart of the problem of the Company's civil service when he says: "The allowances hitherto drawn by the Gentlemen employed in the collection and management of the revenue (excepting those at the head of the Department) have never amounted to more than a bare subsistence and in most places have not been equal to the unavoidable expences of the situation", thus forcing the Company's servants to take to "private business and other avocations." How true this observation was can be understood from the following letter addressed to the Council by the Chiefs and Collectors on the 21st April, 1785, and read out to the Council in the same meeting where Stuart presented his Minute.

"We humbly beg leave to represent that our salaries are not sufficient to support the respect due to our stations as delegates of Government in distant provinces, but have too much deference for the Hon'ble Board to point out the proper additions and rely on their justice to determine them."(6)

Among the fifteen signatories were some of the ablest senior district officers of the Company, such as, T. Law, M. Day, C. Chapman, T. Redfearn, W. A. Brooke, and E. Fenwick. The Plan, therefore, recommended "handsome salaries" for the Superintendents—Rs. 1,200, Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 800 respectively for the three grades in descending order—so that they should be

(6) Proc. Dept., G-G in C. (10 May, 1785).

“placed above every temptation that might lead to an infringement or a neglect of their duty.”

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

It has been noted above that Stuart's recommendation was to unite the the management of revenues and administration of justice in the same hands. Referring to “the clashing of the authority of the judges and of the officers of the revenue” under the system in force, he said that the authorities had decided upon a solution that amounted to a virtual suspension of justice for the greater part of the year.

“The evil existed in the disunion of the two authorities, and without again uniting them in the same person it became evident that one must be made a sacrifice of to the other it was in consequence determined that during the months of heavy collections, the administration of justice should be suspended altogether, which was accordingly done. The judges, therefore, do not at present sit above seven months in the year, a period by no means sufficient to enable them to keep up their business.”

A typical result of the inevitable delay in justice is recorded in a letter (12th April, 1875) addressed to the Government by C. Keating, magistrate of Backergunge.(7) He informs the Council that a large number of criminals are delivered monthly to the Fowjdary Adawlut. But delay in justice causes many deaths among the prisoners who are kept confined in an unhealthy straw-thatched place, awaiting trial. Since most of the cases relate to petty charges, such as using abusive language, petty assaults etc., and require very light punishment, the magistrate prays for additional powers to deal with such cases. And the Council decides to grant the prayer.

Thus, the anomaly arising out of an unnatural division of authority was sought to be remedied by a suspension of justice and the maladjustment resulting from the suspending of justice corrected by grants of additional powers to local officers. Stuart's recommendation breaks through this vicious circle by making the Superintendents responsible both for collection of revenues and the administration of justice.

From the resumé given above it should be clear that Charles Stuart's Plan of 1785 deserves historical recognition as one of the earliest blueprints of that administration which is credited to Cornwallis. Treated with a little more sympathy and decision on the part of John Macpherson, the Plan would not have been cold-storaged and ultimately forgotten. Had the Council decided in that transitional year of 1785 to give Stuart's recommendations an honest trial, Cornwallis on his arrival sixteen months later might have found something ready-made to work upon and the three wasteful years that passed between the Director's letter of the 12th April 1786 and the commencement of the Decennial Settlement could have been saved for better use. For on all essentials Stuart's Plan of April 1785 was as good a starting-point as those directives.

(7) Proc. Dept. G-G in C. (15th April, 1785).

JOHN SHORE'S UNPUBLISHED MEMORIAL OF 1782.

On the 18th May, 1782, John Macpherson, the Governor-General submitted to the Council his Minute in reply to Stuart's. Enclosed with this Minute was a Memorial, dated the 13th January, 1782, signed by John Shore.

The greater part of this Memorial is still unpublished, although its value as a document of great historical interest both for the history of the British administration in Bengal and for an understanding of the writer's personality is beyond question. Neither Firminger nor Hunter seems to have been acquainted with it. Among later scholars F. D. Ascoli is the only one who has left a record of his knowledge of this Memorial by quoting three lines from it without, however, a reference to his source.⁽⁸⁾ Remembering that in 1781 Shore was deputed as a special officer of the Committee of Revenue to make the settlement of Dacca, it is almost certain that the Memorial had been written out at Dacca in course of that year. It is likely, therefore, that a copy of it—may be, the original draft itself—was discovered by Ascoli during his investigation of the Dacca revenue papers. Our source, however, is the copy preserved in the Records Office of the West Bengal Government.

Shore's biographer quotes three extracts from the Memorial, but the title and the date he gives to this document are both wrong.⁽⁹⁾ The title given in the Proceedings is "Remarks on the Mode of Administering Justice to the Natives in Bengal and on the Collection of the Revenues" and not, as the biographer calls it, "Memoir on the Administration of Justice and Collection of Revenues". The biographer's date, 1785, is also three years in advance of the correct date, the 13th January, 1782.⁽¹⁰⁾

Concerning the origin of this document Macpherson says that it was one of the statements which were obtained by him for his personal use from some of the most experienced servants of the Company "containing their impartial sentiments . . . and suggesting to me the best plans for realizing a full and permanent payment of revenue from these provinces." The Memorial received from Shore, he says, "was not meant for the public eye, but to give me a clear view of the subject." The younger Teignmouth, however, gives a slightly different version which, if true, should be regarded as throwing new light both on the development of Shore's own ideas and his relations with Macpherson.

"The reflections communicated by Mr. Shore to Mr. Macpherson were coupled with the request that he would impart the substance of them to Mr. Hastings in the mildest terms. Mr. Macpherson whether through forgetfulness, or more culpable remissness, inserted them, as a Minute, on the Records of the Supreme Council; a breach of confidence which—as Mr. Macpherson, being Senior Member of the Council was destined to succeed Mr. Hastings in the Government—left Mr. Shore,

(8) Ascoli: *op. cit.* p. 36.

(9) Teignmouth: *Life of Lord Teignmouth*, vol. I, pp. 73-74, 485-88.

(10) Extracts from Shore's Memorial and Macpherson's Minute are all taken out of the Proceedings of Rev. Dept., G-G in C., of the 18th May, 1785.

in his own opinion, no alternative, but to resign his post on the occurrence of that event." (11)

From the trenchant criticism of the existing administration contained in the Memorial and from Macpherson's own words that this "was not meant for the public eye", it is easy to understand why John Shore, still a junior official, should have felt shy of Warren Hastings getting a scent of his "impartial sentiments." It is clear also that his hostility to Macpherson dates from this incident. That their relations were not at all unfriendly till the summer of 1785 is proved, first, by the fact that he had confidence enough in Macpherson to consider such a compromising document safe in his hands at a time when he himself was still not at the height of his career, and secondly, by the lavish eulogy, with which Macpherson introduces Shore's notes to the Council.(12) But the unreserved contempt with which Shore writes of Macpherson in a year's time shows that the "breach of confidence" had turned—at least on Shore's part—the former friendliness to bitter hostility.(13)

An incidental interest of Shore's Memorial lies in an elaborate estimate of the character of the natives of Bengal with which he actually opens the statement.

"Individuals", he says, "have little sense of honour and the nation is wholly void of public virtue ; they make not the least scruple of lying where falsehood is attended with advantage. . . ."

Again,

"With a Hindoo all is centred in himself, his own interest is his guide ; ambition is a secondary quality with him, and the love of money is the source of this passion. . . ."

These damning generalizations of an entire people, based evidently on experience of personal contact with those miserable specimens of humanity who alone among our countrymen had, at that epoch, offered their services to the conquerors as banyans, gomastahs, salt and opium contractors and so on, were, however, accompanied by a streak of inescapable self-criticism, as Shore observed :

"Those parts of our character which first drew their attention were bravery, clemency and good faith. They have since found that we are not wholly destitute of weaknesses and vices, and that Europeans, like all others, are open to temptations ; the respect they entertained for us as individuals or as a nation, is diminished, and they now consider themselves upon a more equal footing."

(11) Teignmouth: op. cit. pp. 98-99.

(12) "The universal testimony", says Macpherson in his Minute, "which the voice of the natives, the repeated approbation of this Government and the superior esteem of his fellow servants bore to the merits of Mr. Shore, renders it unnecessary for me to add to this praise, to which he was entitled for his knowledge and integrity in the administration of the revenue."

(13) Teignmouth: Op. cit. pp. 128-29. Shore's Letter to W. Bensley (13 Nov., 1786).

This verdict on native character leads logically to the suggestion that the Company's Government in this country "should, I think, be despotic", and between the governing authority and the subjects "I would preserve a great and respectable distance."

Behind this almost constitutional distrust of the Bengalees and the advocacy of a strong and despotic government there was a pronounced political motive "to provide against all contingencies". It is wise, he says, not to rely "on the peaceable disposition of the natives or on a supposed attachment to us, but establish such a comptrol in all parts of the country that in case of a foreign invasion by an European power, or of the inroads of an eastern enemy, or the event of rebellion in any part of our provinces, the payment of revenues may not be suspended, illicit correspondence or dangerous confederacies may be checked, and the contagion of rebellion stifled". Clearly the halcyon days of imperial expansion had not yet come. The year 1781 was a particularly difficult year. The war with the Marathas had not yet been concluded and Hyder Ali's war had just begun. The war in America was an added reason for being on guard against the other European powers in India, the French above all. Meanwhile, in Bengal itself bands of armed peasantry had joined the Chuars and the Sannyasis, reducing British rule to nothing in certain parts of the western and northern districts. Shore was right, therefore, when he advised that this was no time to relax, to trust, to be friendly with the natives. One of the principal theoreticians of the Permanent Settlement, he realized early enough that the social base of the British rule in Bengal, twenty-five years after Plassey, was still precariously narrow.

His recommendations for reform are based on three main principles: (a) thorough Europeanization of the Company's service in both the departments of justice and revenue; (b) unification of judicial and revenue administration in the same hands; and (c) appointment of district officers as Superintendents to carry out this twin responsibility.

These proposals bear a family resemblance to those of Stuart. In advocating these principles they both argued on the same lines. Was the Plan of 1785 inspired by the Memorial of 1782? There is no evidence to prove that it was, for Shore's document must have been still a matter of closed confidence between Macpherson and himself when Stuart submitted his Minute to the Council on the 10th May, 1785. To discount thus the probability of leakage is to add enormously to the stature of Charles Stuart, for in that case he would be proved to share with Shore himself the credit of having foreseen, long before the Permanent Settlement, the shape of things to come.

MACPHERSON'S REPLY.

The Governor-General Mr. Macpherson's reply to the far-sighted scheme of his colleague comes almost as an anti-climax, especially after he had tabled Shore's brilliant statement. But its historical interest lies precisely in its mediocrity. Full of hesitation and ambiguities, this document very clearly reflects the tone of the Macpherson administration.

On the question of uniting the responsibilities of justice and revenue collection in the same hands, the Governor-General differs with Shore and Stuart, when he says with characteristic indecision: "I very much doubt whether we are as yet sufficiently advanced to risk the consequences of vesting so unchecked a power generally in the hands of our servants. . . . Here I am sorry to be obliged to differ with Mr. Stuart in a leading principle of his system. . . ."

He is also not sure that Stuart's account of declining receipts is correct. He quotes figures to indicate a recent decline in balances which, says he, "is a strong proof of the progressive improvement of the Committee's system and a strong argument against innovation." Of course, the charges of collection have increased by about thirty lakhs in the last ten years since 1772-73, but "the increase might more properly be called the increasing expences of Government than the increased expences of the collection of the revenue." (14)

Fundamentally, Macpherson's weak-kneed defence of the existing system had its source in his fear of all change. He was shy of originality and as he himself admitted in his Minute, resistance to innovation was the very motto of his government: "When I succeeded in February last to the charge of my present office, I laid it down as a general and necessary principle to avoid innovation in the system of government, to endeavour to conduct the public affairs in the train in which they had devolved upon me, rectifying at the same time such abuses as could be remedied without any violence to established arrangements. . . ."

But the policy of no-change could but ill afford to stand its ground in an epoch when the old system was falling to pieces and a radical dismantling had been long overdue, so that before the powerful logic of the line advanced by Shore and Stuart the Governor-General yielded in an amazing confession of weakness. He said that if the majority of the Council differed with him and found Stuart's Plan good enough to be put to execution without risk, he would give his entire support to such a decision despite his own disagreement. As an example of vacillation this has no parallel in the record of the omnipotent Governor-Generals of the 18th century. A Warren Hastings would have fought a duel and a Cornwallis resigned office with lordly dignity rather than give up his ground so sneakishly.

RANAJIT GUHA.

(14) It is interesting to note that Wilson justifies this strange logic. See Mill & Wilson—op. cit., p. 360, footnote.

Our Library Table.

REVIEWS

Dara Shukoh by Dr. K. R. Qanungo (S. C. Sarkar & Sons), Second edition.

This is a reprint of Dr. Qanungo's *Dara Shukoh* (First edition) without any change or addition in the text. The author promises to incorporate the new material he has collected during eighteen years in Vol. II of this work.

Dr. Qanungo studies Dara Shukoh in the context of a great religious and literary movement for the adaptation of Islam to the spiritual traditions of India. This futile statesman, a Moslem intellectual, who translated 52 Upanishads into graceful and masterly Persian prose, occupies a place which is second only to that of Akbar in the cultural history of India. This aspect of Dara's career has been sympathetically delineated.

N. K. SINHA.

The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal from 1704-1740 by Sukumar Bhattacharya (Luzac & Company).

In this monograph Dr. Bhattacharya has traced the course of events in Bengal from 1704 to 1740 with special reference to the activities of the English East India Company. He also writes incidentally about other European traders, about mints and currency, markets and trade. He thus supplements the works of C. R. Wilson (*Early Annals*) and Little (*House of Jagat Seth in Bengal Past and Present*). The Fort William Consultations which flow from 1704 to 1740 without a break, form the main source of information. We get a good idea of the increasing prosperity of the English East India Company during this period.

Selections from Unpublished Correspondence of the Judge—Magistrate and the Judge of Patna, 1790-1857. Compiled and edited by Dr. K. K. Dutt. (The Superintendent, Government Printing Press, Bihar), pp. 422.

These records were originally in the record room of the District Judge of Patna. They have been arranged by the editor into four categories—political, administrative, socio-economic and cultural, with different subsections for each.

These records are mainly of local interest. But there are some papers which would arouse the interest of scholars who are working in other fields of Indian history. Some records concern the treason trial of Mirza Jan Tuppih, who was accused of conspiring with others to invite Zaman Shah of Kabul

to this part of India. Some new light is thrown on British relations with Nepal in the opening years of the nineteenth century. There is an interesting letter relating to slavery (pp. 174, 175). More records on this subject are to be found in the district record office of the Twenty-four Parganas. The establishment for the trial of thugs was practically disbanded in Bihar in 1844 though as many as eleven persons were arrested on this charge in 1847. Even as late as 1854 thuggy returns were submitted. The population estimates (pp. 331-332) in these papers make interesting reading. The judicial and education records in this collection are to be found in other district record offices as well. Attention should, however, be drawn to them. In 1845, 101 village schools were founded to impart useful elementary education in the vernacular language. The teachers were given living wages. It would be interesting to trace how their lot gradually worsened even in government sponsored elementary schools.

N. K. SINHA.

Report of the Secretary West Bengal Regional Records Survey Committee (1954-55).

I am very sorry to report that this year our activity has been less fruitful than in any previous year. We are perhaps not to blame for this. If we do not find a mere sympathetic consideration from those who are in a position to help us, we face the danger of becoming one of the most useless Committees set up by the West Bengal Government.

We resolved in our meeting held on 18-7-53 that a descriptive list of the Sadar Dewani, Sadar Nizamat and Supreme Court records should be prepared for the use of research workers. Our idea was to prepare a full descriptive list with indicative or informative abstracts. Bare hand-lists are of no use. The plan was to publish this descriptive list serially in the annual reports of this Committee. In order to do this efficiently at least two whole-time workers are necessary. I therefore saw Mr. C. Gilpatric, Assistant Director of the Rockefeller Foundations when he came to Calcutta in October 1954, and he agreed to make a grant of Rs. 12,000/- in two years for this purpose. According to this plan two wholetime research workers each on Rs. 200/- per month would assist in this work. Two Calcutta College Lecturers, who are competent scholars, offered to resign from their colleges and work as wholetime paid research workers under this scheme. I wrote to the Registrar, Original Side, Calcutta High Court. Mr. Atul Chandra Gupta also wrote to the Secretary to the Chief Justice recommending our application for favourable consideration. Then followed prolonged correspondence and interviews. At long last I was informed by the Registrar, Original Side, Calcutta High Court that "as the nature and examination of records proposed to be undertaken will require the deputation of two assistants for attendance for an indefinite length of time it is regretted that the necessary facilities cannot be arranged for"—(2nd June, 1955). I wrote in reply immediately to the Registrar enquiring whether the application would be favourably considered if arrangements could be made for the payment of the salaries of two assistants to be appointed by him for this purpose temporarily for two years. He wrote in reply, "the Court's difficulty does not lie in having to pay the Court's assistants. Nor can the Court employ new assistants as its staff strength is limited." In these circumstances I had to write to Mr. Gilpatric that I was not in a position to utilise the grant to be made for this purpose. Mr. Gilpatric replied, "I am sorry that after your well-intentioned and admirably persistent efforts you have had a negative decision regarding the use of materials in the High Court in Calcutta."

We have thus met with a rebuff. It would be relevant to mention in this connection that I did some research work in the High Court Record Office in 1946 and in 1947 altogether for 182 days. Two other research workers,

Mr. Tarit Kumar Mukherjee and Dr. Tapan Kumar Raichaudhuri, also worked there for sometime. I can assure you that we did not abuse our privileges in any way. But the facilities which we could obtain before independence are unobtainable now. The Registrar, High Court, Original Side, was very outspoken. He told me that in the changed state of this there was no use referring to the precedent of 1946-47.

From the experience I could acquire in 1946-47 of the contents of the old High Court records of the eighteenth century I can very well assess the importance of the records of the nineteenth century in the High Court Record Office. The Calcutta High Court has a matchless collection of old documents for the social, economic and administrative history not only of Bengal but of the whole of Upper India over which its jurisdiction extended until the 60's of the nineteenth century. I can very well guess that on various topics such as European commerce in India, high finance, growth of the Indian middle class, wages, prices etc. the records of the Supreme Court—the judicial exhibits—will throw very valuable light. We expect to get a much better picture of rural India in the Sadar Dewani and Sadar Nizamat Adalat papers than even in the records in the Secretariat Record Room. These judicial records have not been utilised because there is no chart for guiding the students of history through this wilderness. How long must we wait for it?

In accordance with our resolution to explore the old records of European Commercial Firms I approached several European firms through the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. I quote extracts from three letters because they are characteristic—

"I regret to inform you that although one of the oldest British firms operating in India we have no old records. Most unfortunately all these were destroyed about 1922 through a mistake of one of the assistants and we have nothing prior to that date which is, of course, scarcely of any interest."

(Gladstone Lyall & Co.)

"Much as we would have liked to assist in your survey of old records we regret our inability to do so. At the beginning of 1954 we moved our office accommodation . . . and the opportunity was naturally taken at this time to have a thorough cleanout of all old documents." (Mackinnon Mackenzie).

"We recently destroyed all our old records on the occasion of our moving our office . . . the old records which are available are unfortunately not in Calcutta but in London."

(Mackintosh Burn Ltd.)

Exploratory work has therefore no prospect in this field.

I was informed by one of our members that the St. Xavier's College possess a good collection of old letters and manuscripts. I wrote to the Rector, St. Xavier's College that we would be very much obliged if some of us who know French could be given access to the collection of letters edifiantes and to the manuscripts in Goethel's Library. I received the following letter in reply—"the Letters Edifiantes is the title of a printed work. It does not deal directly with Indian affairs but has snatches of letters written by Missionaries from foreign countries . . . In view of the private character of the Goethel's

Library, corresponding to a well defined purpose and hedged round by most solemn promises exacted in the late Dr. Goethel's will—we would ask you to drop the idea of an inspection."

Under these circumstances nothing could be done here also.

We have begun a more intensive survey of old Midnapore land revenue papers. Professors Tarit Kumar Mukherjee and Arun Kumar Das Gupta inspected the old English Correspondence volumes—land revenue—covering the period from 1783 to 1803. It would be necessary to carry out examination of these records upto 1818 in order to illustrate very fully the immediate effects of the introduction of the Permanent Settlement in the district. We hope to finish this work in October next. We have reasons to believe that the publication of these land revenue records like the publication of salt papers will help to give us a much clearer picture of the economic condition in rural Bengal of those days than we have at present.

In this connection I may be permitted to draw the attention of the members to the absence of all preservation arrangements in this district record office. One of the assistants of the local record office, who was trained in preservation in the West Bengal Secretariat Record Office, has been transferred to another Government Office in Midnapore. Professors Mukherjee and Das Gupta report that dusting is not done and the volumes once used, have not been kept in their proper place. They had to find out for themselves the volumes they wanted and do the dusting themselves before they could read them. If this state of things is allowed to continue longer the old records will very soon become so brittle and worm-eaten that it would be very difficult to read them. The growing neglect of old district records in the district record offices has created a problem.

The old district records have not been brought to the Secretariat Record Room because there is no accommodation here. But we would expect a preferential treatment for old historical records in Midnapore because in Midnapore alone we have an unbroken continuous series. The old records in other districts are more or less of a fragmentary nature. They may be brought if and when more accommodation is available. But in view of the richness, integrity and variety of records and in the interest of research the old English Correspondence volumes in Midnapore should be brought to the Secretariat Record Room without any further delay. Their total number will not exceed 2000 volumes. We want to make a special study of Midnapore district records. Government at least ought to help us to do something useful.

This Committee is regarded by the Government as its advisory body on matters relating to true records. As you know a selection of old district records—Midnapore Salt papers—has been published by this Committee, the Government of West Bengal providing the necessary funds. This publication has received high praise from all competent scholars. But a very awkward position has been created for this Committee by the publication of West Bengal district records—new series—from the Census Superintendent's Office. We had also announced that we were going to start a new series. This duplication should be prevented. The first publication of the new series from the Census Office—Birbhum District Records—does not conform to certain accepted

principles of the publication of old local records. This raises a very fundamental question of our advisory capacity. I was directed by the Chairman to see the Education Secretary for a solution of this tangle. In my interview with him in the beginning of March, 1955 the Education Secretary gave me an assurance that a resolution would be found. A further communication in this connection is still waited for.

West Bengal lags behind most of the other Indian States in its record-mindedness. Even the East Pakistan Government is collecting all the old district records in its Secretariat Record Office in Dacca. I have been told that this work will soon be completed.

There is no central record office in West Bengal. A resolution for the creation of a Central Record Office was moved in the Legislative Council. An assurance was given that necessary steps would soon be taken. I am told that the matter is receiving active consideration. So widespread is the lack of consciousness of the importance of our heritage of old historical records that the work of this Committee makes little progress. The creation of a Central Record Office can alone create record-consciousness in this State.

We have a unique collection of basic materials for social studies but they lie scattered and neglected and there is no useful guide to help research workers to choose their subject and use the records in an intelligent manner. But, though scattered and neglected, the old records still exist and in the new set up it is natural to expect that we shall have satisfactory arrangements for their preservation and profitable use.

Calcutta Historical Society.

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING.

The Annual General Meeting of the Calcutta Historical Society was held in the residence of Sir Jadunath Sarkar at 10, Lake Terrace, Calcutta-29, on Tuesday, the 5th April, 1955 at 5-30 P.M.

Present—Dr. Jadunath Sarkar (in the Chair)

Khan Bahadur G. A. Dossani
Dr. Narendra Krishna Sinha
Prof. Tarit Kumar Mukerjee
Sri Narendranath Ganguly
,, Gopinath Chandra
,, P. C. Chatterjee
,, Birendra Nath Bose
,, Tapanmohan Chatterjee

The Annual Report for the year ending 31st December, 1954 was read by the Joint Hony. Secretary Sri Narendranath Ganguly.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CALCUTTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY FOR THE YEAR ENDING 31ST DECEMBER, 1954.

In presenting the Annual Report of the Calcutta Historical Society for the year ending 31st December, 1954, it is pleasing to note that passing through many vicissitudes in the past the Society has been able to step into the 49th year of its existence. This would not have been possible but for the whole hearted and warm support of Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt., C.I.E., D.Litt and Major Harry Hobbs, M.B.E., V.D., who even at the age of 84 and 92 respectively never hesitate to come forward to help the Society with their advice and guidance.

Financial Position. It will be seen from the Balance Sheet drawn up and submitted by our auditors Messrs. Lovelock & Lewis after auditing the accounts of the Society for the year ending 31st December 1954, that the Credit Balance at the Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. up to 31st December 1954 was Rs. 2,264-14-6 ; out of which the sum of Rs. 56-6-7 belongs to the Index Fund, and Rs. 2,208-7-11 to the General Fund including the Fixed Deposit of Rs. 1,000/- which has been renewed for a further period of one year.

It may also be recorded here that according to the certificates of the Mercantile Bank of India Ltd. dated the 14th February 1955 to the Honorary

Treasurer of the Society the numbers of the three Fixed Deposits amounting to Rs. 1,000/- with the Mercantile Bank are :

(i) F.D.R. No. 95/145	for Rs. 500/-
(ii) Do. No. 95/17	for Rs. 300/-
(iii) Do. No. 93/8	for Rs. 200/-
<hr/>			
Total Rs. 1,000/-			<hr/>

and their Original Receipts are in the safe custody of the Mercantile Bank of India Ltd., as per their letters addressed to the Honorary Treasurer of the Society.

It may be mentioned here that the subscriptions of ordinary members amounting to Rs. 480/- were in arrears at the end of the year 1954, that a portion thereof, viz. Rs. 100/- has since been realised, and it is hoped that these members who are still in arrears will please arrange to pay their respective subscriptions as early as possible.

Publication of the Society. The Editorial Committee were able to publish two numbers of "Bengal: Past and Present" during the year under review, and this was rendered possible by the grant the Society received from the Government of West Bengal during that year ; and this important activity of the Editorial Committee can be continued together with their other activities provided they receive regularly a substantial grant from the Government of West Bengal.

The Executive and Editorial Committees express their sincere thanks to those honorary office bearers who inspite of their manifold duties have devoted their valuable time to the cause of the Society and its journal Bengal : Past and Present.

The Society also express its sincere gratitude to those gentlemen who helped the Journal with their contributions to maintain its standard of excellence.

NARENDRANATH GANGULY,
Jt. Honorary Secretary.

Dr. Narendra Krishna Sinha proposed the adoption of the annual report. Prof. Tarit Kumar Mukerjee seconded the motion which was carried unanimously.

Khan Bahadur G. A. Dossani, the Hony. Treasurer of the Society then read the audited financial statement of the Society for the year ending 31st December 1954, and laid on the table the balance sheet drawn up by Messrs Lovelock & Lewis the Honorary Auditors of the Society.

Sri P. C. Chatterjee proposed the adoption of the audited account, on being seconded by Prof. Tarit Kumar Mukerjee the motion was carried.

Sri Narendranath Ganguly, the Jt. Hony. Secretary of the Society on account of his broken health submitted his letter of resignation to the Society, which was read ; but after discussion the Hony. Asstt. Secretary Prof. Tarit

Kumar Mukerjee having agreed to render his assistance to Sri N. Ganguly, and also to Sri B. N. Bose in carrying on the work of the Society, Sri Ganguly, subsequently agreed to withdraw his letter, and to render his services to the Society, as far as possible even in the present state of his health.

Election of Office Bearers. Sri N. Ganguly, Sri B. N. Bose and Sri Tarit K. Mukerjee were elected joint secretaries.

The Editors and Treasurers of the previous year were re-elected.

On the proposal of Sri N. Ganguly, Sri Gopinath Chandra (Keeper of the Records of the Government of West Bengal), Pramil Bose (Librarian, Calcutta University), and Sri Nalinaksha Das (Head Assistant of Messrs. Lovelock & Lewis) were elected as members of the Executive Committee in the places of Raja Kshitendra Deb Rai Rai Mohashai, Mrs. Y. M. Mulay and Mr. B. S. Kesavan.

Regarding the question of accommodation of the back numbers of the Society's journal, Index Volumes, etc.—it was agreed that negotiations be opened with the Calcutta University for taking over our back numbers of B. P. & P., etc., the terms to be referred to our members for approval.

On the proposal of Dr. Narendra Krishna Sinha Prof. P. C. Gupta and Prof. S. P. Sen of the Calcutta University were elected as members of the Society.

Sri N. Ganguly proposed that those office bearers who devote their time and energy to the cause of the Society and its journal may be made Honorary Members, and also be entitled to exercise their votes at the meeting, which proposal was carried.

No. 104(5) R.R.

In reply to letter——dated 19th March 1955 from the Asst.
10C—7/55

Secretary to the Government of West Bengal (Education) Records Dept.—
the following resolution was passed—


RESOLUTION.

With a view to encouraging learned Societies and Universities to take a more active interest in the study of regional and local history, this Society requests the Government of West Bengal to secure copies of all records of the Company's period in the National Archives of India which relate to Bengal and which are not to be found in the record office of the Government of West Bengal.



Explanatory note—Resolution II of the Research and Publication Committee of the Indian Historical Records Commission passed at its 23rd meeting wants to encourage research in regional and local history.

In West Bengal this study of local history has immense possibilities. But with a view to creating a congenial atmosphere it is necessary to make all records available in the West Bengal Secretariat Record Office.

19th March, 1955.



BENGAL PAST & PRESENT



JOURNAL OF THE CALCUTTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

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The Jat Dynasty of Bharatpur.

INTRODUCTION

THE Jat race threatened for a few years to dominate the Mughal Empire by spreading their rule over the country from Agra to Maidangarhi (a few miles south of the Qutb Minar), the Jamuna East bank (Doab) and northern Malwa. Under their Rajahs Suraj Mal and Jawahir Singh they were a power to be reckoned with by even the English Government of Calcutta. A Flemish Jesuit named Father Francis Xavier Wendel, who worked at Agra, supplied secret intelligence about them to the E. I. Co's officers in Bengal and served as a sort of agent or spy to Warren Hastings. He is noticed in the *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, and a history of the Bharatpur royal house (ending before Jawahir Singh's death in 1768) which he wrote in French for Warren Hastings, is preserved in two mss of the India Office Library, London. I have secured a transcript of it and made a summary translation (not yet published.)

A much more valuable history of the same family, coming down to the capture of the fort of Bharatpur by the English in 1826, written in Persian by a German native of Poland, is introduced to the student of Indian history in my present paper.

A German of Poland, named Johan Gottlieb Kuen (Kuhn or Cohen?) migrated to India at the age of 17 and evidently entered the corps of European military adventurers under Walter Reinhard, better known as Sombre or Samru. After Samru's death in the Delhi Emperor's service in May 1778, his second wife, the famous Begam Samru who had been baptised as a Christian, ruled his jagir, the principality of Sardhana in the Mirat district, till her death in 1836. Gottlieb married a daughter of Captain Lefevre Chevalier, a Europe-born Frenchman. A younger daughter of Lefevre, named Juliana (born in 1770) was married to Zafar-yab Khan, the son of Reinhard by his first Muslim wife, who was baptised. The only surviving issue of Zafar Yab (d. 1802) and Juliana (d. 1815) was Julia Anne, who was given in marriage to Col. G. A. Dyce, a Scotchman in the Begam's service, in October 1806, and their son was the famous David Ochterlony Dyce Sombre (born in 1808) whom Begam Samru adopted as her heir.

The Polish immigrant's son Franz Gottlieb Kuen, was born on 15th March 1777, in the *Katra* or enclosure of Begam Samru's mansion in Chandni Chauk, Delhi. The lad was cherished and brought up by Begam Samru, on account of their close relationship, his mother being her step-son's sister-in-law. Franz received his education through Persian in the semi-Oriental court of the Begam, and later became an expert author in Persian and Urdu, especially poetry. He took as his master the famous Urdu poet Shah Nasir of Delhi and wrote under the pen-name of *Fransoo*, dying in 1861. During the Mutiny of 1857,

he was bound hand and foot by the mutinous sepoy, and dragged about with his mistress Bakhshu Bai, till he secured his release for a ransom of Rs. 600.

Eleven works from the pen of Fransoo are listed by Dr. S. Md. Abdullah in an article published in the *Oriental College Magazine* of Lahore, May 1944, as available in the Lahore libraries. Among them are the following:—

1. *Qasida-i-Mubarakbad-i-Fath-i-qila Bharatpur*, (Persian poem),
2. *Mirat-i-Hasn-o-Ishq* (Urdu prose),
3. *Musarrat-afza* (Urdu prose),
4. *Zafar-al-Zafar Fathnamah* (Persian poem on the Mutiny),
5. *Diwan* or collection of poems in Urdu. [Mss. preserved in the Lahore Public Library and also in the Lala Sri Ram collection housed in the Benares Hindu University.]

In addition to these, he also wrote a *History of the Bharatpur Raj family* in Persian prose, for presentation to Captain Abraham Lockett, after the British capture of Bharatpur in 1826. The only known ms. of it is preserved in the British Museum, London : *Pers. Add.* 19,501, folios 66, with 15 lines to the page. (Rieu's *Catalogue*, i. 305.) I have made my English version from a rotographic copy of it. Most of the earlier dates and many Indian names in this book, which Franz derived from the Persian munshis of the Bharatpur court (probably at the Delhi Residency) are incorrect, and some dates are left blank.

TRANSLATION

(*Br. Mus. Pers. Add.* 19,501)

[folio 14a] The Rajas of the Braja country were first Muhakam, second Badan, third Suraj Mal, [14 b] fourth Jawahir, fifth Nawal, sixth Ratan, seventh Ranjit. To Ranjit [succeeded Randhir and Baldeo.]

Genealogy.—To Sobha was born Bhupal, to Bhupal Ajpal Mahatpal, to Mahatpal Durpal, to Durpal Rathpal, to Rathpal Churaman I, to Churaman I Bijay, to Bijay Lakpat, to Lakpat Bhunta. Two sons were born to Bhunta, namely Bhao Singh and Churaman II. Bhao Singh's sons were Rup S. and Badan S., while Churaman's son was Muhakam Singh.

Muhakam Singh, aided by fortune, became [the first] Raja among the people of Braja [=the Mathura country.] His father Churaman in the abundance of wealth, had built a fort in the city of Thun, appertaining to Nagar, and Muhakam set up his *raj* in that place.

Badan Singh the son of Bhao S., was an unrivalled soldier and javelin-thrower. Raja Muhakam S, on learning of his bravery, in far-sighted bravery threw [15a] him into prison, admitting none to him. Badan lived in prison, in great sorrow and hardship, constantly praying to God. After some time 22 sardars of the Braja Jat tribe, requested Muhakam to set Badan free. The Raja refused.

So they appealed to Muhakam Singh's Guru Makhandās Bairāgi, touching his feet and praying for Badan Singh's release. The holy man ordered Raja

Muhakam Singh to set Badan Singh free. Muhakam replied, "I have not the power to disobey your command. But I know for certain that your Holiness has now [16a] transferred the sovereignty of Braj from me to the hands of Badan Singh. I shall order his release, as a means of my salvation." Badan Singh on being set free, returned to his own home and planned how to overthrow Mahakam Singh.

Sometime passed in this way, then Badan Singh, one day, getting an opportunity, went to Jaipur and became a servant of Raja Jai Singh Sawāi. By his able services and the risking of his life he gained the favour of Jai Singh and in time became one of his personal attendants (*qurb.*)

[16b] One day getting a favourable chance, he told the Maharajah, "All the great Rajahs are obedient to you. Only the rebel Muhakam Singh by collecting a vast treasure by his robbery on the roads, sits in insolent pride in his castle of Thun and is gathering forces to make himself independent. The mischief can be easily cured now, but in time it will grow to unmanageable strength. If you order your troops [17a] to level Thun Fort to the ground and slay the rebel Muhakam Singh, your rule will prevail in the Braj country."

Maharajah Jai Singh agreeing, set out with a vast army and invested Thun fort from all sides, and bombarded it. Muhakam fought bravely. Badan Singh—who was a man of unrivalled cunning, corrupted many of the captains of Muhakam Singh with seductive words and promises of money. Muhakam Singh, on perceiving that his troops inclined towards his [17b] enemy, planned to escape from the fort.

After two months had passed, Muhakam Singh dug mines at places within the fort and spread gun-powder on their floors, and himself escaped in the darkness of the night. Next morning, spies reported the enemy's flight to Jai Singh. The music of victory was played. Jai Singh wanted to enter the fort with his chiefs and see its houses, but [18a] Badan Singh very wisely dissuaded him, urging the cunning of Muhakam Singh and induced him to put off the visit by one day. Jai Singh agreed. Nearly three hours of the day passed in this discussion, when the mines within the fort began to explode one after another, hurling the stones through the sky.

[18b] Jai Singh highly praised the farsighted wisdom of Badan Singh and thanked him for having saved his life and those of his companions by warning them not to enter the fort. He then granted to Badan Singh, as a reward for his devotion and good services, Mathurā, Vrindāvan, Mahāvan, the parganas of Hisār, Chhāth, Kosi, Hodal etc. of that tract, which had a total revenue of 50 or 60 lakhs of Rupees. In the city and fort of Thun he had the ground ploughed by asses, and levelled them to the dust. On Badan Singh he conferred the title of Raja, the right of coining, the five-coloured flag, the Kotwali (police headship) of the chief town (*sadar*) [Agra].

Marching thence Jai Singh arrived in the middle of the city of Dig, laid the first brick for the foundation of the fort of Dig with his own gracious hand, and issued orders for its being built. From that day Badan Singh built the fort of Dig and strengthened the foundations of his Rāj. [19a] In former times, Churaman the father of Muhakam Singh had given as jagir of Badan Singh the village of Kumbhir which from ancient times had come down as the

zamindari of this clan [and where] Badan Singh had built many houses, a harem-palace and a fort.

Badan Singh had nearly four hundred Rānis as his wives, and each of them was in beauty of face like a shining star ; he had 20 sons by them like Surajmal, Pratap Singh, Akhi Singh, Sobharam, Bhawani Singh, Balram, Sultan Singh, Ummid Singh etc. He put to death the countless daughters that were born to him. The Emperors Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan had taken daughters of the houses of Jaipur and Jodhpur ; the Jat Rajas feared lest such a demand should be made on their family. Thus the shedding of daughters' blood came to prevail among the Rajas of Braj.

[19b] Muhakam Singh, going to the Deccan entered the service of Malhār Rao, and in 5 or 6 years by his devoted service won the favour of Malhār Rao. At last, after bringing with himself a large (Maratha) army, he encamped in the very site of fort Thun, and ploughing the site with elephants, sowed there pearls instead of grain. Thereafter he fought great battles with the fort of Dig. By chance Apa Khande Rao, was killed by a musket shot.* At this the Maratha army in despair and distraction, went off towards Jodhpur etc. Muhakam Singh in helplessness, came to Suraj Mal, and saw him. Suraj Mal received him with all honours, and fixed one Rupee per village in all the taluqs of his kingdom as the nazrana of Muhakam Singh. But in the place of the right to ride on horses elephants and palkis, he allowed Muhakam Singh to ride on *Chārpāis*, so that Muhakam Singh accompanied by the party of his followers, at the head (?) of asses, went to the villages seated on a *charpai*, to collect the appointed money.

When a long time had passed, in the year 1820 Samvat [1763 A.D.] Muhakam Singh during the reign of Raja Ranjit Singh, came to Phulbāri, [garden palace outside Bharatpur], [20a] and interviewed the Raja, who in view of their relationship, gave him a sum of money. Muhakam stayed there for some days, then went to Ajmer, and died before Habuāram [Jivāram] Jat, an inhabitant of village Banchari, who was the factotum of the administration of Maharaja Sindhia [a mistake for Suraj Mal].

Badan Singh after twenty years on the throne was afflicted by blindness ; he placed on the throne his eldest son, Suraj Mal, born of Rani Devaki of village Kāma of the Jat tribe, and himself abandoned the world, spending his days in meditation on Bhagwān. He kept in his own hands the revenue of village Kasāwali in pargana Dig, for supporting beggars, but gave all the kingdom and treasury to Suraj Mal. He continued to live as a blind man for 20 years more.

In the month of Jaith Sudi Ekadasi Sambat 1813 [9 June 1756] he gave up this world.

[20b] *History of Suraj Mal*.—Raja Suraj Mal was endowed with all the qualities of a ruler. He built or repaired the forts of Dig and Ver.....and succeeded by his good government in vastly increasing his territory and treasure.

* Khandoji Holkar, only son of Malhar Rao Holkar and husband of Ahalya Bai, was killed before Kumbher, about 15 March 1754. (See my *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, i. 292.)

In the environs of the village of Bharatpur in pargana Ahrak (Ahring) there was at first a small *garhi* (fortalice) belonging to Khemā Thākur a notorious robber and captain of Sukarwala. Rajah Suraj Mal set himself to suppress him; in the course of time he demolished the *garhi* of Bharatpur, the abode of the abovenamed Thākur, and built a grand fort there, spacious and lofty, with bastions reaching up to the sky.

As Khemā was an expert in the art of defeating tigers by wrestling, the Emperor of Delhi on hearing of his bravery, summoned him to give an exhibition of his power. Khemā went there and killed 2 or 3 big tigers with his own hands. The [21a] Emperor being highly pleased, rewarded him with a horse, a robe of honour, and the subahdari of Agra. Suraj Mal on hearing of it, planned to destroy him; so, he wrote to Bhundārām, an inhabitant of Aring, who was his kinsman (*biradari*) and enjoyed a *jaidad* of three lakhs of Rupees from Suraj Mal's government, to kill Thākur Khemā, who was his neighbour, in any way he could, for which he would be highly rewarded. When Khem (sic) Thākur arrived at Aring, Bhundaram welcomed him with all honours and induced him to halt there, but put poison in his food. The poison spread to all his limbs and robbed him of his senses. At this Khamā Thākur with his present attendants went off on an elephant to village Mutia, [21b] Fathpur, llaqa, at a distance of 7 or 8 kos, with the Thakur of which village he had friendly relations. The Thakur tried medicines to cure him, without success. At last he died on the third day.

At this time enmity broke out between Ghaziuddin Khan and Mansur Ali Khan and great battles were fought between them at Delhi. Mansur Ali Khan begged aid of Suraj Mal. When Mansur Ali Khan after gaining the victory went off to Lucknow, he resigned to Suraj Mal all the treasure, jewels and other things seized as booty during the war, and gave him the country of Koil, Khurjā etc., in all yielding a krór of Rupees as revenue. He gave Suraj Mal the name of Farzand-i-nāmdār, with the title of Bahadur and a splendid *khillat*.

[22a] As Suraj Mal got possession of treasure beyond imagination, he built at different places forts and grand palaces, such as Dig, Kumbher, Ver, Bharatpur, Ramghāt, Ramgarh (alias Aligarh), fort of Khurja, and Kishangarh, and other wonderful places and new gardens.

On Paush Badi 12th* Samvat 1820 [= 31 Dec. 1763] the Rajah was slain after fighting heroically against Najibuddaulah Ruhela in the plain of Shahdara which is 2 kos from Delhi and north of the river Jamuna. But the dead body of the Rajah could not be found; no search traced it. Suraj Mal had four wives—1st. Kishori, inhabitant of Hodal, Jat race, daughter of Kāshi the chauthuri of that *qasba*, had no child. She laid out a garden in Mathura and a *Kunj* in Vrindavan, on the opposite bank of the Jamuna towards Koil. She took out of the treasuries and pits vast amounts of money and gave it to [22b] Jawahir Singh, for fighting Najib Khan Ruhela. She survived her husband by six months [*cor.* years.] When in the reign of Rajah Ranjit Singh,

* Really a copyist's error, *do az dahmin* for *roz dashami* = 29 Dec.

the Mughals invaded the Braj country—under Najaf Khan, Afrasiyab Khan, Najaf Quli Khan, and others, this Rani personally went to the Decan, and brought Maharāja Sindhia Patil personally to her country by paying him a large sum, and uprooted the Mughals.

The second queen of Suraj Mal was Hansiā of village Salimpur, daughter of Rati Ram Chaudhuri, she died without issue.

The third, Gangārāni of village Bichawandi under Bharatpur, the mother of Ranjit Singh.

The fourth, Kalyāni Rāni, of village Nahni Jhansi the mother of Nahar Singh.

The fifth Gauri, of Amāh, of the Gori Rajput clan, the mother of Jawahir Singh and Ratan Singh.

The history of Jawahir Singh—When Jawahir Singh in the month of Ekadasi Paush 1820 Samvat ascended the throne (30 December 1763) on account of his bravery and warlike spirit, he [23a] took revenge for his father's death on Najibuddaulah. He defeated Najib and looted the city of Delhi. Then he went towards Ajmer to bathe at Pushkar. By chance he fought a great battle with Raja Madho Singh, the son of Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur. He fought bravely and by the help of the battalions of Samru Sahib Alemand, fighting with cannon balls and grape (*chharra*) he came away victorious to Alwar fort. After halting there for some time, he returned to Dig. He reigned for about five years.

A man named Madāri Khan of the Meo tribe, was his servant. The Rajah's favour had greatly exalted his rank and honour. This Meo possessed a casket (*huqqa*) of the rarest jewels exceeding one lakh of Rupees in price. Jawahir Singh being eager for it pressed him to show it, but he refused. As Madāri Khan was a great drunkard, one day a spy, made him drunk with some bottles (gourds) of strong wine and when he was fully overcome by the liquor, this man took the signet-ring out of his finger and [23b] stamped it on a piece of paper, and showing it to the family of Madari Khan, brought the casket (*huqqa*) of jewellery out and placed it before Rajah Jawahir Singh. Jawahir Singh who was simple-minded and ignorant of the world, showed the casket to Madari Khan, who trembled on seeing it, as if life was parting from his body, but pleaded and flattered [24a] Jawahir, meditating mischief at heart.

Madari Khan, believing that the Rajah would on a suitable opportunity kill him for his refusal to give up the casket, determined to apply the remedy before such an occurrence. Waiting for an opportunity, he induced one of his own retainers with large promises of money and pleasure, to slay the Rajah when he would get a chance. The traitor agreed.

One day in month Sravan, Samvat 1820 (should be 1824) [August 9, 1768] at Agra Jawahir Singh witnessed an elephant [24b] fight from the roof of the Naumahala palace. It being finished, at the time of sunset as he was descending the staircase, this cursed agent at the instigation of Madari Khan, who was standing concealed on the stair, cut him down with a sword. The Chiefs of the State cremated his body on the sandy bank of the Jamuna.

Account of Rajah Ratan Singh—Ratan Singh was seated on the throne in the same month and year, a day or two after or before [the murder of Jawahir ?]

Ratan Singh was an utter drunkard and whoremonger. Very often in the company of scoundrels he used to go to Vrindavan and there misconducted himself with the women of the higher people of the place ; especially during the season of *Holi*, he used to dress dancing girls in many coloured robes of paper and sprayed them with coloured water through syringes. When the paper robes [25a] were dissolved by the water and colour [powder] thrown on them, and the bodies were stripped naked, he used to enjoy the spectacle. Men used to lament greatly on account of his oppression.

One day Ratan Singh was riding with his retinue through the streets of Vrindavan, when the daughter of Rupram Gosain, 14 years of age and beautiful as the full moon, appeared on her roof to see the procession. On beholding her Ratan Singh was enchanted and bringing her to his place by fraud, made her his bedfellow. Her father Ruprām, though inflamed with anger, very coolly posed as an alchemist and the Rajah who was in search of the philosopher's stone, summoned him. Rupram at first for a few [25b] days set up a tent among the bowers of Vrindavan by way of deception, placed strong screens on all sides of it, and arranging the apparatus of alchemy within, took the Raja there alone. Then he stabbed him to death in Sudi Phagan Samvat 1825 [9-22 Mar. 1769] and himself jumped into the Jamuna. The captains of the Rajah's army, encircled Rupram and slew him. In short Ratan Singh sat on the throne for six months only.

Reign of Kheri Singh—He was the son of Ratan Singh, borne by Satbhāmā, of the Khutil Jat clan, inhabitant of Sāntarak in Bharatpur ilāqa. He sat on the throne in the month of Chait Samvat 1826—[23 March—20 April 1769. Another source gives the exact date as 8 April.]

Dān Sahāi, a Rajput, whose mother was full sister of the mother of Rajah Jawahir Singh, was appointed deputy governor of the Kingdom.

[26a] The Sardars of Braj Desh and the chiefs of the army, burnt with jealousy at the predominance of Dān Sahāi. Also, Jiva Ram of the Jat tribe, a resident of Banchari, who was the former diwan and the brother-in-law of Suraj Mal, became very angry at the old servants of the State being made to obey the orders of this newcomer Dān Sahāi. So, Rani Khattu and Rani Satbhama, out of far sighted wisdom, agreed with the relatives of the Raj (family) and removed Dan Sahai from the Regency, and appointed Nawal Singh, the full brother of Ratan Singh, in his place.

Nawal Singh was a very brave warrior. First during the reign of Kheri Singh and his own regency, he fought a great battle with Sindhia Patil and Tuko (Holkar) Maratha, and others, at Govardhan, in which many great sardars of the Deccanis were slain ; the *chhatris* (cenotaphs) of those wretches are still to be seen at Govardhan.

[26b] At this time Nawal Singh had called in some Sikh troopers to his aid. After his victory over the Deccanis, these Sikhs acted with violence and enmity ; Nawal Singh considered it proper to expel them from his realm. Then,

after a short time, war broke out between him and Najaf Khan, Irāni. In the first battle, at Hodal, near Chhat and Kosi, he defeated the army of Najaf Khan. In the second battle, which was fought at Barsana, when Najaf Khan had a vast army, Nawal Singh's men were slain, and Nawal Singh in despair fled for safety to Dig.

In a short time Nawal Singh was overcome by sickness of body and the depression of defeat ; he, in despair of surviving, very lovingly called Ranjit Singh to his side at Dig and left the government of the kingdom in his charge. He himself died in Paush [27a] Samvat 1832 [January 1776].* In the same month Ranjit Singh was appointed administrator of the realm.

Najaf Khan learning of it, came with a vast force and invested Dig from all sides. Ranjit Singh and Kheri Singh fought bravely. At last no grain or fodder remained in the fort and the soldiers had to starve. Then in utter helplessness, Chitradas Mahant, the guru of Ratan Singh and Jawahir Singh, tying Kheri Singh to his back, escaped on a fleet horse to Bharatpur. At last Ranjit Singh, too, escaped from Dig with Jodh Singh and Chain Singh, faujdar, and entered Bharatpur.

Rani Khattu, the Khās wife of Raja Suraj Mal and other Ranis of Jawahir Singh, Ratan Singh and Nawal Singh etc., Thakuranis of the Desh tribe [Jat], in all about 60 persons remained invested in fort Dig. They, on seeing that their Rajahs and guardians had fled away deserting them and they could only apprehend dishonour [27b] from the troops of Najaf Khan, determined to destroy themselves. Summoning before them Bauriā a Gujar, who was the door-keeper of their *deorhi* (portico), they ordered him to kill them with the sword. Bauria did as commanded. When Najaf Khan gained the fort he mourned their death and ordered their corpses to be cremated with all honour according to the Hindu rites, [30 April 1776.]

Kheri Singh, who had been removed to Bharatpur, was suddenly seized with small-pox and died in Jaith Samvat 1833 [May 1776]. As soon as Kheri Singh died, Ranjit Singh was seated on the throne of Braj. [May 1776.]

History of Raja Ranjit Singh.—On the death of Kheri Singh, [his uncle] Ranjit S. was seated on the throne of Braj, [May 1776.]

[28a] Thereafter Mahadji Sindhia Patil, became the supreme dictator of all the realm of Hindusthan, and defeating the troops of Najaf Khan, expelled them from the realm. So the fort of Dig came into the possession of the Marathas. At this time a war broke out between Sindhia Patil and Raja Pratap Singh of Jaipur. Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg Khan in concert joined Raja Pratap Singh and defeated the Marathas. When Sindhia after his defeat arrived near Bharatpur, Rajah Ranjit Singh assured him that he would undertake responsibility for supplying him with provisions and munitions and cash, and urged him to fight bravely. But Sindhia being filled with despair from his recent defeat, crossed the Chambal at Dholpur and went back to Gwalior.

* The correct date is 11 Aug. 1775. His campaigns are correctly dated and fully described in my *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, vol. 3, ch. 28.

Thereafter Deshmukh came fleeing in terror from the [28b] Saharanpur Zila to Bharatpur, and Ghulam Qadir Khan and Ismail Beg Khan came in pursuit of him and blocked the path of Deshmukh's retreat to Gwalior, pitching their tents on the ferry of Dholpur. Deshmukh at this trembled like a cane branch in the wind. Ranjit Singh promised to conduct him in safety to Gwalior, in the face of the opposition of the two Khans, and at his request Deshmukh gave him a written undertaking to cede the fort of Dig to Ranjit Singh [29a] after the two Khans had been defeated, and sent the paper to Makhu Khan, the qiladar of Dig on the part of Sindhia. Makhu Khan, on seeing Maharaja Sindhia's seal on the paper, yielded the fort to Ranjit Singh.

Ranjit Singh, in a manner that Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg could not know of it, sent Chitradas Mahant with a force to escort Deshmukh, in crossing the Chambal at the ghat Mānchalpur in the Kerauli country.

Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg, on learning of it, in great anger engaged in fighting Ranjit Singh, who by the grace of God and his good fortune, defeated them and put them to flight to Delhi.

After a time, when Mahadji Sindhia Patil again came with [29b] a vast army and war materials from the Deccan to Hindusthan, he defeated the troops of Ghulam Qadir and Ismail Beg Khan and became ruler of all Hindusthan. At Mathura he captured Ghulam Qadir and killed him by cutting off his arms and legs, and threw Ismail Beg Khan into prison in Agra fort. He appointed the battalions of General De Boigne to control the realm of Hindusthan, with Perron as his Deputy.

At this time Tipu Sultan caused great disturbances in the Maratha territory. Mahadji Sindhia sent Perron to the Deccan, and Perron very gallantly defeated and expelled Tipu. Then Mahadji Sindhia died and was succeeded by Daulat Ram Sindhia. De Boigne on hearing of Mahadji's death went away to Europe with a vast amount of treasure.

[30a] So, Daulat Ram had no help but to appoint Perron as his General and entrust the control of Hindusthan to him. Perron came away from the Deccan, and encamped at Koil. During the rule of De Boigne, the Marathas had controlled every pargana and fort by their own men, and now the afore-said Perron Sahib very cleverly took them out of Deccani hands and put his own trusty men in charge of each,—qiladars, amils, diwans, daroghas.

In the course of time all the great Rajahs of Hind, e.g. Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bharatpur, Hathras, Kerawli, Kota Bundi, Udipur, Kishangarh, Rupnagar, Macheri-Alwar, Nimrana, Rewari, Dungar (Bikaner) etc., becoming obedient to his orders and knowing his satisfaction as their good, used to keep their ambassadors with him.

[30b] Some time passed in this way, then Daulat Ram Sindhia, coming away from Malwa reached Ujjain and encamped there, and sent a letter summoning Perron to wait on him. As there was great friendship between Perron and Raja Ranjit Singh, Perron on his way came to Bharatpur and met the Rajah at the Jawahir Burj (tower), halted there for two days and then went to Ujjain.

At this time Lakhwa, Nana Fadnis, Madho Ram Phalké, in envy of Perron, formed a mutual alliance and seizing an opportune moment, told

Daulat Ram Sindhia, "All the Maratha captains are sacrificing their lives in the service of your Majesty and keeping their wives and children (as hostages) in your presence. But although Perron Sahib occupies the highest trust in your eyes, yet he belongs to the Firingi race, faithless like De Boigne. If with such vast wealth and forces he rises against you and tries to seize the government of the country, it [31a] will certainly be very difficult to suppress him. As this wolfish natured fox has fallen into your trap, you ought to imprison him in Gwalior fort." The Maharajah agreeing, asked General Perron to render accounts of the revenue and expenditure of Hindusthan. Perron learning of the plot from Sindhia's intimates, gave a bribe of 9 lakhs of Rupees to Sarji Rao [Ghatgé] the father-in-law of Daulat Ram, left the place and travelling with relay horses with the speed of wind, day and night, reached his camp at Koil.

At last, Rai Singh, diwan of Raja Ranjit Singh, Jiwan Khan wakil of the ruler of Alwar, and Ambaji Maratha (qiladar of Gwalior) who had long been friends of Perron, assembled at his invitation at Koil and after mutual consultation [31b] approached the Government at Calcutta, and invited General Lord Lake with a strong force from Cawnpore, but these three men did not at all inform their masters of the plot, but kept it concealed in their own hearts.

Then Lord Lake arrived at Koil and encamped opposite the camp of Perron and began to bombard it by his gun-fire. Perron Sahib, for outward show, drew up his forces, but in order to deceive the public ordered his guns to fire blank charges (without shot), so that none would be hurt on either side and neither would fall back. Not four gharis had passed in this [mock fight] when Perron in the midst of the fighting went over to Lake's army with a few select persons. Immediately after this, Lake captured the forts of Koil and Ramgarh, and proclaimed the rule of the English Company Bahadur. At once, all the troops of Perron were dispersed and fled away in all directions like clouds driven off by the strong wind of Lake's victorious charge.

[32a] And Diwan Rai Singh, Jiwan Khan, Sambhu Singh the wakil of the Jaipur Raja and Ambaji and other sardars and wakils of every chief and place, came to Mathura.

Twelve days after this, Perron Sahib came to Mathura and dwelt in the tent of Diwan Rai Singh for about 15 days. Rajah Ranjit Singh on hearing of it wrote to Diwan Rai Singh, "As Perron is a great friend of yours, bring him to me so that we can have a talk for four gharis. Don't fear that I mean any treachery." But the Diwan suspecting treachery procrastinated. He had a garden in the suburbs of Mathura, where an unimaginable treasure belonging to [32b] Perron was buried; the honest diwan let him take incalculable sums and jewels out of the hoard, load them in boxes and carry them with himself to Europe. Then the wakils of all the Rajahs and sardars went away to their respective places. Diwan Rai Singh returned to Ranjit Singh, who, in anger at his disobedience of the order about Perron, dismissed him from his post. Lake Sahib came and encamped at Agra. Bhau Pandit, the qiladar of Agra fort, having assembled nearly two thousand Bhadauriyas, fought for 10 or 12 days and then vacated the fort and secretly sought refuge in Bharatpur.

Lake Sahib, after gaining Agra fort, by way of Fathpur Sikri, encamped at Dāru Sarauli. Rajah Ranjit Singh being terribly [33a] alarmed at this, by the advice of his well-wishers, sent faujdar Sew Singh to the General to negotiate. Sew Singh succeeded in establishing peace and amity with Lake Sahib and brought Ranjit Singh to interview Lord Lake at Dāru Sarauli at midnight. The Raja presented many gifts. The Sahib, highly pleased, gave him a *khilat* of 22 pieces, horse, elephant, palki, sword, shield, pearl necklace, etc., and gave him a sanad for the *jaidad* of 22 mahals—Kosi, Rewari, Chhat, Shergarh, Hodal, Sari (Biri?) etc., with a revenue of 15 lakhs of Rupees. The Raja taking his *congee* returned to Bharatpur in the course of that night.

[33b] All the Rajahs of Hindusthan became obedient to Lord Lake. But Jaswant Rao Holkar, hearing of it, came from Indore to Ujjain with an army, looted and greatly devastated the city of Ujjain, crossed the Chambal ghat by way of Bundi, and encamped at Lal Suti Nawāli. Lord Lake, on hearing of it, went from Dāwar-Sarauli to the neighbourhood of Khushhalgarh. At this, Holkar in a panic fled back to Rampura. When the month of Baisakh, with its intense heat arrived, Lord Lake unable to bear it, returned to Kanpur, appointing the brigade of Lucan Sahib to [34a] oppose Holkar. Fighting took place between these two; Holkar by bold attacks defeated the British and looted the property of the army, Lucan himself being killed by a shot. The son of Ajit Singh, Ballavgarhwala, who was with this brigade, was slain with a Maratha spear; those that escaped death, taking no thought of the wounded and slain on their own side, fled and came to Agra. Holkar, giving chase, came by way of Fathpur to the environs of Farah city and sent Harnāth Chela with a large force and guns towards Delhi. Harnāth arriving by forced marches, invested Delhi city and fired on it; for 20 days there was great fighting between him and Ochterlony Sahib, the nazim of Delhi subah. Holkar, hastened from his halting place at Farah with a picked force, set fire to the British camp in Mathura and plundered all its property and seized the district of Koil.

After the Dasahara, Lord Lake, raging like a tiger, [34b] came from Kanpur, by way of Agra to Mathura, and fought a great battle with Holkar at the jhil of Koila. Holkar, unable to resist, encamped at village Sewth (? Satoa) 2 kos from Mathura. The victorious Lake marched towards Delhi. Holkar, leaving his baggage in Bharatpur, went off in pursuit of Lord Lake. When Lake reached Delhi, Holkar, in helplessness, turned towards Panipat. Harnath Chela, with his troops and artillery fled from Delhi to Dig. Holkar, too, unable to fight, crossed the Jamuna at Kunjpura ghat and went to Farrukhabad.

Lord Lake wrote to the Bangash Nawab of Farrukhabad to delude Holkar and induce him to stay there for two watches, or else there would be a rupture of his friendship with the British.

[35a] The Bangash Nawab, agreeing, treated Holkar with great cordiality and honour and sent beautiful dancers and singers to him. While Holkar was enjoying their performance, Lake Sahib suddenly arriving on wind-paced horses, made a night attack on him. Holkar in bewilderment, fled away and joined Harnath at Dig. Marshalling his troops and placing his camp in the middle of the column, he wished to set out for the Deccan. Raja Ranjit

Singh, on hearing of it, dissuaded him, took oaths on the Ganges water to befriend him, reassured his mind, and gave him Rs. 25,000 for his army expenses, the two agreeing to fight and expel the English from Hindusthan.

[35b] After some days, Lord Lake marching out of Farrukhabad with his army laid *siege* to the fort of *Dig* and threw vast cannonballs into it. For nine days the fighting continued. In the end, the heroic soldiers of Lake entered the fort by escalade (ladders). The Jats who had assembled like flies, saved their lives by flight. Rajah Ranjit Singh and Jaswant Rao Holkar fled away from the fort of Dig to Bharatpur, and after a mutual consultation sent Shahji as wakil to Lake Sahib and begged pardon for [36a] their acts, promising to be loyal and obedient to him in future.

Lake Sahib in anger refused to accept the Raja's offer and swore he would conquer *Bharatpur* from that deceiver. He told Shahji to return and tell the Raja to prepare for fighting.

The Raja took all measures for defending the city and [36b] fort. He asked his chiefs and captains whether they advised him to fight or surrender the fort and kingdom to the English. They vowed not to yield the fort so long as they lived.

Then the Raja went to his harem and asked the Ranis if they agreed to his sending them in litters with Kumar Durjan Sal to Jodhpur and Jaipur for asylum, while he would defend the fort. They wept and refused, pointing out how Pratap Singh of Jaipur had surrendered the refugee Nawab Wazir Ali to these very English. "Our family has never done this and shall never seek refuge with others. In the same way that Khatu Rani and all the other Ranis, in the time of Najaf Khan destroyed themselves, we shall slay ourselves by lying on gunpowder and setting fire to it. We dislike begging shelter at the doors of others."

So Raja Ranjit Singh girt his loins for fighting. Artillery exchange began. The Raja, during the fighting, used at night to go out of the fort in disguise, worship Giriraj (Govardhan) give alms to beggars there, and return to the fort.

The first assault of the English was delivered on the Kumbher Gate side. Akhi Singh Purohit and Captain [37b] Sebastian Sahib fighting bravely repulsed the attack.

The second assault was delivered in the direction of the Fath Burj. The English by their fire battered [*lit* holed] the rampart like a crocodile and mounted the wall. But Kumar Baldeo Singh with a party of life-sacrificing Jats arrived there and forced the English back.

The third assault was delivered in the direction of the Anār Darwaza. But Dula Ram Thakur with some brave men issued from the gate and fought so well with their swords that some notable captains of the English were slain, while on this side Thakur Dula Ram and some noted heroes fell. After 14 days during which repeated assaults were delivered on the Anar Durwaza side, in which Akhi Singh Purohit, Balha faujdar and Nur Muhammad of the Meo tribe, were shot dead, the General launched assaults for 14 watches from all sides—Nim Darwaza, [38a] Atalband Darwaza, Bhim Narayan Darwaza, and Shamsheer Darwaza. Shyam Mal *Katthu Mal* fought like Rustam

on the Nim Darwaza side. Karam Singh Thakur, in charge of the Atalband Darwaza, fought well; Thakur Kesri Singh at the Bhim Narayan Darwaza; repulsed the attack. Kumar Randhir Singh at the Shamsheer Darwaza and Kumar Pirthi Singh at the Fath Burj repulsed the English and (Randhir) slew many of them. Pirthi Singh discharged so many musket shots that the field of combat looked like a tulip bed [with fallen red coats.]

At this time, Jaswant Rao Holkar who had been reposing at Phulbari, on hearing the noise of battle, quickly took horse and with his troopers fell upon the English army. In this fighting* Sahib fell fighting with the sword.

Lord Lake putting off his revenge to another time, encamped at Jangina. Raja Ranjit Singh, wisely knowing that he [38b] had no power to resist, sent a prayer for peace with many presents, to Lord Lake, in charge of Kumar Pirthi Singh as his envoy. Lake pardoned the Raja's offences and gave him the forts of Dig, Govardhan, Tāwar warā. After some days' halt, he set out for Kanpur. Jaswant Rao Holkar also marched away to Rampura in Mewar and encamped there.

Raja Ranjit Singh had great love of hunting and was a good shot with muskets. Kishori Rani was the chief wife of Suraj Mal, and Gangā Rani Denkri was his *niḡah* wife who had borne him Ranjit Singh. As Kishori Rani had no hope of bearing children, she had very lovingly adopted Ranjit as her son.

Raja Ranjit Singh, at the age of 22 years had built a thatched bungalow in the Pāin Bāgh (lower garden) where he used to have relations with women of the city of various races. [39a] Jai Kishan Brahman, who was the darogha of the Bagh, used to bring with himself harlots for gratifying the Raja's lust. Thus he became infected with gonorrhoea (*suzāk*). Rani Kishori—learning of it, placed him under the treatment of doctors from Delhi, and he turned somewhat towards recovery. After this four sons were borne to him by four Ranis,—e.g., Randhir Singh by Rani Sarupi, inhabitant of Karha of the Rajput race, in Bundelkhand, Baldeo Singh by Rani Rām Kuar, inhabitant of Undhera ilaqa of Fathpur Sikri, Jat race—Lachman Singh by Rani Pem Kuar, the daughter of Chaudhuri Muāsi, inhabitant of Sānwarah, ilaqa of Fathpur Sikri and Pirthi Singh by Rani [blank in ms.] the daughter of Chand Singh, Chaudhuri of Agra, Jat race.

But when the same disease became aggravated and fistula (ulcer) appeared in his genital organ, he repeatedly withdrew from earthly affairs and became eager to make a pilgrimage to Giriraj. So he went to Govardhan and performed the circumambulation [of the sacred hill.]

[39b] At last in Aghan Sudi Dashami, Samvat 1863 [20 Dec. 1806] he died.

JADUNATH SARKAR.

* The Persian text reads like *Antā Gurgur*, which was the popular name of the grenadiers of the E.I.Co's European Infantry, from the shape of their head dress.

The Sack of Delhi 1857-58 as witnessed by Ghalib.

GREATNESS OF GHALIB.

MIRZA ASAD ULLAH KHAN, poetically surnamed Asad and Ghalib (1) was one of the greatest figures in Urdu Literature, the brightest star in the firmament of Urdu Poetry, and the most towering genius of his age, a great thinker and prose writer of eminence. His claim to greatness lies in his originality, allusive style and power of self introspection. He was also a great thinker and a philosopher. Even in the contemporary world he was much honoured and respected. C. B. Saunders, (2) the Commissioner of Delhi Division, after the Mutiny wrote to Mr. D. S. Macleod, Financial Commissioner of the Punjab on the 8th March, 1859, "Moulvie Asadullah Khan, otherwise commonly known as Mirza Nasheh, the Poet Laureate of Delhi is universally admitted to be a Persian Scholar of the greatest eminence and to be gifted with poetical talents of a high order. His only competitor in the arena of poetical fame at Delhi was the ex-king himself, but the former is considered to have been a more profound scholar and to have been a more gifted poet than the latter". Mr. M. D. Arnold, (3) Director of Public Instruction Punjab, wrote to the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab, "Assaddullah Khan is a man of great reputation and is considered, I believe a living representative in Hindustan of Persian Poetry and literature".

HOW COULD GHALIB STAY IN DELHI AFTER THE BRITISH VICTORY.

Mirza Ghalib was in Delhi when the Mutiny broke out on the 11th of May 1857. He remained there throughout the siege and also after its fall on 13th September. Fortunately he was living in Mohalla *Bili Maran* (4) in the house of Hakim Mohammad Hasan Khan. In that Mohalla there were a large number of houses of Hakims. They were in the service of Raja Narinder Singh, brother of the Ruler of Patiala. The Raja had taken a promise from the Britishers that that Mohalla would not be ransacked after the re-occupation of Delhi. Therefore the Raja's guard took charge of the Mohalla after the British victory and thus the Mohalla escaped wholesale destruction.

(1) Ram Babu Saxena, A History of Urdu Literature, p. 158.

(2) Punjab Government Record Office Simla, Delhi Division. Revenue Records, 1859, File No. 2, Letter No. 1096.

(3) Ibid, Letter No. 82.

(4) Ghalib to Munshi Har Gopal, Letter dated 5th December, 1857. Mukatib-ul-Ghalib edited by Maulvi Haji Hafiz Syed Shah Ali Husan, p. 98.

Thus Mirza Ghalib had the good fortune of witnessing and having the first hand knowledge of the miserable plight of the citizens. He also noticed the large scale revengeful hangings of innocent citizens, the great pillage done by the British Army and the pulling down of many populous Mohallahs of Delhi.

SOURCES OF STUDY.

We can get an excellent, detailed and reliable account of these events from his following writings.

1. *The letters written just after the Mutiny.* Mirza Ghalib wrote a large number of letters to his various friends. These letters contain good number of incidental references about the contemporary events and conditions of the people. A collection of his letters entitled "Urdu-i-Mulla was published for the first time in 1869.

2. *Dastambu* in Persian is a narrative of incidents of the Mutiny in Delhi ranging from 11th May 1857 to 1st July 1858 and is a valuable record of contemporary events. Mirza Ghalib himself (5) wrote to Munshi Har Gopal, "I have written the account of the city and of myself from the 11th May 1857 (day of the commencement of the Mutiny) to the 1st of July i.e. of fifteen months. The language of *Dastambu* is pure old Persian devoid of any Arabic words".

Mr. C. B. Saunders, (6) the Commissioner of Delhi had expressed the following unfavourable opinion about this book. "Ghalib has recently published *Dastambu* in which he has given a narrative of passing events during the present insurrection, principally as they had any personal effect on his own sections or in any way affected his position. With the exception of the peculiarity of the elegant but somewhat obsolete dictum in which he has written his narrative and which renders it therefore really unintelligible to all but the most abstrusive and erudite of Persian scholars, there is said to be nothing either very striking or original in the statements and opinions to which he has given expression in the work".

In spite of this criticism and the fact that Ghalib has laid more emphasis on the *follies* of Indian Mutineers and has often cursed them, one still gets a good account of British Revenge.

Khawaja Hasan Nizami (7) wrote, "Ghalib wrote this book after the Mutiny at a time when the life and honour of Muslims were in a very great danger. If his style and writing is hostile to the Indian Mutineers, we should not criticise him. In spite of very critical times, Ghalib wrote many things very boldly. Shaikh Muhammad Ikram (8) says, "This book has got great value from historical point of view as it was written by a person who participated in these events from the beginning to the end". Gholam Russal Mehr (9) says, "It cannot be said that Ghalib wrote this book for pleasing the

(5) Mukamal Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 36.

(6) Punjab Government Record Office, Delhi Division, Revenue 1859, File No. 2. Letters Ibid; File No. 2 entitled.

(7) Translation of *Dastambu*, p. 59, Hasan Nizami-Mirza Ghalib Ka Roznamcha.

(8) Shaikh Muhammad Ikram—Ghalib Nama, p. 73.

(9) Gholam Rasul Mehr—Galib, p. 173.

English. He had started writing it at a time when hardly any body had belief in the victory of the English". Ghalib had said that he had written it during the Mutiny.

3. An unpublished Petition of Mirza Ghalib for the Restoration of his Pension. There is one petition of Mirza Ghalib for the restoration of his pension and robe of Honour in the Simla Record Office. A vivid account of his activities during the Mutiny which had been traced out by the British authorities, is also contained in the letters of Mr. C. B. Saunders.

4. An elegy (or mourning song) of Delhi.

Ghalib's activities during the Mutiny. There are two contrasting accounts of his activities. Ghalib himself wrote to Munishi Har Gopal (10).

"I have not taken any part in the Mutiny. My innocence is well known". Again he wrote to Choudhry Abdul Ghaffar Khan (11). "During all the period of turmoil, I have lived in this city. I have never stirred out of my house." The British authorities had in the beginning believed in this. Mr. C. B. Saunders (12) had written to the Financial Commissioner, "He certainly took no part either in our favour or against us".

But later on Mr. Saunders changed (13) his views. He wrote, "I deem it right to inform you that since writing above, I have accidentally stumbled upon a passage in a news letter from Delhi during the late siege by Major Hodson, the officer-in-charge of the Intelligence Dept. which shows that the statements of the poet as to his having carefully abstained from presenting himself at the court, and from dedicating another composition to the ex-king was not altogether veracious".

"I append a copy of the news letter for your information. It was written by one Goree Shanker of Delhi. The letter mentions that he devised and submitted for the approval of the Ex. King an Ephigrammatical superscription for the coin of the native which the later was then anxious to have struck in commemoration of his anticipated reconquest of India." This suspicion was enough to stop the payment of Ghalib's pension, Khillut and Darbar for three years (14). But this immensely increased the hardships of Ghalib. He had already been in the habit of spending much. He used to get fifty rupees per month from the Red Fort. He was also deprived of this income after the Mutiny. He was forced to sell his clothes and live on their sale. Ghalib himself wrote to Yusuf Mirza (15), "There are about twenty persons in this house and there is not a single pie's income. Now I don't get wine to drink".

The arrest of Ghalib—Mirza Ghalib was arrested on the 15th October 1857. We get the following account of his arrest in the book of Nawab

(10) Mukatibul Ghalib, edited by Syed Shah Ali Hasan, Letter No. 24.

(11) Mukamal Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 104.

(12) Simla Record Office, Delhi Revenue, File No. 2, Letter No. 1096, dated the 8th March, 1859.

(13) Ibid, No. 1309, dated the 23rd March, 1859.

(14) Ghalib to Munshi Habib Ullah Khan, dated the 15th February 1858. Mukamal Urdu Mulla, p. 26.

(15) Ibid, p. 255.

Ghulam Hussain. (16) "Some white soldiers entered the house of Mirza Ghalib. They arrested him and brought him before Colonel Brown. As God had destined him to live for some years more, fortunately a friend of Ghalib was sitting with the Colonel who recommended his case. Therefore the colonel ordered his release".

Reign of Terror—The period just after the British occupation may properly be styled as the "Reign of Terror". Ghalib wrote to Munshi Har Gopal on the 5th (17) December 1857, "I am afraid of writing in more detail". He also wrote to Hakim Gholam Najf Khan on the 26th December (18) 1857. "It is quite enough to write that both of us are still alive. More than this neither you will like to write nor I shall write". He wrote again to this Hakeem on the 29th (19) January 1858. "I should thank God for safeguarding my life during these troublesome times. But I don't know what may happen the next moment. I am afraid to write a detailed letter. If God has written in our fate to meet each other again, we shall meet each other and narrate the tale of our woes and sufferings". On the 7th February (20) 1858 Ghalib wrote to Mir Mehdi Hussain "what to speak of pension, here I am afraid even of my own life".

"Here there is a vast ocean of blood before me, God alone knows what more I have still to behold".

Military Regime—Delhi was handed over to the Military authorities and remained under their control upto the 24th February 1858. Ghalib wrote to Munshi Har Gopal (21) on the 5th December 1857, "There has been military rule in this City from the 11th May to the present day" (5th December 1857).

Mal Administration of justice. It appears that the system of administration of Delhi was very bad for some time after the Mutiny. Mirza Ghalib wrote to Choudhry Abdul Ghaffar, "Dont take the administration of Delhi to be like that of the administration of Meerut and Agra. This Division (22) is now included in the Punjab territories. Here neither law nor constitutional conventions are followed. Whatsoever comes to the head of any administrator, is the law of this place". He wrote to Mir Mehdi Hussain (23), "Every day a new order is issued in this city. I fail to understand what happens here". He also wrote to Yusuf Mirza (24), "Every body is getting punishment according to his own fate. There is neither a law nor any rule here. No man's influence or his arguments can protect him. In his letter to Zulfiqar-ul-Din (25), he pointed out, "You have not yet understood the nature

(16) Nawab Ghulam Hussain, *Delhi ki Saza*, Hasan Nizami's edition, p. 65.

(17) Syed Shah Ali Hassan, *Makatib-ul-Ghalib*, Letter No. 24, p. 99.

(18) *Mukamal Urdu-i-Mulla*, p. 164.

(19) *Mukatib-ul-Ghalib*, Letter No. 58.

(20) *Ibid*, Letter No. 39, p. 123.

(21) *Mukatibul Ghalib*, Letter No. 24.

(22) *Urdu-i-Mulla*, p. 98. Delhi Division was one of the five Divisions of North Western Provinces like Meerut and Agra in the pre-Mutiny times.

(23) *Ibid*, p. 144.

(24) *Ibid*, p. 251.

(25) *Ibid*, p. 244.

of the rulers at this place, what is the use of taking a copy of order or of appeal. The orders passed by the rulers of Delhi are the recording of fate. There can be no appeal against them anywhere".

Ghalib has narrated an incident which clearly proves the truth of his remarks on Administration. In his letter to Yusuf Mirza (26) he wrote "Now just hear an interesting story of the day before yesterday. Hafiz Memu has been released, as he was not guilty. He had made an application for the restoration of his property. His ownership to the property has already been proved. On that day he presented himself. The Judge asked 'who is Hafiz Mohammad Baksh?' He said, 'I'. Then again the judge asked, 'who is Hafiz Memu?' He said 'I'. He further informed the Judge, that his real name was Mohammad Baksh, but generally he was called Memo. The judge said, 'It does not matter. You are Hafiz Mohammad Baksh, you are Hafiz Memo. You are in fact the whole world to whom the house can be restored. Therefore the case is dismissed'." Ghalib wrote to Yusuf Mirza (27), "Fazlu lives in Arab-ki-Sarai. He came here day before yesterday. He is filing petitions for the restoration of his property, but who cares for him". About his own pension Ghalib wrote to Munshi Har Gopal (28), "I don't know what the Govt: will do about my pension. In fact during the present military rule, the authorities have got no time to consider this matter." Two years later Ghalib wrote to Khwaja Gholam Abbas, "I had instituted an appeal for investigating into my conduct during the Mutiny. The reply came from the Lieut. Governor of the Punjab, 'I don't want to carry on any investigations. Therefore the case is dismissed'."

Brutal Murders. The British forces shot dead many persons. Many were hunged in the Chandni Chowk. The British authorities admitted that 392 persons were hanged and quite a large number were shot dead (29). But the Indians considered this statement to be a very meagre estimate of the deaths caused by the British authorities in their revenge. Ghalib also wrote to Mirza Hatim Ali (30), "Thousands of my friends died. Whom should I remember and to whom should I complain. Perhaps none is left even to shed tears on my death." Ghalib wrote a mourning song of Delhi, a few lines of which are worth being translated.

(26) Ibid, p. 248.

(27) Ibid, p. 255.

(28) Mukhtib-ul-Ghalib, p. 243.

(29) Delhi Gazetteer, 1883-4, p. 30.

(30) Hazrat Zahir Delhvi Dastan-i-Ghadar, p. 127—"Sometimes innocent persons are killed along with the sinners. This is what happened after the Mutiny. The English soldiers began to shoot whomsoever they met on the way (p. 128). Among the men who remained in the City, there were some whose equal has never been born nor shall be born. Mian Muhammad Amin Panjakush, an excellent writer, Moulvie Imam Buksh Sabhai along with his two sons Mir Niaz Ali and the persons of Kucha Chhelan (it is said they were fourteen hundred in number) were arrested and taken to Raj Ghat Gate. They were shot dead and their dead bodies were thrown into the Jumna. As for the women, they came out of their houses along with their children and killed themselves by jumping into the wells. All the wells of the Kucha Chhelan were filled with dead bodies. My pen dare not write more".

. . . . Nawab Ghulam Hussain—*Delhi-ki-Saza*, says (p. 50) Hundreds of persons were hanged. The informants were spread like a net. They were given a reward of two rupees for each arrest. Before the 24th February 1858 many innocent persons had been shot dead on the false report of the informants. Hundreds of women become widows and many thousands of children were made orphans. Mainodin: Two Native Narratives (a pro British account, p. 71) also wrote 'In the City no man's life was safe. All able bodied men, who were seen, were taken for rebels and shot' (31). When one comes out of the house to the bazar, one finds the blood of human beings. The crossing is a place of execution. The house is an example of Jail.

Every particle of dust of Delhi is thirsty for the blood of every Muslim. Ghalib also wrote in *Dastambu* (32), "God alone knows the number of persons who were hanged. The victorious army entered the city along the main road. Whomsoever they met on the way was killed. The white men on their entry started killing helpless and innocent persons. In two or three Mohallas the English both looted the property and killed the people". In some of his letters Ghalib mentioned a few names of his friends, who were either shot dead or hanged by the British. He wrote to Yusuf Mirza (33), "leaving aside the large number of deaths in the Red Fort, many persons have been killed in the City as well. Muzzufarul Dowla, Saiful Din Haidar Khan, Nasirul Din, nineteen year's old Mustafa Khan, Artizi Khan, Murtizi Khan, Kazi Faiz Ullah, Hakim Razi ul Din Khan, Mir Ahmed Husan, Mai Kush are a few of them". He wrote to Mirza Alim Din (34), "Count the deaths among the Muslims. Husan Ali, Mir Nasirud Din and Nazir Hussan were killed." In his letter to Nawab Anwarul Dawla (35), he gave a pathetic description of brutal killing. "How can I write that Hakim Razi-ul Din Khan was shot dead by an English soldier in the general Massacre! His younger brother Husain Khan was also killed on the same day. Both the sons of Taleh yar Khan had come on leave from Tonk. Owing to the Mutiny they were detained in Delhi. After the capture of Delhi, both the innocent persons were hanged". Syed Ahmed Hasan (36) had inquired about the words of Sheikh Kalim Ullah. In reply Ghalib wrote to him, "A large number of persons used to live in the vicinity of Sheikh Kalim Ullah's tomb. But hardly any body escaped Death". A very large number of persons were arrested on suspicion after the Mutiny. Even the British authorities confessed that they had arrested 3306 persons. Ghalib wrote in *Dastambu*, "The Jail is outside the city and the Police lock up is in the City. The number of prisoners in them is beyond calculation". Ghalib also wrote to Shiv Narain (37), "Out of the alive hundreds are in prison". Ghalib has fortunately given us the names of a few persons who were arrested. He

(31) A Painful Funeral rate of Delhi.

(32) *Dastambu* Hasan Nizam's translation, p. 70.

(33) *Ibid*, p. 66.

(34) *Urdu-i-Mulla*, p. 253.

(35) *Ibid*, p. 318.

(36) *Ibid*, pp. 227, 181.

(37) *Urdu-i-Mulla*, p. 273.

wrote to Ghulam Naujib Khan, "The father of Sher Zaman is still under arrest. Mirza Bahadur Beg (38) had been arrested. Ghulam Fakhroodeen too had also been imprisoned". In his letter to Yusuf Mirza he wrote "Hafiz Memmu had been released". He wrote to Mir Ashraf Ali (39), "Hamid Khan was arrested. He has been brought in chains".

Hakim Ahsanullah Khan. He gave the following news about Hakim Sahib to Hakim Gholam Najif Khan (40), "The sepoy who had been posted to keep vigilance over Hakim Ahsanullah Khan has been removed. But he has been ordered to remain in the City. He has been asked to present himself once a week in the court".

Hakim Mahmud Khan—In *Dastambu* (41) he wrote, "Some informant falsely reported that the house of Hakim Mohammad Khan, Physician of the Raja of Patiala, had become the shelter of these rebels. Therefore on the 2nd February 1858, the Hakim along with sixty persons was arrested. Maulvi Sadr-ud-Din Khan remained in Police custody for many days. He was presented in the court. Many witnesses were called and their evidence was recorded. In the end judgment was delivered and his life was forgiven".

Nawab Mustafa Khan (42) Arzuda had been awarded seven year's rigorous imprisonment.

Maulana Fazl Huq Khairabadi—"On appeal the order was passed confirming vigorous imprisonment on him. It was further remarked that he should be immediately exiled".

Jagirdars of Delhi Province: "Even the greatest Jagirdars have been called for interrogation. There used to be seven (43) Jagirdars in the pre-Mutiny times in Delhi Division i.e. Nawab of Jhajjar, Bahadurgarh, Ballabgarh, Farrukhnagar, Dojana, Pataudi and Loharu. Now four of them have been eliminated, only three of Dojana (44) Loharu and Patudi remain". In *Dastambu* Ghalib has given a very vivid account of the pitiable condition of these jagirdars. (*Loharu Family*). The week in which the British occupied Delhi, Aminul Din Ahmed Khan Bahadoor and Ziaul Din Ahmed Bahadur along with their family, three elephants and forty fast running horses started towards their Jagir. But at Mehrauli they were looted and robbed of all their valuables. They were recalled to Delhi by the Commissioner and imprisoned in the Red Fort.

(*Jhajjar*) After two or three days Abdul Rehman Khan of Jhajjar being arrested was brought to the Fort and confined in a part of Diwan-i-Am. His estate was confiscated.

(*Farrukhnagar*) In this way on the 30th October 1857, Ahmed Ali Khan of Farrukhnagar was brought to the Fort and confined to it.

(38) Ibid, p. 168.

(39) Ibid, p. 164.

(40) Ibid, p. 170.

(41) Ibid, p. 248.

(42-45) Letter to Hakim Syed Ahmed Husan, Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 180; Mukhatibul-Ghalib, Letter to Mehdi Husan, letter No. 48; Letter to Yusuf Mirza, Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 248; Mukhatib-ul-Ghalib, Letter No. 24; Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 136, Letter to Mehdi Hasan Distambu, p. 68.

(Ballabgarh) Raja Nahar Singh of Ballabgarh was also imprisoned in this manner. The rulers of Jhajjar, Farrukhnagar and Ballabgarh were separately hanged on the 13th June 1858. The life of Bahadur Jhang was forgiven (45).

Bahadur Shah II. "The aged (46) emperor is under arrest and an interrogation is going on." On the death of Bahadur Shah in exile in Rangoon Ghalib wrote "Ab-ool Zuffer Sirajud Din Bahadur Shah was released from the imprisonment of the foreigners and of the body on the 7th November 1862".

The Royal Family. Most of the Royal princes were either (47) killed or imprisoned. A few of them ran away and saved their lives. Mirza Illahi Baksh, (48) one of the princes, has been asked to leave for Karachi.

The conditions of the Begums is extremely bad. Their beautiful faces are like moon but their clothes are dirty and torn out and their shoes too worn out.

Forced Eviction: Most of the citizens (49) were turned out of the city. Some of them had already left the city when they noticed the revengful attitude of the invaders. They lost all faith in the English. Most of the poor and gentlemen along with their women left the city through Ajmere Gate, Turkman Gate and Delhi Gate. They stopped in small colonies (Nizam ud Din and Mehrauli) and tombs around Delhi. In a letter to Munshi Har Gopal on the 5th December 1857 Ghalib wrote, "Don't take it as an exaggeration. The rich and the poor all have left the city. Those who remained were forcibly turned out of the city. Jagirdars, Pension holders, the rich and the citizens have all been forced to quit the city. (50)

Even after a thorough search one cannot find a single Muslim here, though a few Hindus are still living in the city". (51)

Pass System: "No body can enter the city or go out of it without a pass On my return from Meerut I saw that great hardship is being imposed on the people. In addition to the vigilance of the English soldiers, the Thanadar of Lahori Gate area sits on a stool—whosoever escapes the strict vigilance of the English soldiers, is caught by him and sent to the lock-up. The administrator orders him five canes or a fine of two rupees is imposed on him and is imprisoned for eight days. In addition to these measures an order has been issued to all thanadars to make an enquiry and find out those persons who are living in the City without a pass. In all thanas charts to this effect are being prepared". (52) He wrote to Choudhury Abdul Ghaffoor, "To live in the City without the pass is very risky". (53)

Large scale loot. The prize Agents were appointed. Hundreds of labourers were employed in digging up the houses and the Fort. Ghalib wrote to Mir Mehdi Hussan, (54) "There was an indescrible loot". Ghalib's own valuables had been sent to the house of Kaleh Sahib by his wife for

(46-51) Ibid, p. 69; Urdu-i-Mulla, Letters to Mir Mehdi Hussain, p. 119; Dastambu, p. 69 stories of shooting to death of Mirza Mughal, Mirza Khizar Sultan and Mirza Abu Bakes by Hodsu are welknown; Letter to Munshi Har Gopal, Urdu-i-Mulla; Ibid, p. 51; Dustumbu, p. 66. Zahir ud Din Delhvi in his Dastan-i-Ghaddar says (p. 128); Men were turned out from the Kashmeri Gate and the women were turned out from the Kabuli Gate. One searched for the other.

(52-56) Mukhatab-ul-Ghalib, Letter No. 24. Ibid. Letter No. 48. Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 98. Ibid, p. 138. Letter to Hakeem Syed Ahmed Hasan, Ibid, p. 180.

the sake of safety. But the house of Kaleh Saheb (55) was most thoroughly looted. All the papers, Gold, Woollen Goods and other property were taken away". Ghalib's writings had been deposited in the houses of his friends, "I have never collected the manuscripts of my own writings. Two or three friends of mine used to collect them. But their houses containing the property worth lakhs of rupees and personal libraries worth thousands of rupees have been looted, what to speak of my collections of poems. Nawab Ziaul Din Khan and Nawab Husan Mirza used to collect my books. The houses of both of them were looted along with libraries worth thousands of rupees". (56)

Destruction of Mohallas. "There was a cry that the whole city should be razed to the ground". (57) The British authorities decided in their vengeance to pull down many populous Mohallas. Mirza Ghalib noticed the destruction of some Mohallas. In his letter to Mir Mehdi Hussain, he wrote, "The area between Raj Ghat and Jumma Musjid is without exaggeration a great mound of bricks. If the debris is removed, then a vast ground shall come out. Perhaps you remember that on this side of the garden of Mirza Gohar there used to be a great lowness of ground, but now that place has been filled up. The Raj Ghat Gate has been filled up. Only the nitched battlement of the walls, are apparent. The rest has been filled up with debris. . . . For the preparation of the metalled road, a wide open ground has been made between Calcutta Gate and Kabul Gate. Punjabi Katra, Dhobiwara, Ramji Ganj, Sadat Khan ka katra, Haveli of the wife of the General (General Ochterleny's native wife) godown owners houses, Haveli of the Sahib Ram and his garden, all have been destroyed beyond recognition. In short Delhi has become a vast desert". (58) In his letter to Choudhury Abdul Ghaffar, (64) he wrote, "Here the city is being razed to the ground. Famous Bazars like Khas Bazar, Urdu Bazar and Khanam ka Bazar which were themselves small townships, have been destroyed beyond recognition. Now the owners of houses and shops cannot even locate where their property used to be". (59) In his letter to Mir Mehdi Hussain, Ghalib wrote, "If you even come here, you will see the changed condition of the roads of Jhan Nissar Khan ka Chhata and of Kucha of Khan Chand—you will also notice the pulling down of Mohalla of Balaqi Begum and the establishment of a great open space—70 yards wide around the Jumma Musjid." Syed Ahmed Hussan Khan (60) had inquired about the works of Sheikh Kulim Ullah Jehan Abadi. Ghalib wrote in reply "The tomb of Sheikh Kulim Ullah Jehan Abadi had been completely ruined. The area in the vicinity of the tomb had the population of a good village. The descendants of the Sheikh used to live there. Now there is a vast ground and the tomb is in the middle of it". In his letter to Zulfiqar-ul Din Haider Khan (61), Ghalib gave this news, "All the houses in the vicinity of Lal Digi have been razed to the ground". In his letter to Nawab Aminul Din (62) Nawab of Loharu, Ghalib gave the following piece of information, "The Main gate of Dariba has been pulled

(57-59) Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 137; Ibid, p. 103; Ibid, p. 136.

(60-64) Ibid, p. 180. Ibid, p. 242. Ibid, p. 286. Ibid, p. 251. p. 130. Mukhatib-ul-Ghalib, Letter No. 41.

down. The mosque of Kashmiri Katra has also met the same fate. The remaining portion of Kucha of Kabul Attar has been pulled down". In the letter to Yusuf (63) Mirza Ghalib gave this pathetic news, "Imam Bara of Agha Baqar is being razed to the ground. It has old holy places in it. In front of the Fort where there is Lal Digi, a vast ground shall be cleared up. The shops of Mahbub, houses of Bahlubes, Feil Khana (place for keeping elephant) from the kucha of Balaqi Begum to Khas Bazar shall be razed to the ground or you should take it for granted that from the gate of Ama Jehan to the ditch of Red Fort, except two or three wells and Lal Digi nothing shall remain. Today the houses of Chhata of Jehan Nisar is being razed to the ground. Many shops near the gate of Billimaran have been pulled down. Here one can see the ruins of Urdu Bazar (64), Khas Bazar Kucha of Bulaqi Begum and the Haveli of Khan-i-Daran. Kashmiri Katra (65) has also been pulled down. . . Dar-ul-Baqā shall be pulled down. Kucha of Khan Chand upto the Barh of Shah Bola will be razed to the ground".

Confiscation of property and Pension. The property of most of the nobles and citizens on the suspicion of their taking part in the Revolt of 1857, was confiscated. Ghalib also mentions some of the cases of his friends, "Nawab Mustafa (66) Khan's Zemindaree of Jehangirabad and the property of Delhi was confiscated. . . . The property of Hakim (74) Ahsan Ollah Khan, Mian Gholam Najub Bahadur Jung and Nobee Buksh have been sealed. . . . The Mudrassa (67) of Roshun-ul-Dawala, which is situated on the back of the Kotwali and the Haveli of Kasim were declared to be the property of Nizamul Din and were confiscated. It was auctioned and the money was deposited in the Govt. Treasury. All the property (68) of Hamid Ali Khan was confiscated. . . . The property of Zia-ul-Dawla (69), which used to give a rent of 500 rupees, was also confiscated.

The pension of Mustafa Khan was confiscated (70). Two sisters of Murtiza Khan (71) were getting a pension of 100 rupees each. The order was that "as your brother was a culprit, your pension is being forfeited. But as a matter of pity you are being granted ten rupees monthly allowance. If this is pity God alone knows what the wrath will be?" A cry (72) arose for the demolition of the principal mosques on the ground that they were Muslim rallying points, that some like the Jumma Musjid had been used as strongholds in the street fighting and that it was a fitting act of revenge. The principal mosques were occupied by troops and for sometime their fate was debated.

(65-72) Ibid, Letter No. 40. Letter No. 48. Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 161. p. 318. p. 248. p. 250. Dr. Percival Spear—Twilight of the Mughals, p. 220.

(73-75) Dr. Percival Spear—Twilight of the Mughal, p. 220. Urdu-i-Mulla, p. 119. Nawab Gholam Husain Khan wrote (Translation by Hasan Nizami, Delhi ki Saza, p. 43. "Are the British officers not aware of the fact that many innocent and noble minded women both old and young with small children are roaming in the Forest outside Delhi. They have neither got meals to eat nor dress to wear. They have neither got the place to sleep at night nor a place to take shelter from the burning rays of the sun. The officers of Delhi have turned them out so that they may collect the moveable goods from the houses of the people. One lakh houses of Delhi have been turned into desolate ruins. This populated city has been ruined in such a bad manner that one feels like weeping over its fate." Mukhatib-ul-Ghalib, Letter No. 48.

There was a proposal to sell the Jumma Musjid, and then to use it as a barrack for the main guard of European troops, 'since it can never be allowed to remain in the hands of the Muslim population'. It was only after five years that it was released. Ghalib wrote on the 16th December (73) 1862, "Jumma Musjid has been released—Maulvie Sardar-ul-Din, Fufazil Hussain Khan, Mirza Elahie Buksh and seven other persons have been appointed trustees".

Sufferings of the People :—Most of the inhabitants were forcibly turned out of the city. Their condition was very pitiable. These poor persons started building places for shelter. But the British authorities could not tolerate even that, Ghalib wrote to Mir Mehdi Husain (74), "Yesterday an order was issued saying, why are the people building houses and shops outside the City. Whatsoever has already been constructed should be pulled down immediately. No body in future will be allowed to build a house or a shop outside the city". The condition of the people after forced eviction was equally bad. Ghalib (75) made an enquiry about his friends : "I have learnt that after the brutal murder of ten persons, these persons were turned out from that place. But I don't know how they left that place, whether on foot, or riding. Whether they had any cash or were empty handed? Whether the women were provided with the Rathes to ride? And what happened after their leaving that place? Where did they stay after that?"

Even the British authorities confessed that the sufferings of the citizens of Delhi were indescribable (76).

KRISHAN LAL.

(76) Punjab Government Record Office—Simla General 1859, Delhi Division, File No. 2, Letter No. 42—From R. Temple, Esquire, Secretary to the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab to the Secretary to the Government of India with the Governor General dated Lahore 21, April 1858, "After the capture of the city it was for some period utterly deserted; all the inhabitants had fled, all the moveable property had been plundered or carried away. There remained nothing but bare walls and empty houses. After that the Hindu residents were gradually and cautiously readmitted. But the Mahomedans were still excluded. Recently however the chief commissioner had authorised the re-admission of Mohammedans in the same manner. . . . The crime of these people has brought with it a retribution many times over. . . . After the storming though their lives, persons and honour were safe in the hands of our people, yet their property largely plundered. Lastly throughout the whole winter, which in upper India has its rigours for people of Hindustan, they have lived wretchedly from hand to mouth in the open country, without shelter. They do not now return unpunished as if nothing had happened. But after having endured hardships, they must reinhabit desolate houses."

Mutiny in Bihar.

IN the historic struggle of the Sepoys with the British Government in India between 1857 and 1859 the province of Bihar, as then constituted, became a storm-centre of popular resistance and challenge to the British authority which seemed for a time to bow low before the blast. The then Bihar formed a part of the territories under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. Mr. Frederick Halliday and was territorially composed of the Patna division comprising the districts of Patna, Gaya, Sahabad, Saran, Champaran and Tirhut; the Bhagalpur division consisting of Bhagalpur, Monghyr, Purnea and Sonthal Parganas; and of the Chotanagpur division embracing Lohardaga, Hazaribagh, Singhbhum, Manbhum, Sambalpur and certain tributary Mahals such as Bhokar, Korea, Sirguja, Udaipur, Jashpur, Gangpur, Bonai and Sarunda. While Bengal, Orissa and Assam, also under the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, were by comparison little affected by the mutiny and remained practically peaceful, Bihar stood seriously and universally affected. The effects of the mutinous occurrences in the North-western provinces did not take a long time to be felt in the Lower provinces under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, but excepting in Bihar, in no other area, included in the Lieutenant governorship of Bengal, was there any large-scale rising of the sepoys and of the people noticed or was there any disposition evinced by the people to sympathise with the mutineers and insurgents in a spirit of challenge and opposition to government. Bihar mutinied, while her neighbours, Bengal, Assam and Orissa on the east and south remained practically tranquil. This fact justifies a separate study of the history of the mutiny in Bihar between 1857 and 1859.

The Indian mutiny was the work of the so-called Bengal army. The earliest mutinous occurrences took place in Bengal, when the 19th and the 34th Regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry mutinied at Berhampur and Barrackpur respectively. The spirit of mutiny thereafter travelled up, to the North-western provinces where Meerut rose into revolt on the 10th May, 1857. This revolt of Meerut threw the whole North-western area in a ferment and cast its shadow on Bihar too. In fact during the early part of June considerable excitement prevailed throughout the province of Bihar in consequence of the spread of a general belief that Government contemplated an active interference with the caste and religion of the people. Government adopted various precautionary measures (1) such as strengthening the Police force in Bihar, carefully watching and regulating the 'ghāts' (landing places), and guarding the frontiers of the neighbouring disaffected districts. The treasure at Arrah and Chapra was removed to Patna for the defence of which a volunteer guard

(1) Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part I for 1857-1858. Paper No. 363, page 2.

was formed there and six companies of the Sikh Police Battalion at Suri were rapidly marched to it. They reached Patna on the 7th June and there they continued rendering valuable and efficient services. Despite these precautionary measures mutiny occurred in Bihar. Mutinies flared up in Dinapur, Arrah, Patna, Gaya, Champaran, Saran, Tirhut, Bhagalpur, Sonthal Parganas, Purnea, Singbhum, Manbhum, Muzaffarpur, Palamau, Chaibassa and Sambalpur, in fact, if not in the whole of Bihar without exception, at least in the major part of it.

Bihar was not destined to escape the contagion of the mutiny of the so-called Bengal army. The province bordered on the already affected districts of the North-western area. Similarity (2) in manners, language, sympathies and race of the majority of the inhabitants of the two areas served as a powerful bond of union drawing them closer to one another. The province was, above all, widely garrisoned by detachments of the disaffected Bengal army with whose rising the Indian mutiny straightway began in 1857. Again, those portions of the Bengal army which were posted in Bihar were locally recruited, were, in other words, composed of the native population of the province. Bihar like Oudh was a rich recruiting centre. More than one of its districts supplied sepoys to the Bengal army. Sahabad, for instance, supplied sepoys to the Dinapur Regiments. In fact, a large number of Rajput sepoys in Bihar was drawn from the district of Sahabad which appeared as 'notoriously turbulent' to the military authorities in India during the mutiny. The Bhojepuri-speaking people of Sahabad 'formed the fighting nation of Hindusthan. . . They furnished a rich mine of recruitment to the Hindusthani army and they took a prominent part in the mutiny of 1857'. (3) Again the Ramgarh Battalion which was but a local corps, composed of Hindusthani recruits garrisoned the various stations of Hazaribagh, Ranchi (Doranda), Purulia, Chaibassa and Sambalpur. This Ramgarh Battalion consisted of a full corps of infantry with cavalry and artillery attached (4). The army in Bihar, thus obtained by local recruitment and forming a part of the mutinous Bengal army, had a natural sympathy with their brothers in arms in the North-west and rose into sympathetic revolt along with the civil population in many a part of the province.

The hostility of the army alone would not evidently have sufficed to produce almost a general conflagration in the province of Bihar. The disaffected army of Bihar was guided principally by the old but veteran Rajput hero, the zemindar of Jagadishpur, Kumar Singh as also by his followers, namely his brothers, Amar Singh and Reethnarayan Singh, his nephews, Nishan Singh, Jai Krishna Singh, four other zemindars of Sahabad named Narhan Singh, Joohun Singh, Thakur Dayal Singh, Bisheswar Singh and by one or two Muslims of rank. Of these heroes of the Bihar mutiny it was Kumar Singh 'who had the instincts of a real general' and gave an effective lead to the sepoys in arms. Kumar Singh was a zemindar in Sahabad, owning several parganas in that district. He was a fine, good-looking old man on the wrong

(2) Statement of the mutinies as they affected the lower provinces under the Government of Bengal (1858)—by Frederick Halliday. Quoter in Buckland, Vol. I, page 65.

(3) District Gazetteer—Sahabad, compiled by L. S. S. O'Malley. Page 39.

(4) Frederick Halliday's statement, quoted in Buckland, Vol. I, page 99.

side of seventy at the commencement of the mutiny. Snavely in manners, dignified in bearing, courteous in dealings and noble in appearance and conduct, Kumar Singh during the days before the mutiny was a staunch supporter of Government and a personal friend of Mr. William Tayler, the commissioner of Patna. In course of time he came to cool in his friendship for the English through resentment for the treatment which he, in common with many other great landowners, had received from the Board of Revenue of Bengal (5). Kumar Singh had in his early days become deeply involved in debt and his estates were heavily mortgaged. By 1854-55 the Government of Bengal just to save him from complete ruin undertook the management of his estates from the proceeds of which his creditors were to be gradually repaid through the Collector of Sahabad. Kumar Singh at the same time engaged to borrow money to the extent of twenty lakhs of rupees for the purpose of paying off some of his debts. Eventually Kumar failed to procure the loan and shortly before the outbreak of 1857 the Sadar Board of Revenue sent through the Commissioner of Patna, Mr. Tayler 'a peremptory message to Kumar Singh that unless he obtained the entire loan within a month (which was impossible) they would recommend the Government to withdraw all interference with his affairs and to abandon the management of his estates' (6). This decision of the Board of Revenue was regarded by Kumar as 'the sequestration of his property' and by Tayler as 'unjust'. Tayler protested against the decision in a private letter to Mr. Halliday but in vain. In pursuance of the recommendation of the Board of Revenue Government abandoned the management of Kumar's estates. A final law-suit was also decided against him in the Sadar Court and he was left without resources. Kumar Singh then made a common cause with the mutineers. A considerable part of Bihar rose into mutiny under his leadership (7). Before he finally declared himself for the mutineers, he was never in want of expressions of loyalty to Government or of partiality for European Society. It was accordingly difficult for Government to believe that he meditated mutiny notwithstanding strong rumours to that effect. The Commissioner of Patna deputed Syed Azimuddin Hussain, Deputy Collector of Arrah to intimate to Kumar the suspicions gaining ground against him and to request him to come over to Patna to make a clean breast of the whole thing. Syed Azimuddin Hussain called on Kumar and 'found him lying on bed,

(5) Holmes—A History of the Indian Mutiny, page 196.

(6) Kaye's History of the Sepoy War in India. Vol. III, page 100 (footnote).

(7) Explaining the reasons for Kumar's mutiny Mr. Herwald C. Wake officiating magistrate of Sahabad wrote to Government on 19th July, 1857 as follows: "He (Kumar) is nominally the owner of vast estates, while in reality he is a ruined man and can hardly pay money to pay the interests of his debts. As long as, therefore, law and order exist, his position cannot improve; take them away and he well knows that he would become supreme in this district (Sahabad). I do not think he will openly oppose the Government as long as he thinks that Government will stand, but I do think that should these districts be ever the scene of a serious outbreak, he may take it into his head that it is time to strike a blow for his own interests, and his feudal influence is such as to render him exceedingly dangerous in such an event."

—Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons) Vol. 44, Part II of 1857-58, Paper No. 79, pages 27-28.

pleading extreme sickness, old age and infirmity as preventing obedience to the order of the commissioner to proceed to Patna. He was profuse in his expressions of loyalty and good will, maintained that it was difficult and dangerous for him to arrest mutineers and deserters, utterly denied having any intention of acting with disloyalty, pleaded old age and infirmity in excuse of his not being personally active in the cause of order and pledged himself to repair to Patna as soon as his health would permit and the Brahmins could find a propitious day for the journey (8). Kumar was not however, sincere in his professions of loyalty to Government. The unkind treatment of the Board of Revenue estranged his feelings and made him determined to espouse the cause of the mutineers. His subjects, the brave Rajputs, cast in their lot with him as their feudal chieftain, as he raised the standard of rebellion ostentatiously to give his valued leadership to the sepoys but really to feed fat the grudge he bore against Government for his personal losses and sufferings.

While the soil of Sahabad and of the neighbouring areas was thus prepared for revolutionary seeds by the machinations of Kumar Singh and his followers, Patna was fast assuming a mutinous garb at the instance of the muhammadans of the wahab Sect. The activities of wahabism in Patna went a great way in preparing Bihar for the mutinous outbreak. Muhammadanism was very strong in Patna and it was the most active kind of muhammadanism, as its followers belonged mostly to the wahabi sect. Wahabism, so called after its founder, Muhammad Wahab, began as a religious reform movement but ended as a political and economic agitation. So far as the political programme of the movement was concerned, it aimed at fighting against the Sikhs who oppressed the muhammadans of the Punjab as also at carrying on hostilities against the British in India. This anti-British and anti-Sikh programme of the wahabi movement in India was sought to be carried out by Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly and his followers who had their centre of activity at Patna. 'The fanatical devotion of the wahabis to their spiritual leaders, their abnegation of self and their mode of confidential communication with one another without written documents rendered it difficult to produce legal proof of their machinations, while their fidelity to one another was proof against temptations'. (9) Naturally the wahabis with Patna as their centre fast wove the web of conspiracy against the British in India without the Government being aware and convinced of it sufficiently beforehand. At the commencement of the mutiny such wahab leaders of Patna as Peer Ali, Waris Ali, Ali Kureem, Luft Ali Khan and the three Maulavis, Muhammad Hussain, Ahmad Ullah and Waizul Huqe kept the city in readiness for mutiny at the slightest provocation. Besides the influence of wahabism other factors were at work to make Patna a source of mutinous development in Bihar. Oudh, which was a powerful centre of opposition in the North-west was, for instance, seeking to inject Patna with the virus of mutiny. 'The annexation of that country had sent to Patna a small Oudh colony with all kinds of embittered

(8) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons) Vol. 44, Part I of 1857-58, Paper No. 363, page 38.

(9) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons) Vol. 44, Part I of 1857-58, Paper No. 383, page 3.

resentments against the British Government and there was an active correspondence continually going on between the mahomedans of the two great cities (Patna and Lucknow). (10) Again agents of conspiracy such as Khaja Hassan Ali Khan were at work in Patna to encourage the sepoy regiments to mutiny by instilling into their minds the fear of interference with their caste and religion by Government. It was a credulous time. So people really believed in whatever reports had been brought home to them. Reports had been in circulation to the effect that Government proposed to destroy the caste of the Hindus and to abolish muhammadanism 'by forbidding the initial ceremony through which admission is obtained to the number of the Faithful' as also to 'prohibit pudrah' and to compel the muhammadan females 'to go about unveiled'. (11) Hindus and Muhammadans, high and low, compared these reports with the actual legislations of Government on inheritance, education, messing system in gaol and so on and felt convinced of the sinister designs of Government upon native caste and religion. It was also very popularly believed that 'the introduction of the messing system into the gaols was to be followed by its introduction into the Army and that the sepoy was not much longer to be allowed to have uncontrolled dominion over his own cooking-pot.' The situation became alarming and exciting in Patna. Not only the civil but also the military classes, including the Police and the Nujeebs there stood highly unsettled and ready to revolt. (12) Attempts were made to spread this alarm and suspicion in the neighbouring areas too. At Dinapur, for instance, the Dinapur regiments grew mutinous at the instance of Patna. The mutiny in Bihar was thus largely occasioned by the conspiratory developments in Patna. Again, the presence of the opiumgodown in Patna and of some twenty lakhs of rupees in the Collector's 'cutcherry' (court) there offered sufficient inducements to the city-rabble to rise for the sake of plundering the Treasure and looting the opiumgodown. Patna, thus disaffected, conspired with Sahabad, Dinapur and other areas to produce a provincewide conflagration. In fact, what with the activities of wahabism in Patna, what with Kumar Singh's hostility towards Government, what with the local composition of the regiments in Bihar and last but not the least, what with the popular suspicion about the designs of Government on native caste and religion mutiny at last broke out in the province of Bihar, which occupied a very strategic position in the then British India from political and financial points of view. (13) The political importance of the location of Bihar lay in the fact that different parts of it had more or less easy access to the Ganges, and the Grand Trunk Road ran through a large part of the province, so that any untoward incidents endangering the safety of the province would

(10) Kaye's History of the Sepoy War, Vol. III, page 78.

(11) Ibid, Vol. I, page 304.

(12) Kaye in his History of the Sepoy War in India, Vol. I, page 298 notes that a Scroll, many cubits long, was found containing the names of some hundreds of respectable inhabitants of Patna, Hindus and Mahomedans who were pledged to a solemn oath to die in defence of their religion.

(13) Halliday's statement, quoted in Buckland, I, page 69.

have cut off the two great highways to the Upper Provinces. The strategic importance of Bihar from the financial point of view lay in its immense opium cultivation, the quantity of manufactured and partially manufactured opium in the godown at Patna and in the large and scattered treasuries, almost unprotected, so that in case of mutiny all such Government property in Bihar was likely to fall in the hands of mutineers. The military position in Bihar was no less significant on the eve of and during the mutiny. Militarily speaking Bihar stood defenceless in the sense that the province was garrisoned mainly by native regiments with an almost negligible percentage of European forces to exercise any effective control over them. Thus reviewed, the mutiny in Bihar formed an important chapter in the history of the Indian mutiny.

The mutiny in the north-western area had its early repercussion on Bihar. There, at Rohini, a village in the Deoghur sub-division in the District of the Sonthal Parganas three men of the 5th Irregular Cavalry aimed at raising an insurrection by killing the Commander of the Regiment, Major Macdonald, his Adjutant, Sir Norman Leslie and the Assistant Surgeon of the Regiment, Dr. Grant on the evening of 12th June 1857. Sir Leslie was cut down while the other two escaped with injuries. The mutineers were seized, tried and hanged to death in the presence of the entire regiment. A general rising came to be postponed. The attempted rising at Rohini took place a month after the mutiny at Meerut which had occurred on 10th May 1857. The fate of the three mutineers belonging to the 5th Irregular Cavalry at Rohini did by no means arrest the mutinous activities of the civil and military classes in the various parts of Bihar. The situation in the west Bihar division with Patna as its Head Quarters had been alarming for a long time past. Long before the actual outbreak conspiracies had been systematically and extensively carried on in Patna and the neighbouring territories ; men were engaged and regularly paid ; subscriptions to finance mutinous preparations were raised and the collections distributed ; and communications maintained with the evident and obvious purpose of declaring a general crusade against the British in India and helping the restoration of the muhammadian sovereignty. (14) While all Patna wanted but an opportunity to rise, Mr. Tayler determined 'to take the initiative, to arrest the ringleaders and by paralysing their plans, to check the revolt in the bud.' He determined, in other words, to strike at the root of disaffection by arresting the three maulavis who were at the head of the Patna branch of the wahabis. Along with a few respectable citizens of Patna the maulavis were invited by Tayler to his house 'for consultation on the state of affairs'. At the end of the discussion the Maulavis were detained as hostages for the good behaviour of their followers and were handed over to the custody of Captain Rattray, while the rest were allowed to depart. This measure was followed by an order requiring the citizens to surrender their arms and to remain indoors after 9 p.m. These orders were quietly obeyed. (15)

(14) The Commissioner of Patna to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal. Patna, July 14, 1857. Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part II of 1857-58, Paper No. 79, page 16.

(15) Dist. Gazetteer—Patna. Compiled by L. S. S. O'Malley, page 37.

Patna was not destined to remain tranquil. On 3rd July some 200 men with flags and music, armed with guns broke into the premises of the Roman Catholic Mission in the heart of the city. This was followed by the murder of Dr. R. Lyell, the principal Assistant to the Opium Agent of Bihar. Referring to the nature of this rising the Magistrate of Patna, Mr. J. M. Lewis wrote to Mr. A. R. Young, Secretary to the Government of Bengal as follows :

"The fact of the rioters choosing the Catholic Chapel as the first place of attack, their destroying a considerable quantity of property none of which was taken away by them, the green flags carried and the cry of 'deen, deen' raised by them show that the rising was a religious one. When it is considered that in what a disturbed state many of the neighbouring districts are, it is wonderful that we have not before had similar demonstrations. If the object of these rioters was to raze the city, the attempt was a miserable failure and the ease with which the disturbance was put down cannot but be a source of confidence and had it not been for the sad fact of Dr. Lyell's self sacrifice and the loss sustained by his death, this attempted rising might almost have been looked on as a subject for congratulation." (16) Consequent on the failure of the attempted rising the ringleaders were sought to be arrested and the city underwent a complete search. In the house of a book-seller, Peer Ali were found letters indicating the existence of a widespread conspiracy. He was arrested with many others. In fact thirty one ringleaders were apprehended. Amongst these were Peer Ali, Sheikh Ghuseeta, the jamadar of Looft Ali Khan, the richest banker in the town and Looft Ali Khan himself. The three men were released by Mr. Samuells, the successor of Mr. Tayler, with a view to eliciting more information from them. Of the thirty one who were seized fourteen were hanged in company with a man named Waris Ali jemadar of Mr. Ali Kareem, 'a man of great wealth, large estates and corresponding influence' (17) who escaped falling into the hands of Tayler. When Waris Ali was taken to the gallows he cried aloud: 'If there is any one who professes to be a friend of the king of Delhi, aid me.' (18) The boldness of the steps taken by Tayler made Patna secure against mutiny for the time being. His policy of 'constant arrests' and 'continued hangings' was warmly supported by the mercantile community of Calcutta whose commercial interests had every chance of being jeopardised in case of risings in the district of Tirhut for which Patna and Dinapur were the two most important stations. (19) The interests of the mercantile community of Calcutta were bound up with the indigoplantation in Tirhut. 'Any revolt before the plant had been cut and even subsequently during the process of manufacture would have been fraught with ruin to many of them.' But much to their apprehension and head ache along with Patna, Dinapur also had assumed a threatening attitude and had been marking time for a suitable opportunity to strike a blow. The station of Dinapur was at that time garrisoned by one European regiment, the 10th Foot, three regiments of native Infantry, 7th, 8th and

(16) Home Public Consultations, 31st July 1857, No. 65.

(17) Mutiny of the Bengal Army, page 176.

(18) Ibid, page 177.

(19) Mutiny of the Bengal Army, page 177.

40th and by one company of European and another Company of Native Artillery. (20) The Dinapur regiments had decided to mutiny ; but there was a difference of opinion between them and the townspeople as to the day of occurrence, the sepoys choosing Sunday, while the townsfolk preferring Friday, being the sacred day to the muhammadans. (21) The three native regiments, the 7th, 8th and 40th at last mutinied on Saturday the 25th July 1857. (22) The immediate cause for the mutiny was the order issued to them by General Lloyd for surrendering percussion caps. The mutineers escaped from Dinapur almost unharmed, crossed the Sone, and proceeded unopposed to Arrah on the other side of the river to muster strong under the banner of Kumar Singh, the well-known zemindar in Sahabad. 'It was Kumar Singh who procured boats for the passage of the mutineers across the Sone and it was he who had advised them to march without delay on Arrah, plunder the treasury, murder the residents and then crossing the Ganges at Buxar to make at once for Ghazeepur and Oudh. It was a bold plan and was very nearly succeeding. The sepoys mutinied on 25th ; on 26th they crossed the Sone and were joined by Kumar Singh ; on 27th they arrived at Arrah, let loose the jail-birds, plundered the treasury and attacked the residents.' (23) On 30th July martial law was proclaimed throughout the Patna division. (24) On 31st was extended to the whole of the lower provinces of Bengal the operation of Act XVI of 1857 'which made temporary provisions for the trial and punishment of heinous offences in certain districts.' (25) When on 4th August Tayler was removed from the commissionership and Mr. Samuells came to succeed him 200 British soldiers and 2 guns were sent to Patna for its protection. The military measures might have restored order in Patna but the territories around Patna knew no peace since Gorakhpur came to be overpowered by the mutineers. 'Bands of mutineers roamed at will over the country, destroyed public buildings and levied tribute. These raids, however, did not produce any general rising and were merely local disturbances.'

It would be unjust to hold that the district of Patna as a whole had been mutiny-minded and up in arms. The rural population of the district did not share in the mutinous spirit of the sepoys. (26) The total failure of the attempted rising on 3rd July 1857 signified the unwillingness or inability

(20) District Gazetteer—Patna, page 36.

(21) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part II for 1857-58, Paper No. 72, page 72.

(22) Ibid, page 147.

(23) Mutiny of the Bengal Army, page 182.

(24) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part I of 1857-58, Paper No. 363, pages 20-21.

(25) Halliday's statement, quoted in Buckland, I, page 72.

(26) Edward Lockwood—The Early Days of Marlborough College. Page 171. The author was much impressed with this view when he had to pass two days in a boat on the river Gundak in order to move all the boats from one side of the river to the other, to prevent certain native regiments from crossing the river and to keep a sharp watch on the mutineers. The author spent most of his time reading the 'Vanity Fair' inside the boat, taking a stroll only in the evening. He always found the villagers most polite and humble. None of them offered to molest him, though he was quite alone.

of the mass of the people of Patna to join the mutiny against Government. The Patna mutiny was mainly the work of wahab muslims. The district had been a centre of long-standing conspiracies which, however, remained, in the main, confined to the muslim community. Referring to the hostile attitude of the muslims of Patna Mr. J. M. Lowis, the District Magistrate wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 28th June 1857: "The greater part of the muhamedan gentry here are more or less dissatisfied and would be ready to rise had they the opportunity but they lack the means. Had a man like Maulavi Ali Kareem backed with money and influence attempted to make a disturbance, he would have got plenty of followers." (27)

The mutineers two thousand strong from Dinapur made for the district of Sahabad which during the mutiny had become 'the arena of more than one sanguinary conflict.' The sepoy's garrisoning Sahabad were locally recruited. Their mutiny accordingly aroused a natural and spontaneous sympathy among the members of the civil population. Consequently Sahabad became the centre of the peoples' war, waged against the British Government in India. As the Dinapur mutineers crossed the Sone, they were joined by Kumar Singh who along with his army of 7,000 to 10,000 brave Rajputs made a common cause with them against the Government. The whole band of mutineers marched on the little civil station, Arrah. The native population of Arrah was of a fierce and turbulent character. The warlike native population stood composed for the most part of the Rajput sepoy's, and their relations. There were 300 or 400 prisoners in the jail. The European inhabitants of Arrah and its neighbourhood at the beginning of 1857 consisted of the usual officials, attached to a civil station with their assistants, as also of certain railway engineers and inspectors. There were also some Europeans in Government employ. In anticipation of a mutiny at Arrah the European women and children were sent early in June to Dinapur where the presence of 600 men of 'Her Majesty's' 10th Regiment was expected to ensure their safety. The rest of the European community took up their abode together in the house of the Judge, Mr. Littledale. Meanwhile disquieting and panicky rumours began to pour into Arrah from Patna and Dinapur most frequently. 'The cry of wolf, wolf from Patna and Dinapur having been so often heard without the appearance of danger began after a time to be almost disregarded. But the peril was the same as before. The crisis was in fact approaching and the wolf came at last.' On 25th July the Dinapur regiment mutinied. The receipt of the news of this Dinapur mutiny at once induced the European officials, and their party to take shelter on the night of Sunday, the 26th (28) in Mr. Boyle's (the Railway Engineer) two-storeyed building, originally meant for a billiard room. Regardless of the jeers and opposition of his friends, Mr. Boyle had kept this building in a state of defence and provided it with a large supply of food-stuff, a prudent step that saved him and the rest in the company from the hands of the sepoy's. The party that took shelter in Mr. Boyle's bungalow consisted of

(27) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part I for 1857-58, Paper No. 364, page 50.

(28) Home Public Consultations, 21st August 1857, No. 41.

9 Europeans, 6 Eurasians, and 1 native (Deputy Collector of Arrah, Syed Azimuddin Hossain). There were also with them 50 sikh police whose fidelity remained unshaken in the face of alluring inducements to them for abandoning the party to its fate. 'Had the Sikhs who were with the party been treacherous, they might have eaten the men up for breakfast.' On Monday, the 27th July about 8 a.m. the insurgent sepoys, the whole of the 7th, 8th and 40th Native Infantry arrived at the station and having first released the prisoners, rushed to the Collectorate where they were at once joined by the Nujeebs and looted the treasury amounting to Rupees 85,000, (29) Then they charged Mr. Boyle's bungalow from every side. Hiding behind the trees with which the compound was filled and occupying the out-houses and Mr. Boyle's residence which stood within 60 yards of the fortification, they kept up an incessant fire on the party during the whole day. They were joined by Kumar's men, and the sepoys repeatedly declared that they were acting under his express orders. Kumar was even seen on the parade a short time after the commencement of the siege and remained during the siege. Every endeavour was made by the rebels to induce the Sikhs to abandon the party. Heavy bribes were offered to them. But they treated every offer with derision, showing perfect obedience and discipline. (30) The besieged party determined to hold out as long as their provision lasted. The want of water was removed by digging a well, 18 feet by 4 in 12 hours. (31) 'The rebels tried to suffocate the garrison by setting fire on a heap of chillies outside the walls but a favourable wind arose and blew the stifling smoke away. The same wind carried off the disgusting stench arising from the rotting carcases of the horses belonging to the garrison which the rebels had killed and purposely piled up around the house.' A rescue party, four hundred and ten strong sent under the command of Capt. Dunbar in pursuit of the mutineers from Dinapur and to the relief of the besieged was completely rendered *hors de combat* by the mutineers fighting under the cover of thick groves of trees. Relief at last came, when Major Vincent Eyre marched towards Arrah. He defeated Kumar's forces at Bibiganj on 3rd August 1857, reached Arrah and relieved the English garrison, besieged by the sepoys. The mutineers thereupon led by Kumar Singh disappeared in the jungle fastness at Jagadishpur on the way to Sassaram. At Jagadishpur Kumar Singh 'had stored a vast amount of grain, enough, it is said, to feed an army of 20,000 men for six months and had also established a manufactory of arms and ammunition' (32). Mayor Eyre followed Kumar to Jagadishpur, captured the stronghold and forced him to leave the village of Jagadishpur which along with his house was left behind at the complete mercy of Eyre and his party. Kumar fled towards Sassaram. Eyre captured Jagadishpur on 12th August 1857. He blew up and destroyed Kumar's house and a new Hindu temple in its vicinity, set fire to the village in several parts and departed following the route of the mutineers towards Sassaram. Sir Vincent

(29) Home Public Consultations, 21st August 1857, No. 41.

(30) Ibid.

(31) Ibid.

(32) District Gazetteer—Sahabad, page 27.

Eyre privately wrote to Mr. Tayler about the reaction of the destruction of the temple thus : 'It was curious to see how the Hindus in my camp seemed rather to delight than otherwise in the sacrilege of its destruction. I suppose the fact is that they care as a rule only for public fanes such as Jagannath and are indifferent as to the fate of private ones, built like this one for self-glorification. I regarded the act at the time as necessary to injure Kumar Singh's prestige and think it had that effect' (33). Being a European Eyre was far from feeling the pulse of the Hindus correctly. Nothing would wound a Hindu, it is idle to stress upon, so seriously as the injuries done to his religious feelings or to the religious institutions public or private. The feelings of the natives had definitely been outraged by Eyre's vandalism. If they did not take up arms in protest against Eyre's action subsequently and preferred remaining peaceful, it was because they felt helpless at the flight of the mutineers and of Kumar Singh too on the failure of the siege of Arrah. While, however, the siege of Arrah was on, the people of Arrah and Jagadishpur had demonstrated their manly character and warlike nature by fighting shoulder to shoulder with the sepoy against the British Government. As a matter of fact the mutineers of Arrah and Sahabad were composed not merely of the military classes, city-rabble and the refuse of the jail but also of the warlike population of Rajput villages and feudal retainers, headed by Kumar Singh of Jagadishpur.

The Dinapur Mutineers crossed the Sone to reach Arrah and from Arrah after the failure of the siege of the extemporised fortress of Mr. Boyle they proceeded towards Sassaram. Sassaram came to be attacked and plundered by 2000 of the mutineers from Arrah. The inhabitants of the town and of the neighbouring areas were however kept under control by Shah Kabiruddin Ahmad of Sassaram who had a considerable hold over the muslim community of the area. A petition expressive of loyalty to Government was submitted by him along with others on June 20, 1857 as follows :

"We hear that some native troops have rebelled against the Government. We never expected that these people who had hitherto experienced every kindness from Government would adopt such a course ; and we feel assured that they will soon be visited with merited punishment and that the ryots will continue to live in comfort under the British Government as heretofore. The rebels have given out that Government intends to interfere with the religion of its subjects, but this is evidently a lie ; for since the last 100 years during which Government had held the administration of this country it has never interfered with the religion of any class of people, though it has every power to do so. Nay, it issued notification annually, declaring that it had no intention to interfere with the religion of its subjects and thereby removing their apprehensions. It would fill up a volume, were we to describe the measures which the Government is adopting, at a considerable expense for the benefit of the people. We are prepared to perform voluntarily, whatever the

(33) Quoted in Kaye's *A History of the Sepoy War in India*, Vol. III, page 146 (footnote).

Government may order and what we are capable to do." (34) The people of Sassaram did not evidently respond to the call of the mutineers, and remained peaceful.

Kumar meanwhile after the destruction of his stronghold at Jagadishpur gave up for the time being the idea of immediately recovering the lost ground in the land of his birth and sought instead to fight against the English in other areas, Banda, Cawnpur and Lucknow for instance with the help of his heterogeneous army of sepoys and feudal retainers. He hung about Rhotas and its neighbourhood and could not be dislodged from his position without difficulty. (35) Marching into Oudh Kumar laid his head on a village called Attrowlia, situated at a distance of 25 miles from Azamgarh. The army garrisoning Azamgarh was then under the command of Colonel Milman of the 37th Regiment. Milman in his attempt to oust Kumar from his position at Attrowlia had to accept defeat and to retreat to the encamping ground of Koilsa, not far from Azamgarh. Colonel Dames of the 37th Regiment made another attempt to defeat Kumar but was repulsed by him with a heavy loss. After two successive reverses at Azamgarh at the hands of the old Rajput Chief Lord Canning deputed Lord Mark Kerr to proceed to the rescue of Milman and Dames. Lord Kerr reached Azamgarh on 6th April and at once engaged in a tussle with the mutineers who in this battle of Azamgarh came to be defeated. Azamgarh, however, still remained invested by Kumar's followers who were thirteen thousand strong (36). To relieve Azamgarh completely Sir Edward Lugard with 3 regiments of European infantry, 700 Sikh cavalry and 18 guns arrived at the opposite bank of the river Tons flowing past Azamgarh (37). Kumar Singh matured a bold plan for himself avoiding any clash of arms with Lugard in Azamgarh—such a clash with so vast an army of Lugard meaning sure defeat—and escaping to Jagadishpur. 'Kumar knew very well that the soldiers who had failed to stop the small force of Lord Mark Kerr would have no chance against the more considerable brigade of Sir Edward Lugard. He therefore so arranged his forces that, whilst those upon whom he could most depend should defend the passage of the Tons as long as possible, the great bulk, traversing the town, should march with all speed to the Ganges, and crossing that river at or near Ghazipur, should endeavour to reach his native jungles at Jagadishpur, there to renew the War' (38). Kumar acted as he had planned. He left Azamgarh on 13th April with the bulk of his army, and proceeded towards Ghazipur, leaving behind the flower of his army to oppose the crossing of the river by the forces of Lugard. A portion of his army, thus left behind, to defend the passage of the Tons had indeed a gallant fight with Lugard's forces when on 15th April 1858 the latter crossed the river by a bridge of boats. Defeated in the encounter, the mutineers fell back in perfect order and

(34) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part II of 1857-58, Paper No. 79, page 6.

(35) Halliday's statement, quoted in Buckland, I, page 74.

(36) Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. IV, page 330.

(37) Holmes—A History of the Indian Mutiny, page 461.

(38) Kaye and Malleeson, Vol. IV, page 330.

disappeared in the direction of the Ganges, while pursued by Brigadier Douglas under the orders of Sir Lugard. A proclamation was also issued at the same time by Government for the capture of Kumar Singh, the person handing him over to Government custody being promised a reward of 25,000 rupees and a free pardon (39).

On the way to Jagadishpur Kumar and his men meanwhile came to discontinue the retreat and to halt at the village of Naghai, about fourteen miles from Nathpur on the bank of the Tons where Lugard had fought with a party of Kumar's army. Here Douglas found Kumar Singh on the 17th April and proceeded to attack him. But Kumar Singh carefully eluded Douglas and his army, marched to Sikandarpur, crossed the Gogra and on 20th April 1858 reached Manohar in the Ghazipur District. The presence of Kumar Singh in the Ghazipur district excited a tremendous popular agitation there in favour of the mutineers. Discontented chiefs, landlords, and villagers came forward to swell the army of the retreating Chief, Kumar Singh. To them he owed much for his success in deceiving his pursuers as to the exact point at which he would cross the Ganges. The villagers voluntarily supplied him and his party with food and shelter which they were badly in need of. Kumar still could not escape the pursuing hands of Douglas who succeeded in searching him out at Monohar and overtaking him. In the engagement that followed at Manohar Kumar and his party came to be badly defeated. But the undaunted Rajput hero had not lost his aim. He had all the while kept in view his ultimate object of crossing the Ganges. He managed to collect a considerable number of boats seven miles below Ballia at Seopur ghat wherefrom at night he crossed the Ganges, thus completely outwitting Colonel Cumberlege who with two regiments of Madras Cavalry was lying in wait for him at Ballia.

Kumar thus safely crossed the Ganges from Seopur ghat and found himself amidst the familiar surroundings of Jagadishpur where he was joined by several thousand armed villagers collected by his brother, Amar Singh (40). Kumar reached Jagadishpur on 22nd April. On 23rd he had an encounter with Captain Le Grand who was completely defeated. The defeat of Le Grand required the presence in Sahabad of Brigadier Douglas to defeat and arrest Kumar Singh. But before his arrival the valiant Rajput no more able to bear the strains of war and the burden of anxieties came to die on 26th April 1858, leaving behind a name that would not perish in the dust. (41) As noted by Mr. Halliday in his *Minute on the mutinies in Lower Provinces*, his

(39) Charles Ball—*History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, page 287.

(40) Charles Ball—*History of the Indian Mutiny*, Vol. II, page 287.

(41) According to Kaye and Malletson the circumstances in which Kumar Singh died were as follows:

"Whether Kumar Singh was wounded at the action fought at Manohar or whether, as some of his followers aver, as he was crossing the Ganges, this is certain that immediately on his arrival at Jagdishpur he underwent amputation of the wrist. He was an old man and the shock was too much for him. He died three days after he had defeated Le Grand."—Vol. IV, page 336.

death was for some time carefully concealed by those around him, as his name was always a tower of strength to the rebels in his part of the country. (42)

Kumar died leaving the legacy of prosecuting the crusade against the English to his brother Amar Singh and other surviving leaders of Sahabad. The mutineers under Amar Singh and other leaders such as Harkishen Singh and Shewparshen Singh at Jagadishpur appeared to be about 1800 strong (43). Amar came now to be confronted with a sea of trouble in view of the fact that Douglas got an accession of strength from Lugard in his campaign against Amar Singh and his followers. The valiant fighters of Jagadishpur and the neighbouring areas remained as lions as before and without the least betrayal of despondency or breakdown of morale persisted in presenting a bold and united front under the determined leadership of Amar Singh. The extensive jungles round Jagadishpur afforded them a safe refuge. The mutineers had even set up a temporary government at Jagadishpur in imitation of the British Government "in the appointment of Commissioners, Judges and Magistrates. They even copied the British revenue system to the letter and sold all the estates of the friends of Government for arrears of revenue with as much punctuality as the Collector himself could evince. Amar Singh hanged a rebel for the murder of a 'bania' which showed that the mutineers were compelled to conciliate the people by occasionally giving them justice, even when the offending party was one of themselves". But Amar Singh and his party were not destined to hold their own in the face of the overwhelming strength of the opponent. Lugard resigning his command from ill-health, Douglas succeeded him with an army, seven thousand strong under his control. Douglas determined to crush the enemy root and branch. He arranged his force into seven columns in such a way that 'four should move from Buxar driving the rebels before them towards Jagadishpur and with a fifth, which was in the neighbourhood of Sasaram should form a connected line from the Ganges to the Sone, and thus hem in the Western and Southern sides of the jungle, while two others should hem it in on the East. As the Ganges bounded it on the north, the rebels would be compassed in on every side and must surrender. On the 13th of October the columns began to move and every hour the ring within which the rebels were confined became smaller. On the 15th all the columns were within a short distance of the jungle and Douglas issued orders to his commanders to close simultaneously on to it. But one column was delayed for some hours by a sudden inundation; and the rebels, promptly seizing the opportunity, rushed out of the jungle and struck eastwards with the object of crossing the Sone'. (44) The mutineers thus escaping the trap of Douglas came to be hotly chased by Douglas' forces who succeeded in killing a few hundreds of them in course of the chase. The main body, however, fled on. The villagers were very particular about not disclosing the route followed by the mutineers and thus not betraying them to Government. The mutineers escaped into the Kaimur hills, (45)

(42) Quoted in Buckland, I, page 88.

(43) Home Public Consultations, 9th July 1858, No. 28.

(44) District Gazetteer—Sahabad, pages 28-29.

(45) The Kaimur range extending for about 70 or 80 miles and having an elevation

where also they were not allowed to stay in peace for any length of time. Douglas pursued them even in this new asylum of theirs. Charged by his men the mutineers 'stole down the hills, entered the plains and tried to cross the Ganges. But the Captains of some Steamers which were patrolling the river opened fire upon them and sent them flying from the bank. Their spirit was now at last broken. They no longer attempted to preserve their organisation. The leaders fled for their lives. The rest skulked off by twos and threes to their homes and before the close of the year peace was restored to the land' (46). The Jagadishpur jungle came to be cut down and cleared away by the British Army.

The Mutiny which spread from Dinapur to Sahabad had its repercussion on Gaya also. The officiating Magistrate of Gaya, Mr. Alonzo Money writing to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 28th July 1857 intimated thus: "The mutiny at Dinapur has thrown Gaya into a ferment. There is nothing to be apprehended from the townspeople. They are surrounded by a new and strong Police and have a wholesome dread of the 45 English and 100 sikhs. A town-row would be put down in ten minutes. The present causes of apprehension are two: the inroad of any large number of the Dinapur mutineers or the approach of the Monghyr and Deoghur 5th Irregulars, who are sure to rise, I imagine. . . . There is a treasury here. . . . The force guarding it is 45 English, 100 sikhs, and 150 Nujeebs. These last are scarcely to be trusted. . . . They are all Oudh men and the approach of their mutinous brethren would be a great trial of their staunchness" (47). It is evident, therefore, that the mutiny at Dinapur, the likelihood of the approach of Dinapur mutineers and of the Monghyr and Deoghur 5th Irregulars and the existence of a treasury which was looked forward to as a target of attack for loot and plunder by certain sections of society fast prepared the way for mutinous outbreaks in Gaya. Besides, the presence in the city of a considerable number of bad characters, the existence in the heart of the place of a large jail filled with desperate ruffians under a guard of Nujeebs who were believed to be staunch and trustworthy only so long as the Dinapur sepoys remained quiet, further made the situation of Gaya tense (48). The Gaya gaol contained some eight hundred persons, ready to commit any enormity. The general population also stood highly unsettled to hear of such rumours as the mixture of bone-dust or the blood of swine and oxen with the flour, sold in the market. The attitude of the zemindars was by no means friendly. There were plenty of them, ready to join the mutineers, if they once got the upper hand, though none of the zemindars, as the officiating District Magistrate of Gaya could study them, were likely to hazard life and property before that (49). Factors such as these provoked mutinous feelings in Gaya. There was, however, no overt act of

of about 2000 feet divides the valley of the South-Western Tons, Jabalpur district from that of the Sone Sahabad district.—Kaye and Malleon, Vol. IV, page 344 (footnote).

(46) Dist. Gazetteer—Sahabad, page 35.

(47) Parliamentary Paper, Vol. 44, Part II of 57-58, Paper No. 79, pages 154-155.

(48) Parliamentary Paper, Vol. 44, Part I of 57-58, Paper No. 363, page 2.

(49) Parliamentary Paper, Vol. 44, Part II, of 57-58, Paper No. 79, page 155.

hostility before the abandonment of the station at the bidding of the commissioner, Mr. Tayler. Before an actual outbreak, however, Gaya was in a ferment. The arrival of 150 Sikhs in Gaya served to add to the uneasiness of the town to a considerable extent. The people of the town refused to sit or smoke with them, calling them christians. A carpenter was alleged to have reported to the sikhs that their food was mixed with pig's fat and ground bones of bullocks. The man was hanged by way of punishment. Evidently the mutiny at Gaya was preceded by a general feeling of disquiet and uneasiness which is the forerunner of all great convulsions, social and political. Things headed towards a crisis, when on 31st July the officiating District Magistrate, Mr. Money received an express letter from Mr. Tayler intimating to him the defeat of Dunbar's party in Arrah and ordering him to proceed at once with all force secretly and expeditiously to Patna, removing the treasure in the treasury, if possible, without, of course, endangering personal safety (50).

In obedience to Mr. Tayler's orders Mr. Money and his party left Gaya at six that very evening leaving behind the treasure, as neither carts nor elephants were available for its transport. When at a distance of three miles from Gaya Mr. Money at a second thought decided to return to Gaya and to remain at the station in the hope of maintaining order in the district and preserving the property in the station including the Government treasure to the amount of about 8 lacs of rupees and a gaol containing about 750 prisoners' (51). So Mr. Money accompanied by Mr. C. Hollings, the sub-Deputy Opium Agent of Bihar returned to Gaya with the forces to find all quiet there. On 1st August news reached Gaya that mutineers from Dinapur had attacked and looted Arrah. On the 3rd August Mr. Money heard of the march of an overwhelming force of mutineers and insurgents towards Gaya. To stay or not to stay at Gaya in the face of the impending attack by the mutineers—that was now the question. A detachment of 80 men of Her Majesty's 64th Regiment under Captain Thompson had of course arrived at Gaya beforehand to relieve the officers there of the immediate personal peril in which they were placed. But with so small a party of Europeans as were present at Gaya it seemed doubtful in the opinion of Mr. Money as also of

(50) This order of Tayler directing the abandonment not only of Gaya but also of all out-stations in the Patna division was considered ill-advised by Mr. F. Halliday, the Lt. Governor of Bengal. He accordingly decided to remove Mr. Taylor from the commissionership of Patna.

According to Kaye and Malleeson 'the purport of Mr. Tayler's orders could not be mistaken. It was clear that in the presence of danger of an attack from an overwhelming body with which their small force should be unable to cope, Mr. Tayler took upon himself the responsibility of saving the lives of his subordinates, even at the risk of abandoning the money. if the attack should take place, or if, in the opinion of his subordinates, it should be so imminent as not to admit of their taking the usual measures for removing the treasure. In a word, he relieved his subordinates of the responsibility of uselessly sacrificing their lives in attempting to defend money-bags which they could not save'.—Vol. III, page 71 (footnote).

(51) The Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal to the Secretary to the Govt. of India. Fort William, Aug. 13, 1857.—Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part II, of 1857-58, Paper No. 79, page 410.

the civilians and the officers in command of the detachment whether they would be able to save the treasury, if pressed by so large a force as was on march towards Gaya. A council of war was held. It was resolved at all hazards to secure the treasure and to abandon the city. The entire party excepting Mr. Money left Gaya with the treasure. Having seen the party off Mr. Money returned to his house. As in other places, so in Gaya the removal of the treasure gave the signal to the disaffected to break out into open mutiny; and scarcely had the party left the station when the Nujeebs let loose the prisoners and joining with them pursued and attacked the party whom they overtook in the rocky pass on the Dobhi road. They were repulsed with some loss and the party proceeded unmolested down the Grand Trunk Road on the way to Calcutta via Raneeganj. Meanwhile Mr. Money managed to effect his escape and to join the party along the Grand Trunk Road. He deposited the treasure from Gaya in the General Treasury in Calcutta.

Gaya came to be reoccupied by Government on 16th August 1857. But Gaya was still open to further mutinous attacks. One such attack came from the side of Bhagalpur. The 5th Irregular Cavalry which mutinied there on the 14th August marched into Gaya evading the opposition of Mr. Rattray, broke open the jail, liberated the prisoners, murdered the munsiff of Bihar and rode off for Tikari and the Sone. These events took place on the 8th and 9th September, 1857 (52). Gaya stood much disturbed in September. It is gathered from a correspondence (53) dated Gaya, 17th September 1857 between Mr. A Money and the Secretary to the Government of Bengal that the forces against Government were quite strong. The mutineers were joined by some Bhojapore men, led by a leader, Judhar Singh by name. The disaffected of many villages on the Gaya side of the Sone also had shaken hands with them. A large portion of the district had passed out of the control of Government. The areas to the West, Parganas Arwal, Uncha, Goh Manowra and part of Seris were overrun by numbers of Bhojapore men as also by the disaffected elements from different villages. Many of the roads were in their possession and the zemindars were in consequence afraid of sending their revenue to the station. To the east the area near Nowada was most unsettled. Some of the rujwars and some zemindars collected a rabble of some hundreds, plundered one village and spread reports that the district was deserted by the authorities and that the irregulars were marching back. Evidently the forces of opposition in Gaya caused a serious headache to Mr. Money who was quite at a loss as to how to restore order in the district in the absence of an army, sufficient to cope with the situation. Towards the end of October 1857 a fresh alarm was caused by the advance of two companies of the 32nd Native Infantry which had mutinied at Bhagalpur. But the mutineers passed by Gaya without entering it. The activities of Judhar Singh caused no less consternation to the authorities of Gaya. Making

(52) F. Halliday's statement, quoted in Buckland, Vol. I, pages 74-75.

(53) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part III of 1857-58. Further Papers No. 7 (in continuation of No. 5) relative to the Mutinies in the East Indies, pages 105-106.

grants of lands to his followers and spreading a rumour that the British rule was at an end, Mr. Singh carried on a crusade against the Government and shook the British power round about Arwal. He carefully avoided counter-attack by retreating to his strongly fortified house at Khamini.⁽⁵⁴⁾ The sweep of the mutineers over Gaya received a checkmate, when a number of mutineers came to be tried and executed, a body of European mounted Police was raised, an extra police force of 250 men was sent to Nawada and when in January 1858 Gaya itself was reinforced by 100 sailors and officers of the Indian Navy. (55) The month of June 1858 witnessed the plunder of villages near Arwal by the Sahabad mutineers and the attack on Gaya jail and release of prisoners by two hundred mutineers. This was followed by a surprise attack on the Jahanabad thana, the burning of Government buildings and the murder of the Daroga whose mangled body was hung up by heels on a tree opposite the thana. Judhar Singh seemed to carry everything before him till at last he came to be completely defeated by the army under Captain Rattray on 4th July 1858 at Kusma. (56) This victory rescued the whole district from the control of the mutineers.

The mutiny in the district of Gaya might have been crushed but the movement there was definitely widespread and in certain areas had assumed popular character under different leaders. Judhar Singh at the head of the Bhojepore men had enlisted the sympathy and support of numbers of villages on the Gaya side of the Sone. In the north-eastern portion of the district the leadership was supplied by Hyder Ali Khan who attempted to regain Rajgeer Pargana formerly belonging to his ancestors. (57) Mr. Curton, writer in the Collector's office at Gaya, was rewarded with two hundred rupees for capturing Hyder Ali Khan. He was hanged on charges of rebellion and plunder. (58) Wazeergunj in the neighbourhood of Gaya was widely affected and the movement there was broad based upon the support of villagers. There under the leadership of Kosheal Singh, a 'ticadar' of many villages, villagers were up in arms, and set up the flag of Kosheal Singh in defiance of the British Government. Referring to the cases of rebellion and plunder occurring in Wazeergunj the Assistant Magistrate of Bihar Mr. S. C. Bayley wrote to the Magistrate of Bihar on 4th January 1858 from Camp Saheea: "On my arrival here I found the village entirely deserted. The cattle and all moveable property have been taken away and little except the houses and grain remained. The state of the neighbouring villages is similar. . . . I have as yet taken three separate cases of plunder and rebellion in Wazeergunj. There are in all fifteen villages implicated. Of these the lesser belong to the Mahal of

(54) District Gazetteer—Gaya. Compiled by L. S. S. O'Malley, page 29.

(55) Ibid.

(56) Letter from the Secretary to the Govt. of India (Mr. C. Beadon) to the Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal (Mr. A. R. Young), preserved in the District Magistrate's office, Gaya.

(57) District Gazetteer—Gaya, page 38.

(58) Letter from the Secretary to the Govt. of Bengal to the Commissioner of Patna, dated 4th March 1858, kept in the office of the District Magistrate, Gaya (Gaya Collectorate).

Sukrodap of which Ranee of Tikaree is the 'malik' (owner). The other villages are owned by various people. It is clear that it has not been an assemblage of isolated 'badmashes' from these villages but there was a distinct organised attack made by all the villages in union. There were some 2000 men seen altogether. They surrounded the town of Wazeergunj in the night. These looted every house and shop in the place. The leaders, Khoosheal Singh and Jumunoa Singh of Khoowra declared that the English 'raj' had gone, that they were now the rajas and made every 'dukandar' (shop-keeper) and 'Bunnea' of the place sign a 'sarkhatt' to that effect agreeing not to pay them in future. They then set up a standard of their own in the town which was removed only when the 5th Irregulars passed through. They then inaugurated their reign by seizing everything they could lay their hands on and carrying them on bullocks which they plundered at that time. Of all the villages engaged in plunder Khoowra was the worst. That was the place whence Khoosheal Singh proclaimed his reign and whence he summoned his coadjutors of the neighbouring villages to establish it. It was from Khoowra that most of the loot was carried. I therefore beg to submit that Khoowra should be burnt. Men worthy of punishment are 'ticadars', 'Jet Raiyots' and 'Chowrey class'. (59)

Evidently the sepoy mutineers at Gaya were not divorced from peoples' sympathy and support. Still the Gaya mutiny had the same fate as the mutiny elsewhere in India. The British forces overpowered the mutineers in the long run. The defeat of the mutiny at Gaya is to be ascribed to the want of a strong leadership capable of organising the scattered mutinous forces into an efficient army and keeping alive the fighting spirit till the end.

As at Gaya, so at Muzaffarpur, the chief station of Tirhut, the situation was very tense on the eve of the mutiny of the regiments at Dinapur. Muzaffarpur stood undefended and was thus liable to be a scene of mutinous excesses in the event of an outbreak at Dinapur. It transpires from certain correspondences (60) of H Richardson, Magistrate of Muzaffarpur with the Secretary to the Government of Bengal that considerable panic prevailed at Muzaffarpur as early as June 1857 among the residents of the station, specially among the 'banias' of the Bazar and the Indigo-planters. The 'banias' were panic-stricken apprehending that they might be compelled to supply 'rasad' at a low price, while the Indigo-planters stood highly unsettled for fear of their lives and 'resolved that in case of necessity all European inhabitants should meet in one particular house in the station.' The assembling of the planters of the district in the station in fact occasioned a great consternation among the people of some parts of the district who thought that some danger was imminent; but as the planters came to disperse, confidence came to be restored to them. About the attitude of the zemindars Mr. Richardson wrote to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal on 29th June 1857 thus: 'The

(59) Letter from the Asst. Magistrate of Bihar to the Dist. Magistrate of Bihar preserved in the office of the District Magistrate, Gaya.

(60) Quoted in pages 1-3 of the Annual Report of the Ad Hoc Records Regional Survey Committee, Bihar (1952-53).

zemindars of the district seem generally well-wishers of Government—no doubt a few have talked seditiously. I have one at present on trial but by far the larger portion are well affected. (61) When on 25th July 1857 the Dinapur regiments broke into mutiny Mr. Tayler issued directions on 31st July 1857 to the officials at Muzaffarpur, as also at Gaya, as already noticed, to leave the stations and to retire upon the central position of Patna. The European officials and other European residents who hailed Tayler's order as 'an order which saved them from death and perhaps from something worse than death' lost no time in moving on to Patna leaving public money behind them. On the abandonment of the station a small detachment of the 12th Irregulars revolted. The mutineers robbed the Monghyr mail, plundered the judge's and Collector's houses, attacked the treasury and Government offices and finally decamped towards the district of Saran. The then Collector, Mr. Lautour who had left Muzaffarpur for Patna at the orders of Mr. Taylor returned soon of his own accord to Muzaffarpur to find everything quiet there. (62) The mutiny of the Sepoys in Muzaffarpur and for the matter of that in Tirhut could not proceed to any satisfactory length. This was due to the unfriendly attitude of the wealthy and influential Hindu traders and bankers of the district who had to depend upon Government for the protection of their property against the Sepoys in arms and largely to the unsympathetic attitude of the Tirhut zemindars, whose interests were bound up with those of Government. Such influential zemindars as Raghunandan, Bishnu Prasad Narayan Singh, Keerut Singh, Kooldeep were reported by the Magistrate of Tirhut to have rendered services to Government during the mutiny. Bishnu Prasad Narayan Singh, for instance, stood by Government and helped it with so large a contribution as Rs. 35,000/-. (63)

Though zemindars, traders and bankers of Tirhut went against the mutineers of the district, it would be far from truth to hold that the mutinous sepoy stood entirely divorced from popular support. There were many among the mutineers who belonged to civil ranks of different parganas of the district. The fate of the mutiny in Tirhut was finally the same as at Gaya and elsewhere in India. The mutineers came to be defeated and those who were captured were punished. Many disguised as pilgrims found their way into Nepal.

The mutiny in Bihar, as in the North Western area was not a localised affair. As in Dinapur, Arrah, Gaya and Tirhut, so in Champaran the mutiny broke out. Major Holmes was at this time in command of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Segowlee in Champaran. Banking upon the loyalty of this single native regiment he had kept the whole area between Patna and Gorakhpur under Martial Law. On the evening of 23rd July 1857 this regiment, so much trusted by him, rose into mutiny. It is learnt from the letter dated 25th July 1857 from Maharaja Rajendra Krishna Singh, Bahadur of Bettiah to Mr. C.

(61) Annual Report of the Ad Hoc Records Regional Survey Committee, Bihar (1952-53), page 3.

(62) Dist. Gazetteer—Muzaffarpur compiled by Mr. O'Malley, page 24.

(63) Parliamentary Paper, Vol. 44, Part I of 1857-58, Paper No. 363, page 51.

Beadon, Secretary to the Government of India that 'the sowars at Segowlee having on 23rd instant (July) at about 8 O'clock in the night, mutinied, murdered Major Holmes, his wife, the surgeon and his wife and children and then bolted with the treasure in their keeping towards Chaprah or Allegunge Sewan. (64) This mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Segowlee gave the signal for a serious disturbance in the district. At this crisis the joint Magistrate, Mr. Raikas left Matihari, capital of Champaran for a certain place (Cheragia Indigo factory) of safety near Motihari and transacted business in his retreat. (65) But the Magistrate soon returned to Matihari to resume the civil administration of the district. The Maharaja of Bettiah acted the part of a loyal subject of the British Government in endeavouring to keep the district in order and in taking measures to pacify the inhabitants and preserve the property of the state from injury. (66) Even before the actual outbreak of the mutiny he had written to Mr. Tayler a letter expressive of his loyalty and promise to remain constant in his devotion to Government. "... I observe," he wrote in that letter dated 9th June 1857, "that some evil-minded men have studiously given out unfavourable reports that Government have a design to convert their subjects to christianity which has produced a panic among the people who have actually begun to revolt. I deny their assertions and most truthfully declare that Government have no such designs. The stories are mere inventions of bad men to serve their ends. Now nearly a hundred years the British are the paramount rulers of India ; they have in no instance interfered with the religion of our forefathers ; on the contrary, they have allowed us a free exercise of our religious functions and they have further enacted a law that whoever scoffs at one's religion or molests one in his religious duties should be severely punished." Continuing further the maharaja wrote in this connection, "I have proclaimed to my people through my several tessildars the purport of the first paragraph of this letter and have assured them that they must soften their anxiety and fears, as Government has already taken prompt steps to punish the disturbers of the public peace by strong hands and the disturbance created by the insurgents will soon be settled." (67) The Maharaja was true to his words. He stood by Government and worked for peace and order, when mutiny actually broke out, as noticed above. Though the Maharaja and his people remained attached to Government, the situation tended to be difficult of control due to the incursions of the leader of the Oudh mutineers, Muhammad Husain who had been active also in Muzaffarpur and Chapra. The arrival in August of two Gurkha regiments from Nepal came, however, to arrest the mutiny. "Towards the end of December Jaung Bahadur with his Nepalese army arrived at Bettiah and on the 26th a fight took place at Sahibganj, 5 miles from Pipra between the two regiments sent by Jang Bahadur and a party of rebels who were completely defeated. On the same day a successful action was fought by Col.

(64) Home Pub. Cons., 7th August 1857, No. 11.

(65) Home Pub. Cons., 7th August 1857, No. 12.

(66) Home Pub. Cons., 7th August 1857, No. 13.

(67) Parliamentary Paper, Vol. 44, Part I of 1857-58, Paper No. 364, page 7.

Rowcroft at Sohanpur on the Gorakhpur frontier and these successes had the effect of clearing the districts north of the Ganges". (68)

The mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry at Segowlee on 26th July 1857 caused a great consternation in Saran which constituted one district with Champaran at that time. (69) The fears of an outbreak in Saran were not unnatural in consideration of the fact that as many as 10,000 sepoys in the employ of Government were natives of the district. The property to the value of a crore of rupees belonging to the Raja of Hathwa was another temptation to the mutinous Sepoys to rush into Saran for loot and plunder. (70) On the news of the Segowlee outbreak the European residents in anticipation of a sympathetic rising in Saran left the district Head Quarters, Chapra for Dinapur on 28th July. "But they returned on 12th August to find everything in a tranquil and orderly state, with the jail and treasury untouched and the detachment of Najibs still loyal, order having been preserved during their absence by a Muhamedan gentleman named Kazi Ramzan Ali." (71) But the tranquillity was subsequently disturbed for some time by the incursions of the leader of the Oudh mutineers, Muhammad Husain who declared himself "Chakladar" of Gorakhpur under the King of Oudh, as also by the plundering of two factories, one near Darauli belonging to a native Babu Ram and the other at Gangua belonging to Mr. Macleod, by a party of 500 mutineers from Gorakhpur entering Saran. (72) But this was merely a temporary phase of disturbance which came soon to be arrested. "The Sonpur fair was held as usual and passed off quietly" The posting of a Gurkha regiment together with Captain Sotheby's Naval Brigade at Siwan (the Head Quarters of the Sub-Division of the same name), the assistance rendered by Jang Bahadur and his Nepalese army, the defeat of a mutinous force 6000 or 7000 strong by Col. Rowcroft on 26th December 1857 at Sohanpur on the Gorakhpur frontiers and last but not the least the loyalty of Kazi Ramzan Ali and of the Raja of Hathwa ruined the cause of the mutineers in Saran, kept the mutiny confined to the military class and brought the ultimate victory to Government. The Raja of Hathwa (in Siwan sub-division) presented an 'urjee' to the commissioner of Patna, Mr. Tayler on 20th June 1857 for submission to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal in token of his loyalty to Government. (73) The Raja of Hathwa true to his words came forward with offers of assistance, placed men and elephants at the disposal of Government and gave aid and support to Government during the whole progress of the rebellion. (74)

HARAPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA

(68) District Gazetteer—Champaran, compiled by L. S. O'Malley, I.C.S., page 34.

(69) In 1866 Champaran and Saran were formed into separate districts—District Gazetteer—Saran, compiled by Mr. O'Malley, page 31.

(70) District Gazette—Saran, page 29.

(71) District Gazetteer—Saran, page 28.

(72) Ibid, 28—29.

(73) Parliamentary Paper (House of Commons), Vol. 44, Part I of 1857-58, Paper No. 364, page 80.

(74) District Gazetteer—Saran, page 30.

Early Indo-Nepalese Relations.

BIHAR figures prominently in early Indo-Nepal relationship during the 18th-19th century. Nepal with all her barriers of mountains, forests and unhealthy climate early attracted the attention of the European traders in Bihar. At one time contact with Nepal by the European traders could only be carried through Bihar. There are important documents in the archives of the Government strewn here and there that throw a good deal of light on the early Indo-Nepal relationship in the British period.

A great land-mark is an important event of the Roman Catholic Fathers starting from distant Rome and going to Nepal and Tibet through Bihar. This Mission had a certain amount of success and the Roman Catholic Fathers did open their Church in Nepal in the first part of the 18th century. Their first penetration into Nepal was in 1715. But owing to later persecution the Fathers had to close the Mission and come back to Bihar. There was a later attempt to re-open the Mission in 1745 which functioned for sometime but in 1766 there was no other alternative because of the persecution of the King but to close down the Mission and come down to Bettiah where an important Roman Catholic Centre was opened.

One of the important documents in 1769 is a letter from Mr. Ga. Logan to the President of the Company proposing to go to Nepal and to endeavour to establish a trade with Tibet and the eastern province of China by way of Nepal. The trade relationship that was opened up continued flowing between India through Bihar and Nepal both ways. There are old Correspondence in the record rooms of Muzaffarpur and Saran showing the exports and imports and the business deal between Nepal and India.

The other event in sequence of date that is very important is the Nepal War of 1815. There are various documents regarding this war. There are also papers to show the later arrangements with Nepal and the British.

The relationship became so much improved that in 1857 when the insurrections broke out it was Rana Jung Bahadur of Nepal that came to the rescue of the British with a big army. There are documents to show the very considerable help that the Rana gave in putting down the disturbances in parts of Bihar and in the Eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh. In this article a brief survey will be made of some of these important land-marks showing Indo-Nepal relationship in the 18th and 19th centuries up to the insurrections of 1857.

The British came to Bihar in quest of trade. Next they took up the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The battle of Buxar in October, 1764 strengthened their position as a political power. This victory secured to the British the possession of the Lower Provinces of Bengal. In 1766 Lord Clive came to Chuprah and he met Sujaudallah, Rajah Balwant Singh, Nawab Vizir and Abdul Moniruddin, Minister of Shah Alam. A conference was held and a treaty was drawn up by all these parties for their mutual defence against the

Marhattas. With this background the attempts of the Roman Catholic Missionaries to penetrate into Nepal has to be studied.

The story of the Capuchin Missionaries travelling to Nepal has been disclosed by Father Wessel in his "Early Jesuit Travellers in Central Asia" and Father Desideri's Italian manuscript "Notisie Istoriche Del Tibet" referred to by Father Wessels.

A party of the Capuchin Missionaries had left Rome in 1704 and ultimately only three of them could reach Chandon Nagore in 1706. The leader had perished in Mosopotamia and two others came back to Italy. The three Fathers who came to Chandon Nagore were Father Felix of Montecchio, Joseph of Ascoli and Francis Mary of Tours. From Chandon Nagore two of them set out for Tibet and on the way halted in Patna, where a hospice was set up. From there Father Joseph of Ascoli went to Tibet after covering the journey in about five months from Patna and opened a Mission. This Mission at Lhasa had to close down in 1711 and the Father came back to Patna.

Nepal was penetrated in 1715 by the Roman Catholic Missionaries. In this year two Fathers from Chandon Nagore went to Kathmandu in Nepal while three other Fathers and a brother went over to Lhasa. Reference to Lhasa in Tibet is being made as the attempt to evangelise Nepal and Tibet were taken up almost simultaneously.

The Fathers on their arrival at Lhasa on October, 20, 1716 found another enterprising Catholic Missionary Father Desideri who had gone to Lhasa four months before by a route through the high lands in Kashmir and then over the mountain passes.

The Mission in Tibet had to be liquidated in 1721 owing to internal troubles. Father Desideri left Tibet and came back to Agra where he completed his manuscript "Notisie Istoriche Del Tibet." The Mission at Tibet continued although eclipsed till it definitely faded away by 1732 when Father Horace Della Renna finally left Lhasa in 1732.

In the meanwhile Father Horace who had gone to Kathmandu had revived the Mission there but he soon found himself in the prison at Kathmandu. On his release from prison he was joined by Father Jocikin and both left Kathmandu and came down to Patna. The remaining Father Francis died at Bhatgaon in 1733.

In 1739, however, the king of Bhatgaon in Nepal sent his invitation to reopen the Mission. Father Jocikin and Father Vito went back to Nepal from Patna. There was also another feeble attempt to reopen the Mission at Lhasa in 1741. This time the Fathers presented letters from Clement XII, the Pontiff of Rome and the King and the Grand Lama of Tibet had a certain amount of favourable effect. But internal troubles again broke out and in 1744 Rome instructed that the Mission in Tibet should be closed down. By this time another word came from Rome to the Fathers to open a new Mission at Bettiah in Champaran in response to a request of Raja Dhurup Singh.

The story of the opening of the Mission at Bettiah in Champaran district is closely connected with the Mission at Nepal. Father Joseph Mary, a reputed Doctor was sent to Patna in 1739. Raja Dhurup Singh of Bettiah enlisted Father Joseph Mary's services as a Doctor in 1740 for his ailing wife. It took

five days for the Father to make a journey from Patna to Bettiah. The Rani was cured of her severe throat trouble and the grateful Rajah wanted the Father stay back in Bettiah and preach the Roman Catholic faith to some extent. In the meanwhile Joseph Mary went to Lhasa in 1742 and when the Catholic Mission at Lhasa in Tibet had to close down in April 1745, Joseph Mary came back to Bettiah. By that time the Church authorities at Rome had permitted the opening of a Mission at Bettiah.

The sister Mission at Bhatgaon in Nepal had a certain amount of prosperity for some time. Raja Jayaparkash who had earlier imprisoned Father Horace was more favourable this time and begged Father Horace to open a Mission, at Kathmandu and made a gift of house and land to the Mission. In pursuance of this response a branch was opened at Patan. Father Horace passed away at Patan on July, 20, 1745. But when Pirthwi Narayan the Gurkha Chief successfully seized the cities of Patan, Kathmandu and Bhatgaon the troubles of the Catholic Mission were fully revived. The unsympathetic or rather hostile attitude of Pirthwi Narayan forced the Missionaries to leave Nepal by stopping subsidies as they suspected the British and thought the Missionaries to be the spies of the British and ultimately the Catholic Mission at Nepal had to liquidate itself on November, 10, 1796. The five Missionaries along with 62 Nepalee Catholics comprising 14 families left Nepal. A week after they arrived at Bettiah and settled at Chuhari a village 8 miles east to Bettiah. Bahadur Sah son of Pirthwi Narayan was of a different temperament and had donated a huge bell to the Bettiah Church which is still to be seen.

A particular reference to the activities of Roman Catholic Mission in Nepal has been made because there is no doubt that their attempt penetrated through what was commonly taken to be an iron curtain at that time. The Roman Catholic Missionaries presented an ideal which sustained them for quite sometime inspite of the zeal to evangelise. Some of them were doctors and some of them were very learned men. Father Joseph Mary was particularly learned in Hindi and had translated many Catholic writings in Hindi. He had also made an intensive study of the Hindi scriptures. He died at Bettiah and was interred at Bettiah. The Roman Catholic Fathers at Nepal had studied the geography, fauna and flora of the country, manners and the customs of the people. Their books are a standing monument of their deep study and appreciation of the things they saw in Nepal. As a matter of fact their books still remain an authority for various matters.

While on one side evangelisation was being attempted by the Roman Catholic Missionaries the trade possibilities of the great country of Nepal were attracting attention. There is an important document in the National Archives in New Delhi which is a letter from Mr. J. A. Logan to the President of the East India Company proposing to go to Nepal and to endeavour to establish trade with Tibet and the Western Province of China by way of Nepal. This will be found in Press List of Ancient Records O.C. 31st October, 1769 in the National Archives in New Delhi. A part of the letter is as follows:—

“Having learnt that the Hon'ble Company have recommended a trial to

open a trade between these Provinces Tibet and the Western Province of China by the way of Nepal and considering the little knowledge Europeans have yet acquired of these countries and the commerce of which they are capable he believes that a person of integrity, properly authorised by the Company is wanted to go into countries themselves and report upon their commercial possibilities, he has had some of opportunities of gaining knowledge about these countries and is ready to go as proposed. The merchants of Patna cannot vouch that in times of peace a very considerable trade used to be carried on between their city and Nepal and that Tibet by the way of Nepal. The chief exports of Patna in this trade were coarse woolen cloths, Patna Chintzes, nutmegs etc., the imports, Gold, Ingots, gold dust, borax, musk, cows' tails, Chirras etc. The common value of gold in Nepal, and it is chiefly brought there from Tibet is said to be 50 per cent less than it is at Patna. It does not appear that there ever were subsidy and commercial Treaties between the Subhos of Behar and the Rajas of these countries for the protection of this trade. It is, therefore, probably that under proper regulation and sure protections it is capable of being much more considerable than ever it was. When the communication is opened it is not above 8 or 9 days journey from Patna to Cutmundoo, the chief city of Nepal."

This zeal for opening up trade relationship with Nepal continued unabated inspite of the inaccessible roads through mountain-terrains, hilly rivers and jungles. The climate was extremely unhealthy and many of the people of India going to Nepal for trade purposes fell casualties to fever and other diseases. In spite of this, enterprising businessmen soon struck a fairly large business relationship with Nepal. Ponies and other pack animals were the common vehicles for bringing the merchandise from Nepal to all parts of Bihar for sale. Trade with Nepal was encouraged by the administration of the people of this side of Bihar and Nepal Government was requested to fix proper duties. In a letter dated Tirhut 22nd February, 1792 (preserved in Muzaffarpur Record Room) R. Bathurst, Collector of Tirhut gave a list of articles exported and imported from Nepal. The letter is as follows:—

"Enclosed you will receive the list of exports and imports required by your letter of the 17th last. Though the articles are numerous, the trade is very confined and is likely to continue so, unless the Nepal Government can be prevailed upon to afford the protection to the trader and to reduce and fix the Duties which are at present arbitrary and exorbitant."

The exports to Nepal as mentioned in the letter were, Salt, White Woolen Cloth, Muslin, Malda Cloth, English redcloth, Hindustani shoes, Muskets, Nutmegs, Clove, Pepper, Soopari, Cocoanut, all sorts of Pulses and Opium. The imports from Nepal were, Gold dust, Crude Borax, Ivory, Wax, Cows' tails, Lead, Iron, Copper, Cochin Cloth, Chints, Cinamon, Honey, Sallajeet and Tin.

The points of contact were Birganj, Raxaul, interior *hats* in Sitamarhi, Madhubani and Purnia Sub-divisions. Usually Nepali traders used to bring their pack animals with the merchandise to the recognised *hats* and Bazaars on Indian border, while the Indian merchants would take their own articles

for export to the same places. Indian traders seldom visited interior places in Nepal. Both barter and coin exchange were in vogue. The Old Correspondence or the other documents, however, do not have any reference to show that there used to be anything like godown or store house where articles of export and import would be stored. It appears that individual traders used to take away the merchandise. After selling and purchasing the articles offered by the counter-part they would drive away their pack animals.

The next remarkable event in early Indo-Nepal relationship as already mentioned are the Nepal wars culminating in a treaty in 1816. The administrative unit known as Sarkar Saran at that time comprised the districts of the present Saran district, (headquarters Chuprah) and Champaran district (headquarters Motihari). The area now known as Champaran district has an extensive landstrip on the border of Nepal. In the Record Room at Chapra the district headquarters of the present Saran district there are a large number of Correspondence volumes of 1815 which throw a good deal of light on the affairs of 1815 and after. Even after the treaty it took quite a long time to bring anything like Law and Order in that area known as the Terai on the border of Bihar and U.P.

Some of the Correspondence refer to the fact that the frontier villages were well armed for defence and Parwanahs and Istahars were distributed to the effect that the bandits from Nepal should be repulsed. A simple method suggested was that whenever any bandit will appear in one village the inhabitants will beat *Nakrah* or a large drum by which neighbouring villagers may collect for each others aid.

By April 1815 a Political Agent of the Governor General for the affairs of Nepal had been set up. The Secretary to Government on the 29th of April, 1815 informed Mr. Elliot, Magistrate of Saran that the charge of the Police and the Revenue of the Terai were made over to Lt. Col. Bradshaw, the Political Agent of the Governor General for the affairs of Nepal, until "It should be practicable and convenient to introduce the Law and Regulations of the British Government into the Terai".

Terai was a regular nightmare as it was a noman's land. The Magistrate of Saran was directed to transfer the charge of the Police at Terai to Lt. Col. Bradshaw and to afford to him every available aid in his power in the execution of the duties assigned to him. In another letter dated the 6th May, 1815 the Secretary to Government, however, made it clear to the Magistrate of Saran that taking over by Col. Bradshaw should not, however, mean that there was any intention of an introduction of British Laws and Regulations into the acquired country and that the disposition of the army on the Frontier has been framed with a view to affording the most effectual protection practicable to that territory.

The trade relationship which by that time had considerably progressed with Nepal was a particular responsibility of the administration. In a circular dated 22nd July, 1815 the Secretary to the Government informed the Magistrate of Saran that it was expedient that every practicable restraint should continue to be imposed on commercial intercourse between the Company's territories and Nepal especially in warlike stores of all descriptions. The

Magistrate was asked to exploit every means in his power enforced throughout his jurisdiction the proclamations to that effect. All these letters are in Saran Record Room.

The old Correspondence maintained in the Saran Record Room also make it clear that there was an attempt to raise a valiant line of man power in the areas bordering Terai by making plantation of retired Military people. The Collector was asked to distribute the available waste lands among invalid sepoys as an encouragement and also to maintain a strong Military post for the protection of the Terai. There was even a question of giving arms to the peasantry on the border as a precautionary measure. This idea was, however, given up.

That there was a good deal of tension in the relationship before the treaty of Segauli was drawn up in 1815 is amply borne out by the letters maintained in the Saran Record Room. The old Correspondence makes it clear that in 1815 there was a serious unrest in Sarkar Saran and Sarkar Tirhut on the threat of Nepal Army invading Sarkar Saran. The acting Secretary to Government in a letter to the Collector dated the 26th January, 1815 mentions that the principal zamindars on the frontier should be encouraged to remain in the vicinity of the Military Camp for the purpose of assisting in the collection and transport of supplies for the use of the army in Bettiah. A good deal of confidence was reposed in General Morley and it was considered that as long as General Morley maintains the position it was not probable that Nepali troops will attempt to advance into the interior of the district of Saran. The Magistrate at Saran was asked to be in constant contact with Major General Morley.

A study of these volumes of old Correspondence in Saran Record Room will throw a good deal of light on the affairs of Nepal which affected the British administration both in Sarkar Saran (present Saran and Champaran districts) and Sarkar Tirhut (present Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga districts) from 1787 to 1815 when the treaty of Segauli was drawn up. It is apparent that there used to be frequent inroads before Nepal War actually broke out in 1814. Crime on the border had a very high incidence. In 1813 the number of 200 villages in the neighbouring district of Muzaffarpur had at one time been seized by the Gurkhas. There is no doubt that some of the border zamindars of Bihar worked in complete league with the Gurkhas.

The Nepal war that broke up in 1814 did not last long. The superior resources of the British force under the command of Major Bradshaw saw to the occupation of the Terai very quickly. Capt. Blackney was posted at Samarpur in Nepal Terai to keep in check the occupied Terai tract. But Captain Blacknew was killed on the 1st January, 1815 and his camp was burnt. Peace came with the treaty of Segauli in 1816.

Immediately on the treaty being concluded frontier posts were fixed up. There is a large volume of Correspondence regarding the fixation of the boundary pillars after a regular survey. There was a great casualty among the early surveyors who did this pioneering work because of the very unhealthy climate in the Terai area. A British Resident was posted at Kathmandu and henceforth correspondence from this part of India was carried through the

Resident at Kathmundu. One of the earlier achievements of the British Regiment was to bring about a lull in the practice of the criminal running away from one territory to the other after committing a crime. It was not uncommon for a Nepali criminal to cross over to the Indian village after committing a criminal act on the soil of Nepal and vice-versa. Another immediate administrative problem that engaged the attention of British Resident was to put a stop to or at least to put a lull to the practice of the Nepali to take the law into his own hands and to cross over to India to seek revenge for an alleged wrong. He managed to have this matter taken to the Court at Nepal and got a favourable response.

A letter from Nepal Residency dated October, 13, 1830 (Foreign 1930, Pol. Consultation, 29th October no. 13 in the National Archives, New Delhi) mentions about this matter to George Surnton, Political Secretary to the Government at Fort William. The Resident mentioned that after receiving a complaint from the Magistrate of Tirhut to the effect that as in several cases subjects of Nepal had crossed the frontier forcibly to right their wrongs without any previous application to Indian Police or the Magistracy he had taken up the matter with the Minister and had procured favourable orders from the Darbar to the local Nepali authorities on the boundary. He trusted that the violation of the frontier territory and the constituted British authorities would be put a stop to. He mentioed:—"It is proper for me to add that the Minister met my application in the best spirit and I have no doubt the orders now issuing will be sincerely and effectually directed to the end in view."

The boundary pillars that had been raised after the treaty of Segauli had to be inspected by the Magistrate of Tirhut and Saran from time to time. In Foreign 1834 Pol. Cons. 24 April no. 87 in the National Archives, Delhi there is a letter from Magistrate Wilkinson of Tirhut Magistracy dated the 15th March 1834 giving an account of his tours on the borders for checking up boundary pillars. He mentions some encroachments which were set right and it is obvious that the boundary pillars continued to receive the same type of grant every year.

The Resident at Kathmandu often had to deal with delicate matters avoiding to give the slightest cause of resentment to the Nepal Darbar. One document namely Foreign, 1833 Secret Cons. 22nd August, no. 11-14 shows handling of a delicate matter in the issue of raising Sappers and Miners which had created a certain amount of alarm. The Resident deprecated the measures of Col. Lloyd and remarked "such measures as Col. Lloyd has been authorised to pursue should never have been entered on without a full and perfect understanding with the Nepal Government." He also indicated measures to be adopted in consequence of the restricted Provinces adjoining Nepal.

There is another important reference in Foreign Secret 1830 Cons. 22nd August no. 9-10 in which reference was made to the great activity manifested by the Nepal Darbar in sending Missionaries in every directions. It was felt that some precautionary measures were necessary although there were no immediate reasons to apprehend any offensive demonstrations on the part of the Nepal Darbar. It was suggested that the scheme of Col. Lloyd for inducing

the Lepchas to enter into services, as also strengthening of the number of troops at Benaras and Dinapore or by stationing a field force of observation on the Frontier at one or more stations be considered and adjudged as thought fit. Apparently they were being looked upon with a certain amount of misgivings.

For keeping up smooth relations on boundary matters the desirability of constant tours was insisted. There are various other documents in the National Archives in New Delhi regarding the boundaries of Nepal with reference to different parts of Bihar. Foreign 1834 Cons. 24th April, No. 87 contains copy of the correspondence with the Officiating Commissioner of the Monghyr Division requesting that orders be issued on the subject of the reference to be made to the Resident at Nepal relative to the definition of the boundary of certain *maujas*.

In Foreign 1834 Cons. 24th April, No. 88 there is a letter dated Fort William the 24th April to the Resident of Catmundhoo asking him to enter into communication with the Nepal Courts with a view to the better definition of the portion of the boundary line referred to in Mr. Wilkinson's letter to the Commissioner of the Monghyr Division dated the 15th Ultimo.

There is another letter in Foreign 1834 Cons. 22nd May no. 48 regarding certain dispute between Nepal and Tirhut boundary.

As has been mentioned before the insecurity of the Terai area had its reflection on the Police Administration of Sarkar Saran (Saran and Champaran districts) and Sarkar Tirhoot (Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga districts), there was a general sense of insecurity and all the key officers used to be given extra guards who were known as Barkandazes. The roads had to be protected and at particular places on the roads *chaukis* were provided and particularly bad areas on the border of Terai section used to be patrolled. The traders used to entertain a sort of itinerant *peadas* who were a source of great corruption.

Inroads by hordes of people from Nepal side on the border villages of Sarkar Tirhoot and Sarkar Saran were not uncommon even after the treaty of Segauli. Robbery and cattle lifting were common as well as cases of vendetta for alleged wrongs. There was a certain amount of reciprocity of correspondence on postings and transfers of keymen between Nepal and the Magistrates of Saran and other neighbouring districts of Bihar. There is a letter dated Nepal Residency December 9, 1830 to the Judge and Magistrate of Zila Saran preserved in Saran Record Room in which an intimation was sent that "Udyanand Pandit has been just appointed by the Darbar, Superintendent of the Frontier kingdom towards the affairs from Tribeni west to the Mechni Nadi seized in succession to Hira Pratap. Udyanand Pandit will immediately repair to his headquarters which, like those of his predecessor will be posted at Jaleswar."

The next great point of contact with Nepal was in 1857 when Rana Jung Bahadur of Nepal decided to come down with a big army to help the British. There are a number of letters in the old Correspondence Volumes of 1857-58 in Saran Record Room which indicate the very great help that Rana Jung Bahadur of Nepal gave to the British. The Collectors of Sarkar Saran, Sarkar Tirhut and the other districts were warned to be extremely cautious regarding

the supply of *rasad*, conveyance and other arrangements at the Ghats for the crossing of the troops. At Bettiah there was some trouble regarding a Mukhtear who interfered with the arrangements and there was a talk of prosecuting the Mukhtear. The idea of prosecution was, however, dropped at the instance of Rana Jung Bahadur.

It appears that after giving considerable help to the British in Bihar the Rana's troop went to Gorakhpur and other districts of eastern U.P. which were considerably troubled.

Rana Jung Bahadur had a very pleasant meeting with Lord Mayo, the Governor General of India on the ground of Sonapore mela in Saran district. In "Reminiscences of Bihar" by Minden Wilson (1887) there is a good description of the meeting. The meeting took place in 1857-58 Mela. It is mentioned by Minden that Rana Jung Bahadur came down in a great state with about 300 men and he was met at the river Gandak by an A.D.C. in the Viceregal carriage and conveyed to his camp. Jung Bahadur Rana had about 30 royal ladies in the party and each one of them had a retinue of women servants. The Rana was much interested in the race-stand which he and his party visited on Nepal State elephants. There was a Darbar held at mid-day in a large Shamiana and there were three chairs of gold on the dias for the Viceroy, Sir Jung Bahadur and a relation of his. Sir Jung Bahadur had on his head a golden helmet studded with precious stones and on the top a ruby of the value of 3 lakhs of rupees out of which dropped Bird of Paradise feathers.

The Rana attended an exhibition of skill of the horse-artillery from Dinapore. There was a parade of the Nepali troops on the next day which attracted great attention.

A memorable incident had occurred while Sir Jung Bahadur was in the mela ground. One of the elephants brought to the fair went mad. Sir Jung Bahadur sent one of his elephants and Sir Jung Bahadur's elephant had an encounter with the mad elephant and was able to quiten the mad elephant and the Mahaut took possession of it.

While leaving the Camp grounds the Raja and the Rani distributed the valuable presents and jewellery, the value being suited to the rank of the person or to that of the lady's husband.

From the time onwards there was a closer touch with Nepal. Parties of the Rana family used to come frequently particularly to Gaya, a great place of pilgrimage and the Collectors were always asked to extend the necessary courtesy to the dignitaries and to give all possible aid. As a matter of fact the Gayawals or the priestly class in Gaya used to look forward to the visits of the Rana and other Gurkhas from Nepal because they usually came with lots of gold and precious stones which were presented to the Gayawal Pandas.

P. C. ROYCHAUDHURI

The Date of the Battle of Dharmat.

DR. JADUNATH SARKAR, in his '*History of Aurangzib*' (Vol. II. first pub. in 1912), assigned April 15, 1658, as the date of the battle of Dharmat, which was duly accepted by V. A. Smith (*Oxford History of India*, 1920 ed., pp. 410, 422) and other historians.

The Hijri date of the battle is mentioned in the various contemporary Persian sources in following terms:—

(a) In his letter Murad wrote to Shah Shuja,—“On Thursday, 21 Rajab, I effected junction with my brother (Aurangzib) at Depalpur. . . . On Friday, the army fought an engagement. . . .” (*Faiyyaz-ul-Qawanin*, II, p. 590).

(b) In '*Adab-i-Alamgiri*' Aurangzib himself stated, “On Friday, 22 Rajab, I issued orders for drawing up the troops in battle-array.” (II, ff. 219b-220a).

(c) '*Waqiat-i-Alamgiri*' says,—“On the following day, Friday, 22 Rajab, 1068 A.H., having drawn up his forces in that narrow and uneven ground, Jaswant Singh prepared to give battle.” (Aligarh Ed., pp. 38-39).

(d) '*Alamgir-Nama*' mentions,—“On the auspicious Friday, 22 Rajab, 1068 A.H., corresponding to the 7th Ardibihisht of the Ilahi Era, Aurangzib commenced fighting the Hindus in the morning and defeated them.” (p. 61).

(e) '*Maasir-i-Alamgiri*' states,—“On the auspicious Friday, 22 Rajab, Aurangzib issued orders to marshal his army for an engagement (with Jaswant Singh).” (Pers. text, p. 53).

Thus all these contemporary Persian sources uniformly give Friday, 22 Rajab, 1068 A.H., as the date of the battle of Dharmat. But according to Swamikannu Pillai's '*Indian Ephemeris*', 22 Rajab corresponds to April 15, 1658, which falls not on Friday but on Thursday. Now this difference between the date and the day in the '*Indian Ephemeris*' definitely poses a problem. Here Dr. Jadunath Sarkar apparently accepted the calculations given by Swamikannu Pillai, and thereby ignoring the day, mentioned by the Persian sources, he recorded the date, April 15, 1658, as the date of the battle, which corresponds to 22 Rajab. In his English translation of '*Maasir-i-Alamgir*' too he has accordingly corrected the day and given the date of the battle as “Thursday, the 15th April 1658/22nd Rajab” (p. 2).

The question, however arises while determining the date of the battle of Dharmat, Dr. Jadunath Sarkar was correct in completely ignoring the day of the week, so specifically mentioned by all these Persian sources, particularly when it happened to be a Friday so much auspicious and with all the religious appeal for the Muslims, who could not possibly make any mistake in respect of the same on which the glorious victory was gained by Aurangzib. Moreover, under-mentioned important data also make a reconsideration of the date of the battle of Dharmat, as determined by Dr. Jadunath Sarkar, most imperative.

(i) The Ilahi Era date of the battle, given in '*Alamgir-Nama*', the 7th *Ardibihisht*, duly corresponds to Friday, April 16, 1658. This solar calendar date specifically given by a contemporary historian could not possibly be ignored.

(ii) Both the important Rajasthani sources of this battle, viz., the contemporary poetical work '*Vachanika Rathore Ratan Singhji ri Maheshdasot ri*' by Khadiya Jaga, an eye-witness of the battle, and the *Khyats* of Marwad, giving detailed accounts of this battle, uniformly give Friday, Baisakh *Vidi* 9, 1715 Vikrami, as the date of the battle, which duly corresponds to Friday, April 16, 1658, according to the *Indian Ephemeris*. (*Vachanika*, Bib. Ind., p. 86; Muraridan's *Khyat*, II, p. 99; *Marwad ki Khyat*, I, p. 207).

(iii) Moreover, due to the occasional uncertainties of the heliacal rising of the moon the exact date of the beginning of every one of the Hijri months can not possibly be asserted with the dogmatic certainty of the Gregorian calendar. The beginning of a new Hijri month entirely depends on the sighting of the moon, hence if the moon is not sighted on the right day immediately on the completion of the fixed number of days allotted to that month according to the Hijri calendar, the ending month automatically gets an additional day over and above its fixed allotted number of days. Thus in '*Akhbarat-i-Durbar-i-Mualla*' there are 30 days for Safar in 1078, 1091 and 1098 A.H., 30 days for Rabi-us-sani in 1077 and 1098 A.H., and 30 days for Zilhijja even in 1077, 1091 and 1092 A.H. though none of these was an intercalary year. (Jaipur *Akhbarats*, yr. 9, p. 191; yr. 10, I, 277, and II, p. 129; yr. 24, I, p. 431; yr. 25, p. 11; yr. 26, I, p. 374; yr. 28, I, p. 449, and II, p. 206). Thus an occasional consequential difference of a day between the day of the week on a particular Hijri date as calculated by an ephemerist and that actually observed and duly recorded in the contemporary records and histories is not very uncommon and the possibility of such a difference in this case as well should be duly taken into account.

(iv) Finally, it has to be ascertained with certainty whether the Hijri date, 22 Rajab, had commenced on the previous day and had continued during the day on April 15, 1658, or it actually commenced only after sunset on April 15, 1658, and continued on the following day. For this purpose the exact date and the day of the week on which the month of Rajab, 1068 A.H. in fact commenced must be duly determined. The beginning of every Hijri month is reckoned from the sunset when the moon is for the first time visible after the new moon. According to Sewell and Dikshit, "Where the first *tithi* of a (Hindu) month ends not less than 5 *ghatikas* before sunset, the heliacal rising of the moon will probably take place on the same evening; but where the first *tithi* ends 5 *ghatikas* or more after sunset, the heliacal rising will probably not take place till the following evening." ('*Indian Calendar*' quoted in the '*Indian Ephemeris*', Vol. I-Pt. I, p. 70). Now the *tithi*-ending of the first *tithi* of Chaitra *Shukla*, which falls on Wednesday, March 24, 1658, has been given in the '*Indian Ephemeris*' as 81, i.e. about 48½ *ghatikas* or 19 hours and 30 minutes after the sunrise in the morning of March 24, 1658. Thus according to the above-quoted rule it is certain that the heliacal rising of the moon must have taken place only on the following day, i.e. in the

evening of Thursday, March 25, 1658. In the '*Indian Ephemeris*' 1 Rajab, 1068 A.H. has been given as the date corresponding to March 26, 1658, but as shown above the date 1 Rajab commenced in the evening of Thursday, March 25, 1658, and continued during the day on the following Friday. Such being the case about the beginning of the Rajab month, the commencement of 22 Rajab from the evening of Thursday, April 15, 1658, and its continuing during the day of Friday, April 16, 1658, when the battle of Dharmat was fought, apparently follows.

It is thus evident that both the Hijri date and day of the battle of Dharmat, as given in the original contemporary Persian sources, are correct. In other words, Friday, 22 Rajab, corresponding to Friday, April 16, 1658, is the day on which the battle of Dharmat was fought. Therefore, the same should now onwards be accepted as the correct date of that battle.

RAGHUBIR SING

A Note on the Household Effects of an Ordinary Noble Man of the 18th Century A.D.

THE many Persian annals and the foreign traveller's account throw interesting side-light on the life of the nobility during the medieval age, from which a general idea of their wealth and magnificence may be formed. The following documents discovered by me which rummaging through the records in the West Bengal Record office at Calcutta, is very interesting, offering an idea of the household effects of a petty Jagirdar, Ahmad Khan Qureshi of Daudnagar.

This Ahmad Khan a descendant of Daud Khan Qureshi, conqueror of Palamau, 1661 A.D. was the Jagirdar of Daudnagar and a courtier of Raja Ramnarain, Governor of Bihar. A few fragments of facts are known about him during 1759-1761. He served the Raja in various ways. In 1759 he accompanied the Raja to the tents of Prince Ali Gauhar entitled Shah Alam, when the Prince advanced to the neighbourhood of Patna, with his forces (Siyar-ul. Muta Kherin, Literature ed. 663). In the following year, 1760, when the Prince returned with the army, Ahmad Khan was the commander of the van and fought on behalf of the Raja. He was, however, taken captive in course of the fight, (ibid, 678). In January 1761 after the rout of the Prince's army the French Commander Monseieur Law was brought a prisoner in a palanquin. Ahmad Khan along with other chiefs went to see him. Finding the shutters of the palanquin closed he indulged in a cheap jibe, quite unbecoming of his high position, saying "Monsieur Lass Kuja ast, where is Monsieur Law". He was reprimanded and left the place (ibid 701). His death occurred on 15th 1171 A.D./16th May, 1764.

He left behind him an estate and household effects. A List of which is given below*

PROVINCIAL COUNCIL OF REVENUE, PATNA 9TH JUNE, 1777

List of the money and effects of Ahmad Khan Qureshi at his demise, 15th Ziqad 1179/16th May, 1764 as delivered by the Wakil of Bunny Nur Kuar Specie—

Gold Mohurs formerly laid up—	11,000
„ „ lately received from pargana Dungian	600
	11,600

* By courtesy of the Keeper of Records, West Bengal Record Office.

Rupees formerly laid up 290,000/
70,000/

3,60,000

effects

Three boxes and one casket sealed up with jewels, the latter received from Maharaja Ramnarain for wages.

His ward robe—

51 pair of shawls
38 shawl
50 pieces of velvet
40 Luppaw [Lappa--
Golden silver cloth]
35 K i n k h a b [Kam-
khwab, Silk worked
with gold and silver)
100 of Dacca white cloth
flowered
15 Corchob (Char-qab)
a vest
70 Jamdany* Corchob
10 Shawl Jamahs
5 Multany Chintz
50 Silk-coloured
150 Moldow [Malidah]
12 Stamped Lovadow
[L a b ā d a—a great
Coat, outer garment]
5 Bandar Dhohi
95 White Jammahs
10 White Nema [nimā—
half nimā-astin, a boat
with half sleeves]
102 K a m a r a b a n d [a
girdle, a long piece of
cloth girt round the
loin]
125 Turban
55 Chirraw, scarf, Chira
[Turban] Vide Ain,
trl 93.
50 Gulberdun [Gulba-
dan?—a kind of silk
cloth]
45 Bulbul Chusmaw [possibly a
kind of cloth for turban]
22 Torra, Tora—an ornament like a
chain
50 Sarpech—an ornament in front
of a turban

20 Looking Glasses
2 Spying Glasses
10 Jigah (Zegaw) [a jewel worn
in the turban]
20 Pair Khilat
5 Pearl necklace
5 Bāzu (Bozow) [Bracelet]
1 Necklace with Corals
2 Diamond Gold rings
3 Emeralds

PLATE

2 Silver Rings
2 Golden Rings Called *amany* of
great value
2 Pair Golden Betel-box with plate
13 Silver Betel-box with plate
10 Rose-water sprinkle pot
6 Glass-stand and Sarposh (Sar-
posh-cover)
5 Hulcorraw Tolley Halkhorā
thali
10 Silver Plates
4 Spitting pots
3 Gold Attr dān and stand
6 Silver Attr dān and stand
2 Pairs of aṭabah and Chilimchi
[āṭabā—Ewer]
7 Silver Spitting pots, Chilamchi—
A wash—hand basin of metal
7 Silver Chairs
7 .. Snuffers [instrument for
taking the snuff of a
candle]
10 .. Tholeys [plates—thāli]
7 .. Conches (shells)
20 Golden plates
15 Golden cups
15 China plates
10 China Rose-water sprinklers
50 China Jars
5 China Huqqas
10 China, large round dishes
4 .. Spoons

* Jamdany—a kind of cloth in which flowers are woven in and not worked.

- 10 Copper Cauldrons
 20 " "
 7 " Luggun [Lagan—a large flat copper basin]
 150 Plates Cotoraed, both large and small [prob. coloured]
 5 Copper Sancy=Sānki
 104 Sarposh
 5 Pieces of Copper aftarbchi and Chillumchi
 2 Pieces of Bideery (metal inlay work)
 2 " " Brass aftarbah and Chilimchi
 3 " " China Aftarbah and Chillimchi
 5 Silver spitting-pots
 5 Biddery spitting-pots [a kind of mixed metal of copper and tin, of which vessels and huqqa bottoms are made; originally made at Bihar]
 7 Brass spitting-pots
 1 Sarposh Copper, belonging to the cauldron
 2 Gold-mounted Huqqah
 4 Silver-mounted Huqqah
 4 Bideery mounted Huqqah
 6 Copper-mounted Huqqah
 12 Gold Huqqah Sarposh and chain
 9 Silver Huqqah Sarposh and chain
 HOUSE FURNITURE
 25 Copper Spoons
 9 Pestle and mortar, Brass
 10 Huggacurs
 11 Forts and Walls
 2 Forts small Walls
 10 Glass Hukkah, gold mounted
 15 Glass Huqqah Silver mounted
 25 Glass Huqqah Silver mounted
 10 Chilms—gold mounted [Chilm—Part of Huqqah containing the tobacco and charcoal ball]
 15 Chilms—silver mounted
 4 Tents called Bachobaw [A tent without a supporting pole is called a be-chobo]
 25 Tents called Poles
 2 Silver Hossaw [A mistake for Asa, mace]
 10 Silver Sontaw [Sonta—, mace]
 2 Golden handle Muschals—torch mashal
 6 Silver handle Muschals
 2 Golden handle Surjamukhy*
 2 Silver handle Surjamukhy
 2 Golden handled Punkhaws
 3 Silver handled Punkhaws
 3 Pieces velvet musnad gold embroidered
 10 Large carpets
 5 Small carpets
 20 Pair of carpets
 10 Pair of worked muslund [muslin or very fine cloth]
 40 Pairs of Choundny [small cups containing sandal paste Chandan-dani]
 8 Velvet Purdahs
 25 Broad cloth Purdahs
 1 Velvet Samianah (Canopy)
 15 Chintz Samianah
 35 White Samianah
 1 Velvet Chut (covering for the head and shoulder)
 15 Chintz Chut
 55 Broadwords
 15 Daffer—
 34 Cullwars—
 15 Knives
 5 Fishbone handled knives [pesh-qabz, a dagger kept in the belt]
 2 Pair paicub of Rhinoceros's horns [bracium=upper arm]
 2 Iron brace plates [armour covering only the upper arm]
 2 Iron Body plates
 4 Iron helmet
 5 Iron Khase [Khassa, the personal arms of a noble carried by a servant called the Khassa-bardā]
 5 Handguards [gauntlets]
 10 Spears gold mounted
 10 Spears silver mounted
 10 Spears
 7 Spears Broad
 15 Small Cannon
 10 Lahore matchlocks gold
 10 Firelocks Silver mounted
 5 Bhojpur matchlocks mounted
 5 Gagey [gaz=yard]
 25 Knives both large and small
 45 Armour

*Surjamukhi—A stand supporting a large round plate with rays emanating from a centre—A big fan.

45 Shields	3 Palanquins with furniture
1 Elephant	5 Mazanaws
6 Camels with furniture	2 Camel drums
9 Horse saddles Culgey, both small and large [Kalgi—an orna- ment]	3 Horses
	5 Hackerys, carts
	10 Bullocks

N. B. ROY

Attitude of Sir Charles Wood and Lord Dalhousie Towards Higher Education in Calcutta.

SIR CHARLES WOOD satisfied himself with the "prospects of immortality" (1) through his famous Education Despatch of July 1854. It was said that this education scheme "brought more renown to the Board of Control than any other measure ever adopted by it" (2), and Sir Charles, as the President of the Board, did all he could "to filch for himself the whole credit" of all that had been done for education or was to be done at that time (3). "The education scheme was loudly and generally approved" by the British House of Commons which assured Wood that his name should be handed down to posterity as one of the "renovators of India" (4). And Wood prided, "I hope to have laid the foundation of a great improvement in the condition of the natives of our Indian territories" (5).

But inspite of all these, the Wood papers betray that he neither deserved the credit which he claimed and was given, nor was his intention towards the cause of Indian education very pious or sympathetic.

On the other hand, the Governor-General Lord Dalhousie had hardly been able to associate his name with any great principle of the Indian education. His fame rests mainly with his imperialistic designs, his conquest of the Punjab and Pegu, application of the Doctrine of Lapse, and annexation of Oude etc. That he was a great imperialist there can be no doubt. "To swallow him before I go would give me satisfaction", wrote Dalhousie in a private letter about the king of Oude more than two and a half years before he had actually 'swallowed' him up (6). About the Mughal Emperor he wrote, "The old king of Delhi is dying. If it had not been for the effete folly of the Court, I would have ended with him the dynasty of Timour" (7).

But the 9 volumes of the personal diary of the Governor-General relating to his Indian career (which are preserved still in his own house with his great grand daughter at Colstoun, Scotland), and many volumes of

(1) Wood Papers, Letter Book, Vol. V, Wood to Dalhousie, 9 August 1854.

(2) Friend of India, 10 May 1855.

(3) Dalhousie's Diary, 12 October 1854

(4) Wood Papers, Letter Book, Vol. V, Wood to Dalhousie, 9 August 1854.

(5) Ibid, Vol. VI, Wood to Colvile, 24 October 1854.

(6) Private Letters of the Marquis of Dalhousie, J. G. A. Baird, p. 262.

(7) Ibid.

his private and demi-official papers (preserved in the Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh), give evidence to a great extent that though an imperialist, Lord Dalhousie wanted to associate himself with some of the noble works for the welfare of the people. He spent from his own pocket 34,579 rupees to finance the Bethune female school from the death of its founder till his own departure from India. He prepared grounds for a popular education through the indigenous languages of the people before the education despatch had been issued ; and his feeling towards the higher education of the people, especially in Calcutta, was sincere and sympathetic.

The purpose of this article is to briefly show how the Governor-General and the President of the India Board viewed the cause of higher education in Calcutta.

Practically nothing was done by the British Government till the middle of the 19th century for the education of the people in general ; and for the higher education, if anything was done, it was very little. Earlier during the Company's rule " . . . the only native educational establishments founded in India by the British Government were the Mahommedan College at Calcutta and the Sanskrit College at Benares, established respectively in 1781 and 1792" (8). The Hindoo College of Calcutta, founded in 1816 under native benevolence, was not transferred to Government superintendence until 1823. The British Parliament had directed in 1813 that a sum of £10,000 per annum should be set apart from the surplus revenues of India for revival and improvement of literature. But nothing was done in consequence until 1823, when the Government of Bengal appointed a Committee of Public Instruction, and placed at their disposal the arrears of the Parliamentary grant from the year 1821.

The time of Raja Ram Mohun Roy and Macaulay marked the beginning of a great desire on part of the enlightened class of Bengal for higher education. A few seminaries were established no doubt, but that was inadequate enough to satisfy the popular need. In Calcutta the demand for education continued to increase which led Sir Henry Seton to write to the President, Sir John Hobhouse in 1846. "One of the first calls upon your attention will be the Calcutta University, which will, I have no doubt, receive your sanction and support" (9) But the President had no inclination to think about the above subject.

Lord Dalhousie, in his "first address in India", delivered on the occasion of the distribution of prizes to the alumni of the various Government institutions in Calcutta, declared that "it would be the object of his administration to afford every encouragement for the development of native talent" (10). The Governor-General aimed at the promotion of the higher education. He, like Lord William Bentinck, believed in the efficacy of the Western education, and said, " . . . that any authority should argue now for Arabic, Sanskrit, or

(8) Dalhousie Papers, No 141.

(9) Home Misc: Broughton Papers, Vol. 853, Henry Seton to Hobhouse, 6 Sept, 1846

(10) Friend of India, 2 March 1848.

Persian as the fit foundation for Government education, even in its higher grades, is worse than a heresy" (11).

But it was not till 1853 that Dalhousie could give his serious thought to the subject. It is remarkable that in Calcutta where the desire for higher education was so great, the Government had not yet felt the necessity of establishing a Government college. "While Agra, Delhi, Benares, and many other places of lesser note and inferior importance possess each of them a Government college for general instruction, in Calcutta, the metropolis of the British dominions in the East, there is no general college at all", noted Dalhousie himself (12). Of course, there was the Madrasa, but it was working for the special advantage of the Mahomedans. The Hindu College and the Sanskrit College were both in "flourishing" condition, but they too were "exclusive in their character."

The Bengal Council of Education which felt the necessity of a Government college "for all classes", could not venture to propose for its establishment, because the financial considerations came in their way. The Council wanted, therefore, to change the character and constitution of the Hindu College, and to throw it open to all classes. In other words, the Council wanted to take it up fully as a Government institution.

But Dalhousie, during his administration, had improved the condition of finance greatly, and could securely feel that "Financial considerations no longer shackle the progress of the Government" (13). He felt that "the Government has not done for the encouragement of sound education in this capital all that was desirable, or even all that would have been its possible duty. .", and recommended, "A new general college should be established at Calcutta by the Government, which should be termed 'The Presidency College', in order to distinguish it by name from all merely local and private institutions, and in order to give it an official character" (14).

While Lord Dalhousie was preparing his scheme for the Presidency College through which he visualised "the dignity and proportions of an Indian University", Sir Charles Wood, too, had busied himself in preparing his education scheme. After assumption of his office in the India Board, Sir Charles felt for some time to be "a good deal at sea" (15) on the subject of education. For several months, while he thought of a general education, he could not see his own way, and was puzzled to think "what the village schools are." "I do not see how we could embark on so gigantic an undertaking as rendering assistance and inspecting a school in every village", felt Wood (16).

The bigness of a general plan for elementary education in India seems to have driven Wood to think of a higher University education. His thought

(11) Dalhousie Papers, Miscellaneous Letters to Persons in India & Europe, Dalhousie to Erskine, 18 May 1848.

(12) Dalhousie Papers, Governor General's Minutes, Vol. XIV, 17 October 1853.

(13) Ibid, 25 October 1853.

(14) Dalhousie Papers, Governor-General's Minutes, Vol. XIV, 17 October 1853.

(15) Wood Papers, Letter Book, Vol. III, Wood to Dalhousie, 19 August 1853.

(16) Ibid, Vol. IV, Wood to Marshman, 22 November 1853.

over the question of Indian education, elementary or higher, was closely linked with his political misapprehensions as to how far would education go against the British rule. He had no desire to elevate the moral standard of the people through the spread of education, because to him the British administration had little to do with the mass. "I hope that we shall govern India for many years, but it is clear to my mind that we shall always govern it as aliens not settling in the country or having much in common with the mass of the people whom we govern," said Wood to Dalhousie (17).

If mass education seemed either impracticable or undesirable, the higher education of the few, too, had to be considered through political probabilities. Lord Ellenborough, who, while the Governor General of India had strongly opposed the construction of the great Ganges Canal, and who, when in England after his Indian career greatly discouraged the introduction of railways, did not forget to warn Wood that "education will be fatal" to the British rule (18). "So it may be", apprehended Wood, "unless we accompany education by suitable measures, but I see no reason why it should not strengthen our hold in India if we act wisely in regard to the educated natives" (19).

Under such ideas Sir Charles Wood began to consider the question of higher education. He searched the possibilities of strengthening the British administration through higher education by giving employment to the natives. "I believe this to be advisable", said Wood, "not only for the purpose of providing a career for the improved and educated native, but also for improving our administration in almost all our departments" (20). He could feel that the natives were "capable of such employment" and that they had "great anxiety to participate in it." Accordingly he wrote to Dalhousie, "I should endeavour to enlist in the service of the Government those who might otherwise employ their talents and energies against us, and attach to us by their interest those who might be our most formidable enemies" (21).

Guided by such motive Wood felt that to create a few educated natives to help administration, the establishment of a university was essential. "It seems to me that the easiest step is an university. I don't say the most useful", felt Wood (22). But a second thought on the University education changed his mind. He could realise that it was impossible to provide employment for all the highly educated natives, who, it seemed to Wood that "if they become intelligent from education they may be dangerous" (23). On the 24th April 1854, he informed Dalhousie about his changed opinion thus: "It seems to me that by promoting the high education of the natives and providing no career for them we are weakening ourselves. . . . I am however

(17) Ibid, Vol. IV, Wood to Dalhousie, 24 November 1853.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Ibid, Vol. IV, Wood to Elphinstone, 24 January 1854.

(23) Wood Papers, Letter Book, Vol. V, Wood to Dalhousie, 24 April 1854.

very much for directing our educational efforts much more to general than to high education", (24).

Wood was in a great dilemma. A general elementary education to the vast body of Indian population seemed as difficult to him as the higher University education seemed dangerous. But without elementary and higher education there was no third thing for Wood to base his proposed education scheme. Since the elementary education, for its bigness, had to be touched only at its fringe, the despatch was of necessity to provide for the establishment of a few universities. Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were the only three Presidency capitals where such universities could be thought of. To Wood, Bombay and Madras did not appear to be dangerous spots for higher education. But it was Calcutta which created suspicion in his mind.

So, while Wood was finalising his scheme, he wrote to Dalhousie, "I am not all satisfied with things as they are, and I think that at Calcutta especially too much in proportion has been done for the higher students and too little for the education of the body of the people" (25). Wood was right in his thought that too little had been done for the body of the people. But his supposition that too much had been done for higher students does not stand to reason. As has been seen, there was no Government college in Calcutta, though of course the Hindu College, the Sanskrit College and the Madrasa received the Government aid. How far the higher education had spread, not in Calcutta, but in the whole of Bengal, Assam and Orissa is seen from a "Return of the number of scholars in the several schools and other establishments for education, maintained at the Public expense" submitted by the East India House before the British House of Commons dated the 25th November 1847. In all the 36 institutions of Bengal, Assam and Orissa, including the Calcutta Sanskrit College, Calcutta Hindu College, Madrasa and the Medical College, the number of students on roll on the 30th April 1845, was 7,036 only (26).

Wood could not have possibly denied a university to Calcutta when Bombay and Madras were going each to get one, and specially in view of the Governor-General's strong recommendations for the Presidency College. So he had to agree ; but he wanted to have an impoverished university without much government aid. He made his views clear to Dalhousie in the following words, "I care very little about teaching Hindus to read Bacon and to be examined as we should be for honours at Oxford. I have no objection to their acquiring that education, but I am against paying them for acquiring it as we do in the Government Schools and Government Scholarships. I am inclined to think that these highly educated natives are likely to be a very discontented class unless they are employed, and we can not find employment for them all" (27). Wood's main aim was, in his own words, "for leaving high education to be mainly supported by those who are anxious for it."

(24) Ibid.

(25) Ibid, Wood to Dalhousie, 8 June 1854.

(26) Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons, 1847-48, Vol. X (India Office Libr.).

(27) Wood Papers, Letter Book, Vol. V, Wood to Dalhousie, 8 June 1854.

But Dalhousie's view was liberal. He wanted to enrich the proposed university with enough of scholarships to attract the scholars from far and wide. This is what he had said about the proposed Presidency College: "The time, I doubt not, will come, though it is probably still in the distant future, when the Presidency College, having elevated itself by its reputation and being enriched by endowments and scholarships, will extend its sphere of attraction far beyond the local limits which it is now designed to serve; and when, strengthened by the most distinguished scholars from other cities, and united with the Medical College in all its various departments, as well as with other Professorships of practical science and art whose establishment cannot be long postponed, it will expand itself into something approaching to the dignity and proportions of an Indian University" (28). Lord Dalhousie wanted to "have the satisfaction of seeing the educational Institutions of the Capital (Calcutta) placed upon a footing adequate to the wants of the Community, and worthy of the Government of the Hon'ble Company" (29).

When Wood's view to introduce a "self relying" university system became known, Mr. Cecil Beadon, with his knowledge and experience of the Indian conditions, advocated "in favour of more high scholarships" which he considered to be "essential" to attract pupils for higher education (30). But Wood was determined not to see, in his own words, "your Bengalees reading Bacon and Shakespeare, at the expense of Government, and being paid for learning it." "It seems to our notions absurd to pay a man for being educated" wrote Wood to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Halliday (31).

Had Wood's intention been influenced only by the virtues of a self-relying system as such, it might have been well and good. But if he wanted the Universities to stand without Government aid, it was because of his political apprehensions under which he did not want to encourage the higher learning. His letter to James Halliday which accompanied his celebrated Education Despatch of the 19th July, once more exposes his deeprooted conviction. "... to pay a man, who can afford to pay for himself; making the payment the inducement to the man to qualify himself for employment in public or private office seems to be very contrary to all civilised notions. I do not see the advantage of rearing up a number of highly educated gentlemen, at the expense of the state, whom you cannot employ, and who will naturally become depositaries of discontent. If they choose to educate themselves, well and good, but I am against providing our own future detractors and opponents, and grumblers", wrote Wood (32).

In his Education Despatch Wood cleverly acknowledged "an increased desire on the part of the native population not only in the neighbourhood of the great centre of European civilisation (Calcutta), but also, in remoter districts, for the means of obtaining a better education", and expressed

(28) Dalhousie Papers, Governor General's Minutes, Vol. XIV, 17 October 1853.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Wood Papers, Letter Book, Vol. V, See Letter to Halliday, 24 July 1854.

(31) Ibid.

(32) Ibid.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN CALCUTTA.

happiness to have "evidence in many instances of their readiness to give a practical proof of their anxiety in this respect by coming forward with liberal pecuniary contributions." He was gratified to feel that "Throughout all ages, learned Hindoos and Mahommedans have devoted themselves to teaching with little other remuneration than a bare subsistence ; and munificent bequests have not frequently been made for the permanent endowment of educational institutions" (33). Under the garb of such fine words he pointed out to "the impossibility of Government alone doing all that must be done in order to provide adequate means for the education of the natives", and clearly discouraged "the efforts of Government towards providing the means of acquiring a very high degree of education for a small number of natives of India, drawn, for the most part, from . . . the higher classes", because, as he felt, "the higher classes are both able and willing in many cases to bear a considerable part atleast of the cost of their education" (34). In brief, Wood's Despatch left little chance for the sons of the poor and middle class people (under the economic conditions of the 19th century) to hope for a university education.

Lord Dalhousie, who immediately on the receipt of the Despatch, busied himself "willingly and cordially" (35) to prepare a framework for the Calcutta University (36) could not but feel that withdrawal of senior scholarships would do harm to higher education ; and pointed out that "there are undoubtedly many cases in which poor but very promising students are only enabled by these Scholarships to prosecute their studies to completion, and to deprive such persons of his advantage would probably inflict great discouragement on the cause of Education" (37)).

Had Lord Dalhousie been given a free hand, he was likely to have made education a major item of national expenditure. While the Education Despatch from Wood was on its way to India, the Governor-General was thinking to curtail the military expenses and spend money on education and public works. He suggested to Wood on the 15th August 1854, "Additional expenditure is every year, every month, increasing. The policy of the Government, the interest of the people, the cry of the day, all are forcing on a very large additional annual expenditure on public works. . . . Education will form another large item of new expense. . . . Our want can only be supplied by reductions, and reductions to be effectual must be on a large scale. Such reductions are to be made only on the military establishments" (38).

But the decisions of the Home authorities who ruled India from thousands of miles were taken on all such occasions mostly through political considera-

(33) See the Education Despatch, 19 July 1854.

(34) Ibid.

(35) Dalhousie's Diary, 12 October 1854.

(36) A large number of Dalhousie's private and demi-official letters (unpublished) give evidence to his great interest in the subject.

(37) Dalhousie Papers, Governor-General's Minutes, Vol. XIX, 30 December 1854.

(38) Dalhousie Papers, Letters to the Board of Control, 15 August 1854.

tions. Sir Charles Wood's fear of the educated Bengalees as British Empire's "future detractors and opponents, and grumblers" or its "most formidable enemies" might prove his keen foresight as a statesman, but does not do credit to him as a "renovator of India."*

M. N. DAS.

* This article has been constructed mostly from the unpublished private and demi-official papers of Sir Charles Wood and the Marquis of Dalhousie. The papers of Wood, which were in the possession of the present Lord Halifax, are now available in the Old India Office Library at London for a temporary period from the October 1955. The papers of Dalhousie are to be found in the Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh, except his Diary which is still the property of his great grand daughter.

